Bava Kamma 79b (עט:) — the Talmud in English

If you say

the rental of movable property?

That cannot be said, for: Is that so?

Are movable objects subject to a document

[Are they subject to a document?] That is to say: This works well with money, for although the Sages instituted that money does not effect acquisition, but only meshikha, it nevertheless effects acquisition with regard to accepting “He who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood and from the generation of the Dispersion will in the future exact payment from one who does not stand by his word,” but a document does not effect acquisition of movable property; so why did the beraita institute that rental is effected by a document?

Rather,

said

Rav Chisda

explained:

The beraita is dealing with

the rental of land,

and teaches us that it is effected through money, a document, and possession, just as a sale of land is effected through money, a document, and possession.

Rabbi Elazar said:

If

they saw him

the thief

hiding in the woods

[a forest] , that is, if they saw a person hiding in a forest in order to steal animals grazing there, and

he slaughtered

this man

and sold

the animals he had stolen,

he pays the fourfold and fivefold payment.

The initial assumption is that this man went secretly and slaughtered the animal where it was,

and therefore we ask:

Why? But he did not pull it!

And a thief is not liable unless he performed an act of acquisition.

He said

Rabbi Chisda

answered:

For example,

he struck it with a stick

and acquired it through meshikha.

The scholars

raised another difficulty:

And since they saw him

hiding, and he saw them and was not concerned about them, he is not a thief but

he is a robber,

and a robber is not liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment.

And we answer:

Since he is hiding from them

[since he hid from them], for he hid in the woods,

he is a thief.

The Tosafot wrote in the name of R. Yitzhak [on the gloss "And once they saw him"]: we do not read "from them" but rather 'once he hid himself from the people of the world,' [and in that recension the Raavad wrote 'Geneivah A G']; ;

Rather—

according to your words—

what is the case of a robber,

in what manner is he considered a robber!?

Rabbi Abbahu said: For example, Benaiah son of Jehoiada, as it is stated

about him: “

And he wrested the spear from the Egyptian’s hand and killed him with his own spear.”

Rabbi Yohanan said: For example, the men of Shechem, as it is stated

about them: “

And the men of Shechem set ambushes for him on the tops of the mountains, and they robbed all who passed by them on the road.”

And we ask:

And Rabbi Abbahu—

who learned this from Benaiah son of Jehoiada—

what is the reason that he did not say from this

verse concerning the men of Shechem!?

He would say to you,

Rabbi Abbahu:

Since they hid themselves in hiding

[since they hid themselves in ambush],

they are not robbers

with regard to the fourfold and fivefold payment.

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who brought a proof from the men of Shechem, would say to you:

Their hiding

was only in order

that people should not see them and flee from them,

[they did not hide out of fear of the people, but so that the people would not see them and flee from them].

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai’s disciples asked him:

Why did the Torah deal more stringently with a thief,

who pays double and the fourfold and fivefold payment,

than with a robber,

who does not pay all of these, but only the principal?

He said to them,

Rabbi Yohanan:

This one—

the robber—

equated the honor of a servant

[human beings]

with the honor of his Master,

for he is no more afraid of human beings than he is of the Holy One, blessed be He.

And this one—

the thief—

did not equate the honor of a servant with the honor of his Master,

for he fears them more than he fears the Holy One, blessed be He; and

as though he made the lower eye

[a euphemistic expression, meaning the upper eye]

as though it does not see, and the lower ear as though it does not hear.

The Maharshal explained that the thief, since he fears the judgment below and does not fear the judgment above, he denies Divine Providence and reward and punishment from above; ;

As it is stated: “

Woe to those who go deep’

to conceal counsel,

[that is, they plot in secret to steal and do harm],

and their deeds are in darkness.”

And it is written: “

They kill the widow and the stranger, and murder the orphans.

And they say: The Lord will not see, and the God of Jacob will not understand.”

And it is written: “

For they said: The Lord has abandoned’

the land, and the Lord does not

see.”

Rabbi Meir said: He gave a parable in the name of Rabban Gamliel:

The Torah’s distinction between a thief and a robber

is analogous to what?

To two people who were in a city and each prepared

a

feast,

the

one invited the people of the city but did not invite the king’s people; and the

other

did not invite the people of the city and did not invite the king’s people,

now

which of them receives the greater punishment!?

You must say: The one who invited the people of the city but did not invite the king’s people.

