Bava Kamma 89a — the Talmud in English

And behold, she is under him and serves him.

That is, a woman who lives with her husband, and witnesses came and testified to two things: that her husband divorced her, and that her husband had already paid her ketuba.

And it was found that

these witnesses

were conspiring,

and behold, this woman is not divorced, and her ketuba has never been paid to her.

When they come to obligate the witnesses to pay the woman the loss that they sought to cause her, by virtue of “as he plotted to do to his fellow, so shall be done to him,”

we do not say: Let them pay her entire ketuba,

for now she is not divorced, and her husband is not obligated to pay her a ketuba. If so, the witnesses did not cause her to lose the entire value of her ketuba.

Rather,

they pay her

the benefit of her ketuba,

for she is permitted to sell to others, from now, what she will receive from her husband after the divorce. [Since the sum that they will pay her for this is not large, this matter is called: “the benefit of her ketuba.”]

And this sum the witnesses plotted to cause her to lose, since according to their words her husband owes her nothing, and she will not be able to receive even the “benefit of the ketuba.” Therefore, the conspiring witnesses pay her “the benefit of her ketuba.”

What is the benefit of her ketuba?

That is, how is the value of the ketuba assessed now? For it is possible that in the end her husband will not give her a ketuba [if she dies during his lifetime], and it is also impossible to know when she will collect her ketuba, whether her husband will divorce her or die.

They assess how much a person wishes to give [

is prepared to pay] now

for this woman’s ketuba, so that if she is widowed [

becomes a widow]

or divorced,

the purchaser will take it;

but if she dies,

the woman during her husband’s lifetime,

her husband will inherit her,

and the purchaser will lose what he paid.

And these sums that we assess she could have received from the purchaser, the conspiring witnesses must pay her, for they caused her to lose this monetary value. But they need not pay her the entire sum of her ketuba, since she is not presently destined to receive her ketuba.

a. Every woman who marries her husband obligates him that when he divorces her he will give her two hundred zuz — if he married her when she was a virgin — and one hundred zuz [a maneh] if he married her as a widow or divorcee.

b. A woman who marries and has property may place it in her husband’s possession as nikhsei melog. The property itself then belongs to her, while the husband receives the “produce” that can be derived from it. In such a case, if the property is damaged, the woman bears the losses.

c. Likewise, the woman may place her property in her husband’s possession as nikhsei tzon barzel. The value of the property is then recorded in the ketuba, and if the property decreases in value or is damaged, the husband suffers the loss, and he must give his wife its full value when they separate. The initial assumption was: the “ordinance of Usha” was instituted both regarding nikhsei melog and regarding nikhsei tzon barzel. Before the ordinance of Usha, the woman could sell both during her husband’s lifetime, and if she died, her husband would not inherit her.

And

from this beraita one can prove the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, who said: In Usha they instituted that if a woman sold nikhsei melog during her husband’s lifetime and died, the husband takes them from the purchasers:

For

if it enters your mind that there is no “ordinance of Usha,”

that the Sages never instituted that the woman may not sell property during her husband’s lifetime in a manner that would prevent her husband from taking it after her death,

if so,

why will her husband inherit her

if she dies during her husband’s lifetime? And why should she not

sell her ketuba completely,

for without the ordinance of Usha, if the woman sold it, the husband would neither inherit it nor take it from the purchasers!?

He said [

rejected this],

Abaye:

Even if you say that there is no ordinance of Usha, this is not difficult for you, because

if they said

that she can sell during her husband’s lifetime [before the ordinance of Usha], they said it only

with regard to nikhsei melog,

which belong to her, and the husband has only the produce. For if the property decreases, it decreases for her, and the husband does not bear the losses; likewise, if the property increases, it increases for the woman.

Will they

say:

she can sell

“nikhsei tzon barzel”!?

After all, even without the ordinance of Usha, the woman cannot sell nikhsei tzon barzel. If so, the beraita must be explained as referring to a woman who has no nikhsei melog, but only nikhsei tzon barzel, which a woman cannot sell. If so, it is obvious that the conspiring witnesses do not pay her the entire ketuba, even without the ordinance of Usha, because she cannot sell the nikhsei tzon barzel in a manner that would prevent her husband from inheriting her.

Abaye said: “The benefit,”

of the ketuba,

since it has come into our hands [

since we have engaged with it],

let us say a matter concerning it:

A woman who sold her ketuba for

“the benefit,”

the money does not belong to her husband, nor is it encumbered to him as nikhsei melog, so that one would say: let her purchase land with it, and the husband will consume the produce, but

it belongs to the woman

entirely.

For if it enters your mind that it belongs to the husband,

why do the conspiring witnesses pay her “the benefit of her ketuba”? They should exempt themselves entirely, because

the witnesses could say to her: “What loss did we cause you?” [

what would you have lost] If they had accepted our testimony, after all, even

if you had sold it for “the benefit,” the husband would have taken it from you [

if you had sold your ketuba for “the benefit,” your husband would have taken the money from you].

Rather, it must necessarily be that the husband does not acquire what the woman received through “the benefit of her ketuba.”

He said [

rejected this],

Rav Shalman:

This is not proof, for one can say: In reality, “the benefit” belongs to her husband, and nevertheless there is a loss here for the woman,

because there is household profit,

for by bringing the money to her husband, she would have made her livelihood available in the household with abundance.

Rava said: The halakha is: “The benefit” belongs to the woman, and the husband does not consume the produce. What is the reason? Produce [

the produce of her property]

the Sages instituted for him; produce of produce the Sages did not institute for him,

and the produce of “the benefit of her ketuba” is “produce of produce.” For the benefit of the ketuba is the produce of the ketuba, and the produce that will grow from land purchased with this money is produce of produce.

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the house of Rav [

when they came from the academy],

they said: We have learned [

we found in our Mishna]

regarding the “ordinance of Usha”:

The slave and the woman, their injury is bad; one who injures them —

is liable, but they who injure others —

are exempt,

because they have no money with which to pay.

And if it enters your mind:

according to our Mishna,

there is no

“ordinance of Usha,”

and she can sell her property,

let her sell nikhsei melog and give it to him,

and why did you say that a woman’s injury is bad? After all, she has money with which to pay!?

Rather, learn from it that the “ordinance of Usha” exists, and she cannot sell nikhsei melog, since if she dies, her husband will take them from the purchasers.

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your view,

even if it is indeed subject to the “ordinance of Usha” and she cannot sell it completely,

it is still difficult: why does she not have money?

Let her sell the “usufruct property” for its “benefit-right”

so that if he dies or divorces her, the buyer will take it,

and let her give it

to the injured party!?

Rather,

you are compelled to say: with what are we dealing here?

That she does not have

“usufruct property,” and she has nothing to sell in order to pay for the damage she caused,

so too here

we reject your proof: with what are we dealing here?

That she does not have

“usufruct property.”

And we object: still, why is the woman’s injury severe? It is indeed possible that this woman has neither “usufruct property” nor “iron-flock property,” but every woman does have a ketuba of one hundred or two hundred [zuz] from her husband,

so let her sell her ketuba

this one

for its benefit-right and give it to him!?

And we answer:

This

Mishna

whose opinion is it?

It is Rabbi Meir’s, who says: It is forbidden for a man to keep his wife even one hour without a ketuba,

therefore, the woman cannot sell her ketuba of one hundred or two hundred to others, because if she sells it and her husband divorces her, the buyers will collect the entire amount and she will receive nothing, and she is then like a woman who has no ketuba; and according to Rabbi Meir, it is forbidden to live with a woman who has no ketuba.

And we wonder:

And

this

reason

of Rabbi Meir

what

is it?

So that

because, by being obligated to pay her ketuba if he divorces her,

it will not be easy in his eyes to divorce her,

because he knows that if he divorces her, they will extract a large amount of money from him, and through this he will not divorce her without great necessity.

Here,

when the woman sold her ketuba to others, too,

he will not divorce her

easily, for he knows

that if he divorces her,

a great deal of money will be extracted from him, for

those who bought

those who bought the ketuba will come and

collect her ketuba from him,

the husband!?

If so, the difficulty returns: why is the woman’s injury severe? Let her sell her ketuba for its benefit-right and give it to him!?

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason that we say the woman’s injury is severe is that

the benefit-right

is not actual money, but

mere words

mere speech

they are, and mere words do not become liened

to the injured party. Therefore, she is like one who has no money at all, because the injured party cannot claim from the woman that she sell her ketuba for its benefit-right.

And we wonder:

Why not

do these “mere words” become liened to the injured party?

They are mere words that are sold for denarii,

that is to say, it is possible to sell this benefit-right and receive money for it; if so, this benefit-right is a significant thing, and why does it not become liened to the injured party!?

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason that she has no money is

because of

this

statement of Shmuel,

that she can waive her ketuba to her husband, as he proceeds to explain:

For Shmuel said: One who sells a debt-document to his fellow

Reuven, who borrowed money from Shimon and wrote him a debt-document, and Shimon went and sold the debt to Levi,

and the

lender who sold it

and waived

the

its

debt—the debt is

waived,

and

if the lender died and bequeathed his debt,

even the heir may waive

the debt.

The members of the academy said

they objected:

She should sell it and give it to him, and if she waives it to her husband, let her waive it!?

That is to say: What is the significance of the fact that she can waive it? We shall tell her to sell her ketuba and give the money to the injured party; and if she acts improperly and waives it to her husband, let her waive it—what concern is that to us!?

The members of the academy said

they answered:

Anyone

whose waiver is

to her husband will certainly

be that she

waived it to him,

since the sale of the ketuba was against her will,

and we would knowingly cause that sale to be lost,

that is to say: Since she will certainly waive the debt, it is as though we knowingly cause the buyer to lose; therefore, we do not obligate her to sell her ketuba in order to pay the injured party.

And if you would say

if you ask:

The sale belongs to him

to that one whom she injured, as a benefit-right

.so that she sells the benefit-right of her ketuba to the injured party himself.