Bava Kamma 94a — the Talmud in English

And Rav Yosef said

to explain: The two beraitot disagree in the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, for

Tani

taught

Guryon ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

of Damasporek [

from a place called Asporek ]:

Beit Shammai prohibit

the etnan for the altar even after it underwent a change.

And Beit Hillel permit

the etnan after it underwent a change.

What is the reason of Beit Shammai?

Because they expound the verse written concerning an etnan, as follows:

The verse says: [Deuteronomy 23:19] “

Дварим 23:19 ] «

You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute, and so on, for it is an abomination of the Lord your God

even both of them.”

And they expound from “even”

to include

the

changes thereof,

for even their changes [of the etnan and the price of the dog] are prohibited for the altar.

And Beit Hillel—

what is their reason?

Because they expound the verse written concerning an etnan in the opposite manner.

The verse says: “

The two

of them”

to exclude—only they are prohibited for the altar,

but not their changes.

And Beit Shammai,

why did they expound it to include their changes,

for it is written “

the two

of them”

to exclude?

That

exclusion

is needed

by Beit Shammai for another exposition, for they expound:

“They”—

but not their offspring.

And Beit Hillel,

how do they expound to exclude their offspring?

According to Beit Hillel,

you learn two things from it,

from the exclusion of “they” one learns that only they themselves are prohibited for the altar, and therefore it also excludes

“they”—

but not their changes,

and also

“they”—

but not their offspring.

And Beit Hillel too,

why did they learn from “they” to exclude their changes,

when “even” is written

to include?

And we conclude: The inclusion of

“even” is difficult for Beit Hillel—

what is there to include from it?

And now the Gemara returns to explain the words of Abaye, who said: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, Beit Shammai, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and Rabbi Yishmael—all these tannaim hold that a change does not acquire [the stolen object].

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov—what is it?

Where did we find that he holds that a change does not acquire?

For it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

If one stole a se'a of wheat, ground it, kneaded it,

and baked it

and separated challa from it,

how does he recite the blessing

over the separation of the challa?

This one does not bless; rather, he blasphemes

cursing the Name!

And concerning this it was said: [Psalms 10:3]

Псалмы 10:3 ]

“He who robs and blesses blasphemes the Lord”—

that is, one who steals and blesses the Lord for the theft—this person blasphemes the Name.

It is evident from there that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that despite the fact that he made so many changes to the wheat, the wheat that underwent the changes remains in its place, and it is not considered the property of the robber.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar—what is it?

Where did we find that he holds that a change does not acquire?

For it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said this general principle:

For every improvement with which a robber improved

the stolen object—

his hand is uppermost.

If

he wished,

the robber

takes

the

improvement

that he made to the stolen object for himself. And if

he wished—

he says to him,

the robbed person:

Behold,

the stolen object is

before you, yours.

And we raised the question:

What is he saying?

How are the words he said to be explained: If he wished, he says to the robbed person, “Behold, yours is before you”? This expression applies only to something that had deteriorated from its original state, when he says to him: Take the object as it is, emaciated.

Rav Sheshet said: This is what he is saying

—this is how his words are to be explained: If

the stolen object improved,

the stolen object

takes

the robber

its improvement,

and if

it deteriorated—

the robber says to him,

the robbed person:

Behold,

the stolen object is

before you, yours,

for Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds

that a change remains in its place.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if this is so, that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that a change does not acquire, and the stolen object that underwent a change still belongs to its owners, then

even if it improved as well,

the robber should return the improvement to the owners!

They said:

What the robber takes for himself from what improved is not the fundamental law, but

because of the enactment for repentant persons,

in order to make it easier for those who repent, so that they will not refrain from repenting because of the concern that they will have to return the improvement.

Rabbi Yishmael—what is it?

Where did we find that he holds that a change does not acquire?

For it was taught

in a beraita:

The mitzva of pe'a is to separate

the corner of the field for the poor

from the standing crop,

when the grain is still standing in its stalks, before the harvest.

And if he

did not separate

pe'a

from the standing crop—

he separates from the sheaves.

If he did not separate from the sheaves—

he separates from the grain heap [

a pile of grain ]

before it was leveled,

before he smoothed and leveled the grain heap with the implement designated for this, for leveling the grain heap is considered the completion of the work with regard to the obligation of tithe; and before it becomes liable for tithe, he gives pe'a to the poor without tithing.

But if he

leveled it,

the entire grain heap became liable for tithe. Therefore, before he

tithes

all its tithes,

and gives him

pe'a only after he tithed, so that the poor person should not suffer a loss. For if he had given it to the poor person before the leveling, even if the poor person had combined all his gifts, such as leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a, and made a grain heap from them, he would have been exempt from tithe , since his gifts are ownerless property, and ownerless property is exempt from tithes. But now that it was leveled by the property owner, it became liable for tithe, as we learned in tractate Berakhot [40b]: leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a that he made into a grain heap—became established for tithe. Therefore, the property owner tithes the produce before he gives the pe'a to the poor person.

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said: Even

if he did not separate pe'a until he made dough from the wheat,

he separates

pe'a for the poor person

from the dough and gives it to him.

Since he holds that a change does not acquire, and the wheat still belongs to the poor even after it underwent a change and became dough.

But according to the view of the first tanna, he does not separate pe'a from the dough, because the property owner acquired it through the change. [ But before he made it into dough, the wheat did not change, and the fact that he threshed the wheat is not considered a change, because it is still food as it was. Rashi.]

Up to here, the Gemara detailed all the tannaim cited by Abaye, who hold that a change remains in its place.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Did all these tannaim exert themselves

and toil and gather for this purpose

to teach us

all these tannaim

like Beit Shammai,

when presumably the halakha is not in accordance with him?

He said to him,

Abaye:

This is what they say

—this is what all these tannaim said:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning this matter,

that a change does not grant the robber ownership of the object.

Rava said: From where?

From where does Abaye prove that all those tannaim hold that a change remains in its place?

Perhaps

perhaps

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda said only this there,

concerning the obligation of the first shearing, that dyeing the wool is not considered a change in the wool—

but only concerning dye, since he can remove it

and take it off

by means of tzafon [

soap ]. Therefore, he holds that dyeing does not enable him to acquire it and remove it from the obligation of the first shearing; but in a change that cannot be undone, perhaps he concedes that it is effective to remove the object from the hands of its former owners.

And did we hear only this

that

Beit Shammai said there,

concerning an etnan, that even an etnan in which he made a change is prohibited for the altar—

but

because it is something given

to the Most High,

to the Lord, and therefore it is prohibited for sacrifice even if he made a change in it,

because it became repulsive,

as it became repulsive by being an etnan; but concerning something belonging to an ordinary person, perhaps a change is effective to remove it from the hands of its former owners.

And did we hear only this

that

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said there,

concerning one who separates challa from stolen wheat and blesses over it, that the change in the wheat is not effective to make it his property—

but only with regard to the blessing

did he say this,

because it is a mitzva performed through a transgression,

for he steals an object and blesses over it; and with regard to this Rabbi Eliezer holds that the change is not effective, but with regard to acquisition, perhaps he concedes that the change is effective.

And did we hear only this

that

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said there,

that if the robber caused the stolen object to deteriorate, he returns the stolen object to the robbed person as it is—

but only in a deterioration that can be restored,

for he can return it to its original state, and this is not a complete change; but when he made in it a complete change that he cannot undo, perhaps he concedes that the change is effective to remove the object from the ownership of the robbed person.

And did we hear only this

that

Rabbi Yishmael said there,

concerning pe'a, that if he did not separate it, he must separate it even from the dough—

but only with regard to pe'a

did he say this,

because “you shall leave” is written redundantly,

for in the portion of Kedoshim [Leviticus 19:9–10] it is written, “You shall not finish the corner of your field when you reap, and so on; for the poor and the stranger you shall leave them,” and in the portion of Emor [Leviticus 23:22] it is written, “You shall not finish the corner of your field when you reap, and so on; for the poor and the stranger you shall leave them.” Why did Scripture repeat this twice? It indicates that the verse came to include that if he made a change in it, he does not acquire it, and he is still obligated to separate pe'a from it. But in other places where Scripture did not include this, perhaps he concedes that a change acquires.

And if you would say, let us learn from it

and if you would say that from the inclusion there we should learn that in other matters as well a change does not acquire—

To this it can be answered that

the gifts of the poor are different,

and one cannot learn from the verse concerning the gifts of the poor.

And there is proof for Rava's words, that it is impossible to prove with certainty from Rabbi Yishmael's words concerning other matters that a change does not acquire.

As Rabbi Yonatan asked, for Rabbi Yonatan asked: What is the reason of Rabbi Yishmael

concerning pe'a, who holds that one must separate pe'a even from the dough?

Is it

because he holds that a change does not acquire, or perhaps, in general, he holds that a change acquires, and here it is because “you shall leave” is written redundantly?

And we raised the question: How could Rabbi Yonatan be uncertain concerning the words of Rabbi Yishmael? For

if you should arrive at the conclusion that Rabbi Yishmael's reason is because he holds that a change does not acquire,

then this is difficult:

Why do I need the redundant “you shall leave” that the Merciful One wrote,

for even concerning other matters a change does not acquire, and no special teaching concerning pe'a is needed?

And furthermore,

another difficulty:

according to the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yishmael and hold that a change acquires even with regard to pe'a, if so,

the redundant “you shall leave” that the Merciful One wrote

concerning pe'a

why do I need it?

And we answer: The additional “you shall leave”

is needed

and is required

for that which was taught

in a beraita:

One who declares his vineyard ownerless and rises early to inspect it

before the poor came to acquire from the ownerless property and harvest the vineyard,

and he harvested it

himself—

he is liable for peret [

in a vineyard; and in grain he is liable for leket ],

and for olelot, shikheḥa, and pe'a, and exempt from tithe,

for although ownerless property is exempt even from all the gifts of the poor, they expound from the “you shall leave” written an additional time concerning these gifts of the poor to exclude this case, in which he himself acquired from the ownerless property that he had declared ownerless, so that it is not considered ownerless property exempting it from these gifts of the poor. But he is exempt from tithe, since there is no redundant “you shall leave” concerning tithe from which to expound that he is liable in this case.

Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

such that if the stolen item depreciated in the robber’s possession, he returns the stolen item to the robbed person as it is, and the robber did not acquire it by its depreciation.

And we raise an objection:

But did Shmuel say so?

For Shmuel said: One does not assess [the item] for either a thief or a robber

if they took an animal and it died or depreciated, the carcass is not appraised in order to determine the loss suffered by the owner; rather, the carcass belongs to them, and they must pay the owner for an entire animal,

but

only

in the case of damages

was the law stated that the carcass remains in the possession of the injured party, and one assesses the carcass so that the one who caused the damage pays only the difference from what it had been worth before the damage.

If so, it is explained that Shmuel’s view is that the change by which the stolen item decreased acquires it for a thief and a robber, and for that reason he does not return it to the owners , and how does this accord with what he ruled, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that the robber returns the stolen item that depreciated and does not acquire it for himself?

And we explain:

For Rava, who said

above, when he rejected Abaye’s words:

When Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said [his statement], there

he was speaking of a robber who can return the stolen item that depreciated, only

with depreciation that can be reversed

which can be nullified through fattening, if so,

it is not difficult

what Shmuel ruled, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and, on the other hand, ruled that if the animal died, it remains in the robber’s possession.

For it can be explained:

When he said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that the change remains in its place,

it is speaking

of depreciation that can be reversed,

and Shmuel holds that a change that can be nullified does not acquire.

And when Shmuel said there: One does not assess for either a thief or a robber

the stolen animal that died in his possession, and he acquires it through a change,

but

only

in the case of damages

one assesses the carcass, since there is a scriptural decree that it remains in the possession of the injured party—it is speaking

of depreciation that cannot be reversed

that does not return, such as when it died or its leg was broken; and Shmuel holds that through a change that cannot be nullified, he acquires it.

But according to Abaye, who said: When Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said

that the robber returns the stolen item that depreciated and does not acquire it for himself—even

with depreciation that cannot be reversed

that does not return,

what is there

to say

how is it possible to reconcile the ruling that Shmuel ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar with what he said, that the robber acquires the animal for himself if it died in his possession?

And we answer:

Abaye teaches it in this way

he transmits Shmuel’s statement in a different wording: