Bava Kamma 66a — the Talmud in English

“They,” and not their offspring, is what it comes to teach:

to teach that the offspring of an etnan and the price of a dog are fit for an offering.

And Beit Hillel

say to you: Since Scripture said “they,” it therefore implies they alone, and

you have heard two [teachings] from it

one thing Scripture spoke, and two we have heard]: a.

They, and not their changes.

b.

They, and not their offspring.

And

we raise an objection to

Beit Hillel: Is it not written “

also,”

which implies that it comes to include something!?

And we conclude: “

Also”

according to Beit Hillel

indeed

is difficult:

what does it come to include?

And we raise an objection:

It is only in this matter that Rabbi Ilaa and Rabbi Hanina disagree

—Rabbi Ilaa and Rabbi Hanina—

but:

The one who said—

Rabbi Ilaa—

held: A change—

such as this case, in which it was a lamb and became a ram—

acquires.

And the one who said—

Rabbi Hanina—

held: There is no change

of this kind

that acquires.

But with regard to the payments—

the double payment alone, according to Rabbi Ilaa, and even the payment of four and five, according to Rabbi Hanina—

everyone—

both Rabbi Ilaa and Rabbi Hanina—

agree: He pays as it was initially, for

it is

taught

in the beraita:

He pays double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment as it was when he stole it.

And if so,

let us say that this is a refutation of Rav, who said: “

He pays the principal as it was when he stole it; the double payment and the fourfold and fivefold payment”

he pays

as at the time of standing for judgment”!

He said

he answered

Rava:

There is a distinction in the form of payment, concerning whether he pays as it was initially or as at the time of standing for judgment:

If he comes to pay with

lambs

like the lambs that he stole, then he pays

as it was initially

with lambs, even though the lamb became a ram; and this is what we learned: “As it was when he stole it.”

But if he comes to pay

money

for the theft, then he pays

as it is now,

as Rav said.

Rabba said:

A change

in the act performed on the stolen property that

acquires

the stolen property— in my view this is obvious, and because of the following:

For

it is written

in the Torah, and

we have learned

it in the Mishna, as he proceeds to explain.

A change

is written

in the Torah, as it is said: “

And he shall return the

stolen property that he stole,”

and

what does the verse teach by saying: “that he stole,”

when it should have said only, “And he shall return the stolen property”? Rather, it comes to teach:

If

the stolen property is

as it was when he stole it,

having not changed, then

he shall return

it.

But if not,

if it is not as it was when he stole it because it changed, then

he needs to pay mere money

he pays only its monetary value].

And a change is also

learned

to acquire, for this is what we learned below, at the beginning of the chapter “One Who Steals Wood”:

One who steals wood and makes utensils from it

and improves them, or

wool and makes garments from it

and improves them, behold he

pays

as at the time of the theft,

and he does not return the improved stolen property.

Alternatively,

from this Mishna we can learn that a change acquires, for we learned:

If he did not manage to give it to him

to the priest, the first shearing,

before he dyed it,

behold he is

exempt

from giving the first shearing to the priest.

Consequently,

it is proven that

a change acquires.

And Rabba adds and says:

However,

despair

indeed

the Sages said that it acquires

they said that it acquires]—

But we do not know whether

from

the Torah

despair acquires,

or whether

from

the Sages

it is merely [a rabbinic law], for the reason explained below.

The Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

a. One who finds a lost object, and its owners despaired of it, and afterward the finder lifted it, it is his.

b. The finder does not acquire the lost object through despair unless it came into his hand after the owners despaired of it; but if it came into his hand before the owners despaired of it, he does not acquire it through despair.

If it is from the Torah

the stolen property is acquired through despair:

Just as is the case with

a robber

and a finder of a lost object,

for

does not a finder of a lost object acquire it as soon as its owner despairs of it before it comes into his hand

[whenever the owners despaired before the object came into the finder’s possession], and

whenever the owners despaired before the lost object came into the finder’s hand]

acquire it—

If so, let us say that

this

stolen property

too, once its owner despairs of it,

therefore

he acquires it

the robber,

consequently he acquires it

the robber acquires it through despair from the Torah.

