Bava Kamma 87a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehuda says: A blind person has no embarrassment. And thus Rabbi Yehuda used to exempt him from all laws of the Torah,

he neither judges nor is judged, and the court is not obligated to attend to his judgment.

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse says

[Numbers 35:24]:

“And the congregation shall judge between the striker and between the blood-avenger, according to these judgments,”

the verse compared “judgments” to “striker” and “blood-avenger”:

Anyone who is included

[who belongs]

with the striker and with the blood-avenger—

is included in judgments; anyone who is not included with the striker and with the blood-avenger—

is not included in judgments,

and since a blind person was excluded from the law of execution by the court, he is exempt even from judgments.

It was taught in another beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: A blind person has no humiliation, and thus Rabbi Yehuda used to exempt him from all the mitzvot stated in the Torah.

He said

[he explained]

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse says

[Deuteronomy 6:1]:

“And this is the mitzva, the statutes, and the judgments

which the Lord your God commanded you,” the verse compared mitzvot and statutes to judgments.

Anyone who is included in judgments—

is included in mitzvot and statutes; and anyone who is not included in judgments—

is not included in mitzvot and statutes,

and since a blind person was excluded from judgments by the verse “and the congregation shall judge,” as above,

He is exempt even from all the mitzvot. Rav Yosef was blind.

Rav Yosef said: At first I used to say

[I was accustomed to say]:

Whoever says

to me:

The halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda

who says: A blind person is exempt from the mitzvot—I would make a festival day for the Sages

[a meal for the students] out of great joy.

And

what is the reason

was I so happy?

For I am not commanded

[I am not obligated in mitzvot]

and

even so

I perform mitzvot,

and I thought that my reward was greater, since I perform them even though I am not commanded to perform them.

And now that I have heard this which

said

Rabbi Hanina,

for Rabbi Hanina said: Greater is

he

who is commanded

in a mitzva

and performs

it

than one who is not commanded yet performs,

since one who is commanded is more concerned lest he stumble than one who is not commanded, who has “bread in his basket,” for if he wishes, he will not perform it.

Whoever says to me: The halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda

but according to the Sages, who say: A blind person is obligated in all the laws, punishments, and mitzvot of the Torah,

I will make a festival day for the Sages.

And

why is that?

I was so happy,

for when I am commanded, I have greater reward

[if indeed I am commanded in mitzvot, then my reward is greater] than when I am not commanded.

Mishna:

This is the greater stringency of the

law of

a person

who causes damage

than of an ox

that caused damage:

for a person

who injures his fellow

pays

five things:

damage, pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation. And

if he struck a pregnant woman and she miscarried,

he pays the value of the offspring

to the woman's husband.

And

if

an ox

that injured a person

pays only for damage

and is exempt from pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, as it is stated [Leviticus 24:19]: “And if a man gives a blemish to his fellow, as he did, so shall it be done to him,” and we expound: “a man against his fellow” is liable in the law of inflicting blemishes [the four payments], but not an ox that injures his owner's fellow.

And

likewise, when an ox injures a pregnant woman and she miscarries, its owner

is exempt from the value of the offspring,

as it is stated [Exodus 21:22]: “And when men fight and they strike a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge, but there is no fatality [death], he shall surely be punished, as the woman's husband imposes upon him,” and we expound: “when men fight”—but not oxen.

a. “One who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death” [Exodus 21:15], and his death is by strangulation; and specifically when he injured them and made a wound [a blow in which there is blood].

b. One who intentionally performs labor on Shabbat is liable to stoning if witnesses warned him; but one who performs labor on Yom Kippur is not executed by the court, but is liable for karet, and if witnesses warned him, he is flogged.

c. An injury in which there is blood [a wound] is labor on Shabbat and on Yom Kippur, because the blood is the life, and it is like slaughtering, for which one is liable on account of “taking a life” [Shabbat 75b].

d. If he committed a transgression for which court-imposed death is incurred, and at that same time he damaged his fellow's property or injured him, he is exempt from paying [even if he committed this transgression inadvertently, so that he is not liable for it]; if he committed a transgression for which only karet or lashes are incurred, even if he did so intentionally, he is not exempt from the payments for injury for which he became liable at that time.

One who strikes

his father and his mother

[or his mother]

and did not

make a wound in them

[a blow in which there is blood], since he is not liable for court-imposed death for striking them, is liable for all of them—damage, pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation.

And

likewise

one who injures his fellow on Yom Kippur,

even though he made a wound in him,

is liable for all of them,

since there is no court-imposed death for one who performs labor on Yom Kippur.

One who injures a Hebrew slave

[an Israelite who was sold as a slave]

is liable for all of them

like one who injures a free man,

except for loss of livelihood

for which he is not liable

while he is his

[if the master injured his own slave].

One who injures another's Canaanite slave is liable for all of them

and even for humiliation;

Rabbi Judah

disagrees and

says: there is no

one who injures

slaves

who has a payment obligation of

“humiliation,”

therefore, he is liable only for damage, pain, medical expenses, and loss of livelihood, but not for humiliation; and in the Gemara [88a] it explains their dispute.

A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor

have no understanding, and their acts do not obligate them; therefore

their injury is disadvantageous—

one who injures them is liable, while they, when they injure others, are exempt.

And likewise

the slave

[a Canaanite slave]

and the woman

[a married woman]

their injury is disadvantageous—

one who injures them is liable, while they, when they injure others, are exempt,

because they have nothing with which to pay: a slave has no property, because “whatever a slave acquires belongs to his master”; a woman has no ability to pay from her property, because it is subordinated to her husband.

But the woman and the slave are not equal to the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor, because the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor are completely exempt, even later, when they become people of understanding;

but

the woman and the slave

pay later,

when they have money.

How so?

If the woman is divorced and the slave is freed,

and they acquire property, then they

are obligated to pay.

One who strikes his father and his mother

[or his mother]

and makes a wound in them,

is exempt from all of them [from all monetary payments for his injury].

And

likewise

one who injures his fellow on Shabbat

a blow in which there is blood,

is exempt from all of them, because his life is judged

[he committed a transgression for which court-imposed death is incurred], and is exempt from monetary payments arising at that same time.

And one who injures his own Canaanite slave is exempt from all of them.

Gemara:

a. The father betroths his daughter, and the money of her betrothal belongs to him.

b. The work of a daughter, and likewise her found objects, belong to her father.

Rabbi Elazar asked

[asked]

Rav: One who injures the minor daughter of another,

the payments for the

injury to whom

are they given?

Do

[do we]

say: since the Merciful One granted the father the gains of youth

as it is written [Numbers 30:17]: “While she is in her youth, in her father's house,” and we expound: all the gains of youth belong to her father, and even the money of her betrothal belongs to him, if so, the payments for

injury also belong to her father; for what reason? For he diminished her value

and this too is a “gain of youth.”

Or perhaps

it is not comparable:

“the gain of youth”

[the money of her betrothal]

is what the Merciful One granted him, for

the Torah gave him permission to betroth her to whomever he wishes, and

if he wishes

to hand her over

even

to a leper, he can hand her over

to him; therefore, it is logical that the money of her betrothal belongs to him.

But injury, since if he wished to be injured by her

[to injure her]

he could not injure her,

for a person is not permitted to injure his daughter, since she is an Israelite woman and he transgresses “he shall not add, lest he add to striking him” [Deuteronomy 25:3] if so, she is not under her father's control with regard to injury, and

the Merciful One did not grant him

the payment for the injury.