Bava Kamma 62a (סב.) — the Talmud in English

When are these matters stated

that he is exempt for concealed property?

When he kindled the fire within his own property, and the fire

spread

and burned within another’s property.

But when he kindles the fire within another’s property,

(everyone agrees

that he pays

for

everything that was inside it.

And Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Rabbis that when one lends his fellow a place in which to make a stack,

to make there

a stack, and he made the stack and concealed

vessels within the stack, and the owner of the field kindled a fire, and it burned the stack together with the concealed vessels,

he pays only the value of the stack,

because with regard to the concealed vessels, he did not accept responsibility for guarding them, since he was entirely unaware of them. And likewise, if he lent him a place

to make a stack

there

of wheat,

and he went

and made a stack

there

of barley.

Or if he lent him a place to make a stack

of barley, and he made the stack

in its place

of wheat.

Or if he lent him a place to make a stack

of wheat,

and he indeed made a stack of wheat, but

covered it

with wheat on the outside

with barley.

Or if he lent him a place to make a stack

of barley, and he covered it with wheat.

And the owner of the field kindled a fire, and the stack was burned,

he pays only the value of the barley.

And the reason is:

a. If he lent him a place to make a stack of wheat, and he made a stack of barley, certainly he pays only the value of the barley.

b. If he lent him a place for barley and he made a stack of wheat, even though the lender saw that he had made a stack of wheat, he is liable only for the value of barley, because he accepted responsibility only for guarding barley.

c. If he lent him the place for wheat and he covered it with barley, the owner of the field can claim: Even though I gave you permission for wheat, nevertheless I saw only barley, and therefore I was not as careful with it. Consequently, he pays only the value of barley. d. If he lent him the place for barley and he covered it with wheat, this is no better than if he had made only a stack of wheat in place of the barley, in which case he pays only the value of barley [as in section b].

Rava said: If one gives a woman a gold dinar

in order that she guard it,

and says to her: Be careful with it, for it is silver!

If

she damages it

directly, by burning it or throwing it into the sea,

she pays a gold dinar,

even though she thought that the dinar was silver.

And the reason is

because the depositor said to her

that

“What claim did you have to it that you damaged it?!”

Was the dinar yours, that you destroyed it directly? Therefore, she pays according to its true value.

But if she merely

was negligent with it,

by failing to guard the dinar in the manner customary for guardians, and it was lost,

she pays

only a dinar

of silver.

Because the woman said to him:

the woman said:

“I accepted responsibility for guarding silver; I did not accept responsibility for guarding gold!”

I accepted responsibility only for guarding a silver dinar, not a gold dinar. Therefore, she is liable only as though she had been negligent and failed to guard a silver dinar.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: You,

teach it in the name of Rava.

You say this law—that if she was negligent with it, she pays for silver—in the name of Rava.

But

we derive it explicitly from a baraita.

We prove this law from the baraita cited above, in which it is stated:

“Wheat, and he covered it with barley; barley, and he covered it with wheat—he pays only the value of barley.”

Apparently,

it is evident from here that when he had barley and covered it with wheat, he does not pay for the wheat that was burned, because

the owner of the field said to him:

the owner of the field said:

“I accepted responsibility for guarding barley!”

I accepted responsibility for guarding only barley, not wheat.

Here too,

when one gives her a gold dinar and tells her that it is silver,

she says to him: “I did not accept responsibility for guarding gold!”

I accepted responsibility for guarding only a silver dinar, not a gold dinar; therefore, she pays only a silver dinar.

Rav said: I heard a statement from Rabbi Yehuda,

I heard some novel law according to Rabbi Yehuda’s view in our Mishna, who holds one liable for concealed property damaged by fire,

but I do not know what it is.

I do not remember what that law is.

Shmuel said: What,

does

Abba not know

[a designation for Rav]

what he heard,

what that law is?

Was the law not stated as follows:

According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for damage caused by

concealed property

in a fire,

the Rabbis instituted

a

regulation for

a robbed person

in his fire!

For if the owner of the burned stack claims that he had concealed vessels there and cannot prove it, the Rabbis instituted a regulation enabling him to take an oath regarding the amount—just as the Rabbis instituted a similar regulation for the robbed person, who takes an oath as to how much the robber robbed from him, and the robber must pay him that amount.

Ameimar raised a dilemma:

whether

they instituted the regulation for

the robbed person

and thereby cause his property to be robbed from him. Did the Rabbis also institute a regulation here, enabling the person against whom the informer informed to take an oath as to how much money the informer caused him to lose through his informing, and requiring the informer to pay him that amount?

Or not?

According to the one who says that we do not adjudicate the law of indirect causation,

meaning that we do not hold a person liable for causing his fellow a loss, but only for a loss that he caused directly,

you have no dilemma,

there is no question here whether they instituted the regulation for the robbed person in the case of an informer, because even if the amount the informer caused him to lose through his informing were known, he would not be liable to pay him,

for

according to that view, even the basic law of

informing is not adjudicated.

Since the informer merely caused the loss, we do not adjudicate him liable to pay for it at all.

Rather, you have a dilemma according to the one who says that we adjudicate the law of indirect causation,

for according to him, one is liable to pay even for causing a loss. If we knew how much the informer caused him to lose through his informing, we would hold him liable to pay. The question now is whether

they instituted the regulation for

the robbed person

in the case of an informer, so that he takes an oath and collects,

meaning that the one who suffered the loss takes an oath as to how much the informer caused him to lose and collects payment for it from him,

or not,

perhaps they did not institute this regulation for an informer? And we conclude:

Teyku!

There was a certain man who kicked

and kicked

his fellow’s strongbox

[a box in which money is kept]

and cast it into the river,

throwing it into the river.

The owner came

the owner of the box arrived,

and said: “I had such and such inside it!”

There had been a particular object and another particular object in the box.

Rav Ashi sat and examined the matter: In a case like this, what is the law?

Is the damager liable to pay for the object that the injured party claims had been inside the box? [As the Gemara will immediately explain the two sides of the dilemma].

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ivia, and some say:

and some say that

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ivia,

said this

to Rav Ashi:

But

is this not precisely the ruling in the Mishna!

The ruling is explicitly stated in our Mishna.

As we learned: And the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehuda, with regard to one who kindles a fire in another’s building, that he pays for everything inside it, as it is the usual practice for people to place items in their houses.

It is evident that it is customary for people to place all sorts of objects in their homes. If so, the one who caused the damage should have taken into consideration every object that might have been inside this chest; why, then, should we not obligate him to pay for everything that the injured party claims was inside the chest?

Rav Ashi said to him:

Rav Ashi:

If he claims money,

if the injured party claimed that there had been money inside the chest,

here too!

we would certainly obligate the one who caused the damage to pay, since it is customary to place money in a chest.

Rather,

here

(with what are we dealing

?):

he claims that there was a precious stone there.

Therefore, the question is:

What

does this mean? Is the one who caused the damage obligated to pay for it or not?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Do people place precious stones in a chest,

is it customary for people to place a precious stone in a chest,

or not,

as it is not customary for people to do so? Consequently, the one who caused the damage can claim: Since it is not customary to place a precious stone in a chest, it did not occur to me that there was a precious stone in the chest, and I am exempt from paying for it.

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

Rav Yemar said to Rav Ashi: If one claims that he had a silver goblet in the building,

one whose building [i.e., house] was burned and who claims that he had a silver goblet there,

what

is the ruling? Do we believe him that he possessed such an expensive object and obligate the one who kindled the fire to pay him for it, or do we not believe him?

Rav Ashi said to him:

Rav Ashi:

We examine:

we see

whether he is a wealthy person,

if he is wealthy,

who possesses a silver goblet,

and is accustomed to keep a silver goblet in his possession;

or alternatively, whether he is a trustworthy person,

or whether he is a trustworthy individual,

with whom people deposit items,

as people entrust deposits to him, and it is possible that someone deposited a silver goblet with him,

he takes an oath and collects.

He swears that he had a silver goblet in his possession [as explained above, that they instituted the takkanat nigzal with regard to his fire], and the one who kindled the fire pays him for it.

But if not,

if he is neither wealthy nor trustworthy,

his claim is not sufficient!

He has no power to make such a claim, and we do not believe him that he had a silver goblet in his possession. The one who kindled the fire is not obligated to pay him for it.

Rav Adda, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: What

is the difference

between a robber and an extortionist? ,

He said to him:

Rav Ashi said to him:

An extortionist gives money.

One who takes an object from another by force and pays him for it is called an extortionist.

A robber does not give money.

One who robs without paying is called a robber.

Rav Abba said to him:

Rav Abba said to him:

If he gives money, “

do you call him an extortionist?!”

But did Rav Huna not say: If they hang him and he sells,

if they “hang” him—that is, force him—until he agrees to sell some of his property,

the sale is a sale!

The transaction is valid, and he cannot retract. Why, then, is he called an extortionist?

Rav Ashi said to him:

This is not difficult.

This

is when he said, “I want to,”

when the seller subsequently agrees to sell, in which case the transaction is valid and he is not called an extortionist.

This

is when he did not say, “I want to,”