Bava Kamma 89a (פט.) — the Talmud in English

And yet she is under his authority and serves him.

That is, a woman living with her husband, and witnesses came and testified to two matters: that her husband had divorced her and that her husband had already paid her ketuba.

And it turned out that

these witnesses were

conspiring witnesses,

yet this woman is not divorced, and her ketuba was never paid to her.

When the witnesses are being required to pay the woman the loss they sought to cause her, under the principle, “As he plotted to do to his fellow, so shall be done to him,”

we do not say: Let them pay her entire ketuba,

because she is not now divorced, and her husband is not obligated to pay her a ketuba. Therefore, the witnesses did not cause her to lose the entire value of her ketuba.

Rather,

they pay her

the benefit of her ketuba,

because she is permitted to sell to others now what she will receive from her husband after the divorce. [Since the sum that they will pay her for this is not large, this is called “the benefit of her ketuba.”]

The witnesses plotted to cause her to lose this sum, since according to their testimony her husband owes her nothing, and she will not even be able to receive “the benefit of her ketuba.” Therefore, the conspiring witnesses pay her “the benefit of her ketuba.”

What is the benefit of her ketuba?

That is, how is the value of the ketuba assessed now? Ultimately, her husband might not give her the ketuba [if she dies during his lifetime], and it is also impossible to know when she will collect her ketuba, whether her husband will divorce her or die.

We assess how much a person would be willing to pay

prepared to pay] now

for this woman’s ketuba, so that if she is widowed

becomes a widow]

or divorced,

the purchaser will take it;

but if she dies,

the woman during her husband’s lifetime,

her husband will inherit her,

and the purchaser will lose what he paid.

The money that we assess she could have received from the purchaser is what the conspiring witnesses must pay her, because this is the monetary value that they caused her to lose. They need not pay her the entire sum of her ketuba, since she is not presently destined to receive her ketuba.

a. Every woman who marries her husband obligates him that when he divorces her, he will give her two hundred zuz if he married her as a virgin, and one hundred zuz [a maneh] if he married her as a widow or divorcee.

b. A woman who marries and has property may place it under her husband’s authority as nichsei melog. The principal of the property remains hers, while the husband receives the “produce” that can be derived from it. In this case, if the property is damaged, the woman bears the loss.

c. Similarly, the woman may place her property under her husband’s authority as nichsei tzon barzel. The value of the property is then recorded in the ketuba, and if the property decreases in value or is damaged, the husband bears the loss and must give his wife its full value when they separate. The initial assumption was: The “regulation of Usha” was enacted with regard both to nichsei melog and to nichsei tzon barzel, and before the regulation of Usha, in both cases the woman could sell the property during her husband’s lifetime, and if she died, her husband would not inherit it.

And

from this beraita one can prove the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, who said: In Usha they enacted that if a woman sold nichsei melog during her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband takes them from the purchasers:

For

if it enters your mind that the “regulation of Usha” does not exist,

that the Sages never enacted that a woman may not sell property during her husband’s lifetime in such a way that her husband could not take it after her death,

if so,

why will her husband inherit her

if she dies during her husband’s lifetime? And why should she not

sell her ketuba entirely,

since without the regulation of Usha, if the woman sold it, the husband would neither inherit it nor take it from the purchasers!?

He said

rejected this]

Abaye:

Even if you say that the regulation of Usha does not exist, this is not difficult for you, because

if they said

that she could sell property during her husband’s lifetime [before the regulation of Usha], they said this only

with regard to nichsei melog,

which belongs to her, while the husband has only the produce. For if the property decreases in value, it decreases for her, and the husband does not bear the loss; and likewise, if the property increases in value, the increase belongs to the woman.

Would they

say:

She may sell

“nichsei tzon barzel”!?

Even without the regulation of Usha, a woman cannot sell nichsei tzon barzel. If so, the beraita must be explained as referring to a woman who has no nichsei melog, but only nichsei tzon barzel, which she cannot sell. If so, it is obvious that the conspiring witnesses do not pay her the entire ketuba, even without the regulation of Usha, because she cannot sell the nichsei tzon barzel in a manner that would prevent her husband from inheriting them.

Abaye said: “The benefit,”

of the ketuba,

since it has come into our discussion,

since we are dealing with it,

let us say something about it:

A woman who sold her ketuba for

“the benefit,”

the money does not belong to her husband, nor is it subject to his rights as nichsei melog, so that one could say that she should purchase land with it and the husband should consume its produce. Rather,

it belongs to the woman

entirely.

For if it enters your mind that it belongs to the husband,

why do the conspiring witnesses pay her “the benefit of her ketuba”? They should be entirely exempt, because

the witnesses could say to her: “What loss did we cause you?”

what would you have lost if our testimony had been accepted? After all, even

if you had sold it for “the benefit,” your husband would have taken it from you

if you had sold your ketuba for “the benefit,” your husband would have taken the money from you.

Rather, it must follow that the husband does not acquire what the woman receives as “the benefit of her ketuba.”

Rav Shalman

rejected this and

said:

This is not proof, for it can be said that “the benefit” does indeed belong to her husband, and nevertheless there is a loss here for the woman

because there is benefit to the household,

since by bringing the money to her husband, she would have ensured that her household’s livelihood was provided for generously.

Rava said: The halakha is: “The benefit” belongs to the woman, and the husband does not consume the produce. What is the reason? Produce

the produce of her property

is what the Sages instituted for him; produce of produce the Sages did not institute for him.

The produce of “the benefit of her ketuba” is “produce of produce,” because the benefit of the ketuba is the produce of the ketuba, while the produce that grows from land purchased with this money is produce of produce.

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the house of Rav

when they came from the academy,

they said: We have learned

we find in our Mishna

support for the “regulation of Usha”:

“The slave and the woman are in an unfortunate position; one who injures them —

is liable, while they, if they injure others —

are exempt,”

because they have no money with which to pay.

And if it enters your mind

that according to our Mishna

there is no

“regulation of Usha,”

and she may sell her property,

let her sell her nichsei melog and give it to him,

and why did you say that the woman is in an unfortunate position? She has money with which to pay!?

Rather, can one not conclude from this that the “regulation of Usha” exists, and that she cannot sell nichsei melog, since if she dies her husband will take them from the purchasers?

And we refute this:

But according to your reasoning, [according to your view]

even if it is indeed the case that the “Usha ordinance” exists and she cannot sell it outright,

the question still arises: Why does she have no money?

Let her sell the “nichsei melog” at its “benefit of enjoyment” value [so that if he dies or divorces her, the purchaser will take it]

and give it

to the injured party!?

Rather,

you are forced to say that here we are dealing with

a case where she does not have

“nichsei melog,” and she has nothing to sell in order to pay for the injury she caused.

So too here,

we reject your proof: Here we are dealing with

a case where she does not have

“nichsei melog.”

And we challenge this: The question still arises: Why is the woman’s injury disadvantageous? It is indeed possible that this particular woman has neither “nichsei melog” nor “nichsei tzon barzel,” but every woman has a ketubah of one hundred or two hundred zuz from her husband.

Let her sell this ketubah

of hers

at its benefit-of-enjoyment value and give it to him!?

And we answer:

Whose

Mishna

is this?

It is Rabbi Meir’s, who says: It is prohibited for a man to keep his wife even for a single hour without a ketubah.

Therefore, the woman cannot sell her ketubah of one hundred or two hundred zuz to others, because if she sells it and her husband divorces her, the purchasers will collect the entire amount, and she will receive nothing. She would then be like a woman who has no ketubah, and according to Rabbi Meir it is prohibited to live with a woman who has no ketubah.

And we wonder:

And

this

reason

of Rabbi Meir,

what

is it?

So that

by virtue of being obligated to pay her ketubah if he divorces her,

it will not be easy in his eyes to divorce her,

because he knows that if he divorces her, a considerable sum of money will be taken from him, and consequently he will not divorce her without great necessity.

Here,

when the woman has sold her ketubah to others, as well,

he will not divorce her

easily, since he knows

that if he divorces her,

a great deal of money will be taken from him, for

those who purchased [those who purchased the ketubah will come]

and collect the ketubah from him,

the husband!?

If so, the difficulty returns: Why is the woman’s injury disadvantageous? Let her sell her ketubah at its benefit-of-enjoyment value and give it to him!?

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason we say that the woman’s injury is disadvantageous is that

the benefit of enjoyment

is not actual property, but

mere words [words alone]

and mere words cannot be pledged

to the injured party. Therefore, she is regarded as one who has no money at all, because the injured party cannot demand that the woman sell her ketubah at its benefit-of-enjoyment value.

And we wonder:

Why not

pledge these “words” to the injured party?

They are words that can be sold for money;

that is, this benefit of enjoyment can in fact be sold and money can be received for it. If so, this benefit of enjoyment is something of value, and why can it not be pledged to the injured party!?

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason she has no money is

because of

this

statement of Shmuel,

that she can waive her ketubah for her husband, as he proceeds to explain:

For Shmuel said: If one who sells a promissory note to another [Reuven borrowed money from Shimon and wrote him a promissory note, and Shimon then sold the debt to Levi]

returns

the creditor who sold it

and waives

any part

of

the debt, the debt

is waived,

and

if the creditor dies and bequeaths his debt,

even an heir can waive

the debt.

The members of the academy said [they raised the following difficulty]:

Let her sell it and give it to him; and if she waives it vis-à-vis her husband, let her waive it!?

That is, what difference does it make that she can waive it? We will tell her to sell her ketubah and give the money to the injured party; and if she acts improperly and waives it for her husband, let her waive it—why should we care!?

The members of the academy said [they answered]:

Whenever

the waiver is

vis-à-vis her husband, it is certain

that she

will waive it for him,

since the sale of the ketubah was against her will,

and we would be deliberately causing the loss of that sale,

meaning: Since she will certainly waive the debt, it is as though we are deliberately causing the purchaser to lose. Therefore, we do not require her to sell her ketubah in order to pay the injured party.

And if you would say [and if you ask]:

The sale belongs to him,

the one who injured him, at the benefit-of-enjoyment value [that she should sell the benefit of enjoyment of her ketubah to the injured party himself].