Bava Kamma 87a (פז.) — the Talmud in English

And so Rabbi Yehuda exempted him from all laws of the Torah,

he may neither judge nor be judged, and a court is not obligated to address his case.

What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion? The verse says

Numbers 35:24:

“The assembly shall judge between the assailant and the blood avenger, according to these laws,”

the verse compares the word “laws” to “assailant” and “blood avenger”:

Anyone who is included

who belongs

among the assailant and the blood avenger—

is included among the laws; and anyone who is not included among the assailant and the blood avenger—

is not included among the laws.

Since a blind person was excluded from the law of execution by a court, he is also exempt from the laws.

It was taught in another beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: A blind person is not subject to payment for humiliation, and so Rabbi Yehuda exempted him from all the mitzvot stated in the Torah.

Rav Shisha son of Rav Idi said

explaining:

What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda? The verse says

[Deuteronomy 6:1]:

“And this is the mitzva, the statutes, and the laws

that the Lord your God commanded you,” the verse juxtaposes mitzvot and statutes with laws.

Anyone who is included in the laws—

is included in the mitzvot and statutes; and anyone who is not included in the laws—

is not included in the mitzvot and statutes.

And since a blind person was excluded from the laws by the verse “and the assembly shall judge,” as stated above,

He is exempt even from all the mitzvot. Rav Yosef was blind.

Rav Yosef said: At first I used to say

that I would regularly say:

If someone were to tell

me:

The halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda

who says: A blind person is exempt from the mitzvot, I would make a festival day for the Sages

[a feast for the students], out of great joy.

And

what is the reason

that I would have been so happy?

Because I would not be commanded

[I would not be obligated in the mitzvot]

and

even so

I would perform mitzvot,

and I thought that my reward would be greater, since I would perform them even though I was not commanded to do so.

Now that I have heard this teaching of

said

by Rabbi Hanina,

for Rabbi Hanina said: Greater is the one who is commanded

than

the one commanded

in a mitzva

and performs it

than one who is not commanded and performs it,

since the one who is commanded is more concerned that he might fail than one who is not commanded, who has “bread in his basket,” for if he wishes, he need not perform it.

because one who is commanded is more concerned that he might fail than one who is not commanded, who has “bread in his basket,” since if he wishes, he need not perform the commandment.

If someone were to tell me: The halakha does not follow Rabbi Yehuda

but follows the Sages, who say that a blind person is obligated in all the laws, punishments, and mitzvot of the Torah,

I would make a festival day for the Sages.

And

what is the reason

was I so happy?

Because when I am commanded, I have greater reward

[If indeed I am commanded to perform mitzvot, then my reward is greater] than if I am not commanded.

Mishna:

This is the greater stringency of the

case of

a person

who causes damage

than of an ox

that causes damage:

For a person

who injures another

pays

five types of compensation:

damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation. And

if he struck a pregnant woman and she miscarried,

he pays the value of the miscarried offspring

to the woman's husband.

And

if

an ox

injures a person,

it pays only for damage

and is exempt from payment for pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, as it is stated [Leviticus 24:19]: “And if a man inflicts a blemish upon his fellow, as he has done, so shall it be done to him.” And we expound: “A man upon his fellow”—he is liable in the case of inflicting blemishes [the four types of compensation]; but not an ox that injures the fellow of its owner.

And

likewise, when an ox injures a pregnant woman and she miscarries, its owner

is exempt from payment for the miscarried offspring,

as it is stated [Exodus 21:22]: “And when men fight and they strike a pregnant woman, and her offspring emerge, but there is no fatality [death], he shall surely be punished, as the woman's husband shall impose upon him,” and we expound: “And when men fight”—but not oxen.

a. “One who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death” [Exodus 21:15], and his death is by strangulation; this applies specifically when he injured them and caused a wound [a blow that draws blood].

b. One who intentionally performs labor on Shabbat is liable to stoning if witnesses issued him a warning; but one who performs labor on Yom Kippur is not executed by a court. Rather, he is liable to karet, and if witnesses issued him a warning, he is flogged.

