Bava Kamma 66b (סו:) — the Talmud in English

Vo vsyakom sluchae

govorit emu

grabitel pokhishchennomu:

vot tvoe pered toboi,

i emu ne nuzhno platit emu stoimost khametsa takoi, kakoi ona byla v moment pokhishcheniya, nesmotria na to, chto teper khamets nichego ne stoit.

Iz etogo voznikayet trudnost dlia Rabba: ved

etot

khamets

kogda nastupil srok zapreta

[kogda nastupil srok zapreta khametsa], ved

nesomnenno otchaivalsia

pokhishchennyi ot khametsa. -

Teper voznikayet trudnost:

a esli ty skazhesh, chto otchaivanie

samo po sebe

priobretaet

kak utverzhdaet Rabba,

pochemu govorit emu

pokhishchennyi: «

Vot tvoe pered toboi»?

Ved grabitel priobrel pokhishchenie posredstvom otchaivaniia, i ono bolshe ne prinadlezhit pokhishchennomu; poetomu nelzia skazat: «Vot tvoe pered toboi», i zapoved vozvrata pokhishchennogo ne ispolniaetsia. V takom sluchae

on dolzhen zaplatit emu polnuiu stoimost

[polnuiu stoimost, ravnuiu stoimosti khametsa v moment pokhishcheniia, on dolzhen zaplatit emu] — kak v sluchae kazhdogo, kto ne ispolniaet zapoved vozvrata pokhishchennogo i dolzhen zaplatit ego stoimost po ee razmeru v moment pokhishcheniia.

Skazal emu

Rabba Rav Yosefu:

kogda ia govoril

[kogda ia govoril], chto otchaivanie priobretaet, eto otnositsia k sluchaiu, kogda

etot

pokhishchennyi

otchaivaetsia, a etot

grabitel

khotet priobresti

pokhishchenie.

However,

this

leavened bread indeed:

this one,

the robbery victim,

despairs, but

however

this one,

the robber,

does not want to acquire

it. And whenever the robber does not want to acquire the item, he does not acquire the robbed item, and he can return it and be exempt.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba—

who maintains that despair acquires an item—from a source that teaches:

V Tora skazano [Vayikra 1]: «Esli ego zhertva — olah ot krupnogo skota, pust zerkalo bez poroka, pust prineset ego», i poetomu Tora skazala: «

ego zhertva»,

chtoby nauchit: eto ego sobstvennaia zhertva

a ne

zhertva

pokhishchennaia.

Abaye predpolagal tolkovat tak, chto stikh iskliuchaet sluchai, kogda chelovek pokhitil zhivotnoe u drugogo, posviatil ego i prines v zhertvu: prinesennaia im zhertva ne schitaetsia blagovolnoi dlia nego.

No

kak eto vygljadit,

v kakom sluchae Tora ego iskliuchila?

Esli skazhesh

— zhivotnoe, kotoroe bylo pokhishcheno, no vse eshche

do otchaivaniia

vladeltsa v nem, togda nelzia tak skazat:

zachem nuzhen stikh, chtoby iskliuchit takuiu zhertvu? Ved

After all,

ochevidno,

chto grabitel ne mozhet posviatit predmet, kotoryi emu ne prinadlezhit!?

No inache

neobkhodimo skazat, chto stikh iskliuchaet sluchai, kogda chelovek pokhitil zhivotnoe, a pokhishchennyi prines ego v zhertvu

posle otchaivaniia

vladeltsa: togda zhivotnoe stanovitsia sviatym iz-za otchaivaniia v soedinenii s posviashcheniem, kotoroе yavliaetsia «izmeneniem vlasti» — perekhodom iz vlasti obychnogo cheloveka vo vlast Vsevyshnego; posredstvom otchaivaniia grabitel priobretaet pokhishchenie ; no vse zhe Tora sdelala ego nepriemlemoi zhertvoi, potomu chto posredstvom posviashcheniia ona stanovitsia ego sobstvennostiu.

Ved

iz etogo sleduet: otchaivanie ne priobretaet,

potomu chto esli by ono uzhe priobrelось grabitelem do posviashcheniia, ne bylo by prichiny delat zhertvu nepriemlemoi!?

Rabba promolchal i ne otvetil Rav Yosefu!