Or perhaps:

robbery

is not comparable to lost property;

for:

with lost property, when it came into his hand,

the finder

it came into his hand permissibly [when it came into the finder's hand, it came into his hand permissibly] -

but this

robbery—it may be said—

since it

came into his hand under prohibition, by rabbinic enactment

only

the Sages said: Let him acquire it, because of the ordinance for penitents

in repentance, who wish to return the robbery, so that they should not have to toil after the robbery itself, but should return its monetary value, and that is sufficient.

Tosafot wrote in s.v. haka: “Nevertheless, it is properly necessary to derive that despair acquires in the case of robbery after it came into his hand before despair, for with a lost object as well, although he would not acquire it in this respect—that he would not need to return it and would be entirely exempt, since he had already become obligated in its restoration—nevertheless, he would acquire it in this respect: that he would not become obligated to pay money corresponding to what he robbed”; And this is what Rashi intended by his language in s.v. “one who finds lost property,” where he wrote: “It follows that he acquires it; whereas here, with robbery that came into his hand before despair, and afterward he despaired, payment of money is sufficient for him.” The plain meaning of their words is that, with lost property as well, they did not say that he does not acquire the object altogether, but rather that he is obligated to pay money; and if so, even though with robbery “it came into his hand under prohibition,” nevertheless he will acquire the object and pay money, [for in any event we are not discussing exempting him from paying money]. And the later authorities had difficulty with this, for this is understandable with robbery: it may be said that although he acquired the robbery itself through despair, nevertheless he becomes obligated in money for the robbery, similar to one who becomes obligated in money when he acquires the robbery through a chang; but with lost property, it is not at all applicable to obligate him in money, and if so, how can the law be established that despair is effective to acquire the lost property and obligate him in money? And in “ Ketzot HaChoshen section 353, subsection 2, wrote that it is necessarily necessary to say that despair—both with lost property and with robbery—does not effect complete acquisition when it came into his hand before despair, but there is a reservation in his acquisition with regard to money: he does not acquire the object with regard to its monetary value. [The language of Tosafot, “since he had already become obligated in its restoration,” requires explanation according to the interpretation of the Ketzot HaChoshen]”. And in “ the Innovations of Rabbi Shimon Bava Kamma, section 37, paragraph 1, wrote about this that he knows of no concept whereby there would be a reservation requiring payment of the object's value. And in Bava Metzia, section 21, he explained this matter on the basis of his principle [this novel principle was cited in his name in the notes to “Chavruta” above, folio 45a]: “The obligation of money upon a bailee is by virtue of restoration from the outset: he became obligated either to return the object, or to guard it properly, or to pay the money. The law of despair does not alter this. Although he can acquire the object even though he became obligated in its restoration, this is because this law depends upon the owners and upon the monetary claim that they have against him; and once they despaired, this law is nullified. But the detail concerning the substitute for the object's monetary value does not depend upon a change in the owners’ monetary claim with regard to acquisition.” [There is a novel point in his words here: although, from his side, he completed the laws of guarding, the obligation of restoration remains imposed upon him.] See additional sources for the words of the later authorities on this matter in the “Book of the Key.” C. He further wrote there in the Ketzot HaChoshen that, concerning the main difficulty of Tosafot, it may be said that lost property that he does not acquire when it comes into his hand under prohibition is not comparable: the reason for this—according to Ramban in the Milchamot on Bava Metzia 26—is that the hand of the guardian of lost property is like the hand of the owner, and this is “despair within the domain,” which does not effect acquisition. In contrast, with a robber, despair is effective to effect acquisition even though it came into his hand under prohibition, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger likewise wrote here; [ And the language of the Gemara is more readily understood according to this interpretation, for from the language of the Gemara it appears that the Gemara compares despair with robbery, when it came into his hand under prohibition, to despair with lost property, when it came into his hand permissibly; but according to the interpretation of Tosafot, this is not so. D. According to what Tosafot wrote, it appears that the Gemara's reasoning in saying that despair does not effect acquisition because “it came into his hand under prohibition” is that the Gemara is uncertain whether, with lost property, despair after the finding does not effect acquisition at all, or perhaps it acquires the body of the object, but he pays money]. And Rav Yosef said: Despair does not effect acquisition, even by rabbinic enactment,

and he must return the robbery itself.

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba -

who holds that despair effects acquisition with robbery—from that which we learned in the Mishna:

One who robbed leavened bread, and Passover passed over it

and it became forbidden in benefit according to the law of “leavened bread over which Passover passed”: