Bava Kamma 90a — the Talmud in English

For Rava said: ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location") a.

Consecration

removes an object from a lien, for if a person placed a lien on his ox for his debt, such as when he made it an apotiki and said to the creditor, “From this you shall collect your debt,” and afterward the debtor consecrated the ox as a sacrifice, the creditor’s lien was removed from it.

b. The prohibition of

leaven

removes an object from a lien. If a Jew borrowed from a gentile and placed under lien to the gentile the leaven that was in his possession, then when the time for the removal of leaven arrives on the eve of Passover, at which time the leaven becomes prohibited for benefit, the gentile’s lien is removed, and the Jew is obligated to remove the leaven.

c.

And

so too

manumission,

for if a Canaanite slave was pledged for repayment of his master’s debt, and afterward his master [the debtor] manumitted him, the slave is a free man, and the creditor cannot collect him for his debt. For these three [consecration, leaven, and manumission]

remove an object from a lien.

And just as one who manumits his slave through a deed of manumission causes the manumission to remove the slave’s lien, so too if the debtor knocked out his slave’s tooth or eye, the slave goes free and the creditor’s lien upon him is removed. Therefore, a woman who injured her melog slaves, they go free through tooth and eye, despite the fact that they are pledged to her husband. And even after the enactment of Usha, through which they strengthened and reinforced the husband’s right in the melog property of his wife, nevertheless the slave’s manumission removes his lien.

Therefore, when a woman injures her usufruct slaves, they go free through the loss of a tooth or an eye, even though they are pledged to her husband. And even after the ordinance of Usha, which strengthened and reinforced the husband’s rights in his wife’s usufruct property, the slave’s emancipation nevertheless removes the lien on him.

And we raise an objection:

Shall we say

that

the

words of

Rava

are stated in a dispute among

the tannaim!?

For according to Rava, the melog slaves go free through tooth and eye to the woman, whereas the view of the one who says, “neither to the man nor to the woman,” does not accord with Rava’s words.

And the Gemara explains:

No,

the tannaim did not disagree concerning Rava’s words, for

everyone accepts Rava’s position,

that manumission removes an object from a lien.

But the tannaim disagreed concerning the husband’s lien. The one who says that they go free through tooth and eye to the woman holds that the husband’s lien is like every lien, and the woman’s manumission removes them from his lien.

Rather, the tannaim disagreed about the husband’s lien. The one who says that the slaves go free through the woman holds that the husband’s lien is an ordinary lien, and the woman’s emancipation removes it.

And

the one who says: They do not go free through tooth and eye, neither to the man nor to the woman, holds that

here

the matter differs from every lien, since

the Sages strengthened the husband’s lien,

and consecration and manumission do not remove an object from his lien.

And if you wish, say:

The dispute among the tannaim may be explained in another way:

everyone does not accept the “enactment of Usha” of these tannaim,

and the husband’s acquisition of the produce of the melog property is like usufructual acquisition everywhere.

And here, concerning

every

“usufructual acquisition,”

whether

it is considered like “acquisition of the substance”

or not,

they disagree.

The one who says that the melog slaves go free through tooth and eye by the woman holds that, since “usufructual acquisition” is not like “acquisition of the substance,” the woman is the “owner” of the slaves; therefore, if she injures them, they go free.

And the one who says that the melog slaves do not go free through tooth and eye, neither to the man nor to the woman, holds that “usufructual acquisition” is like “acquisition of the substance,” both in the case of a father who wrote his property to his son from today and after death, and in the case of a husband who has the produce of his wife’s melog property.