Skazal emu Rava

Abaye, otvechaia na ego vozrazhenie protiv metoda Rabby:

A po tvoemu,

po tvoemu metodu, soglasno kotoromu stikh iskliuchaet cheloveka, pokhishchaiushchego zhivotnoe ego druga, i uchit, chto zhertva ne schitaetsia blagovolnoi dlia grabitelia, — kak ty obiasnish

to, o chem skazano v baraite

v sviazi s tumoi zav?

V Tora skazano [Vayikra 15]: «Vsyakoe lozhe, na kotorom lozhitsia zav, budet nechisto, i vsyakoi predmet, na kotorom sidit zav, budet nechist. I tot, kto kosnetsia ego lozha, pust stirayet odezhdy, omoeтsia vodoi i ostanetsia nechistym do vechera», i poetomu Tora skazala: «

ego lozhe»

chtoby nauchit: zav oskverniaet tolko svoe lozhe,

a ne

oskverniaet

pokhishchennoe, potomu chto takovo postanovlenie stikha

—

No

kak eto vygljadit

[kakoe pokhishchennoe lozhe Tora iskliuchila]?

Esli skazhesh

— podobno tomu, kak ty tolkuешь v sviazi s zhertvoi: on pokhitil zhivotnoe i posviatil ego dlia zhertvy, —

chto pokhitil

zav

sherst

[sherst] u drugogo

i sdelal ego

zav

lozhem

[sotkal ego i sdelal iz nego lozhe], togda nelzia tak skazat:

razve est kto-libo, kto skazal,

to est: razve est sredi amoraiм sporivshikh zdes v voprose otchaivaniia takoi, kto schitaet, chto

izmenenie deistviia —

podobno etomu sluchaiu, kogda iz shersti sdelali lozhe —

ne priobretaet!?

Ved oni sporiat tolko o slovakh Rabby, skazavshego: «Otchaivanie priobretaet», no v otnoshenii ego slov: «Izmenenie deistviia priobretaet» — spora net; a poskolku ono nesomnenno priobretaet, ono vkliucheno v poniatie «ego lozhe».

No chto ty mozhesh skazat

[inoe obiasnenie, kotoroe ty vynuzhden privesti] — Tora iskliuchaet iz «ego lozha» sluchai, kogda

on pokhitil lozhe

gotovoe

ego druga

[pokhitil lozhe svoego druga] — i togda

zdes takzhe

v sluchae «ego zhertvy» ty dolzhen skazat, chto stikh ne iskliuchaet togo, kto pokhitil obychnyi predmet i prines ego v zhertvu, tak chto zhertva ne schitaetsia blagovolnoi dlia grabitelia; Tora iskliuchaet, naprimer, sluchai, kogda

on pokhitil zhertvu svoego druga

[pokhitil zhertvu, kotoruiu ego drug posviatil dlia sobstvennoi nuzhdy] —

Tora ne uchaet, chto zhertva ne schitaetsia blagovolnoi dlia grabitelia, a uchaet, chto ona ne schitaetsia blagovolnoi dlia pokhishchennogo, dazhe do otchaivaniia; sledovatelno, iz etogo nelzia dokazat, chto otchaivanie ne priobretaet.

Abaye vozrazil Rav Yosefu —

schitaiushchemu, chto otchaivanie ne priobretaet, — iz Mishna traktata Kelim: a.

Kozhi khoziaina

[cheloveka, kotoryi ne torguet kozhei]:

mysl

kozhaina, zadumavshego ostavit ikh v tom vide, v kakom oni nakhodiatsia, dlia ispolzovaniia, schitaetsia zaversheniem izgotovleniia «sosuda» i

delает ikh nechistymi,

to est oni stanovиatsia sposobnymi vospriniat tумu, potomu chto teper vyshli iz statusa «kozhi» i stali «sosudom», kotoryi tolko i mozhet vospriniat tумu.

b.

A

esli kozhi

kozhevnika

[torgovtsa kozhei]:

ego mysl ne

ispolzovat svoi kozhi v tom vide, v kakom oni nakhodiatsia,

ne delaet ikh nechistymi,

potomu chto on torgovets i, vozmozhno, peredumaet i prodaст ikh, a pokupatel zakhochet sdelat iz nikh sosudy, trebuиushchie zaversheniia izgotovleniia; poka zhe ikh izgotovlenie ne zaversheno, na nikh ne rasprostraniaetsia status «sosuda» i oni ne vosprinimaiut tумu.

v. Kozhi

grabitelia, mysl

grabitelia

delaet ikh nechistymi.

g. No kozhi

grabitelia, ego mysl ne

grabitelia

delaet ikh nechistymi.

