Bava Kamma 65a — the Talmud in English

And

I have only

when they stole it in

his hand

literally, that he is liable for double payment—

but if it entered

his roof, his courtyard, and his enclosure,

and he locked it before it in order to steal it

from where

do we know that he is liable for double payment?

Therefore

the verse says: “

If the theft is surely found

in his hand,” the verse doubled its wording in order to teach us: theft

in any event.

And if so, this is difficult: how can we learn from “if the theft is surely found” the case of one who admits liability for a fine and afterward witnesses came!?

And we answer:

if so—

that the verse came only to teach one of them—

let the verse say

the wording of finding uniformly:

either “

if it is surely found”

or “

it shall surely be found,”

and we would learn one of the laws from the superfluous wording. But

since the verse altered [

the wordings of finding], therefore

learn from it: two

laws.

The substance: Rav said:

One who steals an animal and it became emaciated or decreased in value between the time of the theft and the time of standing for judgment, and likewise if it became enhanced or increased in value between the theft and standing for judgment, and it has already been lost and is not present,

the thief pays

the principal as the thing he stole,

according to its condition and its price at the time of the theft. But

double payment and

also

fourfold and fivefold payments

the thief pays

as at the time of standing for judgment.

And the Gemara explains:

What is Rav’s reason?

For

the verse says: “theft and life”

[as explained above, 64b], and

why did the Merciful One say: “life with the theft,”

in order to teach:

give it life

[make it live]

for the principal,

so that it will be complete

as the thing he stole.

Rav Sheshet said: I say that Rav stated this teaching while dozing and lying down

[I think that Rav stated this teaching when he was dozing while lying down], for it was taught in a beraita contrary to his words.

For it was taught: One who stole an animal

that was emaciated and it became fat,

this person

pays double payment and fourfold and fivefold payments as the thing he stole,

that is, according to the value of an emaciated animal. It is thus explicit in the beraita contrary to Rav’s words; rather, even double payment and fourfold and fivefold payments he pays as the thing he stole, and not as at the time of standing for judgment!?

They said

the members of the academy, to reconcile Rav’s words:

Rav said that he pays as at the time of standing for judgment only when the animal became enhanced by itself, such as when it became fat on its own, or when animals became more expensive in the market. But if the thief fattened it, he does not pay as at the time of standing for judgment,

because he says to him

the thief to the one robbed: “What, is it that

I fattened it and you take it” [I will fatten it and you will take it]!?

[I will fatten it and you will take it]!?

Come and hear

from another beraita contrary to Rav’s words: for it was taught:

One who stole an animal

that was fat and he made it emaciated

the thief by hand, such as by making it work excessively, or with a stick: this person

pays double payment

for the theft,

and fourfold and fivefold payments

if he slaughtered and sold it after making it emaciated,

as the thing he stole.

We have thus learned contrary to Rav’s words, for he holds: “Double payment and fourfold and fivefold payments are as at the time of standing for judgment”!?

And we answer:

there,

when he made it emaciated by hand and afterward slaughtered it,

also

Rav did not say that he pays as at the time of standing for judgment,

because we say to the thief: just as when the thief slaughtered the entire animal at once, he certainly pays as at the time of slaughter, and not according to its value after the slaughter, so too, if he first made it emaciated by hand and afterward slaughtered it, he should be made liable as at the time of making it emaciated, for

:

what difference is it to me if he killed all of it, and what difference is it to me if he killed half of it

[what difference is it if he slaughtered the entire animal, and what difference is it if he slaughtered half the animal]—

That is: from the time the thief began to make the animal emaciated, that is the beginning of the slaughter, and he pays according to its value at that time.

And

when Rav said—

that he pays double payment and fourfold and fivefold payments as at the time of standing for judgment—

with regard to increase in price

and decrease in price

[when the animal increased or decreased in value]

is what he said, but if the thief fattened it by hand or made it emaciated, Rav did not say so in these cases.

but Rav did not make his statement with regard to these cases when the thief fattened the animal by his own actions or made it emaciated.

We raise another difficulty against Rav:

what is the case,

in what manner did Rav state his law?

If you say that at first it was worth one zuz

[at the beginning, at the time of the theft, the animal was worth only one zuz],

and afterward,

at the time of slaughter and loss from the world,

it was worth

the stolen item

four zuz,

and in such a case Rav said that he pays the principal as the thing he stole, and double payment and fourfold and fivefold payments as at the time of standing for judgment—this cannot be said, for:

Is it so that, according to Rav, he pays

the principal as the thing he stole

alone, when he slaughtered the animal when it was worth four zuz!?

Shall we say, should we say that

this

disagrees

with

Rabbah’s teaching!?

For Rabbah said:

One who robs a barrel of wine from his fellow

[one who robbed a barrel of wine from his fellow],

at first,

at the time of the theft, it was

worth one zuz, and afterward it was worth

four zuz

[the price of the wine rose from the time of the robbery until the time of breaking, from one zuz to four zuz], its law is divided:

If he

broke it

[he broke the barrel by hand and ruined the wine],

or drank it

[or drank the wine in the barrel], this person

pays four

zuz for the robbery, according to the value of the wine at the time he ruined the wine, because we make him liable for the time of breaking and ruining.

But if

it broke on its own

[the barrel broke by itself and the wine inside it was ruined], this person

pays one zuz

alone, according to the value of the wine at the time of the robbery, since we can make him liable only for the robbery, as at the time of breaking and ruin he did nothing.

And according to Rabbah’s reasoning, it follows that the thief should be made liable for the principal as at the time of slaughter, which is the time when he ruined the theft by hand; and certainly Rav did not disagree with him concerning this, and it is impossible that Rav should state in such a case that he pays the principal only as the thing he stole.

They said

the members of the academy said, to reconcile it:

When Rav stated

his ruling:

for example, when initially—

at the time of the theft—

it was worth four

zuza,

but ultimately—

at the time of slaughter—

it was worth one

and then he pays

the principal according to what he stole,

whereas

the double payment and the fourfold and fivefold payments are according to the time of standing before the court.

And if so, there is no contradiction to the words of Rabba, for Rabba said only that he must be obligated stringently even according to the time of breaking and loss; but when the stolen object was worth more at the time of the theft, Rabba concedes that he must be obligated stringently according to the time of the theft, since both the theft and the breaking and loss are causes for obligating him.

Rabbi Hanina taught

a beraita

to support Rav

from the law of one who “claims a claim of theft,” for he too pays—according to Rav—the principal according to the time of the claim, which is like the time of the theft in the case of a thief, whereas the double payment and the fourfold and fivefold payments are according to the time of standing before the court:

For it was taught:

A householder who claimed a claim of theft concerning a deposit, and swore

about it,

and

afterward

admitted

that the deposit was in his possession,

and

also

witnesses came

that the deposit was in his possession.

If, before witnesses came—

he admitted,

then this person

pays the principal, the one-fifth, and the guilt-offering,

as is the law concerning one who denied a deposit under oath and admitted: he pays the principal, the one-fifth, and the guilt-offering, but he does not pay the double payment as the law of one who “claims a claim of theft,” for this obligation is a fine, and “one who admits to a fine is exempt.”

But if, after witnesses came—

he admitted,

then this person

pays

the double payment

because of the witnesses, according to the law of one who claims a claim of theft,

and a guilt-offering

by the law of “the oath concerning a deposit,” for he admitted—

and his one-fifth—

which he was required to pay by the law of the oath concerning a deposit—

is counted for him toward his double payment,

that is to say: if the amount of the one-fifth was equal to the amount of the double payment, he pays the double payment, and thereby becomes exempt from the one-fifth.

These are the words of Rabbi Yaakov.

Thus, he disagrees with Rashi on two points: they do not need to be equal, and he becomes exempt from the double payment while paying the additional fifth, unlike Rashi, who holds that he pays the double payment and becomes exempt from the additional fifth. The Riva in Tosafot, on the second side of the page, in the passage beginning “Double payment,” disagrees with Rashi on only one point: they do not need to be equal.