Therefore, the woman’s ownership is not complete ownership, and likewise the man is not a complete “owner,” and therefore the “melog slaves” do not go free through tooth and eye, neither through the husband nor through his wife. And according to this approach, that the two baraitot above disagreed over whether usufructual acquisition is like acquisition of the substance or not, these tannaim disagree

in

that same

dispute of these tannaim,

in the following baraita: a. It is said in the Torah [Exodus 21:20]: “And when a man strikes his slave or his maidservant with a rod

and he dies under his hand, he shall surely be avenged” — his death is by the sword.

b. And it is further said [there, 21]: “But if he remains for a day or two, he shall not be avenged, for he is his money” — if the slave did not die immediately, but only after “a day or two,” which are “a full day,” twenty-four hours, his master is not liable to death for killing his slave, since “he is his money.”

c. A person who is not the slave’s owner, who struck the slave and he died, even if the slave died only after a long time, is put to death by the sword, like any murderer who becomes liable to death, even if the one struck died only after a considerable period.

As it was taught

in a baraita: One who sells his slave

the Canaanite

to another, and stipulates with him [with the purchaser]

that he is selling him the slave from now,

on condition that

the slave

serve him

for another

thirty days,

that is, the substance of the slave is acquired by the purchaser already now, but the enjoyment of the “produce,” meaning the right to use the slave, the seller retained for himself until thirty days after the sale.

Rabbi Meir says:

The

first [the seller] is considered the “owner” of the slave during these thirty days, and

he is [he is subject]

to the law of “a day or two,”

and if the first struck the slave and the slave died after “a full day,” he is not executed,

because he is [the slave]

“under”

the authority of the first.

and if the first person strikes the slave and the slave dies after a full twenty-four-hour period, he is not executed,

because he [the slave]

[the slave]

is “under his authority”

And although the first has only “usufructual acquisition” in the slave,

Rabbi Meir holds: “Usufructual acquisition is considered like acquisition of the substance.” But the second [the purchaser] is not subject to the law of “a day or two.” If he struck the slave and the slave died even after a considerable period, he is executed for him, since during all these thirty days he has only the substance of the slave and is not considered an owner, because the usufructual acquisition that the first has is considered like acquisition of the substance.

Rabbi Meir holds:

Rabbi Judah says: The second

[the purchaser]

is subject to the law of “a day or two,” because he is “his money” and his property, for the substance of the slave belongs to him from today. And although the seller has “usufructual acquisition” during all these thirty days, Rabbi Judah holds: “Usufructual acquisition is not considered like acquisition of the substance,” and the seller’s right to use the slave does not remove the purchaser’s ownership.

because the first person’s usufruct acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the body itself.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The second person

But the seller is not subject to the law of “a day or two,” for he has only “usufructual acquisition,” which is not considered ownership like acquisition of the substance. If he struck the slave and he died, he is executed for him, even if the slave died only after a considerable period.

Rabbi Yose says: Both of them,

both the seller and the purchaser,

are subject to the law of “a day or two”; this one,

the seller,

because he is [the slave] still

“under his authority”

for all thirty days,

and this one, the purchaser,

because he is “his money”

and his property.

And if you ask: Rabbi Yose’s words appear to contradict one another, for if “usufructual acquisition” is like acquisition of the substance, the “owner” is the seller and not the purchaser; and if “usufructual acquisition” is not like acquisition of the substance, the “owner” is the purchaser and not the seller. How, then, does Rabbi Yose hold that both are exempt, and that both have the law of owners? The answer is: Indeed, only the one who is the “owner” is exempt from death, and it is impossible to consider both of them “owners.” Rabbi Yose’s reason is that

he is uncertain whether “usufructual acquisition” is

[whether it is]

considered like acquisition of the substance, or is not considered like acquisition of the substance.

is “under his authority”

for all thirty days,

and this one

the buyer,

because he is “his money”

and his property.

And if you ask: Rabbi Yosei’s statements appear contradictory. If a usufruct acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the body itself, the owner is the seller and not the buyer; and if a usufruct acquisition is not considered like an acquisition of the body itself, the owner is the buyer and not the seller. How, then, does Rabbi Yosei hold that both are exempt and that both have the legal status of owners? The answer is: In fact, only the person who is the owner can be exempt from execution, and it is impossible to consider both of them owners. Rabbi Yosei’s reason is that

he is uncertain whether a usufruct acquisition [whether]

[whether it is]

is considered like an acquisition of the body itself or is not considered like an acquisition of the body itself.

And

therefore Rabbi Yosei said: both are exempt, because

a doubt concerning lives is treated leniently.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Both,

both the seller and the buyer,

are not included in the law of “a day or two,” this one,

the buyer,

because he is not “under him,” and this one,

the seller,

because he is not “his money.”

Therefore, whether the seller or the buyer, if one of them struck the slave during these thirty days, and the slave died after a twenty-four-hour period, he is executed, according to the law of one who kills the Canaanite slave of others.

Rava said:

If you ask,

what is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer!?

After all, one of the two is the owner [the seller, if you say that acquisition of the produce is like acquisition of the body; or the buyer, if you say that it is not like acquisition of the body], and how does Rabbi Eliezer make both of them liable to death, according to the law of one who kills the slave of others!? Your answer is:

The verse says: “For he is his money.”

It implies,

his money that is exclusive to him.

And since this one has acquisition of the produce and that one has acquisition of the body, the slave is not “exclusive” to either this one or that one. And with regard to one whose slave is not “his money that is exclusive to him,” the leniency of “but if he stands for a day or two, he shall not be avenged, for he is his money” was not stated; and he is therefore executed on his account.

And the Gemara adds two further laws that depend upon the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, that both are not considered an “owner exclusive” in the property: a.

In accordance with whom is that which Amemar said

[with the words of which tannaitic authority do the words of Amemar agree]?

For Amemar said:

A man and a woman who sold “property of usufruct,”

even if they both sold it together,

have done nothing,

for the husband is not a complete “owner” so that he can sell the property, since the body is not his, and the woman is not a complete “owner” so that she can sell the property, since the husband has “acquisition of the produce” in it.

In accordance with whom? In accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds that anyone whose slave is not “his slave exclusive to him” cannot emancipate him, just as he is not included in “a day or two.” And also with regard to a sale, neither of them can sell him, since he is not “his property exclusive to him.”

b.

Which tannaitic authority taught this that the Sages taught

in a beraita?

Just as a slave goes out to freedom through a tooth and an eye, so does he go out to freedom through other limbs and defects that do not return and heal.

For it was taught:

One who is half slave and half free,

and likewise a slave belonging to two partners, do not

these slaves

go out

to freedom

through

a tooth and an eye, nor through other

heads of limbs that do not return.

Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi: This is what they say in the name of Rava:

This beraita, according to the view of

Rabbi Eliezer,

is taught. For

did

[is it the case that]

Rabbi Eliezer not say,

with regard to the law of “a day or two,” that this exemption is stated only with regard to one whose slave is

“his money exclusive to him”?

Here too

with regard to going out to freedom, it is stated [Exodus 21:26]: “And if a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall send him to freedom for the sake of his eye.” And it is to be expounded:

“His slave” exclusive to him.

And these slaves are not slaves exclusive to their owners, and they do not go out to freedom, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Mishna:

A person who strikes,

hits

his fellow

on his ear,

gives him a sela

for the payment of his humiliation.

Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean:

He gives him

a maneh.

He slapped him

on his cheek—

he gives him two hundred zuz

as the payment for his humiliation.

He slapped him on his cheek

with the back of his hand

[for he struck him with the back of his hand], his humiliation is greater, and

he gives him four hundred zuz.

He tore

[pulled]

his ear,

or

pulled his hair,

or

spat

at his fellow

and it reached him,

[him]

his spittle,

he gives him four hundred zuz.

And likewise, if

he removed his garment from him

and he remained outside without a garment, he gives him four hundred zuz.

And likewise, if

he uncovered

and exposed

the woman’s head in the marketplace,

he gives her

[her]

four hundred zuz.