Bava Kamma 90b — the Talmud in English

This is the general rule

in payments for humiliation:

everything is according to his honor.

And in the Gemara it explains that this is what the First Tanna said: all these amounts that were stated in our Mishna were stated with regard to the wealthy and honored; but with regard to those beneath them and the poor—each and every one is according to his honor.

Rabbi Akiva said:

not so; rather,

even the poor among Israel are regarded as though they were free men

and honored, but

who have fallen from their possessions, for

indeed

they are the sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,

and these amounts were stated both with regard to the wealthy and with regard to the poor.

And

so there was

an incident involving one who uncovered

the

head of a woman in the marketplace,

and she was poor,

she came before Rabbi Akiva

to demand compensation for her humiliation,

and he obligated

him

to give her four hundred zuz.

He said to him

the one who humiliated Rabbi Akiva:

Rabbi, give me time,

that is, it is difficult for me to pay the payment for her humiliation now, and I ask that you grant me permission to pay her at a later time,

and he gave him

Rabbi Akiva

time.

This man knew that this woman was not concerned for her honor, and he waited for an opportunity through which he could prove this and be exempted from the payment.

He watched her

[he waited for her] until he saw her

standing

at the entrance to her courtyard,

and he broke the jug before her, and in it

[in the jug] there was only

oil worth an issar

[a small amount of oil, which one buys with an “issar”—eight perutot].

This woman was not concerned for her honor and humiliation, and in order not to lose the oil

she uncovered her head, and she was wiping

her hands with the oil,

and placing

her

hand on her head,

so that the oil would be absorbed into her hair, and afterward she would conceal the oil in her house.

He stationed

that man

against her,

concerning this act that she had performed,

witnesses

who would see her in her degradation and testify against her.

And he came before Rabbi Akiva

with his witnesses.

He said

[he asked]

him

that man to Rabbi Akiva:

Rabbi,

is it possible that

to

this

woman I should give four hundred zuz!?

After all, this is a disreputable woman, and this humiliation of uncovering her head is not important to her; why, then, did you obligate me to pay such a large sum!?

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Rabbi Akiva:

You have said

and claimed

nothing,

and you are obligated to pay her, even though she is not concerned for her honor, even for the sake of several perutot.

For

one who wounds himself, even though he is not permitted -

is exempt

he.

But

others who wound him,

even in the case of that person whose way it is to wound himself,

are obligated

to pay him.

And

so also

one who cuts down his saplings

[young fruit trees],

even though he is not permitted,

for he transgresses “you shall not destroy its tree” [Deuteronomy 20:19], nevertheless

is exempt

he.

But

others

who cut down his saplings

are liable.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: one who strikes his fellow with a slap gives him a sela; Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean: he gives him a maneh. There were two types of coins:

Tyrian coins and provincial coins, and the difference between them was in the quantity of silver in them: in Tyrian coins there was a quantity eight times greater than in provincial coins, and therefore their value too was eight times greater.

They raised a question before them,

the members of the academy were uncertain:

Whether

a Tyrian maneh we learned

[we learned] that the one who slaps gives payment for humiliation, according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean—

or

perhaps

a provincial maneh

[which is equal in value to one-eighth of a Tyrian maneh]

we learned,

that the one who slaps gives payment for humiliation?

Come and hear,

that “a Tyrian maneh we learned”:

A

case involving

a certain man who slapped his fellow

[a case involving a man who slapped his fellow]—

and

he came

the one who slapped, for judgment

before Rabbi Yehuda

the Nasi

[the one who slapped came before him for judgment].

He said to him

Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi to the one who slapped:

Here am I,

and

here is Rabbi Yose the Galilean

[here am I, and here is Rabbi Yose the Galilean], and the Gemara proceeds to explain it—

and therefore:

give him

to the one who was slapped

a Tyrian maneh,

the payment for his humiliation!

Here,

learn from it: a Tyrian maneh we learned!

And we conclude: indeed,

learn from it

from this incident that “a Tyrian maneh we learned.”

The Gemara returns to explain the incident:

The sugya is explained here according to Rashba.

