Bava Kamma 89b — the Talmud in English

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For what should we be concerned? After all, even

if she waives it with regard to the husband, he does not lose

anything at all,

for now too she is not giving him anything at all

[Even now, when she does not sell him her ketuba, she gives him nothing]—and why should we not say: in any event, let her sell her ketuba to the injured party, so that if she does not waive it for her husband, the injured party will profit; and why did you exempt her entirely!? One must say:

in the end, in every case with regard to the husband, certainly

he

waives

it, [and] if so, all our exertion is only in vain,

and we do not trouble the court for nothing

[without charge]

we do not trouble it.

And we challenge this:

Rather,

according to your words, that the usufruct value of the ketuba is encumbered to the injured party, and we refrain from collecting it for the injured party only because of the loss of the purchaser and the trouble of the court.

That which the

beraita teaches:

and so

if she injured her husband, she did not lose her ketuba,

that is, she is exempt from paying him his damages as long as he has not divorced her, and she need not waive her ketuba in exchange for payment of the injury.

And let this be difficult for you:

why

does she not lose her ketuba on account of the injury?

Let her sell her ketuba to her husband for its usufruct value

[let her sell her ketuba to her husband for “its usufruct value”], and whatever her husband gives her for the usufruct value of the ketuba, she will pay to her husband

with this injury,

for what she injured him.

For

even

if she waives

her ketuba

with regard to the husband, there is no

any

loss

to the husband, so why did we teach in the beraita that she does not lose her ketuba!?

And we answer:

this

beraita

is certainly Rabbi Meir, who says: It is forbidden for a man to leave his wife even for one hour without a ketuba.

And the Gemara explains:

and

behold,

what

is the reason of Rabbi Meir?

What

is it?

So that she will not be easy in his eyes to divorce

[to divorce her] and

here,

if she sells him her ketuba in payment of his damages, she will be easy in his eyes to divorce, because he will have no monetary loss if he divorces her, for he

divorces her

[her],

and collects it from her through his injury

[for his injury he will collect her ketuba from her]—that is, he will not pay her a ketuba.

Therefore it teaches: Even though she injured her husband, she did not lose her ketuba; that is, she does not sell him her ketuba for the injury, but she is exempt from paying him until she is divorced.

And we refute this:

If so,

if the fact that the ketuba is payment for his damages is considered to make it easy in his eyes to divorce his wife,

now too,

even if she is currently exempt from paying, nevertheless it is easy for him to divorce her, because

he divorces her and collects it from her through his injury,

and he will have no monetary expenditure if he divorces her!? And we answer: What are we dealing with here?

For example, her ketuba is large

[the value of her ketuba is great] in comparison with the value of the injury, and it is not easy in his eyes to divorce her, since

because of that small amount

[the small amount of money of the damages]

he does not lose

the husband

a great deal

[a large amount of money].

The amount of the ketuba money that the husband undertakes to pay his wife [the “principal ketuba”] is two hundred zuz if he married her when she was a “virgin,” and one hundred zuz [a maneh] if she was a widow or divorcee; and he has permission to write for his wife an “addition” beyond this amount, which he is obligated to her by law.

And

the Gemara explains:

if her ketuba is larger than a Torah-level ketuba

[if he wrote for his wife an “addition” to the “principal ketuba”], there is no reason to exempt her from paying, for

let us establish it with regard to the Torah-level ketuba, and the rest let her sell to him through her injury

[she can sell her husband the “addition to the ketuba,” and the “principal ketuba” will remain owed to her].

Rather, what are we dealing with here?

For example, her ketuba is not larger

[her ketuba is not large]

than a Torah-level ketuba,

and nevertheless she will not be easy in his eyes to divorce, since

her injury is

only

four zuz

and the amount of her ketuba, if she is a widow, is one hundred zuz;

because of four zuz

that he will receive from her for her injury,

he will not

divorce her, for then

he loses

twenty-five

sela. [which are one hundred zuz].

And we refute this:

Rather, that which the

beraita teaches:

just as she may not sell

her ketuba

while she is under him

[under her husband],

so she will not lose while she is under him.

We initially understood that this is what it means: Just as she cannot sell her ketuba while she is under him, so she will not lose anything from her ketuba on account of any injury or damage that she causes while she is under him.

Therefore we ask: How could the tan­nay state as an absolute matter that she does not lose her ketuba if she injured her husband,

when sometimes one finds that she loses

[sometimes it will be found that she loses] part of her ketuba,

and what is the case? For example, her ketuba is larger than a Torah-level ketuba,

so that they leave her the amount of a Torah-level ketuba, and she sells the rest to her husband in exchange for her injury; and why did the tan­nay state as an absolute matter that she does not lose!?

a. One of the conditions of the ketuba is that the sons inherit their mother’s ketuba if she dies during her husband’s lifetime, and afterward they divide the rest of the inheritance equally with their brothers, the sons of another wife. This inheritance is called: “the ketuba of male children.”

b. Even if the woman sold her ketuba for its usufruct value, and afterward died and her husband inherited her, her sons inherit from their father “the ketuba of male children.” We do not say: Since, if their mother had been alive, she would not have received her ketuba, for the purchaser acquired it, now too her sons should not receive her ketuba; rather, her sons inherit her ketuba even in this case.

The reason that they do not lose after their mother acted improperly regarding her ketuba and lost it is that her sons say: Our mother needed money, and she was compelled to sell her ketuba; it was not her desire to lose her ketuba.

Said

[he answered]

Rava:

The

end

does not deal with one who sells her ketuba to her husband; rather,

we have come

[we have come to discuss]

the “ketuba of male children.”

And this is what it teaches

[thus the beraita is to be understood]:

just as one who sells her ketuba to others

and dies

does not lose

for her sons

the “ketuba of male children,”

and

what is the reason?

for we say:

money compelled her

[the need for money compelled her] to sell the ketuba, and we do not treat her as one who acted improperly concerning her husband’s ketuba.

So, one who sells her ketuba to her husband,

does not lose

for her sons

the “ketuba of male children”; what is the reason?

For we say:

money compelled her.

Now the Gemara returns to the “enactment of Usha” mentioned above.

Let us say [

shall it be said ]:

the “Usha enactment”

is a dispute

of tannai

m

?

If a master injures his Canaanite slave and knocks out his tooth or his eye, the slave goes free.

For one [baraita] teaches

a baraita:

The slaves of "

the property of

usufruct"

of a woman, even though the husband consumes the produce

go out

they

through tooth and eye for the woman

but not for the man,

that is, the woman is the “owner” of the slaves, and if she injures them and knocks out their tooth or eye, they go free, but the man is not considered their “owner”; therefore, they do not go free if he injures them.

And another [baraita] teaches

a baraita: usufruct slaves do not go free through tooth and eye,

neither for the man nor for the woman,

not through the husband who injured them, nor through his wife.

They thought [

the members of the academy were of the opinion to say ]:

that according to everyone, “ownership of the produce”

which the husband has

is not considered like “ownership of the body,”

and if so, what the husband has—“produce”—in his wife’s “usufruct property” does not make him an owner of the property.

Is it not that they [the two baraitot] dispute this:

the two baraitot:

That the one who says:

they go free through tooth and eye

for the woman, does not hold of the Usha enactment,

and therefore the woman is the “owner” of the slaves, since her husband has only “ownership of the produce,” which is not considered “ownership of the body.”

” And the one who says:

the slaves do not go free through tooth and eye

neither for the man nor for the woman,

his reason is that

he holds of the “Usha enactment,”

and therefore, even for the woman they do not go free through tooth and eye, since the Sages gave force to the husband’s lien, and it is thus like “ownership of the body.”

If so, it emerges that the tannaim disputed whether the “Usha enactment” was enacted or not.

And we reject this:

No,

the tannaim did not dispute the matter, and

everyone holds of the “Usha enactment.”

And there is no dispute here between the two baraitot,

rather

they speak of two periods:

Here [

the one who says “for the woman but not for the man” is speaking ]

before the “enactment

of Usha.” And then indeed the woman was the “owner” of the usufruct slaves, and they went free through her if she injured them through tooth or eye.

Here [

the one who says “neither for the man nor for the woman” ]

[is speaking] after the enactment,

for the Sages strengthened the husband’s lien, so that his ownership of the produce would be like ownership of the body, and the woman is not considered the “owner” of the slaves; therefore, the slaves do not go free through her through tooth or eye.

And if you wish, say: both this and that [

the two baraitot are speaking ]

after the enactment, and they hold of the “Usha enactment.”

Rather,

if you ask

the one who says: “for the woman but not for the man”—what is the reason!?

for after the Usha enactment, the woman’s “ownership of the body” is not effective for her to be considered an owner!?

One can say: This tannai holds, with regard to going free through tooth and eye through the woman,

as

is stated by

Rava

elsewhere.