Bava Kamma 64a — the Talmud in English

But behold,

when it says

“that”

explicitly,

behold, “that”

has already been

stated.

And if so,

what do I establish by

“theft”—that is, what else does the verse come to include through the rule of “if the stolen item is surely found in his hand”?

It must necessarily be that it comes to include

every object

that is movable and whose substance has monetary value [such as an ox and a sheep].

And still you have room to ask:

let

the verse state only the “specification” of

ox

and

sheep and

the “generalization” of

“theft” [“if the stolen item is surely found in his hand”],

with

and

already

everything

[every movable object whose substance has monetary value]

included—

why did the verse add the specification of donkey?

Had

the verse

thus

spoken,

I would have said: just as the specification—

ox and sheep—

explicitly

is

something sanctified by the firstborn offering, so everything

that

is something sanctified by the firstborn offering;

then the thief would be liable to pay double for it, but I would not have said that he is liable to pay double for every movable object whose substance has monetary value. But now that “donkey” is also stated in the Torah, I learn that even one that is not sanctified by the firstborn offering is subject to liability for it. How so? [For is not a donkey also sanctified by the firstborn offering?]

For

what can you bring

and include by the measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization” [had “donkey” not been stated explicitly]? Only

a donkey

that is sanctified by the firstborn offering—

But behold,

when it says

“donkey”

explicitly,

behold, donkey

has already

been stated.

And if so,

what, then, do I establish by

“theft”—that is, what else does the verse come to include through the rule of “if the stolen item is surely found in his hand”? It must necessarily be that it comes

to include

every object

that is movable and whose substance has monetary value [such as an ox, a sheep, and a donkey].

And still you have room to ask:

let it state ox and donkey

and

sheep, and

“

theft”—

and everything is included!?

Had

the verse

thus

spoken,

I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly

that it is

living creatures, so everything

that it is

living creatures. What can you bring—other living creatures? When it says

“living”

explicitly,

behold

the other

living creatures

have already

been stated.

And if so,

what, then, do I establish by

“theft”?

To include every object.

And the resolution of the beraita will be explained further in the Gemara.

a. Here the Gemara returns to explain the entire beraita, which was explained above on the assumption that the intention of the tan[n]ay in all his statements is that only “ox,” or only “ox and sheep” with a generalization following it, should be written, and that there is here a measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization.” But according to the plain wording of the beraita, it appears that the issue is that the generalization “if the stolen item is surely found in his hand” should first be written, and afterward only the specification “ox,” or “ox and sheep.” According to its plain meaning, it is difficult to understand it, as will be explained.

b. There are three measures of generalization and specification:

“Generalization and afterward specification”: the generalization contains only what is in the specification, and we do not include even something similar to the specification in all its aspects.

“Specification and afterward generalization”: the generalization becomes an addition to the specification, and all things are included, even those that are not similar to the specification.

“Generalization, specification, and generalization”: you judge only according to the character of the specification.

The master said:

“Let it state ox and theft

and everything is included,” implying according to its plain meaning that the issue is that only these generalization and specification formulations should be written. And when the tan[n]ay said, “and everything is included,” this is because it is “specification and generalization,” in which the generalization becomes an addition to the specification and everything is included:

And we raise an objection to this:

Is it written

“ox and theft,”

which would be “specification and generalization”!? But

“theft and ox”

is what is written, for “if the stolen item is surely found in his hand” was said before the specification of ox. And when the tan[n]ay asked, “Let it state ox and theft,” his intention was that the verse should state: “theft and ox.” And when it is stated in the Torah—

And if so, this is not “specification and generalization,” but “generalization and specification,” in which the generalization contains only what is in the specification. How, then, does the tan[n]ay say, “and everything is included”!?

And if you would say

to explain:

“Had it said

“ox and theft, and everything is included,”

he is saying—that is, not as you thought, that the tan[n]ay’s question is that the verse should remain as it is, but rather that it should state only the specification “ox.” Rather, the tan[n]ay’s intention is to ask: Why did the Torah not reverse the order and say “ox” first, which is a specification, and afterward a “generalization” and nothing else? This is what the tan[n]ay said: “and everything is included”!?

The Gemara rejects this possibility:

But is that to say that

“Had it said ox and theft” is what the tan[n]ay said!? For if this were indeed the tan[n]ay’s question, it would be a strong question,

and can you say

the continuation of the beraita: “Had it been thus, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly something offered on the altar, so everything offered on the altar”!?

