Bava Kamma 65b (סה:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say:

If he admitted after witnesses had arrived, he does not pay a fifth at all, even when the value of the fifth is not equal to the value of the double payment. This is because it is stated in the passage concerning an oath of the deposit [Numbers 5:7]: “And he shall restore

his guilt-offering

with its principal

the principal as it is,”

and its fifth

“he shall add to it”—to teach that

property whose payment is made with its principal

as it is, without an additional double payment,

he adds

to it

a fifth;

whereas

property whose payment is not made with its principal

because he adds a double payment to it,

he does not add a fifth;

but according to the Sages, he is obligated to bring the guilt-offering.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says

and adds to the words of the Sages:

There is neither a fifth nor

even

a guilt-offering paid in a case where there is a double payment.

In any event, it teaches

in the beraita:

“His fifth counts toward his double payment,” the words of Rabbi Yaakov.

But

what are the circumstances

in which the value of the double payment and the value of the fifth would be equal?

If you say that initially

when he denied and took an oath [which was the time of the theft], the object

was worth four, and

also

at the end

when the case was brought to court, the object

was worth four—

that cannot be said. For in such a case, is this what is meant by

“his fifth counts toward his double payment”?

But:

The double payment

the second payment made by virtue of the obligation of double payment

is four

zuz, which is double the object’s value;

whereas

if

the fifth

is only

one zuz, which is one quarter of the principal, then when you add it to the principal, you have a “fifth from the outside.” And whenever the value of the fifth is not equal to the double payment, he is not exempt from paying the fifth by virtue of paying the double payment.

which is one quarter of the principal, then when it is added to the principal, it is a “fifth from the outside”—a fifth of the total after the addition. Whenever the value of the fifth is not equal to the double payment, the double payment does not exempt him from paying the fifth.

Rather, necessarily

you will find that the value of the double payment and the fifth are equal only in a case such as

where initially

at the time of the denial

it was worth four, but ultimately

at the time the case was brought to court

it was worth one zuz—

for in this case they are indeed equal:

the double payment

is only

one zuz

at the time the case was brought to court, in accordance with Rav’s statement,

whereas

also

its fifth

is

one zuz, since the fifth is assessed according to the principal, whose value is as it was initially.

Thus it is evident

as is proven:

A.

“The principal is like what he stole,”

and therefore the principal is calculated according to the value of the deposit at the time of the denial; consequently, the fifth, too, is assessed according to this value, since the fifth is calculated from the principal.

B.

Double payments and fourfold and fivefold payments are assessed according to the time the case is brought to court,

for if the double payment were not assessed according to the time the case was brought to court, but rather like what he stole, as with the fifth, then the double payment would necessarily be four times the fifth, and they would not be equal.

He said

he refuted this,

Rava:

Actually,

the beraita is dealing with a case

where initially it was worth four, and now as well it is worth four.

And what is difficult

to you is: How can his fifth count toward his double payment, since

the double payment is four, whereas

the

fifth is one zuz!?

Do not raise this difficulty. For

here, with what are we dealing

with

a case in which he took an oath and then took an oath four times,

and witnesses came and he became liable for a double payment of four—

and

then

he admitted that the oaths had been false, and became liable for four fifths calculated externally, which likewise amount to four zuz, since:

He consequently became liable for four “fifths from the outside,” which together are also four zuz, since:

And the Torah said:

“And his fifths,”

the Torah multiplied many fifths for one principal.

It follows that the value of the fifth equals the double payment, and therefore he is exempt from it.

The Master said: And the Sages say:

“With its principal and its fifth,”

property whose payment is made with its principal requires the addition of a fifth; property whose payment is not made with its principal does not require the addition of a fifth:

The Gemara infers:

But

a

guilt-offering he brings

even though it is not property whose payment is made with its principal!

And why!?

What is different about the fifth, that he does not pay it,

because

it is written:

“With its principal and its fifth”?

If so,

he should not pay the guilt-offering either, for it is written [Leviticus 5:24–25]: “And he shall pay it

with its principal and its fifth

he shall add to it, to the one to whom it belongs he shall give it on the day of his guilt.

And his guilt-offering

he shall bring to the Lord, an unblemished ram from the flock”!?

he shall bring to the Lord: an unblemished ram from the flock”!

The Sages can say to you:

“

And

‘and his guilt-offering he shall bring to the Lord,’ which is written after the Torah stated, ‘And he shall pay it with its principal’”—

the verse interrupted

between “and he shall pay it with its principal” and “he shall bring his guilt-offering,” to teach that the guilt-offering is not conditional on the principal payment being made “with its principal,” without any additional payment.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai—

who exempts him from the guilt-offering as well, on the basis of this verse, when the payment is not made with its principal—can say to you: The vav of “

and

his guilt-offering”

the verse joined

the guilt-offering to the principal payment made with its principal, to teach that the guilt-offering, too, is conditional on the principal payment being made with its principal, without a double payment.

And the Sages can say to you: If it were as Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says,

if the verse indeed joined them,

the Merciful One need not have written either the vav

and

of “and,”

or even

not

“

and” itself. Why would the verse first interrupt and then join them? Rather, necessarily, the verse interrupted and did not join them.

itself. Why would the verse first interrupt and then join the obligations together? Rather, it must be that the verse interrupted them and did not join them.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai can say to you: Although the verse joins the obligations, nevertheless, “

Although the verse joins the obligations, nevertheless “

and”

could not be omitted

for the verse had to write it, in order

to separate property belonging to the Most High

the guilt-offering

from property belonging to an ordinary person

the principal and the fifth—

And since the verse needed to write “and,”

therefore the vav came and the verse joined them.

the verse joined them together.