What is the meaning of “

here am I, here is Rabbi Yose the Galilean,”

[what was Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi’s intention in these words]?

If you say

that

this is what he said to him

[perhaps you will say that this was his intention]:

Here am I, for I saw you

[here am I, whom you saw], meaning: I testify now before my colleagues that I saw you slapping—

and here is Rabbi Yose the Galilean, who says,

[and this is Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion]:

a Tyrian maneh

he is obligated to give as payment for his humiliation—

and we judge you and issue the ruling:

go, give him a Tyrian maneh

[go, give him a Tyrian maneh]—

If we explain it this way, surely the following difficulty arises:

Does this imply that a witness

who testifies before a court

becomes a judge

to judge that same matter!?

But it was taught:

A Sanhedrin that saw

the

one who killed a person: some of them became witnesses, and some of them became judges,

that is:

a. The judges do not judge on the basis of their own seeing, but on the basis of testimony, even though they themselves saw it; and we do not say: “The hearing [of the judges from witnesses] should not be greater than seeing [by the judges themselves].”

b. Those who testify before them do not themselves sit to judge.

These are the words of Rabbi Tarfon,

and the same applies also in monetary law.

Rabbi Akiva says:

since the entire Sanhedrin saw, none of them is again fit to judge, because

all of them are “witnesses

they are

by seeing alone,

and a witness does not become a judge

in that matter concerning which he is a witness; and this law applies specifically in capital cases, because it is stated concerning them [Numbers 35:24–25]: “And the assembly shall judge … and the assembly shall save [the Sanhedrin shall seek grounds in his favor].” Judges who themselves saw the killing can no longer find merit for him.

It is therefore explained that

Rabbi Tarfon said only thus far,

namely “

some of them became witnesses and some of them became judges,”

but a witness

who testifies

becomes a judge

to judge that same matter,

he did not say,

Rabbi Tarfon, for even a witness who knows and sees does not judge on the basis of his seeing, and all the more so a witness who testifies does not become a judge—

If so, how shall we explain Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi’s intention, that he judged the one who slapped after he had testified before the court concerning the slap!?

And we answer:

when that was taught

concerning Rabbi Tarfon, that a witness cannot judge on the basis of his seeing, it was only

in a case where they saw him at night, for they were not fit to render judgment

they were

[they were not fit at that time to judge]. But during the day he can judge on the basis of his seeing, and it cannot be proved from here that a witness who testifies cannot testify.

And if you wish, say

to explain Rabbi Yehuda’s words in a manner that does not raise the difficulty of how Rabbi Yehuda was both a witness and a judge:

this is what he said to him

Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi said to that man:

Here am I, who hold in accordance with Rabbi Yose the Galilean, who says: “

a Tyrian maneh”

the one who slaps pays as payment for humiliation,

and here are witnesses who testify against you

[and here are witnesses]

Others testify against you that you blew [the horn], and if so:

“Go out and give him a silver maneh.”

Go out and give him a silver maneh.] If so, Rabbi Yehuda was only a judge and not a witness.

The Gemara asks:

And

is it really the case that

Rabbi Akiva held that

in capital cases

a witness—

one who saw the event, even though he did not testify—

cannot become a judge

to judge this matter even on the basis of the testimony of others!?

But it was taught in a beraita:

It is written [Exodus 21:18]: “When men quarrel,

and one strikes his fellow with a stone or with a fist,

and he does not die but falls into bed; if he rises and walks outside on his support, then the one who struck him shall be acquitted; he shall nevertheless pay for his lost work and provide for his complete healing”:

Shimon HaTimni says:

The verse teaches that it compares a stone to a fist:

Just as a fist is a particular object that is entrusted to the court

[the court]

and to witnesses,

meaning that it can be brought before the court so that they can assess whether this fist was capable of producing the result that it caused, and if it becomes clear that it was not capable of producing that result, he is exempt, because we attribute what happened to the injured person’s weakness and fragility. Every other object with which he struck him creates liability only when it is an object whose nature can be determined by the court and the witnesses —that is, when the witnesses and the court can assess it. The verse therefore excludes the following case:

Likewise, every

other object with which he struck him, he is liable only when it is

available to the assembly and to the witnesses,

meaning that the witnesses and the court can assess it; and the verse came to exclude:

excluding when a stone went out from beneath the hand of the witnesses,

that is, excluding striking with a stone which witnesses saw, but which was lost from beneath their hands, so that the court cannot assess it, and the striker is not liable, because the assessment must be specifically by the court.