For if it were thus—that “ox” should be written and afterward “theft”—we should say otherwise:

ox would be a specification, and theft a generalization

that the verse writes after the specification, and this is the measure of “specification and generalization”—

And this is the law of the measure:

“The generalization becomes an addition to the specification,”

and all matters are included, even what is not offered on the altar. And there is here no answer to the question as we explained it.

“Ox” would be a specification, and “theft” would be a generalization written after the specification. This would be the pattern of “specification followed by a generalization”—

And we raise an objection:

Rather,

you mean to say that

we are saying, as it is written: “theft and ox,”

that is: What are you coming to prove, that the interpretation of the beraita is according to its plain meaning: “Let the verse state theft and afterward ox, and everything is included; had it been thus, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly something offered on the altar”—

But even if you interpret it according to its plain meaning, there is a difficulty: and can you

say that if “theft” and afterward “ox” had been written,

“everything is included,”

or you should have this difficulty: And can you say, “just as the specification is explicitly”

something offered on the altar—

For

theft would be

a “generalization”

and “ox”

a “specification,”

and this is the measure of “generalization and specification”—

And this is the law of the measure:

“With generalization and specification, the generalization contains only what is in the specification.”

And if so,

only ox

would indeed be subject to liability for double payment, whereas

nothing else

would be subject to liability for double payment.

How, then, does the tan[n]ay ask: “Let it state ox and theft, and everything is included,” when this is not so!?

And how does the tan[n]ay say: “Had it been thus, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly something offered on the altar,” when this is not so, for they would be liable only for an ox, and not for other things offered on the altar!?

He said—

he answered—

Rava:

The tan[n]ay relies on

“living” [on the word “living,” which is stated after the specification; the tan[n]ay relies on it], which is an additional “generalization”—

And

“generalization, specification, and generalization”

he is saying, namely, the tan[n]ay is saying that you judge only according to the character of the specification.

That is, the interpretation of the beraita is that the verse should state a first generalization, “theft,” followed by the specification of only “ox,” or “ox and sheep,” and the verse should further state the second generalization after the specification, which is “living.” Why, then, do I need the other specifications?

According to this interpretation, the tan[n]ay’s statement is well resolved: “Had it been thus, I would have included only things offered on the altar,” or something sanctified by the firstborn offering! However, the continuation of the beraita that we learned still is not resolved: “Let it state ox, donkey, sheep, and theft, and everything is included. Had it been thus, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly living creatures, so everything is living creatures. What can you bring—other living creatures? When it says ‘living,’ behold, living creatures have been stated; what, then, do I establish by ‘theft’? To include every object.” For there is a difficulty: What is he saying? If it is as it appears in its plain meaning, that the tan[n]ay’s question was that only one generalization, “theft,” should be written together with the specifications “ox, donkey, sheep,” and why did the verse say “living” as well, this cannot be said, for there is a difficulty: What is this that the tan[n]ay said, “and everything is included”? For the generalization contains only what is in the specification! And what is this that the tan[n]ay said, “just as the specification is explicitly”? For we include only according to the character of the specification!? And if you interpret it as Rava interpreted the beginning of the beraita, namely, that the intention is “generalization, specification, and generalization,” and that “theft” should be written at the beginning and “living” at the end, together with the specifications “ox, donkey, sheep,” this certainly cannot be said, for then there is no place for the question at all. What is the tan[n]ay asking should not be written? Indeed, Rava did not finish explaining his interpretation of the beraita. Rather, the Gemara interrupts his words and raises another question against them, and afterward the Gemara returns to the continuation of Rava’s words.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s words, that the first generalization is “if the stolen item is surely found in his hand,” whereas the second generalization is “living”:

But the latter generalization is not similar to the first generalization [for the first generalization is not similar to the last generalization]!? For the latter includes only living creatures, and this is not “generalization, specification, and generalization”!

And we answer:

this—this beraita—

is the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, for in such a case he expounds generalizations and specifications, [holding that even such a formulation is “generalization, specification, and generalization”].

And here the Gemara returns to explain the end of the beraita that we learned: “Let it state ox, donkey, sheep, and theft, and everything is included. Had it been thus, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly living creatures, so everything is living creatures. What can you bring—other living creatures? When it says ‘living,’ behold, living creatures are stated; what, then, do I establish by ‘theft’? To include every object.”

And this is what is difficult to him,

to the tan[n]ay:

Let it state ox, donkey, theft, and living, and everything is included;

and

“if the stolen item is surely found”

why do I need it!?

And he explains it progressively throughout the entire beraita, and its end:

a.

“Let it state ox [a specification]

and theft [the first generalization]

and living [the second generalization],”

and everything is included; why do I need “sheep”?

Had it been so, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly something offered on the altar, so everything offered on the altar.

Therefore “sheep” was said, for

what can be brought from “generalization, specification, and generalization”? Only

sheep and things similar to it. And

when it says

“sheep,”

behold, sheep

has already

been stated. Necessarily,

what, then, do I establish by “theft” [that is, for what purpose does the “generalization, specification, and generalization” come]?

To include every object.

b.

Let it say

“theft [a generalization]

and ox and sheep [specifications]

and living [a generalization],”

and everything is included; why do I need “donkey”?

Had it been so, I would have said: just as the specification is explicitly something sanctified by the firstborn offering, so everything sanctified by the firstborn offering.

Therefore “donkey” was said, for

what can you bring?

Only

a donkey. [And

when it says “donkey,”]

behold, donkey has already been stated, and if so,

what, then, do I establish

“theft”

to include every object.

And here the Gemara explains the difficult part at the end of the beraita:

c.

Let it state

“theft [a generalization]

and ox, sheep, and donkey [specifications]

and living [a second generalization],”

and everything is included; why do I need “if the stolen item is surely found”?

Had it been so, I would have said: just as the specification—ox, sheep, and donkey—

is explicitly living creatures, so everything is living creatures.

And for this reason “if the stolen item is surely found” was said, for it itself consists of two generalizations, as though all the specifications had been written between them. And do not expound the second generalization from “living”; rather, “living” itself is a specification. Through this we will know to include every object, for if not to include every object, there would be no need for “generalization, specification, and generalization,” since we already knew this from “living”; necessarily, it comes to include every object.

And the tan[n]ay of the school of Hezekiah raises an objection to this answer:

For even if “if the stolen item is surely found,” which constitutes two new generalizations, had not been written, but I would have learned from the generalization of “theft” and the generalization of “living” that every object is to be included, how is it that

what can you bring through the measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization”? Only

other living creatures. And

when it says

“living,”

behold all

living creatures

have already

been stated, for the generalization “living” explicitly includes all living creatures, and for this there is no need for the measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization.” Necessarily,

what, then, do I establish by “theft”—that is, the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of “theft” and “living”—

to include every object—

And if so, there is still a difficulty:

“If the stolen item is surely found”

why do I need it!?

And with this question the beraita of the tan[n]ay of the school of Hezekiah concludes.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s interpretation:

when it says “donkey,”

the donkey has already been stated.

And if so,

how do I understand "

“theft”?

To include every object.

Here the Gemara explains the difficult section at the end of the beraita:

c.

“Let it say "

“theft” [a generalization]

and “ox, sheep, and donkey” [specifications]

and “living” [a second generalization],

“and everything is included.” Why, then, do I need “If the theft is certainly found”?

“If it said this, I would say: Just as the specification”—

ox, sheep, and donkey—

explicitly concerns living creatures, so too everything concerns living creatures.” For this reason, “If the theft is certainly found” was stated. This expression itself contains two generalizations, as though all the specifications were written between them. Do not interpret the second generalization from “living”; rather, “living” itself is a specification. Through this, we know that every object is included, because if the purpose were not to include every object, there would be no need for the pattern of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” since we would already know this from “living.” Therefore, it necessarily comes to include every object.

The tanna from the school of Hizkiya raises a difficulty against this answer:

Even if “If the theft is certainly found”—the two new generalizations—had not been written, but I could have learned from the generalization “theft” and the generalization “living” that every object is included, then how could it be that

what you could include through the pattern of “generalization, specification, and generalization” would be only

through the rule of "generalization, specification, and generalization" is only

“other living creatures”?

And

when it says "

“living,”

then

all

living creatures

already

have been stated, since the general term “living” explicitly includes every living creature. The pattern of “generalization, specification, and generalization” is not needed for this. Therefore,

for the generalization "living" explicitly includes all living creatures, and there is no need for the rule of "generalization, specification, and generalization" for this. Necessarily,

“how, then, do I understand ‘theft’”—that is, the “generalization, specification, and generalization” of “theft” and “living”—

namely, the "generalization, specification, and generalization" of theft and living—

to include every object—

And if so, there is still a difficulty:

“If the theft is certainly found,”

why do I need it?

With this question, the beraita of the tanna from the school of Hizkiya ends.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rava’s explanation: