Bava Kamma 87b — the Talmud in English

Rav said to Rabbi Elazar:

:

The Torah granted the father only “the benefit of youth”

the money of her betrothal

alone,

but the payments for her injury belong to her herself and not to her father.

hand her over for betrothal through a document or intercourse, but he has no right to receive money for this. See Rashi and Tosafot in Ketubot there, and Tosafot in Kiddushin 3b, s.v. “The father,” in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud. And in the book Yam HaTalmud a difficulty was raised: If Rav holds that the father has no right to that by which her value is reduced with regard to betrothal, why does the father receive the “defect” with which his daughter was disfigured through rape or seduction! See what Rabbi Meir Simcha distinguished in his novellae: with regard to betrothal money, this is not the father’s property which the one who injured her diminished for him; whereas with regard to what made her a non-virgin, this is the father’s property, since the Torah gave this matter to the father [to make her a non-virgin by handing her over for betrothal and the wedding canopy], and the rapist took the father’s property from him. It might have entered our minds that Rav holds that even shevet belongs to her and not to her father.

He raised an objection to him

from our Mishna:

“One who injures a Hebrew slave is liable for all of them, except for shevet when he is

the slave

his own;

for if he injured his own Hebrew slave, he does not pay him shevet, since his labor belongs to his master; if so, in the case of his daughter also, shevet should belong to her father, since her labor belongs to her father!?

Abaye said:

Rav said that the payment for her injury belongs to her herself only with regard to “damage”—the amount by which her value was reduced through the injury; but

Rav concedes with regard to “shevet”

that it belongs to her father, since

her labor until the time of physical maturity belongs to her father.

He raised an objection to him

from a beraita:

“One who injures his son

the

adult—

shall give

shall pay

him immediately.

He injured

his son

the

minor,

he should not give it to him immediately, for he does not know how to safeguard it, and it is as though he were throwing the money away; rather,

he shall make

for him a segula

a treasure until he grows up; and below it explains what “segula” is.

“One who injures his minor daughter is exempt; and moreover,

even

others who injure her are liable to give [the payment] to her father.”

And this is difficult according to Rav, who says: Her injury belongs to her herself! And we answer:

here too,

we are not speaking of “damage,” but

of “shevet,”

since her labor belongs to him, and shevet comes in place of labor and the proceeds of labor. Therefore, one who injures his minor daughter is exempt from shevet, while others who injure her give shevet to her father; but “damage” \-

it belongs to her and not to her father.

Now the Gemara returns to discuss the words of the beraita mentioned above:

“And in the case of his adult son, he shall give it to him immediately”!

Is he indeed obligated to pay him for his injury!?

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita:

“One who injures the sons and daughters of others,

if

they are adults,

they

he shall give it to them immediately;

if

they are minors,

they

he shall make a segula for them.”

One who injures

his own sons and daughters—

is exempt,

whereas the first beraita holds that he is liable to pay; and they contradict one another!?

They said

the members of the academy:

It is not difficult! Here

where it teaches “exempt”

is when

his sons and daughters

are dependent on his table

and are supported by him.

Here

where it teaches “liable”

is when

his sons and daughters

are not dependent on his table.

If they are dependent on his table, the father is exempt from paying them shevet, because he supports them; but if they are not dependent on his table and he does not support them, he is liable to pay them for their injuries.

And we challenge this:

How did you establish the

beraita

first: as referring to those who are not dependent on his table? If so, say the latter clause

of that beraita:

“One who injures his minor daughter is exempt; moreover, others who injure her are liable to give [the payment] to her father.”

But above we said, according to Rav, that the beraita is speaking of payment of “shevet”; and now this is difficult: If it is when they are not dependent on his table and they support themselves from the proceeds of their labor, then

to her he must give

to pay her the “shevet”

for

that

she requires sustenance,

and “shevet” stands in place of “the proceeds of labor.”

And

one cannot say: The father is permitted to say to his daughter, “Do labor and give me your wages, and I do not give you sustenance; rather, go out and support yourself from charity,” and likewise here—the father should take her shevet, and she should support herself from charity.

In Gittin 12b, the amoraim disputed whether a master may say to his Canaanite slave: “Do labor for me and I do not support you.”

Thus one cannot say this, for

even according to the one who says: The master may say to the slave, “Do labor for me

labor

and I do not support you”

he means “support you”; behold,

this applies only to a Canaanite slave, to whom

the master says to his slave:

“Do work all day, and in the evening go around and eat”

.]“Do your work all day, and in the evening go around the doorways so that you will have what to eat.”

But with regard to a Hebrew slave, of whom it is written

in his case [Deuteronomy 15:16]:

“for it is good for him with you,”

and we expound [Kiddushin 20a]:

“with you

in food; “with you” in drink,

so that you should not eat fine bread while he eats coarse bread; you should not drink aged wine while he drinks new wine; you should not sleep on mattresses while he sleeps on the ground. From here they said: Whoever acquires a Hebrew slave is like one who acquires a master for himself.”

It is obvious that the master

cannot

say to him: “Do labor for me and I do not support you.”