c. An injury that draws blood [a wound] is labor on Shabbat and on Yom Kippur, because the blood is the life, and it is like slaughtering, for which one is liable because of “taking a life” [Shabbat 75b].

d. If one commits a transgression for which he is liable to execution by a court, and at that same time damages another's property or injures him, he is exempt from payment [even if he committed this transgression unwittingly, in which case he is not liable for it]; if he committed a transgression for which he is liable only to karet or lashes, even if he did so intentionally, he is not exempt from the payments for the injury for which he became liable at that time.

One who strikes

his father and his mother

[or his mother]

but does not

cause them a wound

[a blow that draws blood], since he is not liable to execution by a court for striking them, is liable for all of them—damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation.

And

likewise,

one who injures another on Yom Kippur,

even though he caused him a wound,

is liable for all of them,

since there is no execution by a court for one who performs labor on Yom Kippur.

One who injures a Hebrew slave

[an Israelite who was sold into slavery]

is liable for all of them

as when one injures a free person,

except for loss of livelihood

for which he is not liable

while he belongs to him

[if the master injured his own slave].

One who injures another's Canaanite slave is liable for all of them

even for humiliation.

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees and

says: There is no

payment obligation for one who injures

slaves

with regard to

“humiliation,”

therefore, he is liable only for damage, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood, but not for humiliation; and in the Gemara [88a] it explains their dispute.

A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor

lack understanding, and their actions do not make them liable; therefore,

their injury is disadvantageous—

one who injures them is liable, whereas they are exempt when they injure others.

Likewise,

the slave

[a Canaanite slave] and

the woman

[a married woman]

their injury is disadvantageous—

one who injures them is liable, whereas they are exempt when they injure others,

because they have nothing with which to pay: A slave has no assets, because “whatever a slave acquires belongs to his master”; a woman has no ability to pay from her assets, because they are subject to her husband's rights.

But a woman and a slave are not equivalent to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, because a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are completely exempt, even later, when they become capable of understanding;

but

the woman and the slave

pay later,

when they have money.

How so?

If the woman is divorced or the slave is freed,

and they acquire assets, then they are

liable to pay.

One who strikes his father and his mother

[or his mother]

and causes them a wound,

is exempt from all of them [from all monetary payments for his injury].

And

likewise,

one who injures another on Shabbat

with a blow that draws blood,

is exempt from all of them, because he is judged with regard to his life

[he committed a transgression for which one is liable to execution by a court] and is exempt from monetary payments arising at that same time.

And one who injures his own Canaanite slave is exempt from all of them.

Gemara:

a. A father betroths his daughter, and the money of her betrothal belongs to him.

b. The earnings of a daughter, as well as anything she finds, belong to her father.

Rabbi Elazar asked

[he asked]

Rav: In the case of one who injures another's minor daughter,

to whom are the payments for

the injury

given?

Do

[we]

say: Since the Merciful One granted the father the benefit of her youth

as it is written [Numbers 30:17]: “While she is in her youth, in her father's house,” and we expound: All the benefits of her youth belong to her father—and even the money of her betrothal belongs to him—if so,

the payment for her injury also belongs to her father. What is the reason? For the injury diminished her value

and this too is a benefit of her youth.

Or perhaps

it is not comparable:

“The benefit of her youth”

[the money of her betrothal]

is what the Merciful One granted him, for

the Torah gave him permission to betroth her to whomever he wishes, and

if he wishes

to hand her over

even

to one afflicted with boils, he can hand her over

to him. Therefore, it is logical that the money of her betrothal belongs to him.

But with regard to an injury, since if he wished to injure her

[to wound her]

he could not injure her,

because a person is not permitted to injure his daughter—after all, she is an Israelite woman, and he would violate “He shall not add, lest he add to strike him” [Deuteronomy 25:3]—if so, she is not under her father's authority with regard to injury, and

the Merciful One did not grant him

the payment for the injury.