Bava Kamma 93b (צג:) — the Talmud in English

Our Mishna comes to teach that if the stolen item underwent a change while in the robber’s possession, even though the owners have not yet despaired of recovering it, the robber acquires it through the change and pays its value as it was at the time of the robbery.

a.

One who robs wood and makes it into utensils

and thereby changes it from its original form at the time of the robbery, or one who robs fleeces of

wool and makes them into garments.

He

pays

the owners money for the stolen item

as it was at the time of the robbery,

according to the value of the stolen item at the time he robbed it. He does not return the stolen object, since the robber acquired it for himself through a “change in the object” that he made in it.

The Gemara will explain what change in an object is considered a change through which the robber acquires the stolen object.

b. If he

robbed a pregnant cow and it gave birth

while in his possession, or robbed a

sheep bearing a fleece,

a sheep bearing wool,

and sheared it

the robber—

pays

the owners

the value of a cow ready to give birth, and the value of a sheep ready to be sheared,

meaning: the robber returns the cow or the sheep itself to the owners, since giving birth and shearing do not constitute a change in the body of the cow or sheep. As for the offspring or the wool, he acquires them through the change, and he adds to the payment to the robbed party their value as it was before the birth and shearing; any additional value that they have now belongs to him.

c.

If he robbed a cow and it became pregnant and gave birth while in his possession,

or robbed a

sheep and it grew

wool while in his possession

and he sheared it,

the pregnancy or the growth of its wool is considered a change even with regard to the cow or sheep, and he is not required to return them; rather, he pays their value.

Therefore, he

pays as it was at the time of the robbery,

that is, the value of the cow and the value of the sheep according to their worth at the time of the robbery; and all appreciation from the time of the robbery onward belongs to the robber.

This is the general principle:

All robbers pay as it was at the time of the robbery,

and therefore, if one stole a lamb and it became a ram, or stole a calf and it became an ox and then slaughtered or sold it, he is exempt from the fourfold and fivefold payments. Since the animal underwent a change in his possession, he acquired it, and he is slaughtering or selling his own animal.

Gemara:

They said,

they said in the study hall, deducing from the wording of the Mishna: Only if he robbed

wood and made it into utensils,

it is not

considered a change; but if he

planed it

[smoothed and polished the wood]—

it is not

considered a change.

Likewise, one who robs

wool and makes it into garments—it is not

only this form that is considered a change; but if he

bleached it—

it is not

considered a change.

For before making utensils from the wood, one must plane it, and likewise before making garments from the wool, one must bleach it. If these acts were considered a change, the robber would already have acquired them from the time of planing and bleaching. Why, then, did the Mishna need to state that he made utensils from the wood and garments from the wool? Rather, it must be that the Mishna holds that planing and bleaching are not considered a change in the object that enables the robber to acquire the stolen item, and therefore it needed to mention the change into utensils and garments.

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned in a beraita

If one robbed wood and planed it,

or robbed

stones and hewed them,

or

wool and bleached it,

or

flax and cleaned it—

he pays

money

as it was at the time of the robbery,

and he does not return the object! It is evident from the beraita that planing and bleaching are also considered a change in the object through which the robber acquires it.

Abaye said: The tanna of our Mishna teaches

the tanna in our Mishna presented a form of

change

in the object

of rabbinic authority,

a change that is effective only by rabbinic authority; namely, a change

that can be reversed,

as it is possible to undo the change and return the object to its original state, as it was at the time of the robbery,

and all the more so

if he made

a change by Torah law,

a change that enables acquisition even by Torah law; namely, a change that cannot be undone and the object cannot be returned to its original state, such as planing and bleaching.

And this is how the words of the Mishna are to be understood: If he robbed

wood and made it into utensils—

it is referring to

wood

that was already

planed

at the time of the robbery.

And what are they?

What are those planed pieces of wood called?

Planks!

Since the wood was already planed,

for the reversible change is

what the robber did by joining the planks and making them into utensils,

as, if he wishes, he can pull them apart

for if he wishes, he can dismantle the joints and return them to their original state, as they were at the time of the robbery.

For this reason, the Mishna mentioned a change in which he made utensils from planks, such as chests and chairs, in order to teach that even a minor change that can be undone—for he can dismantle the planks and restore them to the state they were in at the time of the robbery—nevertheless enables the robber to acquire the object through that change. All the more so, if he planed the wood, which is considered a complete change and enables the robber to acquire the object by Torah law.