Rabbi Ilaa said:

If one stole a lamb and it became a ram,

or if he stole

a calf and it became an ox,

then

a “

change”

occurred in his possession,

the thief’s,

and he acquired it

for this purpose: if he

slaughtered or sold them after they had changed, we say:

the animals after they have changed, we say:

“He slaughters his own animal; he sells his own animal,”

and he is not liable for fourfold and fivefold payment for the slaughter or sale.

Rabbi Ḥanina raised an objection to Rabbi Ilaa

from that which is taught in a beraita:

“If one stole a lamb and it became a ram, or a calf and it became an ox: He pays double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment like what he stole,”

that is, the value of a lamb and the value of a calf.

And if it enters your mind that acquisition occurs through a change,

as you said, then

why does he pay

fourfold and fivefold at all? Surely,

“he slaughters his own animal; he sells his own animal!”

He said to him

Rabbi Ilaa to Rabbi Ḥanina:

“Rather, what

do you wish to prove from this beraita—that a

change

such as this, where a lamb became a ram,

does not effect acquisition? If so,

then

why does he pay

double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment

‘like what he stole’!?

Let him pay according to its current value

as its value is now”!?

He said to him

Rabbi Ḥanina to Rabbi Ila’a:

As it is now, this is the reason that he does not pay, because the thief says to the one from whom he stole

: “What, did I perhaps

steal an ox from you

or

steal a ram from you

[What, did I perhaps steal an ox or a ram from you, that you obligate me to pay the value of an ox or the value of a ram? I stole only a calf and a lamb, and that is what I will pay]!”

Rabbi Ila’a said to him

Rabbi Ḥanina:

May the Merciful One save us from this opinion

[May God save me from this opinion that you are expressing]!

Rabbi Ḥanina said to him

Rabbi Ila’a:

On the contrary, may the Merciful One save us from your opinion

[On the contrary, may God save me from your opinion]!

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection:

Even if it were not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ila’a, who holds that the increase in the physical status of a calf that became an ox, or of a lamb that became a ram, constitutes a change, in any event this beraita is difficult:

And

let the thief acquire them through

the

“change of

name”

that occurred when the calf came to be called an “ox,” and the lamb came to be called a “ram,” and every change of name effects acquisition of stolen property— And if so, why should he pay for the slaughter and the sale? It is his own animal that he slaughters, and his own animal that he sells!?

Rava

answered:

He said:

There is no change of name here, because even

an ox on the day it is born is called an ox

and even

a ram on the day it is born is called a ram

, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

An ox on the day it is born is called an ox—

From where is this derived?

As

it is

written

[Leviticus 22:27]:

“An ox, or a sheep, or a goat, when it is born”

, thus indicating that from the moment of its birth it is called an “ox,” and not a “calf.”

A ram on the day it is born is called a ram—

From where is this derived?

As

it is

written

[Genesis 31:36]: “Jacob became angry and contended with Laban. Jacob said to Laban: What is my transgression, what is my sin, that you have hotly pursued me? When you have felt through all my belongings, what have you found of all your household objects? Set it here before my brothers and your brothers, and let them decide between the two of us. These twenty years I have been with you; your ewes and your she-goats have not miscarried,

and the rams of your flock I have not eaten.”

And what, did

Jacob not eat rams

of Laban, but

sheep

[lambs] of Laban

he did eat

Jacob!?

Rather, can it not be concluded from this:

Even

a ram on the day it is born is called

“a ram,”

and when Jacob said, “And the rams of your flock I have not eaten,” Jacob included the lambs in his statement as well.

Once Rabbi Zeira’s question has been resolved, the Gemara returns to the matter with which it began:

In any event, the difficulty remains

Rabbi Ḥanina’s question from this beraita against Rabbi Ila’a!?

Rav Sheshet said

in response

Rav Sheshet said:

Whose opinion does this beraita reflect?

It is the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: A change remains in its original place

and does not effect acquisition

, and therefore we do not say: “It is his own animal that he slaughters; it is his own animal that he sells.”

As it was taught:

The Torah states [Deuteronomy 23:19]: “You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both are an abomination to the Lord your God.” -

And if

he gave her

[the man who had intercourse with the prostitute]

wheat as her payment, and she made it into fine flour;

or he gave her

olives, and she made them into oil;

or

grapes, and she made them into wine:

One teaching states: It is forbidden

to sacrifice them on the altar, even though they underwent a change.

And one teaching states: It is permitted

to sacrifice them on the altar, because they underwent a change.

And Rav Yosef said:

Guryon of Maspork taught

a beraita in which we learned:

Beit Shammai prohibit

because they hold: “A change remains in its original place,”

and Beit Hillel permit

because they hold that once the wheat has changed, the designation “payment to a prostitute” that it had is removed from it, since it was not this that he gave her. And this is the explanation of the contradiction between the teachings: one is the opinion of Beit Shammai, and one is the opinion of Beit Hillel.

This beraita as well, concerning “one who stole a lamb and it became a ram,” is the opinion of Beit Shammai, who hold: “A change remains in its original place,” and therefore it is no longer difficult for Rabbi Ila’a, who holds in accordance with Beit Hillel.

And we explain:

What is the reason for Beit Shammai?

It is because

it is written:

“also

[both of them]”

to include their changed forms.

And Beit Hillel

hold: On the contrary, the verse says: “[both of them]” and this implies:

they, but not their changed forms.

And Beit Shammai

say to you:

That

verse, “both of them,” comes to teach: