Bava Kamma 95a — the Talmud in English

Here,

in the Tosefta, it is speaking

of an existing stolen object

for in this manner there is no enactment of the Sages, and therefore he must return it even if he does not recognize the owners, whereas

here,

in the beraita above, where we learned that one does not accept from them, it is speaking

of a case in which the stolen object is not extant.

And we raise an objection: Above they brought a beraita that was taught in the days of Rabbi: There was an incident involving a robber who wished to repent, and his wife said to him that if he repented, even the belt would not be his; and following this, the Sages enacted that he need not return it as a matter of law,

but

behold,

the belt

was stolen,

for it is an existing stolen object,

and concerning this the Sages enacted that he need not return it. If so, how does Rav Naḥman say that their entire enactment was in a case in which the stolen object was not extant?

And we answer:

What is “the belt”?

It does not mean that the belt itself was stolen, but rather

the value of the belt,

that the value of the belt must serve as payment for the stolen object, and concerning this the Sages enacted that he need not pay for the stolen object.

And we raise an objection:

Wherever the stolen object is extant, did

they not make

an enactment of the Sages

for the robber that he need not return it?

But what of a beam

[a beam]

which is an existing stolen object, and we learned:

in Gittin [55a]: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified

concerning a stolen beam

a beam that a person stole from his fellow,

which he built

the robber

into a large building

—into a large structure; the Sages enacted

that he shall take

the owner of the beam

its value,

and the robber is not obligated to return the beam itself,

because of the enactment for those who repent!

It is explained there in the Mishna that there is an enactment for those who repent even concerning an existing stolen object.

And we answer:

That case is different

with regard to the beam, where the robber placed it inside a building that he constructed,

for since there is loss to the building,

since the entire building would have to be demolished in order to remove the beam,

the Sages rendered it as nonexistent

the Sages regarded the beam as though it were not extant.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth,

he pays the one robbed the value of a cow standing ready to give birth, whereas he acquires the offspring through the change.

The Sages taught:

in a beraita:

If one stole a ewe and sheared it,

and likewise one who stole

a cow and it gave birth—

he pays for it, and for its shearing, and for its offspring,

for he must return everything that he took from it and everything by which it appreciated; these are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says: The stolen object returns in its present state

as it is now, shorn, and he adds payment of the value of the wool and the fetus as they were worth at the time of the theft. He does not pay for the appreciation of the wool and the offspring that appreciated in his possession, because they underwent a change and now belong to him; he is obligated only to pay for the stolen object as it was at the time of the theft.

Rabbi Shimon says: We see it

the stolen object

as though it were assessed

[valued]

by him in money,

that is, he pays according to its assessed value at the time of the theft. And below the Gemara will explain in what Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon disagree.

A question was raised before them: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir

who holds that the robber must return all that the stolen object appreciated and all that he took from it?

Is his reason

because he holds that a change remains in its place,

and even after the change the stolen object belongs to the one robbed, and for that reason he must return the appreciation?

Or perhaps

perhaps

in general

in other places

a change effects acquisition, and here it is a penalty that he imposes

upon the robber to return the appreciation, so that the sinner should not profit?

What practical difference is there

if Rabbi Meir’s reason is a penalty or because a change does not effect acquisition?

The practical difference is

in a case

where it did not appreciate, but, on the contrary,

it became emaciated,

for if Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he holds that a change remains in its place and does not leave the possession of the one robbed, then even when it became emaciated the robber returns the stolen object as it is now. But if Rabbi Meir’s reason is a penalty, then when it became emaciated, where there is no reason to penalize him, the robber acquires the object because it changed, and he must pay for the stolen object its value at the time of the theft.

Come and hear:

the Gemara attempts to resolve the doubt from the following Mishna, where we learned:

If one stole an animal and it grew old

in the robber’s possession, or stole

slaves and they grew old

in his possession and their value decreased—

he pays as at the time of the theft,

according to their value at the time of the theft, since he acquired them through the change.

Rabbi Meir says: With regard to slaves

that he stole and they grew old—

he says to him,

the robber says to the one robbed:

Behold, yours is before you,

for he returns them as they are, since the law of slaves is like that of land, which always remains in the domain of its owners, and they are not acquired by the robber through a change; they grew old while under the ownership of the owners.

But with regard to an animal,

whose law is not like that of land, Rabbi Meir holds that if it changed and its value decreased, he must pay the one robbed money

as at the time of the theft.

And if it should enter your mind that Rabbi Meir holds that a change remains in its place,

then

even an animal as well

if it became emaciated, he should return it as it is now.

Rather, is it not to be inferred from this: Rabbi Meir holds that a change effects acquisition,

and therefore, when the stolen object became emaciated, only slaves, whose law is like that of land and who are not acquired through a change, are returned as they are now; but an animal, whose law is not like that of land, is acquired through a change, and he must pay the owners money according to the value of the animal at the time of the theft.

And here,

where it appreciated, the reason Rabbi Meir said that the robber does not acquire the appreciation and must return it is

that it is a penalty that he imposes,

so that the sinner should not profit.

So it would apparently be possible to prove this from the Mishna.

The Gemara rejects this:

They said,

they said that one cannot prove it from this Mishna, for it is possible to say that

Rabbi Meir

said this according to the words of the Rabbis:

and this is how his words may be explained:

According to me,

according to my view,

a change does not effect acquisition, and even an animal as well

is returned as it is now;

but according to you, who say

according to your view, since you hold that

a change effects acquisition, at least agree with me concerning slaves, which are like land,

at least agree with me concerning slaves, whose law is like that of land,

and land cannot be stolen

and a change is not effective in it to acquire it; therefore, their law is that he returns them as they are now.

And the Rabbis said to him: No, slaves are like movable property,

their law is like that of movable property, which can be stolen and in which a change is effective to acquire them. Therefore, the Rabbis hold that when they changed and became emaciated, he must pay money according to their value at the time of the theft.

If so, one cannot resolve from this Mishna what Rabbi Meir holds.

Come and hear:

to resolve the doubt from another Mishna that we will learn below [100b]: If one gave wool to a dyer

to dye it for him

the wool with dye

red and he dyed it

with dye

black,

or he gave it to him to dye it

black and he dyed it

with dye

red,

meaning that he changed what the owner of the wool had stipulated with him.

Rabbi Meir says: He gives him

the dyer gives him

the value of his wool.

And it is precise in Rabbi Meir’s words that only

the value of his wool, yes,

he must pay, but

the value of his wool and its appreciation,

the appreciation, the addition in value that came about through the dyeing,

no,

he need not pay.

And if it should enter your mind that Rabbi Meir holds that a change does not effect acquisition,

then

the value of his wool and its appreciation

he would have to give

to him,

he must give it to the owner of the wool, for the wool remains belonging to its owner even after he made a change in it!

Rather, is it not, infer from this

from the fact that Rabbi Meir said that he need pay only the value of his wool,

that Rabbi Meir holds that a change effects acquisition,

and since the dyer acquires the wool through the change, he therefore pays only the value of the wool according to its value before the change.

And here,

where Rabbi Meir said concerning one who stole an animal and it was shorn and gave birth that he must return the appreciation, his reason is

that it is a penalty that he imposes

upon the robber, so that he should not benefit from the theft through the wool and the offspring. But they did not penalize the dyer, since he is not a robber and is not a sinner, but rather is inadvertent.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

infer from this

that this is Rabbi Meir’s view. And since this is so, according to Rabbi Meir, when the stolen object became emaciated, he cannot return it as it is now, but must pay its value at the time of the theft.

There are those who say:

there are those who say:

This was not the question raised before us,

we did not have this doubt as to whether Rabbi Meir holds that a change effects acquisition or not.

From the fact that Rav reversed

because Rav later [96b] reversed the Mishna there

and taught

and recited it as follows:

If one stole a cow and it grew old, or slaves and they grew old—

he pays as at the time of the theft,

these are

the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages say: With regard to slaves

whose law is like that of land—

he says to him, “Behold, yours is before you.”

And according to this version recited by Rav:

Certainly, according to Rabbi Meir

a change effects acquisition,

for according to Rabbi Meir, when the stolen object became emaciated, he does not return it as it is now, even if it was slaves. His reason is certainly that a change effects acquisition.

And here,

in the case of one who stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth, Rabbi Meir’s reason for returning the appreciation is certainly

that it is a penalty that he imposes upon him

the robber.

Rather,

when we raised the question

concerning Rabbi Meir’s words—

this is what we raised the question:

Does Rabbi Meir hold that

when he imposes a penalty

upon the robber, he does so only when the stolen object was in his possession

deliberately, but

if the stolen object was in his possession

inadvertently,

for example, he took it from a robber and it appreciated, and he did not know that it was stolen,

he does not impose a penalty

upon him in this manner?

Or perhaps

perhaps

even

if the stolen object was with him

inadvertently

and it appreciated,

he also imposes a penalty

upon him, requiring him to return the appreciation to the one robbed?

Come and hear:

the Gemara attempts to resolve this from a beraita, for it was taught:

Five

things

are collected

only

from

property

that is unencumbered,

which remains free in the possession of its owners, and not from property subject to a lien that the owners sold after they had already become obligated in these matters.

And these are they:

1.

Produce, and the appreciation of produce,

for example, if a person stole a field from his fellow, sold it to another, and the purchaser improved it by fertilizing and plowing it, and afterwards the one robbed removed it from the purchaser’s possession together with the appreciation that he effected in it and with its produce, and the purchaser now returns to the seller who sold it to him with a warranty in order to collect from him: he collects from the seller the principal from property subject to a lien, but the appreciation and the produce he collects only from unencumbered property, since they are not fixed amounts, and the purchasers could not take care to refrain from purchasing from the seller property corresponding to the appreciation and the produce.

2.

And one who undertakes

at the time of the betrothal

to provide sustenance for his wife’s son and his wife’s daughter,

who had them from previous marriages: they too do not collect from property subject to a lien, since the sustenance is not a fixed amount and was not written in a document.

3.

And a deed of debt

[a debt document]

that does not

have written

a warranty,

meaning that it is not written in the document that the property is subject to a lien for repayment of the debt.

4.

And a woman’s marriage document that does not

have written

in it

in the marriage document

a warranty,

that the property is subject to a lien for repayment of the marriage document.

And from the fact that it is written in the beraita that a document that does not contain a warranty does not collect from property subject to a lien, it is proved that if a condition of a warranty to encumber the property for repayment was not written in the document, we do not say that this is a scribal error, that he forgot and did not write a warranty, and since it is an error, it is as though it were explicitly written. Rather, a document in which a warranty is not written cannot collect from property subject to a lien.

Whom have you heard say

who is the tanna whom we have heard hold this, that a condition of

a warranty

of property that was not written in the document

is not a scribal error?

Rabbi Meir

holds this in Bava Metzia [12b]; if so, he is the tanna who taught this beraita.

And it teaches

in a beraita: also

produce and the appreciation of produce.

What are the circumstances of the appreciation of produce?