Bava Kamma 90a (צ.) — the Talmud in English

For Rava said:

a.

Consecrated property

removes an item from a lien. If a person placed his ox under a lien for his debt, for example, by designating it as an apotiki and saying to the creditor, “Collect your debt from this,” and afterward the debtor consecrated the ox as an offering, the creditor’s lien on it was removed.

b. The prohibition of

leaven

removes an item from a lien. If a Jew borrowed money from a gentile and placed the leaven in his possession under a lien for the gentile, then, when the time for removing leaven arrives on the eve of Passover, at which point the leaven becomes prohibited for benefit, the gentile’s lien is removed, and the Jew is obligated to remove the leaven.

c.

And

likewise

emancipation,

for if a Canaanite slave was pledged as security for his master’s debt, and afterward his master [the debtor] emancipated him, the slave becomes free, and the creditor cannot collect him toward his debt. These three things—[consecrated property, leaven, and emancipation—

remove an item from a lien.]]

Just as when one emancipates his slave with a deed of emancipation, the emancipation removes the slave from his lien, so too, if the debtor knocked out his slave’s tooth or eye, the slave goes free and the creditor’s lien on him is removed.

Therefore, when a woman injures her avdei melog, they go free through the loss of a tooth or eye, despite the fact that they are pledged to her husband. Even after the enactment of Usha, which strengthened and reinforced the husband’s rights in his wife’s nikhsei melog, nevertheless the slave’s emancipation removes him from the lien.

And we raised an objection:

Shall we say

that

the

words of

Rava

are stated in a dispute between

tannaitic

authorities!?

For according to Rava, avdei melog go free through the loss of a tooth or eye when injured by the woman, whereas the opinion of the one who says, “Neither to the man nor to the woman,” is inconsistent with Rava’s words.

And the Gemara explains:

No,

the tannaitic authorities did not disagree concerning Rava, for

everyone accepts Rava’s principle,

that emancipation removes an item from a lien.

Rather, the tannaitic authorities disagree concerning the husband’s lien. The one who says that they go free through the loss of a tooth or eye when injured by the woman holds that the husband’s lien is like any other lien, and the woman’s emancipation removes them from his lien.

And

the one who says that they do not go free through the loss of a tooth or eye, neither to the man nor to the woman, holds that

here

the matter differs from all other liens, since

the Sages strengthened the husband’s lien,

and neither consecration nor emancipation removes them from his lien.

And if you wish, say

that the dispute between the tannaitic authorities can be explained differently:

everyone agrees that these tannaitic authorities do not accept the enactment of Usha,

and the husband’s acquisition of the produce of his wife’s nikhsei melog is like an acquisition of produce everywhere.

And here they

disagree concerning

every “acquisition of produce,”

whether

it is considered like “an acquisition of the substance”

or not:

that is the issue over which they disagree.

The one who says that avdei melog go free through the loss of a tooth or eye when injured by the woman holds that, since an “acquisition of produce” is not like “an acquisition of the substance,” the woman is the “owner” of the slaves, and therefore, if she injures them, they go free.

And the one who says that avdei melog do not go free through the loss of a tooth or eye, neither to the man nor to the woman, holds that an “acquisition of produce” is like “an acquisition of the substance,” both in the case of a father who wrote his property to his son from today and after death, and in the case of a husband who has the produce of his wife’s nikhsei melog.

Accordingly, the woman’s ownership is not complete, and the man’s ownership is likewise not complete, and therefore avdei melog do not go free through the loss of a tooth or eye, whether through the act of the husband or through that of his wife.

And

according to this approach, that the two baraitot cited above disagree over whether an acquisition of produce is like an acquisition of the substance, these tannaitic authorities disagree

over

the same

dispute between these tannaitic authorities,

as in the following baraita: a. It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 21:20]: “And when a man strikes his slave or his maidservant with a rod” “and he dies under his hand, he shall surely be avenged”—his death is by the sword.

b. It is further stated [there, 21]: “However, if he survives a day or two, he shall not be avenged, for he is his money”—if the slave did not die immediately, but only after “a day or two,” meaning “from time to time,” twenty-four hours, his master is not liable to death for killing his slave, since “he is his money.”

c. If a person who is not the slave’s owner struck the slave and he died, even if the slave died only after a long time, the assailant’s death is by the sword, as with any murderer who incurs the death penalty, even if the victim died only after a considerable period.

As it is taught

in a baraita:

One who sells his slave

the Canaanite

to another, and stipulates with him

[with the purchaser] that he is selling him the slave from now,

on condition that

the slave

serve him

for another

thirty days,

meaning that the substance of the slave is acquired by the purchaser immediately, but the “produce,” that is, the right to use the slave, the seller retained for himself until thirty days after the sale.

Rabbi Meir says:

The

first

[the seller] is considered the “owner” of the slave during these thirty days, and he

is subject

[he is]

to the law of “a day or two,”

and if the first struck the slave and the slave died after “a full day,” he is not executed,

because he is

[the slave]

“under”

the authority of the first.

And although the first has only an “acquisition of produce” in the slave,

Rabbi Meir holds:

Rabbi Meir

“an acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance.”

But the second [the purchaser] is not subject to the law of “a day or two.” If he struck the slave and the slave died even after a long time, he is executed for him, since during all these thirty days he has only the substance of the slave and is not considered an owner,

because the first’s acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The second

[the purchaser]

is subject to the law of “a day or two,” because he is “his money”

and his property, for the substance of the slave belongs to him from now.

And although the seller has an “acquisition of produce” during all these thirty days,

Rabbi Yehuda holds:

Rabbi Yehuda

“an acquisition of produce is not considered like an acquisition of the substance,”

and the seller’s right to use the slave does not remove the purchaser’s ownership.

But the seller is not subject to the law of “a day or two,” for he has only an “acquisition of produce,” which is not considered ownership like an acquisition of the substance. If he struck the slave and the slave died, he is executed for him, even if the slave died only after a long time.

Rabbi Yose says: Both of them,

both the seller and the purchaser,

are subject to the law of “a day or two”; this one,

the seller,

because he is

[the slave] still

“under”

his authority for all thirty days;

and this one,

the purchaser,

because he is “his money”

and his property.

And if you ask: Rabbi Yose’s words appear contradictory, for if an “acquisition of produce” is like an acquisition of the substance, the “owner” is the seller and not the purchaser; and if an “acquisition of produce” is not like an acquisition of the substance, the “owner” is the purchaser and not the seller. How, then, can Rabbi Yose hold that both are exempt, and that both have the status of owners? The answer is: Indeed, only one who is the “owner” can be exempt from execution; it is impossible to consider both of them “owners.” Rabbi Yose’s reason is that

he is uncertain whether an “acquisition of produce” is

[whether it is]

considered like an acquisition of the substance or is not considered like an acquisition of the substance.

And

therefore Rabbi Yosei said: Both are exempt, because

uncertainty in matters of life is treated leniently.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Both of them,

both the seller and the purchaser,

are not subject to the law of “one day or two days”: The former,

the purchaser,

because he is not “under him”; and the latter,

the seller,

because the slave is not “his money.”

Therefore, whether the seller or the purchaser struck the slave during these thirty days, and the slave died after twenty-four hours, he is executed, as one who kills a Canaanite slave belonging to another.

Rava said:

If you ask,

what is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer!?

After all, one of the two is the owner—either the seller, if you maintain that usufruct rights are equivalent to ownership of the substance, or the purchaser, if you maintain that they are not equivalent to ownership of the substance—and how does Rabbi Eliezer obligate both of them to be executed as one who kills another’s slave!?

The verse says: “For he is his money.”

This indicates:

his money that is uniquely his.

Since one has usufruct rights and the other has ownership of the substance, the slave is not “unique” to either of them. And with regard to one for whom the slave is not “his money that is uniquely his,” the leniency of “but if he survives for one day or two days, he shall not be avenged, for he is his money” was not stated; therefore, he is executed on his account.

The Gemara adds two further laws that depend on Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning that neither is considered the “unique owner” of the property: a.

In accordance with whose opinion is that which Ameimar said

[with the opinion of which tanna are Ameimar’s words consistent]?

Ameimar said:

When a man and a woman sell “usufruct property”

even if they both sell it together,

they have accomplished nothing,

because the husband is not a complete “owner” who can sell the property, since the substance is not his, and the woman is not a complete “owner” who can sell the property, since the husband has “usufruct rights” in it.

In accordance with whose opinion? In accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s,

who holds that anyone for whom it is not “his uniquely owned slave” cannot emancipate him, just as he is not subject to the law of “one day or two days.” And likewise with regard to a sale, neither of them can sell him, since he is not “his uniquely owned property.”

b.

Who is the tanna of that which the Sages taught

in a beraita?

Just as a slave goes free through the loss of a tooth or an eye, so too he goes free through the loss of other limbs and through permanent injuries that do not return and heal.

For it was taught:

One who is half slave and half free,

and likewise a slave owned by two partners, these slaves do not

—these slaves—

go free

through the loss of a tooth or an eye, nor through the loss of other

limbs

that

do not return.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what they say in the name of Rava:

This beraita is stated

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion

as its author. For

did

[does]

Rabbi Eliezer not say

with regard to the law of “one day or two days” that this exemption applies only when the slave is

“his uniquely owned money”?

Here too,

with regard to going free, it is stated [Exodus 21:26]: “If a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall send him free in exchange for his eye.” And it is to be expounded:

“His slave” who is uniquely his.

And these slaves are not slaves uniquely owned by their masters, and therefore they do not go free, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Mishna:

One who strikes,

beats

his fellow

on his ear,

gives him a sela

as payment for his humiliation.

Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

He gives him

a maneh.

If he slapped him

on his cheek, he

gives him two hundred zuz

as payment for his humiliation.

If he slapped him on his cheek

with the back of his hand

[striking him with the back of his hand], his humiliation is greater, and

he gives him four hundred zuz.

If he pulled

[drew]

his ear,

or

pulled out his hair,

or

spat

at his fellow

and it reached him,

[him]

his saliva,

he gives him four hundred zuz.

And likewise, if he

removed his cloak from him

and he remained outside without a cloak, he gives him four hundred zuz.

And likewise, if he

uncovered

and exposed

a woman’s head in the marketplace,

he gives her

[her]

four hundred zuz.