Bava Kamma 64a (סד.) — the Talmud in English

But

when it says "

that"

explicitly,

it is already stated

already

inferred.

And if so,

what do I establish "

theft"—that is, what additional item does the verse come to include through the general principle of "if the theft is indeed found in his possession,"

it must necessarily be that

it includes every item

that is movable and has monetary value in itself [such as an ox and a sheep].

You still have grounds to ask:

Let

the verse state only the "specifications" of

ox

and

sheep, and

the "generalization" of "

theft" ["if the theft is indeed found in his possession"],

and

then

already

everything

[every movable item with monetary value in itself]

is included; why did the verse add the specification of a donkey?

Why, then, did the verse add the specification “donkey”?

Had

the verse said

this,

then

I would say: Just as the specification—

an ox and a sheep—

explicitly

is

an item sanctified by the firstborn sanctity, so too everything

that is

an item sanctified by the firstborn sanctity.

The thief would therefore be liable to pay double for it, but I would not say that he is liable to pay double for every movable item that has monetary value in itself. Now that the Torah has also stated "donkey," I learn that even an item that is not sanctified by the firstborn sanctity is one for which he is liable. [But is a donkey not also sanctified by the firstborn sanctity?]

For

what can you bring

and include through the rule of "generalization, specification, and generalization" [had "donkey" not been stated explicitly]? Only

a donkey

that is sanctified by the firstborn sanctity—

But

when it says "

donkey"

explicitly,

a donkey

already

is stated.

And if so,

what do I establish "

theft"?

That is, what additional item does the verse come to include through the general principle of "if the theft is indeed found in his possession"? It must necessarily be that

it includes every item

that is movable and has monetary value in itself [like an ox, sheep, and donkey].

You still have grounds to ask:

Let it state ox and donkey

and

sheep, and "

theft"—

and everything would be included!?

The Gemara will explain below this question of the tanna.

Had

the verse said

this,

then

I would say: Just as the specification is explicit

as being

living creatures, so too everything

that is

living creatures. What can you bring to include the other living creatures? When it says "

living"

explicitly,

behold

the other

living creatures

already

are stated.

And if so,

what do I establish "

theft"?

To include every item.

The resolution of the beraita will be explained later in the Gemara.

a. Here the Gemara returns to interpret the entire beraita, which was explained above on the assumption that the tanna’s intent throughout is that the verse should state only an ox, or only an ox and a sheep followed by a generalization, constituting the rule of "generalization, specification, and generalization." According to the plain wording of the beraita, however, it appears that the issue is whether the verse should first state the generalization "if the theft is indeed found in his possession," and afterward the specification of "ox," or only "ox and sheep." According to its plain meaning, the beraita is difficult to understand, as will be explained.

b. There are three rules in the relationship between a generalization and a specification: "Generalization followed by a specification": The generalization includes only what is in the specification, and it does not include even something similar to the specification in every respect. "Specification followed by a generalization": The generalization is made to add to the specification, and all items are included, even those that are not similar to the specification. "Generalization, specification, and generalization": One may infer only something similar to the specification.

“A generalization followed by a specification”: the generalization includes only what is stated in the specification; even something resembling the specification in every respect is not included.

“A specification followed by a generalization”: the generalization adds to the specification, and all things are included, even those that do not resemble the specification.

“A generalization, a specification, and a generalization”: you may derive only matters similar to the specification.

The master said: "

Let it state ox and theft

and everything would be included." According to its plain meaning, this indicates that the issue is whether only these generalization and specification should be written. What the tanna said, "and everything would be included," is because this is a "specification followed by a generalization," which is made to add to the specification, and everything is included:

And we raise an objection to this:

Is it written "

ox and theft," which would be a "specification followed by a generalization"? Surely

which would be a “specification followed by a generalization”? After all,

"theft and ox"

is what is written,

for "if the theft is indeed found in his possession" is stated before the specification of ox. When the tanna asked, "Let it state ox and theft," his intent was that the verse should say, "theft and ox." And when it is stated in the Torah—

this is not a "specification followed by a generalization," but rather a "generalization followed by a specification," in which the generalization includes only what is in the specification. How, then, can the tanna say, "and everything would be included"!?

And if you would say

to interpret it as follows: "

Had it said

ox and theft, and everything would be included,"

that is what he is saying—that is, not as you thought, that the tanna’s question is that the verse should remain as it is, but that it should state only the specification of "ox." Rather, the tanna’s intent is to ask: Why did the Torah not reverse the order and say "ox" first, which is a specification, and afterward a "generalization" and nothing more? This is what the tanna said: "And everything would be included"!?

But is that to say that

The Gemara rejects this possibility:

Is that to say that "

had it said ox and theft"

is what the tanna said? If this were indeed the tanna’s question, it would be a powerful question,

and can you say

the continuation of the beraita: "Had it been so, I would say:

Just as the specification is explicit

as something fit to be offered on the altar, so too everything fit to be offered on the altar"?

For if it were so—that an ox were written followed by theft—we would have to say otherwise:

The ox would be a specification, and theft a generalization

written after the specification, which is the rule of "specification followed by a generalization"—

and this is the law of that rule: "

The generalization is made to add to the specification";

and all items are included,

even what is not fit to be offered on the altar. Thus there is no answer here to the question as we explained it.

And we raise another objection:

Rather,

you intend to say that

we are speaking according to what is written: "theft and ox",

that is: What are you trying to prove—that the beraita should be understood according to its plain meaning: "Let the verse state theft and afterward ox, and everything would be included; had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification is explicit as something fit to be offered on the altar"—

even if you interpret it according to its plain meaning, the difficulty remains:

and

can you say

that if theft were written followed by ox, "

everything would be included"?

Or

the difficulty is: Can you say

"just as the specification is explicit

as an item fit to be offered on the altar"?

For

theft would be a

generalization

and "

ox" a

specification, which is the rule of "generalization and specification"—

and this is the law of that rule: "

In a generalization and specification, the generalization includes only what is in the specification."

And if so,

only an ox

would indeed be subject to liability for double payment, whereas

nothing else

would be subject to liability for double payment.

How, then, could the tanna ask, "Let it state ox and theft, and everything would be included," when that is not so!?

And how could the tanna say, "Had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification is explicit as an item fit to be offered on the altar," when that is not so? They would be liable only for an ox, and not for the other items fit to be offered on the altar!?

Said

the answer was given by

Rava:

The tanna is

relying on "

living" [the tanna relies on the word "living," which is stated after the specification], which is an additional "generalization"

—

and "

generalization, specification, and generalization"

is what he is saying: The tanna says that one may infer only something similar to the specification.

the tanna says: you may derive only matters similar to the specification.

That is, the meaning of the beraita is that the verse should state the first generalization "theft," followed by the specification of only "ox," or "ox and sheep," and then the verse should state the second generalization after the specification, namely "living." Why, then, would the other specifications be needed?

According to this interpretation, the tanna’s statement is well resolved: "Had it been so, I would say" that I would include only items fit to be offered on the altar, or an item sanctified by the firstborn sanctity!

Nevertheless, the continuation of the beraita that we learned is still not resolved: "Let it state ox, donkey, sheep, and theft, and everything would be included. Had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification is explicit as living creatures, so too everything living creatures. What can you bring to include the other living creatures? When it says 'living,' living creatures are stated; what, then, do I establish 'theft'? To include every item."

For the following difficulty arises: What is it saying?

If it is as it appears from the plain wording, that the tanna’s question was that only one generalization, "theft," should be written with the specifications "ox, donkey, sheep," and why did the verse state "living" as well, this cannot be said, for the difficulty would be: What is the meaning of the tanna’s statement, "and everything would be included"? Surely the generalization includes only what is in the specification! And what is the meaning of the tanna’s statement, "Just as the specification is explicit"? Surely we do not include anything similar to the specification!?

And if you interpret Rava’s explanation of the beginning of the beraita as referring to "generalization, specification, and generalization"—meaning that "theft" would be written at the beginning and "living" at the end, with the specifications "ox, donkey, sheep"—that too certainly cannot be said, for then there is no place for the question at all: What is the tanna asking should not be written?

Indeed, Rava did not complete his interpretation of the beraita. Rather, the Gemara interrupts his words and raises another objection to them, and afterward the Gemara returns to the continuation of Rava’s statement.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s statement that the first generalization is "if the theft is indeed found in his possession," whereas the second generalization is "living":

But the latter generalization is not similar to the first generalization [the first generalization is not similar to the final generalization]!? For the latter includes only living creatures, and this is not "generalization, specification, and generalization"!

Therefore “sheep” was said, for

And we answer:

This—

this beraita—

is the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, for in such a case he expounds generalizations and specifications [he holds that even such a structure is considered "generalization, specification, and generalization"].

behold, sheep

Here the Gemara returns to explain the end of the beraita that we learned: "Let it state ox, donkey, sheep, and theft, and everything would be included. Had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification is explicit as living creatures, so too everything living creatures. What can you bring to include the other living creatures? When it says 'living,' living creatures are stated; what, then, do I establish 'theft'? To include every item."

And this is what is difficult for him,

the tanna:

Let it state ox, donkey, theft, and living, and

"if the theft is indeed found"

why do I need it!?

And he proceeds to explain the entire beraita, including its conclusion:

a. "

Let it state ox" [a specification],

and everything is included; why do I need “donkey”?

"and theft" [the first generalization],

Therefore “donkey” was said, for

"and living" [the second generalization],

Only

and everything would be included. Why, then, do I need "sheep"?

when it says “donkey,”]

Had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification is explicit as an item fit to be offered on the altar, so too everything fit to be offered on the altar. Therefore "sheep" was stated, for

“what could be included”

what can be brought

from "generalization, specification, and generalization"? Only

sheep

and things similar to it. And

when it says "

sheep,"

behold, sheep

already

is stated.

Therefore necessarily

what, then, do I establish "theft"

[that is, for what purpose does the "generalization, specification, and generalization" come]?

To include every item.

b.

Let it state "

theft" [a generalization],

when it says

"and ox and sheep" [specifications],

behold all

"and living" [a generalization],

have already

and everything would be included. Why, then, do I need "donkey"?

what, then, do I establish by “theft”—that is, the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of “theft” and “living”—

Had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification is explicit as an item sanctified by the firstborn sanctity, so too everything that is sanctified by the firstborn sanctity. Therefore "donkey" was stated, for

And if so, there is still a difficulty:

what can you bring?

Only

a donkey.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s interpretation:

And when it says donkey,

behold, a donkey is already stated.

And if so,

what, then, do I establish "

theft"?

To include every item.

Here the Gemara explains the difficult section at the end of the beraita:

c.

Let it state "

theft" [a generalization],

"and ox, sheep, and donkey" [specifications],

"and living" [the second generalization],

and everything would be included. Why, then, do I need "if the theft is indeed found"!?

Had it been so, I would say: Just as the specification—

an ox, a sheep, and a donkey—

is explicit as living creatures, so too everything living creatures. Therefore "if the theft is indeed found" was stated, since it itself constitutes two generalizations, as though all the specifications had been written between them. Do not derive the second generalization from "living"; rather, "living" itself is a specification. Through this we will know to include every item, for if the purpose were not to include every item, there would be no need for "generalization, specification, and generalization," since we already knew this from "living." Consequently, it necessarily follows that every item is included.

The school of Hizkiya raises an objection to this answer:

Even if "if the theft is indeed found," which constitutes two new generalizations, had not been written, but I would learn from the generalization of "theft" and the generalization of "living" to include every item, how could it be that

what can you bring

through the rule of "generalization, specification, and generalization" is only

the other living creatures?

And

when it says "

living,"

behold

all

living creatures

already

are stated,

for the generalization "living" explicitly includes all living creatures, and there is no need for the rule of "generalization, specification, and generalization" for this. Necessarily,

what, then, do I establish "theft"—

namely, the "generalization, specification, and generalization" of theft and living—

to include every item—

and if so, the difficulty still remains: "

if the theft is indeed found"

why do I need it!?

And with this question, the beraita of the school of Hizkiya concludes.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s interpretation: