Bava Kamma 79a — the Talmud in English

Or if he

stole and consecrated.

Stole and sold on credit

sold it on credit]. Or if he

stole and exchanged

the theft for another object, through the acquisition of “exchange”.

Or if he

stole and gave it as a gift.

Or if he

paid

for the ox

with his debt, or if he

or if he

paid

for the ox

with his credit [he paid with it what he owed for his credit at the shop].

he paid with it what he owed at the shop].

Or if he

stole and sent engagement gifts [

gifts that a groom customarily sends to his betrothed]

to the house

of his father-in-law—

In all these cases, he

pays the four-and-five payment.

And we raise an objection:

What does this teach us

this beraita?!

And we answer: There is a novelty in the first clause, and a novelty in the last clause:

It teaches us in the first clause: “

He stole and gave it to another, and he slaughtered it

as his agent, for which he is liable; and he stole and gave it to another and sold it as his agent, for which he is liable.” And the tan­‍nay taught us by this

that there is an agent for a transgression in slaughter and sale,

for

even though throughout the entire Torah there is no agent for a transgression,

nevertheless

here—

in slaughter and sale—

there is an agent for a transgression!

What is the reason?

Because it is stated: “

And he slaughtered it or sold it.”

Just as a sale, which cannot possibly be other than through another person,

namely, a buyer, since the transaction is effected by a seller and a buyer,

so too slaughter by another person

namely, an agent,

makes

the thief liable; and then we derive sale from slaughter, to make the thief liable even for a sale through an agent.

And it teaches us in the last clause: He stole and consecrated it

for which he is liable, and it teaches us:

What difference is there if he sold it to an ordinary person,

for which the Torah made him liable for four and five, and

what difference is there if he sold it

to Heaven;

and he should be liable in this case as in that case.

a. A thief becomes liable only when he stole and performed an act of acquisition in the theft. b. The acquisition of a theft is either through lifting, whether in the owners’ domain or outside their domain; and likewise through pulling. The amoraim disputed in Ketubot 31b whether pulling effects acquisition with regard to theft even in the public domain, or whether pulling effects acquisition only when he pulled it into his domain or into a side-area.

Mishna:

He stole

the ox or the sheep

in the owners’ domain,

that is, he pulled it from the owners’ domain,

and slaughtered and sold

it

outside their domain,

for by pulling it outside their domain—into the public domain or into a side-area—an acquisition is effected.

Or if he stole outside their domain,

that is, the animal was outside the owners’ domain, and the thief lifted it there, and brought it into the owners’ domain,

and slaughtered and sold it in their domain

of the owners.

Or if he stole

through lifting or pulling,

and

also

slaughtered and sold it outside their domain.

In all these cases, he

pays the four-and-five payment.

But

if

he stole

not through lifting and

slaughtered and sold it in their domain

of the owners, he is

exempt,

because no act of acquisition was performed.

If he was pulling

the ox, the thief, from the owners’ domain

and was going out

with it outside their domain,

and it died

while the ox was still

in the owners’ domain,

the thief is

exempt

from paying for the ox, since he did not perform an act of acquisition.

If he lifted it,

the thief, in the owners’ domain,

or took it out of the owners’ domain—

into the public domain or into a side-area—

and it died, he

is

liable, because he performed an act of acquisition through lifting or pulling.

He gave it

to

a kohen for

the

firstborn of his son [which he is obligated to redeem], or

to his creditor,

or:

to a gratuitous bailee, to a borrower, to a paid bailee, or to a renter.

And he was pulling it,

and it died

the ox

in the owners’ domain,

the thief is

exempt.

If he lifted it, or took it out of the owners’ domain, and it died, he is liable,

the thief.

вор.

This clause will be explained in the Gemara shortly.

Gemara:

Ameimar raised a problem:

Did the Sages

institute

for

pulling among bailees,

so that a bailee does not become liable for guarding until he pulls it,

or did they not

institute it?

Rav Yeimar said to Ameimar:

Come and hear

from our Mishna that they instituted pulling for a bailee:

For we learned:

He gave it for the firstborn of his son, or to his creditor, to a gratuitous bailee, to a borrower, to a paid bailee, or to a renter; he was pulling it and going out, and it died in

the owners’ domain, he is exempt;

if he lifted it or took it out of the owners’ domain and it died, he is liable.

And

what,

is it not that what we learned: “He was pulling it, he lifted it, he took it out,” means that

the

bailee

or the kohen or the creditor or the borrower and renter did so; and this is the interpretation of our Mishna:

The thief said to the kohen, before the thief lifted it, that the kohen should take it from the owners’ domain as the redemption of the thief’s firstborn, or he said to his creditor that he should take it as payment of the debt, or he said to a gratuitous bailee or a paid bailee that they should take it from there to guard it, or he said to a borrower or a renter that they should take it from there to use it. And these “others” were pulling the ox and going out from the owners’ domain, and the ox died before they managed to take it out of the owners’ domain—the thief is exempt, because an act of acquisition had still not been performed either by the thief or by his agents. But if these others lifted it, or they had already taken it out of the owners’ domain and pulling had thereby been effected, then the thief is liable on account of the lifting performed by these others.

And

if so,

learn from it—

from the fact that the Mishna mentioned pulling and lifting also concerning bailees—

that they instituted pulling for bailees.

Ameimar said

to Rav Yeimar:

No,

not as you explained what we learned: “If he was pulling it, lifted it, or carried it out”—that this refers to the custodian’s pulling or lifting, or to one of the other people mentioned in our Mishna. Rather, it refers to the thief’s pulling or lifting

.

This is the explanation of our Mishna: If the owner gave the ox to a priest for the redemption of his firstborn son, or gave it to his creditor [but had not yet transferred ownership to them; rather, he designated it as collateral and told them that if he did not repay the debt by a certain day, it would belong to them],

or gave it to an unpaid custodian, a borrower, a paid custodian, or a renter, and the thief pulled it from the domain of one of these people and it died in their domain, he is exempt, because the thief had still not performed an act of acquisition. But if the thief lifted it in the domain of one of these people, or carried it out of their domain, so that an act of acquisition had already taken place, the thief is liable.

Rav Yeimar said to Ameimar: How could it enter your mind to explain the latter clause of our Mishna as referring to the thief’s pulling or lifting the

thief!?

It already taught

this very law in the

first clause!?

Ameimar replied to Rav Yeimar:

The first clause teaches

this law with regard to a

thief who stole from the owner’s house, and the latter clause teaches

the same law with regard to a

thief who stole from a custodian’s house.

Rav Ashi said

to Ameimar:

Do not dismiss

Rav Yeimar! The explanation you give of our Mishna—that the first clause discusses the thief’s acquisitions from the owner’s domain, while the latter clause discusses the thief’s acquisitions from the custodian’s house—is not reasonable, because:

What difference is there between a thief who stole from a custodian’s house and a thief who stole from the owner’s house!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that our Mishna discusses the acquisitions of the

custodian

and the other people mentioned,

and

indeed

this proves that the Sages instituted pulling for custodians.

And we conclude:

This proves it!

It was also stated: Rabbi Elazar said: Just as the Sages instituted pulling as an act of acquisition for purchasers, so they instituted pulling as an act of acquisition for custodians.

It was also taught in a beraita:

a.

Just as the Sages instituted pulling as an act of acquisition for purchasers, so they instituted pulling as an act of acquisition for custodians.

b.

Just as land is acquired

by the purchaser

with money,

by deed, and through taking possession, so a rental is acquired

by the renter

with money, by deed, and through taking possession.

And we explain:

A rental of what

does the beraita say is acquired through these acts of acquisition?