In the Tosefta [7:1] the textual reading is: "and did not call the king." the king.” did not read

So too, the thief, who fears human beings as though he had invited them to his feast, but did not invite the Holy One, blessed be He, for he does not fear Him; whereas in the eyes of the robber, human beings and the Holy One, blessed be He, are equal, and he fears neither of them, as though he had invited neither of them to his feast.

Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great is the power of labor!

A bull whose labor

the thief

caused to cease

by his theft, depriving the owner of his work, he pays

five

when he slaughtered or sold it.

But

a sheep whose labor he did not cause to cease

for the owner, since it is not designated for labor, the thief pays only

four.

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Come and see how great is the honor of people!

A bull that walked on its own feet

when the thief stole it, so that the thief did not need to demean himself by carrying it on his shoulders, the Torah obligated him to pay

five

when he slaughtered or sold it. But

a sheep that he carried

the thief

on his shoulders,

demeaning himself, the Torah eased his liability, so that he pays only

four,

when he slaughtered or sold it.

Mishna:

a.

One may not

raise small livestock in the Land of Israel,

because of the settlement of the Land of Israel, since the animals damage the fields, and all the fields of the Land of Israel are presumed to belong to Jews.

But one may raise them in Syria

[Aram Tzova], which David conquered for his own needs, and this tanna maintains that “the conquest of an individual” “is not considered a conquest,” and therefore its law is not like that of the Land of Israel.

And

so too, one may raise small livestock

in the wildernesses of the Land

of Israel,

where there are no fields for them to damage.

b.

One may not raise chickens in Jerusalem,

which is the place where sacrificial meat is eaten,

because of the sacrificial meat,

lest they render it impure, since chickens are accustomed to pecking in refuse, and perhaps they will bring a lentil-sized bone from a creeping creature and render the sacrificial meat impure.

Nor may priests

raise chickens

in

all

the Land of Israel, because of the purity

of the foods they eat, since they eat teruma and must be careful regarding their own purity and the purity of the teruma.

c.

One may not raise pigs anywhere,

even in the Diaspora, as the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

d.

A person may not raise a dog,

because it bites and barks, and a woman may miscarry out of fear of it,

unless it was tied with a chain.

e.

One may not spread traps

[snares, traps]

for pigeons,

because there is concern that the pigeons of the settled areas may fall into them,

unless it was thirty ris distant from the settled area

[which is four mil, and a mil is 2,000 cubits].

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One may not raise small livestock in the Land of Israel, but one may raise them in the woods

[forests]

of the Land of Israel.

As Onkelos translates the verse [Deuteronomy 19:5], “And one who enters the forest with his fellow”: “One who enters the forest with his fellow,” as Rashi explains.

And in Syria—

which is “the conquest of an individual,” and is not considered a conquest—one may raise them

even in a settled area, and needless to say

one may raise small livestock

in the Diaspora.

Another baraita was taught:

One may not raise small livestock in the Land of Israel, but one may raise them in the wilderness of Judea and in the wilderness on the border of Akko [

samekh with a sheva, and peh with a kamatz]

Akko,

as we likewise learned in our Mishna: “But one may raise them … and in the wildernesses of the Land of Israel.”

And although

the Sages said:

One may not raise small livestock

in the Land of Israel,

but one may raise

there

large livestock,

even though these too cause damage, the reason is:

Because a decree is not imposed upon the community unless the majority of the community can withstand it—

and therefore they imposed the decree only with regard to small livestock, a decree that the community can withstand, because

small livestock—

which is needed mostly for eating—

can be brought from outside the Land,

whereas

large livestock—

which is needed in settled areas for carrying loads and plowing—

cannot be brought from outside the Land.

That is, bringing it from outside the Land would not be sufficient, since one must raise it locally; this is not so with regard to small livestock, which one can bring in and slaughter.

And although

the Sages said:

One may not raise small livestock, but he may keep

small livestock in his possession

before the pilgrimage Festival—

when the number of festive meals increases—

for thirty days, and

he may likewise keep it

before

the

wedding feast of his son for thirty days.

Provided that he does not keep the last one

that he purchased close to the Festival

for thirty days,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

The tanna’s intent in his words is to teach us

that it might have entered your mind to say: If the Festival has passed, and from the time he purchased it until now—

thirty days have still not elapsed for him [

if the Festival has already passed, but thirty days have not yet elapsed since he purchased it],

do not

say: Thirty days are permitted for him to keep it [

and the tanna teaches us that we should not say: The Sages permitted him to keep it for thirty days, and therefore he may keep it until thirty days have elapsed]. This is not the law.

Rather, once the Festival has passed

he is no longer permitted to keep it [

once the Festival has passed, he may no longer keep it].