Bava Kamma 64b — the Talmud in English

If so, it is indeed difficult for him

for the tanna of the school of Hezekiah: “If finding shall be found”—why do I need it? And what is the answer to this difficulty? Moreover, it is not reasonable that the tanna leaves the matter as a difficulty!?

And we answer: This is what we said: If the Torah had written the general expressions of theft and living creatures together with the particulars, then necessarily we would have said that “generalization, specification, and generalization” includes every matter—that is not so,

because it has a refutation

[there is a refutation that can be brought against this derivation], as he explains and proceeds, and it is a simple refutation, and the tanna did not take care to state it; and thus you can refute:

The reason that with “generalization, specification, and generalization” we expound according to the nature of the specification is that the first generalization and the specification that follows it exclude everything except what is in the specification [“generalization and specification: the generalization contains only what is in the specification”]. Therefore, the second generalization comes to include more than if there had been “generalization and specification,” and it cannot be that it comes to include everything, for if so, why was the “specification” written? Therefore we say that the second generalization comes to include only what is similar to the specification.

From where does he derive for him the inclusion of every matter

[from where do you wish to include every matter]? For

from the latter generalization

[from the second generalization], that is: the second generalization, which teaches you to add more than the specification, is from it that you come to learn that every matter is included [and since for living creatures there is no need for the measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” and the word “living creatures” is sufficient]. And this is impossible, for:

The generalization itself

the second one—which includes—

“living creatures”

is written in it,

and if so,

“generalization, specification, and generalization”

what benefit does it provide him!?

For

if it is to bring in

“every matter,”

“living creatures” is written

in the latter generalization, and it means:

living creatures, yes; something else, no.

And if so, it follows that if the Torah had written: theft, living creatures, and specifications alone, I would not have been able to learn from this to include every matter.

And

for this reason it was necessary

“if finding”

“shall be found,” which is a generalization that does not refer only to living creatures; and you can say: Since necessarily this “generalization, specification, and generalization” does not come to include only living creatures, because they are already written in the word “living,” necessarily this “generalization, specification, and generalization” comes to include every matter.

They said

the members of the academy, to raise a difficulty against what Rava explained, that “if finding shall be found” is in itself two generalizations:

But they are two generalizations that are adjacent to one another

[for they are two generalizations adjacent to one another], and this is not “generalization, specification, and generalization,” but “generalization, generalization, and specification”!?

He said,

he answered,

Ravina:

As they say in the West

[as they say in the Land of Israel]:

Every place where you find two generalizations adjacent to one another, place the specification

—which was written beside the generalizations—

between them, and expound them by

“generalization and specification”

and generalization.

It has already been explained in the Gemara above, on page 63, beginning of column a, that when there are several specifications, we do not expound them all as one “generalization, specification, and generalization”; rather, we treat each specification as though it were “generalization, specification, and generalization” on its own. It follows accordingly that the specifications mentioned in this verse—ox, donkey, sheep, living creatures—are all treated as four “generalization, specification, and generalization” formulations, and in each one you must find what it comes to teach; and this is what the Gemara comes to explain.

a. Ox:

Place

[place]

“ox”

between

“finding”

and

“shall be found”—

which is “generalization, specification, and generalization”—

to include what?

What shall we expound through the measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization” to include as similar to the specification?

If it is to include living creatures,

that is: to teach that one is liable only for living creatures similar to the specification of “ox,” then

from

the specification of

“living”

it emerges

[they are learned]!?

Rather,

for this reason the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of ox was stated:

to include

[to include] that he is liable to pay double for

a matter that is not a living creature,

for which too one is liable.

And expound it thus: Just as the specification explicitly refers to a movable object whose substance has monetary value, so too every matter that is movable and whose substance has monetary value.

b. Donkey:

And again, place

“donkey”

between

“finding”

and

“shall be found”

to include what?

If it is to include a matter that is not a living creature,

and it is movable and its substance has monetary value, it has already

from

“ox”

emerged!?

Rather, to include a marked object

[one that has an identifying sign], that is: to teach you that the inclusion includes only a marked object.

And we still raise a difficulty:

If so,

“sheep”

why do I need it!?

That is: it should still be difficult for you: what does the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of sheep come to teach us!?

Rather,

the Gemara says that everywhere where two generalizations and a specification beside them are stated, this verse is not expounded by the measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” but by the measure of

“included, excluded, and included”

it

is expounded; according to this measure, everything is included, and each specification comes to exclude one matter, as he explains and proceeds.

And from where is this so?

As the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael:

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael:

it is written

“in water, in water”

twice, adjacent, as it is stated [Leviticus 11:9]: “This you may eat from everything that is in the waters; everything that has fins and scales in the waters,” and afterward a specification is stated: “In the seas and in the streams, them you may eat.” This specification implies that only fish of seas and streams need to have fins and scales, whereas fish of cisterns and caves do not need them—

—

This is not

“generalization and specification”

and generalization,

but

“included, excluded, and included,”

and

it included everything,

and excluded only one matter, namely: fish in vessels ; and here too expound thus:

What did it include

[what does the second inclusion of “shall be found” come to include]?

It included every matter

[it included everything].

If so, all these specifications—

donkey, ox, sheep, and living creatures—

why do I need them?

One, to exclude land.

And one, to exclude slaves.

And one, to exclude documents.

And we still need to explain what the exclusion of “living creatures” comes for, and the Gemara explains:

Theft and living creatures,

that is: for this reason the Torah stated the expression “living” concerning theft,

to

teach

as Rav said,

that one who steals an animal and it becomes weakened or decreases in value pays, when it is no longer present, according to the value of the animal at the time of the theft; and because “living” was stated, we learn:

“Restore it to life

[make it live]

for the principal as it was when he stole it,”

so that it will be whole like it was.

And after it has been explained at length from where the passage concerning the thief himself is learned, according to the one who holds that both [verses] concern one who falsely claims the claim of a thief, the Gemara returns to explain the view of the disputant:

And according to the one who says:

the two liabilities of double payment stated in the Torah concerning an unpaid bailee are

one concerning a thief, and one concerning one who falsely claims the claim of a thief, and the thief himself emerges from

“if the thief is found”,

“he shall pay double,” stated there—if so:

This

“if finding shall be found

in his hand the stolen item, from ox to donkey to sheep, living creatures, he shall pay double,”

what does he expound from it!?

For it is a superfluous passage, since we already have to learn it from “if the thief is found, he shall pay double,” which comes to teach concerning the thief that he shall pay double.

And we answer:

He needs it

for this “if finding shall be found”

to

teach

as Rava bar Ahilai!

For Rava bar Ahilai said: What is the reason of Rav, who said

[below, 74b]:

One who admits to a fine, and

even if

witnesses subsequently come,

he is

exempt

because he admitted first:

Because

it is written

concerning double payments, which are a fine:

“If finding shall be found,”

in order to teach:

“If finding

first

by witnesses

that he stole, then

you shall find

the double payment, which is a fine,

through judges

who will obligate him—

Except for one who condemns himself,

saying, “I stole,” who is not liable for double payment, even if witnesses subsequently come.

The Gemara returns and explains the view of the disputant:

And according to the one who says:

“Both concern one who falsely claims the claim of a thief,”

for,

according to his words,

this

“if finding shall be found”

derives the thief himself

to make from them two inclusions, as explained above—

If so,

from where do we know that one who condemns himself

is exempt?

And we explain: According to the one who says this, the exemption of one who admits to a fine is learned

from

“whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double to his fellow,””

for you have learned: if the judges condemned him, he shall pay double,

but not one who condemns himself.

The Gemara returns and explains the view of the disputant:

And according to the one who says:

“One concerns a thief and one concerns one who falsely claims the claim of a thief,”

who brought it to him

[who already learned]

from

“if finding shall be found”

that one who condemns himself

is exempt—if so,

this

“whom the judges shall condemn”

what does he expound from it, since we already know that one who admits to a fine is exempt!?

!?

And we explain:

He can say to you: That

“whom the judges shall condemn”

is needed for one who admits to a fine

and witnesses did not subsequently come, that he is

exempt.

Иными словами: если бы Тора не учила нас в другом месте, что признавшийся в обязательстве штрафного характера освобождён, мы не выводили бы из «если действительно найдётся», что он освобождён даже после прихода свидетелей. Но поскольку Тора уже научила нас из «которых Бог обвинит», что человек не обязан платить на основании собственного признания, мы можем вывести из «если действительно найдётся», что даже признавшийся в штрафном обязательстве, после чего пришли свидетели, освобождён.

That is: if the Torah had not taught us elsewhere that one who admits to a fine is exempt, I would not learn from “if finding shall be found” that he is exempt even when witnesses subsequently came. But since the Torah has already taught us, through “whom the judges shall condemn,” that he is not liable on the basis of his admission, we can learn from “if finding shall be found” that even one who admits to a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt.

The Gemara returns and explains the view of the disputant:

And the one who says: Both concern

“one who falsely claims the claim of a thief” —

and “finding shall be found” was needed for two inclusions—indeed

holds that one who admits to a fine and witnesses subsequently come

is

liable,

for according to his view we have no additional source to teach that one who admits to a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt.

We raise another difficulty:

And according to the one who says: One concerns a thief and one concerns one who falsely claims the claim of a thief, who

already

derives the thief from there

[from “if the thief is found, he shall pay double”], then

granted

“if finding shall be found”

is not superfluous, for it comes

to

teach

as Rava bar Ahilai,

that one who admits to a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt, as was explained.

But all these specifications—

“ox, donkey, and sheep,” stated in that same passage, as it says: “From ox to donkey to sheep, living creatures, he shall pay double”— —

why do I need them!?

For if they come to exclude land, slaves, and documents, we have already learned to exclude them from the verse “concerning every matter of transgression”!?

And we answer:

As the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael!

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael: Every passage that was stated and repeated was repeated only for the matter newly introduced in it!

That is: sometimes the Torah repeated an entire passage solely in order to introduce one detail in it that was not learned from the other passage, and in this passage it was newly introduced that one who admits to a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt.

We raise another difficulty:

And say

even

the thief himself

is not liable for double payment except

upon an oath!?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to say that the Torah obligated the thief only when he swore, as

as it was taught:

Rabbi Yaakov says:

“If the stolen item is surely found in his hand, from ox to donkey to sheep, living creatures,

he shall pay double,”

even

without an oath.

You say without an oath, or perhaps it is only with an oath.

Если предположить, что вор обязан платить только после клятвы, тогда

You have said

[say it yourself]: Is it not that

this is indeed what happened!?

который поклялся,

And we explain:

What

is “this is indeed what happened”?

Abaye said:

If you should conclude that a thief is liable only with an oath, then:

the Merciful One should not have written

“he shall pay double”

concerning a thief

who swore,

and let it come

[and let us learn it for the thief]

by a kal va-chomer from

one who falsely claims the claim of a thief,

who is liable; and we would learn as follows:

And just as

one who falsely claims the claim of a thief,

to whom it came by permission

[it came into his possession permissibly, since he was a bailee], nevertheless

the verse says: “Let him pay double”

[pay double] if he swore,

A thief himself, to whom it came through prohibition

[for the theft came into his possession through prohibition from the outset],

is it not all the more so

that he is liable to pay double if he swore!?

Rather,

certainly

“he shall pay double,”

which the Merciful One wrote concerning the thief himself—why do I need it?

In order to teach

that

a thief is liable to pay double

even without an oath.

Here the Gemara returns to what was said above, that “if finding shall be found” comes to teach that one who admits to a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt; and it raises a difficulty:

And

is it so that

this

“if finding shall be found”

for this purpose

[for one who admits to a fine]

is what it came!?

It is needed

for this verse

for what was taught:

It is written, “If finding shall be found in

his hand

the stolen item”—