Likewise, it is to be explained that in the case of one who robs

wool and makes it into garments—

it is referring to

wool

that was already

spun

at the time of the robbery.

Since the wool was spun,

for the reversible change is

what the robber did by knitting garments from it,

as, if he wishes, he can unravel it,

for if he wishes, he can undo the garment and return the wool to its original state, as it was at the time of the robbery.

And all the more so

if the robber made

a change by Torah law,

a change that enables acquisition even by Torah law—that is, one that cannot be undone, such as if he planed the wood or bleached the wool—it is certainly considered a change, and he acquires the stolen object for himself.

And the tanna of the beraita

in the beraita mentions only

a change

in the object

by Torah law, and a change

in the object that enables acquisition only

by rabbinic authority he does not mention.

Rav Ashi said

to resolve the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita in another manner:

The tanna of our Mishna also teaches a change by Torah law,

the tanna in our Mishna likewise speaks of a case in which the robber made a change that enables acquisition by Torah law [that is, a change that cannot be undone]; but if the robber made a change that can be undone, he does not acquire it.

The difficulty with the Mishna is this: If only a change that cannot be undone enables acquisition, then it must be referring to wood that has not been planed and wool that has not been bleached. If so, why did the Mishna state that he made utensils from the wood and garments from the wool? The change produced simply by the robber’s planing the wood and bleaching the wool should suffice to enable him to acquire the object.

This is how the Mishna is to be understood: One who robs

wood and makes it into utensils—

the reference is to a utensil called

bukhani

[a surface for pounding], which involves no carving, only planing,

that is, he planed it,

as mentioned in the beraita. This is a change that cannot be undone and is effective by Torah law.

Likewise, what is stated in the Mishna:

wool and makes it into garments—

the reference is to garments called

namtei

[felt coverings], and with these garments the wool is not bleached.

The Mishna’s novel teaching is that if the robber made these garments from the wool without bleaching it, he acquired them, since

that is, it is an irreversible change,

for the wool can no longer return to its original state, with each and every fiber separate.

And we raise an objection:

And bleaching

the wool,

is it

really considered

a change?

And we raise a contradiction

from a Mishna in tractate Ḥullin [135a], where we learned: Regarding a person who sheared his sheep and became obligated in the first shearing,

if he did not have time

the owner of the fleece

to give it to him

the first shearing to the priest

before he dyed it

all the wool—

he is exempt

from giving it any longer, since he dyed it and intended to take it for himself, the owner of the fleece acquired it through the change. He is therefore like one who damages priestly gifts or like one who consumed them, in which case he is exempt even from returning their monetary value, because they are property without claimants.

But if the owner of the fleece

bleached it,

if he bleached the wool before giving the first shearing to the priest,

but did not dye it—

he is obligated

to give it to the priest, since bleaching is not a change and does not remove it from the status of “the first shearing.”

This is difficult in light of what is explained here, that bleaching is considered a change.

Abaye said: It is not difficult:

This

the tanna who holds that bleaching is considered a change follows the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon; this

the tanna who holds that bleaching is not considered a change follows the opinion of

the Rabbis.

It is explained in tractate Ḥullin that only if one has five sheep to shear, and each one has wool in the amount of one and a half manehs, is he obligated in the first shearing.

And what is the mitzva of the first shearing? After shearing a sheep, he gives some of the fleece to the priest, as much as he wishes, provided that the gift is of significant value.

As it is taught

in a beraita:

If he sheared them,

if he sheared one sheep and, before shearing the others,

spun and wove it,

and he did likewise with the second and third sheep—

it does not combine

all the wool to create an obligation in “the first shearing,” since the owner of the fleece had already acquired the wool that he spun and wove through the change.

But if he only

bleached

the wool of the first sheep before shearing the others, there is a dispute:

Rabbi Shimon says: It does not combine

that wool with the wool that has not yet been sheared to create an obligation in the first shearing, since he holds that bleaching is considered a change.

And the Rabbis say: It combines,

since they hold that bleaching is not considered a change.

The Mishna in Ḥullin and the beraita here disagree on this dispute as to whether bleaching is considered a change.

Rava said

to resolve the contradiction in another manner:

Both

the Mishna in Ḥullin and the beraita here follow the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that bleaching is considered a change.

