Bava Kamma 66b — the Talmud in English

In any event,

the robber says to him

the robbed person:

“Here is yours before you,”

and he need not pay him the value of the leavened bread as it was worth at the time of the robbery, even though the leavened bread is now worth nothing.

And from here there is a difficulty against Rabba: for

this

leavened bread

once the time of its prohibition arrived [when the time of the prohibition of the leavened bread arrived],

then

he certainly despairs

the robbed person of the leavened bread -

And now it is difficult:

and if it enters your mind that despair

alone

acquires

and like Rabba,

why does he say to him

the robbed person: “

Here is yours before you,”

when the robber has acquired the stolen property through despair and it does not belong to the robbed person, and it is not appropriate to say, “Here is yours before you,” and the mitzva of “and he shall return the stolen property” is not fulfilled in it—and if so,

he must pay him full value [he must pay him the full monetary value, according to the value of the leavened bread at the time of the robbery]!? As is the law of anyone who does not fulfill “and he shall return the stolen property,” who is liable for its value as at the time of the robbery.

[polnuiu stoimost, ravnuiu stoimosti khametsa v moment pokhishcheniia, on dolzhen zaplatit emu] — kak v sluchae kazhdogo, kto ne ispolniaet zapoved vozvrata pokhishchennogo i dolzhen zaplatit ego stoimost po ee razmeru v moment pokhishcheniia.

He said to him

Rabba said to Rav Yosef:

When I say this [when did I say] that despair acquires? When

[kogda ia govoril], chto otchaivanie priobretaet, eto otnositsia k sluchaiu, kogda

this

the robbed person

despairs, and this

the robber

wants to acquire

the stolen property.

But

this

leavened bread indeed,

this

the robbed person

despairs, and

however

this

the robber

does not want to acquire

it, and whenever the robber does not want to acquire it, he does not acquire the stolen property, and he can return it and be exempt.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba—

who holds that despair acquires—from that which was taught:

It is written [Leviticus 1]: “If his offering is an ascent-offering from cattle, a male without blemish shall he offer it,” and therefore the Torah said: “

His offering,”

to teach: his own offering,

and not

an offering that is

stolen.

And Abaye had thought to explain that the verse comes to exclude one who steals an animal from his fellow, consecrates it, and offers it, so that the offering he offered does not rise favorably for him.

But

what are the circumstances,

in what manner did the Torah exclude it?

If you say

that the verse excluded an animal that was stolen and the owners still

had not despaired

of it, this cannot be said, for:

why do I need a verse

to exclude an offering such as this, when

it is obvious

that the robber cannot consecrate something that is not his!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily, that the verse comes to exclude one who steals an animal, which the robbed person offered as an offering

after the owners had despaired

of it? For then the animal becomes sacred through the despair together with the consecration, which is a “change of domain,” having changed from the domain of an ordinary person to the domain of the Most High, and through the combination with despair he acquires the stolen property; but nevertheless the Torah disqualified it, because through the consecration it becomes his.

This

proves: despair does not acquire,

for if it had already been acquired by the robber before he consecrated it, there would again be no reason to disqualify it!?

Rabba remained silent and did not answer him, Rav Yosef!

Rava said to him

to Abaye, in answer to his difficulty against Rabba’s view:

And according to your reasoning—

and according to your view, that the verse comes to exclude one who steals his fellow’s animal, and the verse teaches that it does not rise favorably for the robber—how will you explain

that which was taught

concerning the ritual impurity of a man with a discharge:

It is written [Leviticus 15]: “Every bed upon which the man with a discharge lies shall become impure, and every vessel upon which the man with a discharge sits shall become impure. And a man who touches his bed shall wash his garments and bathe in water and be impure until the evening.” Therefore the Torah said: “

His bed,”

to teach: the man with a discharge renders impure only his bed,

and not

does he render impure

the stolen

one, for so is the decree of the verse—

But

what are the circumstances [which stolen bed did the Torah exclude]?

of the robbed bedding that the Torah excluded?

If you say—

as you explain concerning the offering, that he stole an animal and consecrated it as an offering—

that the man with a discharge stole

the man with a discharge

wool [wool]

from his fellow,

and made it

the man with a discharge

into a bed [wove it and made a bed from it], this cannot be said, for:

[sotkal ego i sdelal iz nego lozhe], togda nelzia tak skazat:

Is there anyone who says,

that is, are there any among the amoraim who dispute here concerning despair who would hold:

a change through an act—

such as this, by which he made a bed from the wool—

does not acquire!?

But they disputed only concerning Rabba’s words, who said: “Despair acquires,” but concerning what he said, “A change through an act acquires,” they did not dispute. And since it certainly acquires, it is included in “his bed.”

Rather, what can you say [rather, necessarily you must explain] that the Torah came to exclude through “his bed,” in a case such as

[inoe obiasnenie, kotoroe ty vynuzhden privesti] — Tora iskliuchaet iz «ego lozha» sluchai, kogda

that he stole a bed

ready-made

belonging to his fellow [he stole his fellow’s bed]—

and if so,

here too concerning “his offering,” you can say that the verse did not come to exclude one who stole unconsecrated property and offered it as an offering, so that this offering does not rise favorably for him; rather, the Torah came to exclude, in a case such as

with regard to “his offering,” you should say that the verse does not come to exclude one who robs an ordinary animal and sacrifices it as an offering, teaching that this offering is not acceptable for him. Rather, the Torah comes to exclude a case such as

that he stole his fellow’s offering [he stole an offering that his fellow had consecrated for himself]—

[pokhitil zhertvu, kotoruiu ego drug posviatil dlia sobstvennoi nuzhdy] —

And the Torah does not come to say that it does not rise favorably for the robber, but rather that it does not rise favorably for the robbed person, even before despair; and once again you cannot prove from here that despair does not acquire.

Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef—

who holds that despair does not acquire—from a Mishna in tractate Kelim: a.

Hides belonging to a householder [a person who is not a merchant]:

[cheloveka, kotoryi ne torguet kozhei]:

thought

that the householder thought concerning them that they should remain as they are for use, makes the hides count as the completion of the work of the “vessel”—and

renders them impure,

that is, they are fit to receive impurity, because through this they left the category of “hides” and became a “vessel,” which alone is fit to receive impurity.

b.

But

if the hides are

those of a tanner [a hide merchant]:

[torgovtsa kozhei]:

his thought does not render them impure

to use his hides as they are

renders them impure,

and because he is a merchant, perhaps he will change his mind and sell them, and the purchaser will want to make vessels from them that require completion of their work. And until their work is completed, they do not have the status of a “vessel,” and they do not receive impurity.

c. Hides

belonging to a thief, thought

of the thief

renders them impure.

d. But hides

belonging to a robber, the thought does not

of the robber

render them impure.

Rabbi Shimon says: The matter is reversed:

hides

of a robber, thought

of the robber

renders them impure; and

these hides

of a thief, there is no thought

of his

that renders them impure.

And this is the reasoning of the tanna kamma regarding a robber, and this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon regarding a thief:

because the owners have not despaired.

That is to say: according to the tanna kamma, an anonymous “theft” contains despair of the owners, but an anonymous robbery does not; therefore the thief renders [the hides] impure with his thought, whereas the robber does not; while Rabbi Shimon holds: the matter is reversed—an anonymous robbery contains despair of the owners, and an anonymous theft does not contain despair of the owners.

And

if so,

learn from it

from the words of both of them:

despair acquires,

and therefore, once the owners have despaired, the thought of the robber or the thief renders them impure; and this is difficult for Rav Yosef, who holds: despair does not acquire!?

He said

he answered

to him

Rav Yosef to Rabba:

here—

regarding hides whose thought of the thief or robber is effective for them after despair—

with what are we dealing: for example, where he cut them,

which is a minor change through an act, which is effective together with despair.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan challenged him:

But surely “

a mat”

was taught here,

that is to say: But surely this thought with which we are dealing is a thought to make a mat from the hides [something like a table on which to eat]!?

And a mat

surely

does not require cutting,

that is to say: Even though it is cut, nevertheless, even without cutting it, it renders [the hides] impure; because the cutting is only for beauty, and this is not the “completion of the work” of a vessel. And from where do we know that the Mishna is dealing with a mat, because

we learned [ [A0049]]in an earlier Mishna ]:

Мишне]:

Every place where there is no deficiency of work, thought renders it impure; where there is a deficiency of work, thought does not render it impure, except for the mat,

for although it is customary to cut it and his intention is to cut it, it is impure even without his having cut it, because the cutting is only in order to beautify it.

Rather, Rava said

concerning the proof from the Mishna in tractate Kelim that despair acquires:

This matter—

this difficulty from the Mishna in tractate Kelim—

was difficult to Rabba against Rav Yosef for twenty-two years and was not resolved [ [A0061]]Rabba raised it to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and Rav Yosef had no answer ],

he raised it to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and Rav Yosef had no answer ],

until Rav Yosef sat at the head [ [A0063]]until Rav Yosef became head of the academy ],

until Rav Yosef became head of the yeshiva ],

and

then the Holy One, blessed be He, granted him merit and

resolved it [ [A0067]]he settled the difficulty ]: “

he resolved the difficulty ]: “

A change of designation” [ [A0069]]of the hides, together with despair

of the hides, together with despair ]

is like “

a change through an act”

indeed!

For

a change through an act—

for example, as we learned: “One who robs wood and makes vessels from it pays according to the time of the robbery”—

what is the reason

that he acquires it? Because

there, initially there was wood,

whereas

now there are vessels [ [A0090]]initially they were wood, and now they are vessels ].

they were initially wood, and now they are utensils ].

If so,

“

a change of designation”

[ [A0094]]mere hide ],

and

whereas

now—

once he has formed an intention concerning them—they are called

“avrazin” [ [A0100]]mat in the Aramaic language ].

“mat” in the Aramaic language ].

And since there is a change of designation together with despair, the robber acquired it.

And we raise an objection:

But surely “

a beam,”

which is a robbed beam that they set into a house in order to place the ceiling upon it,

there is “

a change of designation,”

for surely:

Initially

before they set it into the house, it is called

“

a beam,”

and

whereas

now,

when they placed the ceiling upon it, it is called

“

a roof” [ [A0118]]its name is “roof” ]—

and

nevertheless we learned that it is not acquired by the robber—as a matter of basic law—even together with despair, for

we learned

in tractate Gittin:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgoda testified …

concerning a robbed beam that he built into a building [ [A0125]]a house ],

a house ],

that

the robber does not return the beam itself to him, but rather

the robbed person takes

the

value of it, because of the enactment for those who repent

in repentance, so that they would not have to demolish their building in order to return the robbery to its owners.

It is implied:

the reason is because of the enactment for those who repent,

therefore he does not have to return the beam itself—