Bava Kamma 65a (סה.) — the Talmud in English

And

I have only

when they stole it with

his hand

literally, in which case he is liable for double payment—

but if it entered

his roofed area, courtyard, or enclosure,

and he locked it in front of it in order to steal it,

from where

do we know that he is liable for double payment?

Therefore,

the verse states: “

If the theft shall indeed be found

in his possession,” Scripture repeated its wording in order to teach us: theft

in any event.

If so, this is difficult: how can we derive from “if the theft shall indeed be found” the law concerning one who admits liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive?

And we answer:

if so—

if the verse came only to teach one of these laws—

let the verse say

the expression of finding in identical wording:

either “

if it shall surely be found”

or “

it shall indeed be found,”

and we would derive one of the laws from the extra expression. But

since the verse varies

[the verse changed the expressions of finding],

learn from it: two

laws.

The substantive discussion: Rav said:

If one steals an animal and it became emaciated or decreased in value between the time of the theft and the time he stood trial, or if it became fatter or increased in value between the theft and the trial, and it was subsequently lost and is no longer extant,

the thief pays

the principal as it was when he stole it,

according to its condition and value at the time of the theft. But

double payment and

likewise

fourfold and fivefold payment,

the thief pays

as of the time he stands trial.

And the Gemara explains:

What is Rav’s reason?

For

the verse says: “theft and life,”

[as explained above, on 64b]. And

why did the Merciful One say: “life with the theft”?

In order to teach:

restore its life

[restore it to life]

to the principal,

so that it should be complete

as it was when he stole it.

Rav Sheshet said: I would say that Rav stated this teaching while dozing and lying down

[I think Rav stated this teaching while he was drowsing in a reclining position], for a beraita was taught contrary to his statement.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one stole an animal

that was emaciated and it became fatter,

he

pays double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment as it was when he stole it,

that is, according to the value of the emaciated animal. It is thus explicit in the beraita contrary to Rav’s statement: he pays even double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment as it was when he stole it, and not according to the time he stands trial!?

They said

the members of the academy, in defense of Rav’s statement:

Rav stated that he pays according to the time he stands trial only when the animal became fatter on its own account—for example, it fattened by itself, or the price of animals increased in the marketplace. But if the thief fattened it, he does not pay according to the time he stands trial,

because he can say to him

the one robbed: “What,

I fattened it and you take it”

[I will fatten it and you will take it]!?

Come and hear

from another beraita contrary to Rav’s statement, as it was taught:

If one stole an animal

that was fat and he made it emaciated

by his own actions—for example, he made it work excessively, or struck it with a stick—then

he pays double payment

for the theft,

and fourfold and fivefold payment

if he slaughtered and sold it after making it emaciated,

as it was when he stole it.

We have thus learned contrary to Rav’s statement, for he holds: “Double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment are according to the time he stands trial”!?

And we answer:

there—

where he made it emaciated by his own actions and afterward slaughtered it—

also, Rav did not say that he pays according to the time he stands trial,

and

because we say to the thief: Just as if the thief slaughtered the entire animal at once, he certainly pays according to its value at the time of slaughter, and not according to its value after the slaughter, so too, if he first made it emaciated by his own actions and afterward slaughtered it, he should be liable according to the time he made it emaciated, because

:

what difference is there between killing all of it and killing half of it

[what difference is there if he slaughtered the entire animal, and what difference is there if he slaughtered half the animal]—

That is, from the moment the thief began to make the animal emaciated, this was the beginning of the slaughter, and he pays according to its value at that time.

And

when Rav said—

that he pays double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment according to the time he stands trial—

with regard to an increase in price

and a decrease in price

[when the animal increased or decreased in value]

is what he said,

but Rav did not make his statement with regard to these cases when the thief fattened the animal by his own actions or made it emaciated.

We raise another objection to Rav:

What are the circumstances

in which Rav stated his ruling?

If we say that initially it was worth one zuz

[at first, at the time of the theft, the animal was worth only one zuz],

and ultimately,

at the time of slaughter or destruction from the world,

the theft was worth

the animal was worth

four zuz,

and it was in such a case that Rav said that he pays the principal as it was when he stole it, and double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment according to the time he stands trial—this cannot be said, because:

Does he really pay, according to Rav,

only the principal as it was when he stole it,

when he slaughtered the animal when it was worth four zuz!?

Shall we say that

perhaps

it disagrees

with

Rabba’s ruling, contrary to Rav!?

For Rabba said:

One who robs a barrel of wine from another

[one who robs a barrel of wine from another person],

initially,

at the time of the robbery, it was

worth one zuz, and ultimately it was worth

four zuz

[the price of the wine rose from the time of the robbery until the time the barrel was broken, from one zuz to four zuz]. The law differs according to what occurred:

If he

broke it

[he broke the barrel by hand and caused the wine to be lost],

or drank it

[or drank the wine in the barrel], then

he pays four

zuz for the robbery, according to the value of the wine at the time he caused the wine to be lost, because we hold him liable according to the time of the breaking and loss.

But if

it broke on its own

[the barrel broke by itself and the wine inside it was lost], then

he pays one zuz,

only one, according to the value of the wine at the time of the robbery, since we can hold him liable only for the robbery, as at the time of the breaking and loss he did nothing.

It follows, according to Rabba’s reasoning, that the thief must pay the principal according to the time of slaughter, which is the time when he actively caused the stolen object to be lost. Rav certainly did not disagree with him on this point, and Rav cannot have been speaking of such a case when he said that he pays only the principal as it was when he stole it.

They said

the members of the academy in resolution:

When Rav said

his ruling, he was referring to a case

such as when initially—

at the time of the theft—

it was worth four

zuz,

but ultimately—

at the time of the slaughter—

it was worth one zuz,

and at that point he pays

the principal according to the value when he stole it,

whereas

the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment are calculated according to the time of the court proceedings.

If so, this does not contradict Rabba’s statement, for Rabba said only that he must be obligated according to the more stringent valuation even at the time of the breaking or loss; however, when the stolen item was worth more at the time of the theft, Rabba agrees that he must be obligated according to the more stringent valuation at the time of the theft, since both the theft and the breaking or loss are causes generating his liability.

Rabbi Hanina taught

a beraita

in support of Rav

from the law of one who “claims that a deposit was stolen,” who likewise pays—according to Rav—the principal according to the time of his claim, which is analogous to the time of the theft in the case of a thief, whereas the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment are according to the time of the court proceedings:

As it was taught:

The homeowner who claimed that a deposit had been stolen and swore

to that effect

and

then

admitted

that the deposit was in his possession,

and

also

witnesses came

that the deposit was in his possession.

If, before the witnesses came—

he admitted,

he

pays the principal, the one-fifth surcharge, and a guilt-offering, as is the law in the case of one who denies possession of a deposit under oath and then admits: He pays the principal, the one-fifth surcharge, and a guilt-offering, but he does not pay a double payment, as in the case of one who “claims that a deposit was stolen,” for this liability is a fine, and “one who admits liability for a fine is exempt.”

as is the law concerning one who denied a deposit under oath and admitted: he pays the principal, the one-fifth, and the guilt-offering, but he does not pay the double payment as the law of one who “claims a claim of theft,” for this obligation is a fine, and “one who admits to a fine is exempt.”

But if, after the witnesses came—

he admitted,

he

pays

the double payment

because of the witnesses, as is the law in the case of one who claims that a deposit was stolen;

and a guilt-offering

according to the law of an oath concerning a deposit, since he admitted—

and his one-fifth surcharge

which he would have been required to pay under the law of an oath concerning a deposit

is credited against his double payment,

meaning: If the amount of the one-fifth surcharge was equal to the amount of the double payment, he pays the double payment and thereby becomes exempt from the one-fifth surcharge.

These are the words of Rabbi Yaakov.

Thus, he disagrees with Rashi on two points: they do not need to be equal, and he becomes exempt from the double payment while paying the additional fifth, unlike Rashi, who holds that he pays the double payment and becomes exempt from the additional fifth. The Riva in Tosafot, on the second side of the page, in the passage beginning “Double payment,” disagrees with Rashi on only one point: they do not need to be equal.