Rabbi Shimon says: The matters are reversed:

hides

of a robber, the robber’s thought

of the robber

renders them susceptible to impurity; but

if hides

of a thief, his thought

of his

does not render them susceptible to impurity.

This is the rationale of the first tanna with regard to a robber, and the rationale of Rabbi Shimon with regard to a thief:

because the owners had not despaired of recovering them.

In other words: According to the first tanna, an unspecified case of “theft” includes the owners’ despair, but an unspecified case of robbery does not; therefore, the thief renders the hides susceptible to impurity through his thought, whereas the robber does not. Rabbi Shimon, however, holds that the matters are reversed: An unspecified case of robbery includes the owners’ despair, whereas an unspecified case of theft does not include the owners’ despair.

And

if so,

infer from this

the statements of both of them:

Despair effects acquisition; therefore, once the owners have despaired, the thought of the robber or thief renders the hides susceptible to impurity. This poses a difficulty to Rav Yosef, who holds that despair does not effect acquisition!?

and therefore, once the owners have despaired, the thought of the robber or the thief renders them impure; and this is difficult for Rav Yosef, who holds: despair does not acquire!?

He said

he explained

to him

Rav Yosef to Rabba:

Here—

with regard to hides, whose susceptibility to the thought of a thief or robber after despair is effective—

what are we dealing with? For example, where he cut and shaped them,

which is a minor change effected through an act, and which is effective together with despair.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan challenged him:

But “

a mat”

was taught here,

meaning: Is this thought with which we are dealing not a thought to make a mat from the hides [something like a table on which to eat]!?

And a mat

does it not

require no cutting and shaping,

meaning: Although it is customary to cut and shape it, nevertheless it renders the hides susceptible to impurity even without such cutting and shaping, because the cutting and shaping is only for aesthetic purposes and is not the completion of the manufacture of a utensil. And from where do we know that the Mishna is dealing with a mat, because

we learned [in an earlier Mishna]:

Wherever no labor remains to be done, thought renders it susceptible to impurity; where labor remains to be done, thought does not render it susceptible to impurity—except in the case of a mat,

which, although it is customary to cut and shape it and he intends to cut and shape it, is nevertheless susceptible to impurity even before it has been cut and shaped, because the cutting and shaping is only to beautify it.

Rather, Rava said

concerning the proof from tractate Kelim that despair effects acquisition:

This matter—

this difficulty from the Mishna in Kelim—

troubled Rabba in relation to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not resolved [

he raised it to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and Rav Yosef had no answer ],

until Rav Yosef sat at the head [

until Rav Yosef became head of the yeshiva ],

and

then the Holy One, blessed be He, granted him the merit and

resolved it [

he resolved the difficulty ]: “

A change of designation” [

of the hides, together with despair ]

is like “

a change effected through an act”

in this respect!

For

a change effected through an act—

as in what we learned: “One who robs wood and makes utensils from it pays according to the value at the time of the robbery”—

for what reason

does it effect acquisition? Because

initially they were wood,

whereas

now they are utensils [

they were initially wood, and now they are utensils ].

If so, “

a change of designation”

likewise: Initially it was called mishka [

mere hide ],

and

whereas

now—

once he has formed an intention concerning them—it is called

“avrazin” [

“mat” in the Aramaic language ].

Since there is a change of designation together with despair, the robber acquired it.

And we raise an objection:

But “

a beam,”

which is a stolen beam that they installed in a house in order to place the ceiling upon it,

there is “

a change of designation,”

for:

Initially,

before it was installed in the house, it was called

“kashura” [

a beam ],

and

whereas

now,

when they have placed the ceiling upon it, it is called

“talala” [

its name is “roof” ]—

and

nevertheless, we learned that it is not acquired by the robber—in principle—even together with despair, as

we learned

in tractate Gittin:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada testified …

concerning a stolen beam that one built into a mansion [

a house ],

that

the robber does not return the beam itself to him; rather,

the victim takes

the

value of the beam, for the sake of the ordinance for those who repent,

so that they would not have to demolish their buildings in order to return the stolen property to its owner.

It is thus implied:

The reason is that of the ordinance for those who repent,

and therefore he need not return the beam itself—