Bava Kamma 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

Or if he

stole and consecrated.

stole and sold on credit

[that is, he sold it on credit]. Or if he

stole and exchanged

the stolen animal for something else, through an acquisition by “exchange.”

Or if he

stole and paid

the ox

as his debt,

or if he

stole and paid

the ox

against his credit [

he paid with it what he owed at the shop].

Or if he

stole and sent betrothal gifts

[gifts customarily sent by a groom to his betrothed]

to the house

of his father-in-law—

In all these cases, he

pays four and five payments.

And we raised the difficulty:

What does this teach us

this beraita!?

And we answer: There is a novelty in the first clause, and a novelty in the latter clause.

The first clause teaches us: “

If he stole and gave it to another, and [the other] slaughtered

it as his agent, he is liable; and if he stole and gave it to another, and [the other] sold it as his agent, he is liable.” With this, the tanna teaches us

that there is agency for a transgression in slaughter and sale,

even though throughout the entire Torah there is no agency for a transgression.

Although throughout the entire Torah there is no agency for a transgression,

nevertheless

here—

in slaughter and sale—

there is agency for a transgression!

What is the reason?

Because it is stated: “

And he slaughtered it or sold it.”

Just as a sale cannot take place other than through another

namely, a purchaser, since the transaction is performed by a seller and a purchaser,

so too, slaughter through another

namely, an agent,

makes

the thief liable. And we again derive that sale is like slaughter, to make the thief liable even for a sale performed through an agent.

And the latter clause teaches us: If he stole and consecrated

it, he is liable, and it teaches us:

What difference is there whether he sold it to an ordinary person,

for which the Torah made him liable for four and five payments,

or whether he sold it

to Heaven;

he should be liable in this case just as in that case.

a. A thief becomes liable only when he steals and performs an act of acquisition with the stolen object. b. The acquisition effected by theft is either through lifting, whether in the owners’ domain or outside their domain, or through pulling. The amoraim dispute in Ketubot 31b whether pulling effects acquisition with regard to theft even in the public domain, or whether pulling effects acquisition only when he pulls the object into his own domain or into a side area.

Mishna:

If one stole

an ox or a sheep

from the owners’ domain,

that is, he pulled it from the owners’ domain,

and slaughtered or sold

it

outside their domain,

for by pulling it outside their domain—into the public domain or into a side area—he effected an acquisition.

Or if he stole it outside their domain,

that is, the animal was outside the owners’ domain, and the thief lifted it there and brought it into the owners’ domain,

and slaughtered or sold it in their domain

of the owners.

Or if he stole it

through lifting or pulling,

and

also

slaughtered or sold it outside their domain.

In all these cases, he

pays four and five payments.

If he was pulling it

the ox from the owners’ domain

and was emerging

with it outside their domain,

and it died

while the ox was still

in the owners’ domain,

the thief is

exempt

from paying for the ox, since he did not perform an act of acquisition.

If he lifted it

in the owners’ domain,

or removed it from the owners’ domain—

into the public domain or into a side area—

and it died, he

is

liable, since he performed an act of acquisition through lifting or pulling.

If he gave it

to

a

koen for

the redemption of his firstborn son

[which he was obligated to redeem], or

to his creditor, or:

to an unpaid bailee, a borrower, a paid bailee, or a renter.

And he was pulling it,

and it died

the ox

in the owners’ domain,

the thief is

exempt.

If he lifted it, or removed it from the owners’ domain, and it died, he is liable

the thief.

This clause will be explained in the Gemara shortly.

Gemara:

Ameimar raised a dilemma:

Did the Sages

institute

a requirement of

pulling for bailees,

so that a bailee does not become liable for the bailment until he pulls it,

or not

did they institute this requirement?

Rav Yeimar said

to Ameimar:

Come and hear

from our Mishna, which indicates that the Sages instituted pulling for bailees:

For we learned:

If he gave it for the redemption of his firstborn son, or to his creditor, to an unpaid bailee, to a borrower, to a paid bailee, or to a renter, and he was pulling it and it died in

the owners’ domain, he is exempt;

if he lifted it or removed it from the owners’ domain and it died, he is liable.

And

is it not so that what we learned—“he was pulling it, he lifted it, he removed it”—means that the

bailee

or the koen, creditor, borrower, or renter performed these actions? This is the interpretation of our Mishna:

The thief said to the koen, before the thief lifted it, that the koen should take it from the owners’ domain as payment for the thief’s redemption of his son; or he said to his creditor that he should take it as payment; or he said to an unpaid or paid bailee that they should take it from there to guard it; or he said to a borrower or renter that they should take it from there to use it. These people were pulling the ox and emerging from the owners’ domain, and the ox died before they managed to remove it from the owners’ domain. The thief is exempt, because no act of acquisition had yet been performed, either by the thief or by his agents. But if these people lifted it, or if they had already removed it from the owners’ domain and pulling had thereby effected acquisition, the thief is liable on account of their lifting

.

And

if so,

infer from this—

from the fact that the Mishna mentioned pulling and lifting also with regard to bailees—

that the Sages instituted pulling for bailees.

Ameimar said

to Rav Yeimar:

No,

not as you explained what we learned: “If he was pulling it, lifted it, or took it out,” meaning the pulling and lifting performed by the bailee, or one of those mentioned in our Mishna; rather, it refers to the pulling and lifting performed by the

thief—

and this is the explanation of our Mishna: The owner gave the ox to a koen for the redemption of his son, or the owner gave it to his creditor [but had not yet transferred ownership to them; rather, he gave it to them as an apotiki, saying that if he did not pay by a particular day, it would belong to them],

or to an unpaid bailee, a borrower, a paid bailee, or a renter, and the thief was pulling it from the domain of one of these people, and it died in their domain—in that case he is exempt, because the thief had still not performed an act of acquisition. But if the thief lifted it in the domain of one of these people, or took it out of their domain, so that an act of acquisition had already occurred, the thief is liable.

Rav Yeimar challenged Ameimar: How could you possibly explain the latter clause of our Mishna as referring to the thief’s pulling and lifting the

thief!?

But it already taught

this very law—in the

first clause!?

Ameimar replied to Rav Yeimar:

The tanna taught

this law in the

first clause

with regard to a

thief who stole from the owner’s house, and the tanna taught

the same law in the latter clause with regard to a

thief who stole from a bailee’s house.

Rav Ashi said

to Ameimar:

Do not reject Rav Yeimar! For the explanation you offer of our Mishna—that the first clause concerns the thief’s acquisitions from the owner’s domain, while the latter clause concerns the thief’s acquisitions from the bailee’s house—is not reasonable, because:

What difference is there between a thief who stole from a bailee’s house and a thief who stole from the owner’s house!?

Rather, is it not the case that our Mishna deals with acquisitions by the

bailee

and the others mentioned,

and

indeed,

learn from it: They instituted pulling for bailees.

And we conclude:

Learn from it!

It was also stated: Rabbi Elazar said: Just as they instituted pulling for purchasers, so they instituted pulling for bailees.

It was also taught likewise:

a.

Just as they instituted pulling for purchasers, so they instituted pulling for bailees.

b.

And just as land is acquired

by the purchaser

with money,

by means of a document, and through possession, so too a rental is acquired

by the renter

with money, by means of a document, and through possession.

And we explain:

A rental of what? [That is, of what] does the beraita say that it is acquired through these acts of acquisition?

does the beraita say is acquired through these acts of acquisition?