Bava Kamma 64b (סד:) — the Talmud in English

If so, the difficulty of the tanna of the school of Hezekiah is well posed:

“Why do I need ‘if it is surely found’?” And what is the answer to this difficulty? Moreover, it is not reasonable that the tanna would leave the matter unresolved in difficulty !

And we answer: This is what we said: Had the Torah written the general expressions “theft” and “animals” together with the specific terms, then we would necessarily have said that the hermeneutical principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” includes every object—but this is not so,

because it can be refuted

[this inference can be challenged], as the Gemara proceeds to explain. This is a simple refutation, and the tanna did not consider it necessary to state it explicitly. The refutation is as follows:

The reason that, with “generalization, specification, and generalization,” we interpret the law as referring to objects resembling the specification is that the first generalization and the specification that follows it exclude everything except what is contained in the specification [“a generalization followed by a specification includes only what is in the specification”]. Therefore, the second generalization comes to include more than would have been included had there been only “a generalization and a specification.” Yet it cannot come to include everything, because if so, why was the “specification” written? Therefore, we say that the second generalization comes to include only objects resembling the specification.

From where do you derive the inclusion of every object

[why do you wish to include every object]? After all,

from the final generalization

[from the second generalization], meaning: You derive from the second generalization—which teaches you to include more than the specification—that every object is included. [And since, with regard to animals, there is no need for the hermeneutical principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” as the word “animals” suffices,] this is impossible, because:

The generalization itself

the second one—which includes additional cases—has the word

“animals”

written in it. If so,

then

what does “generalization, specification, and generalization” accomplish for him!?

If it is to include

the category of

“every object,”

the word “animals” is written

in the final generalization, and it implies:

Animals, yes; something else, no

.

If so, it turns out that had the Torah written only “theft,” “animals,” and the specifications, I would not have been able to derive from this that every object is included.

And

for this reason it was necessary

to write “if it is surely found

in his possession,” which is a generalization that does not refer only to animals. You can therefore say: Since the “generalization, specification, and generalization” cannot necessarily be coming only to include animals, because they are already written in the word “animals,” this “generalization, specification, and generalization” must be coming to include every object.

The members of the academy said

to raise a difficulty concerning what Rava explained—that “if it is surely found” consists intrinsically of two generalizations:

But they are two adjacent generalizations

[the two generalizations are adjacent to one another], and this is not “generalization, specification, and generalization,” but rather “generalization, generalization, and specification”!?

He said

in reply,

Ravina:

As they say in the West

[in Eretz Yisrael]:

Wherever you find two adjacent generalizations, place the specification

that is written alongside the generalizations

between them, and interpret them according to

“generalization, specification,

and generalization.”

It was already explained in the Gemara above, on page 63a, that when there are several specifications, we do not interpret them all as one instance of “generalization, specification, and generalization.” Rather, we interpret each specification as though it were itself an independent “generalization, specification, and generalization.” Accordingly, the specifications mentioned in this verse—ox, donkey, sheep, and animals—are all interpreted as four instances of “generalization, specification, and generalization.” In each one, it is necessary to determine what it comes to teach, and this is what the Gemara proceeds to explain.

a. Ox:

Place

[insert]

“ox”

between

“is surely found”

and

“is found”—

which constitute “generalization, specification, and generalization”—

to include what

what shall we derive through the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” to include objects resembling the specification?

If it is to include animals,

meaning: to teach that one is liable only for animals resembling the specification “ox,” this is already

derived

from the specification

“animals”

!

[They are derived from it.]

Rather—

this is the purpose of the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of “ox”—

to include

[to include objects] for which one is liable to pay double

that are not animals,

and for which one is likewise liable.

And interpret it as follows: Just as the specification explicitly refers to a movable object whose substance has monetary value, so too every object that is movable and whose substance has monetary value.

b. Donkey:

And again, place

“donkey”

between

“is surely found”

and

“is found”

to include what?

If it is to include an object that is not an animal

and that is movable and whose substance has monetary value, this has already been

derived from

“ox”

!

Rather, it comes to include an identifiable object

[one that bears an identifying mark], meaning: to teach you that the inclusion applies only to an identifiable object.

We nevertheless continue to challenge this:

If so,

“sheep”

why do I need it!?

Meaning: It still remains difficult for you: What does the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of “sheep” come to teach us!?

Rather,

the Gemara says that everywhere

where two generalizations are stated with a specification alongside them, this verse is not expounded according to the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” but according to the principle of “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion” it

is expounded. According to this principle, everything is included, and each specification comes to exclude one thing. The Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And from where do we know that this is so?

As the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written

“in water, in water”

twice

in succession, as it is stated [Leviticus 11:9]: “These you may eat from all that are in the waters: Whatever has fins and scales in the waters,” and afterward a specification is stated: “In the seas and in the streams you may eat them.” This specification implies that only fish of the seas and streams must have fins and scales, whereas fish in cisterns and caves do not need them—

This is not

“generalization, specification

and generalization,”

but rather

“inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion.”

And

it includes everything

and excludes only one thing: fish kept in vessels . And here too, expound it in this manner:

What does it include

[what does the second inclusion of “is found” come to include]?

It includes every object

[it includes everything].

If so, why do I need all these specifications—

donkey, ox, sheep, and animals—

why do I need them?

One is to exclude land.

One is to exclude slaves.

And one is to exclude documents.

We must still explain what the exclusion of “animals” comes to teach, and the Gemara explains:

“Theft” and “animals,”

meaning: This is why the Torah used the expression “animals” with regard to theft:

to

teach

as Rav said,

that one who steals an animal and it becomes weakened or decreases in value pays, when the animal is no longer present, according to the value of the animal at the time of the theft. This is because “animals” was stated, and we derive:

“Restore it to life

[revive it]

with regard to the principal, as it was when he stole it,”

so that it is restored at its original value.

Having explained at length from where the section concerning the thief himself is derived, according to the opinion that both verses concern one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen, the Gemara returns to explain the view of the opposing tanna:

And according to the one who says:

that the two liabilities to pay double stated in the Torah with regard to an unpaid bailee are

one for a thief, and one for one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen, while the thief himself is derived from

“If the thief is found”

“he shall pay double,” which is stated there—if so:

This

“if it is surely found, it is found

in his possession—the theft, from ox to donkey to sheep or animal—he shall pay double,”

what does he expound from it!?

After all, this is a superfluous section, since we already have a basis from which to derive that the thief pays double, namely, “If the thief is found, he shall pay double.”

And we answer:

He needs it

for this verse, “if it is surely found, it is found,”

to

teach

as taught by Rava bar Ahilai!

For Rava bar Ahilai said: What is the reason of Rav, who said

[below, 74b]:

“One who admits liability for a fine, and

even if

witnesses subsequently come

he is

exempt

because he admitted first”?

The reason is

that it is written

with regard to the payment of double, which is a fine:

“If it is surely found, it is found,”

in order to teach:

“If it is surely found

first

by witnesses

that he stole, then

it is found

that the double payment, which is a fine,

by judges

who obligate him—

excluding one who condemns himself,

who says, “I stole,” and is not liable to pay double, even if witnesses subsequently come.

The Gemara returns to explain the view of the opposing tanna:

And according to the one who says:

“Both concern one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen,”

for

according to his view:

this

“if it is surely found, it is found”

derives the thief himself

as two inclusions, as explained above—

If so,

from where do we know that one who condemns himself

is exempt?

And we explain: According to the one who says this, the exemption of one who admits liability for a fine is derived

from

“whom the judges condemn

“he shall pay double to his fellow.” You have learned from this: When the judges condemn him, he shall pay double,

but not when he condemns himself.

The Gemara returns to explain the view of the opposing tanna:

And according to the one who says:

“One is for a thief, and one is for one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen,”

who derives

[who has already derived]

from

“if it is surely found, it is found”

that one who condemns himself

is exempt—if so,

this

“whom the judges condemn”

what does he expound from it, since we already know that one who admits liability for a fine is exempt

!?

And we explain:

He can say to you: That

“whom the judges condemn”

is needed for one who admits liability for a fine

and witnesses did not subsequently come; he is

exempt.

The Gemara returns to explain the view of the opposing tanna:

And the one who says: Both concern

“one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen”—

and “is surely found, is found” was needed for two inclusions—indeed,

he holds that one who admits liability for a fine and witnesses subsequently come

is

liable,

since according to his view we have no additional source to teach that one who admits liability for a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt.

We raise another difficulty:

And according to the one who says: One is for a thief, and one is for one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen,

who

has already derived the thief from there

[from “If the thief is found, he shall pay double”],

granted that

“if it is surely found, it is found”

is not superfluous, since it comes

to

teach

as Rava bar Ahilai taught,

that one who admits liability for a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt, as explained.

But all these specifications—

“ox, donkey, and sheep,” which are stated in that section, as it says: “From ox to donkey to sheep or animal, he shall pay double”— \-

why do I need them!?

After all, if they come to exclude land, slaves, and documents, we have already learned to exclude them from the verse “for any matter of trespass” !

And we answer:

As the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught!

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Any section that is stated and repeated is repeated only for the matter that is newly introduced in it!

Meaning: Sometimes the Torah repeats an entire section solely in order to introduce one detail that was not learned from the other section, and the new element in this section is that one who admits liability for a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt.

We raise another difficulty:

And say

even

the thief himself

is not liable to pay double except

upon an oath!?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to say that the Torah made the thief liable only when he swore, as

it was taught:

Rabbi Yaakov says:

“If the theft is surely found in his possession, from ox to donkey to sheep or animal,

he shall pay double,”

even

without an oath.

You say that it is without an oath, or is it only with an oath?

You have said

[say on your own]: Is it possible that

this was not so!?

And we explain:

What does

“this was not so” mean?

Abaye said:

If you maintain that a thief is liable only upon an oath, then

the Merciful One should not have written

“he shall pay double”

with regard to a thief

who swore.

Let it instead be derived

[and let us derive it for the thief]

by a kal va-chomer from

one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen,

who is liable. The derivation is as follows:

And just as

one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen,

to whom it came lawfully

[it came into his possession lawfully, since he was a bailee], nevertheless

the verse says: “Let him pay double”

[let him pay twice] if he swore,

The thief himself, to whom it came unlawfully

[as the theft came into his possession unlawfully from the outset],

is it not all the more so

that he is liable to pay double if he swore!?

Rather,

certainly the phrase

“he shall pay double”

that the Merciful One wrote with regard to the thief himself—why do I need it?

It comes to teach

that

a thief is liable to pay double

even without an oath.

Here the Gemara returns to what was stated above—that “if it is surely found, it is found” comes to teach that one who admits liability for a fine and witnesses subsequently come is exempt—and raises a difficulty:

And

is it really the case that

this

“if it is surely found, it is found”

came only for this

[for one who admits liability for a fine]

purpose!?

This verse is needed

for

what was taught: It is written, “If the theft is surely found in his

It is written, “If finding shall be found in

possession

the theft”—.