And this is not difficult: Here

the Mishna in tractate Hullin is referring to bleaching

in which he merely fluffed it

[separating the fibers with his hands before the bleaching, and the bleaching is not considered a sufficient change].

Here

our case is referring to bleaching

in which he combed it

by combing the fibers with a comb before the bleaching, in which case it is considered a complete change [according to Rabbi Shimon].

Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said

another resolution:

Here

the Mishna in tractate Hullin is referring to bleaching

in which he merely whitened it

whitening it alone, without sulfur, which is not considered a sufficient change.

Here

our case is referring to bleaching

in which he treated it with sulfur

with sulfur so that it would become thoroughly white, in which case it is considered a complete change [according to Rabbi Shimon].

And we raise an objection: How can Rabbi Shimon hold that bleaching is considered a change?

Now one can say

that

dyeing,

which is a greater change than bleaching,

according to Rabbi Shimon is not a change,

as is demonstrated by the beraita below; if so, how can he hold that

bleaching is a change?

And the proof that according to Rabbi Shimon dyeing is not considered a sufficient change is

as it was taught

in a beraita:

If he sheared each portion separately and dyed it

each shearing separately, before he sheared the next portion, or if he sheared

each portion separately and spun it,

or if he sheared

each portion separately and wove it,

it is considered a change, and through the change he acquired it for himself. Therefore, the shearing that he changed

is not combined

with the wool that he will shear afterward to reach the measure that incurs the obligation of the first shearing.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

If he

dyed

the sheared wool, it is not considered a change in the wool; therefore, it

is combined

with the wool that he will shear afterward to reach the measure that incurs the obligation of the first shearing.

It is proven from the beraita that according to Rabbi Shimon dyeing is not considered a sufficient change. If so, how can he hold that bleaching is a change that effects acquisition?

Abaye said: This is not difficult:

Here

the beraita that cites Rabbi Shimon as holding that bleaching the wool is considered a change, and all the more so dyeing it, reflects the opinion of

the Rabbis according to Rabbi Shimon.

Whereas

here

the beraita that cites Rabbi Shimon as holding that a change through dyeing does not effect acquisition, and all the more so the lesser change of bleaching, reflects the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda according to Rabbi Shimon.

Rava said

another resolution:

Actually, the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda

and all agree that according to Rabbi Shimon dyeing is not considered a change. This does not contradict the ruling that bleaching is considered a change, because

it is different

different

from dyeing

than bleaching:

since he can remove it

the dye

with soap [

soap] and restore the wool to its original state, whereas bleaching is a change that cannot be undone, and the wool cannot be restored to its original state.

And when it is taught there

and when we learned there in the Mishna in tractate Hullin that if

he did not have time

the owner of the shearing

to give it to him

the first shearing to the priest

until he dyed

all the wool—

he is exempt

from giving it any longer, since the owner of the shearing acquired it through the change.

And we established

and interpreted this Mishna

according to everyone.

It is not referring there to ordinary dye, but to dye

with kala ilan

whose color resembles tekhelet, and it is a dye

that does not come out,

which cannot be removed; therefore, everyone agrees that it is considered a change.

Abaye said:

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, Beit Shammai, Rabbi

Eliezer ben Yaakov, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and Rabbi Yishmael—all of them hold

that all these authorities hold that

a change remains in place

and that the change in the object does not suffice to remove it from the possession of its previous owner.

And where do we find that all these tannaim hold this?

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda

we find that he holds this with regard to

that which we said

above: According to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, dyeing does not remove the wool from the obligation of the first shearing. Abaye explained his position as follows: He holds that a change does not effect acquisition. Therefore, he holds that even a change through dyeing, which is more substantial than bleaching, does not effect acquisition.

What is the case with Beit Shammai?

Where do we find that they hold that a change does not effect acquisition?

The fee of a prostitute: This is the payment she receives for intercourse, and it is disqualified for the altar. As it is stated [Deuteronomy 23:19]: “You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God.”

As it was taught

in a beraita:

If he gave her

the prostitute

wheat as her fee,

as payment for intercourse,

and she made it into fine flour,

or if he gave her as her payment

olives—

and she made them into oil,

or

grapes—

and she made them into wine.

One teaching states: It is prohibited

to offer them on the altar still, and the change made to them does not permit them.

And another teaching states: It is permitted

to offer them, since they have already changed from what they were when given as the fee, and they are no longer considered the fee.