Rabbi Akiva said to him, to dispute his words, according to which he required the assessment specifically by the court:

the following:

And is it so

that when he struck him with a fist, he struck him

in the presence of the court, so that they know

the court:

how many

blows

he struck him, so that they would be able to assess—

Furthermore, if your position is that the court must make the assessment itself

and with what [

with which of his limbs

he struck him, whether on his shins or on the tip of his soul [the cartilage opposite the heart, and it is easy to be injured there]!? And if so, even a fist is not available to the court, but only to the witnesses, who know all this; and how shall we learn from here: excluding when a stone went out from beneath the hand of the witnesses?

and he died, and

And furthermore,

if it is as you say, that the court itself must assess:

If he pushed his fellow from the top of the roof or

from the top of the building [

house],

and he died,

and is it then the case that

the court goes to the building, or the building goes to the court!?

That is: Did the verse burden the court to leave the Chamber of Hewn Stone—the place where the Sanhedrin sits—in order to see the building and assess it, or perhaps they bring the building to the court in order to assess whether it is fit for one to be injured by falling from it? Certainly the Torah did not say this; thus, an assessment by the court is not required.

And furthermore:

and is it so that

if it fell,

the building, before the court came to see it, is it then the case that

he rebuilds it

in order that they assess it!?

Rather—

said Rabbi Akiva—this is what you should learn from the comparison of a stone to a fist:

Just as a fist is a particular thing that is available to the witnesses,

for it is not possible for the fist to be lost,

so too everything that is available to the witnesses [

even though it is not available to the assembly], and to teach:

excluding when a stone went out from beneath the hand of the striker

and was lost before witnesses saw it, for he is

exempt.

And from this beraita the Gemara proves that even according to Rabbi Akiva, a witness who sees may judge on the basis of other witnesses, for

it nevertheless teaches

in the beraita:

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Was it in the presence of the court that he struck him, so that they know how many blows he struck him—

it is implied:

if he struck him in their presence—

that he is a witness in the matter—

a witness becomes a judge

to judge on the basis of others; and it is difficult: Rabbi Akiva holds that a witness does not become a judge in capital cases!?

And we answer: Rabbi Akiva—who said the wording, “Was it in the presence of the court that he struck him?”—

said it according to the words of Rabbi Shimon the Temanite,

who disputes him and holds that even in capital cases, a witness who saw may judge,

but according to him

—according to Rabbi Akiva—

he does not hold

this way.

The Sages taught: An innocuous ox that killed

a person, and it is liable to be stoned,

and

afterward

caused damage:

and afterward caused damage:

They judge it—

the ox—

in capital cases

to stone it,

but they do not judge it in monetary cases,

for an innocuous ox pays only from its body, and it is to be stoned.

A forewarned ox that killed

a person, and it is liable to be stoned,

and

afterward

caused damage:

They judge it

first

in monetary cases,

for it pays from the best of the property.

And they return and judge it in capital cases,

to stone it.

But if

the court preceded

and

judged it in capital cases,

again

they do not return and judge it in monetary cases,

as it explains the reason and proceeds.

And we challenge:

And if they preceded and judged it in capital cases, what of it [

what difference does it make]!? Still,

let us return and judge it

the forewarned ox

in monetary cases [

let them return and judge it in monetary cases]!?

Rava said: I found the scholars of the academy of Rav sitting and saying [

I found the scholars of the academy sitting and saying] as the reason for the beraita:

Whose view is this—

this beraita—

It is Rabbi Shimon the Temanite’s, who said: Just as a particular fist is available to the assembly and to the witnesses,