And

all the more so

with regard to

his daughter

that he cannot say to her: “Give me the proceeds of your labor, and go support yourself from charity.”

If so, how is it possible that the first beraita, which says that when others injure a minor daughter he gives the shevet to her father, is speaking in a situation in which the daughter is not dependent on her father’s table? For shevet is like the proceeds of labor, and this is as though he were saying to her: “Give me the proceeds of your labor, and go support yourself from charity”!?

And we answer:

As Rava, son of Rav Ulla, said

with regard to the proceeds of her labor—for we say in Ketubot 43a that the proceeds of her labor belong to her father even when he does not give her sustenance, and we challenge: But a person cannot say to his Hebrew slave, “Do labor for me and I do not support you”; all the more so, his daughter! And Rava, son of Rav Ulla, answered it:

It was necessary only with regard to the surplus,

for if the proceeds of her labor exceed her sustenance, the surplus of the proceeds of her labor belongs to her father.

Here too

with regard to shevet,

it was necessary

to say that shevet belongs to her father

only with regard to

the matter of

the surplus,

for if the payment of her shevet exceeds her sustenance, the surplus belongs to her father.

And we challenge:

How did you establish the

beraita

second

which teaches: “One who injures his own sons and daughters is exempt,”

as referring to those dependent on his table.

If so, why does the first clause of that beraita teach: “One who injures the sons and daughters of others,”

adults—

“he shall give them immediately; minors—

“he shall make a segula for them.”

And

why?

For since they are dependent on their father’s table,

he ought to give it to their father,

for if their father injured them, he is exempt from shevet, since they are dependent on his table; if so, when others injure them as well, the payment of shevet should be given to their father!?

They said

the members of the academy: When others injure them, the payment of shevet does not belong to their father, even though the father is exempt from paying shevet to his sons, because

when he insists

the father

it is regarding something by which he suffers a loss

in something through which he is financially lacking; therefore, money is not taken from him when he injures them.

But

with regard to something that comes from elsewhere,

in the case of shevet that comes from others who injured them,

the father does not insist

the father if the sons take the shevet for themselves; therefore, the Sages did not enact that the shevet should belong to the father.

And we challenge:

But what of a found object

which

the father does not suffer a financial loss, and

from elsewhere

from another place

it

comes

to them,

and nevertheless the Sages enacted that the found object of sons dependent on their father’s table belongs to their father, because

he does insist

if they do not give him their found object!?

They said:

The students of the yeshiva resolved: the find that comes to them without suffering cannot be compared to the payment for loss of work that comes through injury and bodily suffering;

the profit that

comes

to them from elsewhere and they have no bodily suffering in it

[with this monetary profit],

the father is particular,

the father,

but an injury, since they have bodily suffering, and

also

from elsewhere it

comes

to them—

he is not particular,

and the Sages did not institute it for him.

Therefore, one who injures his sons is exempt, since he diminishes their property; when others injure them, they give [the payments] to the sons and not to the father, since they have bodily suffering, even though it comes from elsewhere; the finds of the sons belong to their father, since they have no bodily suffering. And all this is with regard to sons dependent on their father’s table.

But with sons who are not dependent on their father’s table, even if the father injures them, he is liable to pay; all the more so if others injure them, and likewise their finds belong to themselves.

And we raise a difficulty:

But there

in the first beraita,

since bodily suffering is present and it comes from elsewhere

it is that

comes to her, and

the father acquires the payment for his daughter’s injury, since

he is particular!?

For

it teaches: “And furthermore,

even

when others injure her, they are liable to give [the payment] to her father,”

and why? Did you not say: With something that comes from elsewhere and in which there is bodily suffering, he is not particular!?

They said:

The students of the yeshiva resolved: It is different

there, for he is a particular man

[a particular man]

since they are not dependent on his table,

and such a person

is particular even with something that comes to them from elsewhere.

But

here,

[in the later beraita],

where he is not a particular man, since they are dependent on his table,

we say:

When he is particular, it is with something through which he is diminished

in property, even though they suffer bodily suffering;

with something that comes to them from elsewhere

and they have bodily suffering,

he is not particular.

We learned in the beraita above: One who injures his minor son should make a fund for him.

And we explain:

What is “a fund”?

Rav Hisda said: A Torah scroll

for studying from it, so that the produce [of the study] and the principal remain.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A palm tree

[a palm tree]

from which he eats

dates,

and the principal remains; but he should not give the money in an isqa, lest some mishap occur to it and it be lost.

Now the Gemara returns to the words of Rav, who said: The Torah caused the father to acquire only the “benefit of youth” alone.

And likewise Resh Lakish said

in accordance with Rav’s view:

The Torah caused the father to acquire only the “benefit of youth” alone.

And Rabbi Yohanan

disagreed and

said: Even

payments for

injury

the Torah granted to the father.

And we are astonished:

“Injury”—can it enter your mind

that the father acquires them!?

But

even Rabbi Eleazar,

who asked Rav [above

did not

come

to question him

[was not uncertain]

except

with regard to

an injury.