Bava Kamma 62a — the Talmud in English

In what case are these words said

that he is exempt for what was concealed,

when he kindled within his own property, and the fire

spread

within another’s property.

But when he kindled within another’s property,

(according to everyone

he pays

for

everything that was inside it.

And Rabbi Judah concedes to the Sages in the case of one who lends his fellow a place for making a pile,

to make there

a pile, and he made the pile and concealed

vessels within the pile, and the owner of the field kindled a fire, and it burned the pile together with the concealed vessels,

that he pays only the value of the pile,

because with regard to the concealed vessels, he did not undertake to guard them, since he did not know of them at all. And likewise, if he lent him a place

for making a pile

there of

wheat,

and he went

and made a pile

there of

barley.

Or if he lent him a place for making a pile

of barley, and he made a pile

in its place of

wheat.

Or if he lent him a place for making a pile

of wheat,

and he indeed made a pile of wheat, but

he covered them

the wheat from the outside

with barley.

Or if he lent him a place for making a pile

of barley, and he covered it with wheat.

And the owner of the field kindled a fire, and the pile was burned,

he pays only the value of the barley.

And the reason is:

a. If he lent him a place for making a pile of wheat, and he made a pile of barley, certainly he pays only the value of the barley.

b. If he lent him a place for barley and he made a pile of wheat, even though the lender saw that he had made a pile of wheat, he is liable only for the value of barley, because he accepted responsibility upon himself only for the safekeeping of barley.

c. If he lent him [the place] for wheat and he covered it with barley, the owner of the field can claim: Even though I gave you permission for wheat, in any event I saw only barley, and therefore I was not as careful with it. Therefore, he pays only the value of barley. d. If he lent him [the place] for barley and he covered it with wheat, this is no better than if he had made only a pile of wheat in place of barley, in which case he pays only the value of barley [as in section b].

Rava said: [In the case of] one who gives a gold dinar to a woman

in order that she guard it,

and he said to her: Be careful with it, for it is silver!

If she

damaged it

directly, by burning it or throwing it into the sea,

she pays a gold dinar,

even though she thought that the dinar was silver.

And the reason is

because the depositor said to her

:

What did you have with it that you damaged it?!

Was the dinar yours, and why did you destroy it directly? Therefore, she pays according to its actual value.

But if she merely

was negligent with it,

in that she did not guard the dinar in the manner of custodians, and it was lost,

she pays

only a dinar

of silver.

Because the woman said to him

:

I accepted upon myself the safekeeping of silver; I did not accept upon myself the safekeeping of gold!

I accepted upon myself only to guard a silver dinar and not a gold dinar. Therefore, she is liable only as though she had been negligent and failed to guard a silver dinar alone.

Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi: You

learned it in the name of Rava.

You say this law, “If she was negligent with it, she pays silver,” in the name of Rava.

But

we, it is obvious to us from a beraita.

We established this law from the beraita cited above, in which it was stated:

“Wheat, and he covered it with barley; barley, and he covered it with wheat—he pays only the value of barley.”

It follows

that from here it is proven that when it was barley and he covered it with wheat, he does not pay for the wheat that was burned, because

the owner of the field said to him

:

“I accepted upon myself the safekeeping of barley!”

I accepted upon myself to guard only barley and not wheat.

So too,

when he gave her a gold dinar and told her that it was silver,

she said to him: “I did not accept upon myself the safekeeping of gold!”

I did not accept upon myself to guard a gold dinar, but only a silver dinar; therefore, she pays only a silver dinar.

Rav said: I heard a statement concerning Rabbi Judah,

I heard some newly stated law according to Rabbi Judah’s opinion in our Mishna, who holds one liable for “concealed” property in a fire,

but I do not know what it is.

I do not remember what that law is.

Shmuel said: And

does

Abba not know [

a designation for Rav]

what he heard,

what that law is?

But this is how the law was stated:

According to Rabbi Judah, who holds one liable for damage caused by “

concealed”

property in a fire,

the Sages made

the

ordinance of “

the robbed person”

for his fire!

For if the owner of the burned pile claims that he had concealed vessels there, and cannot prove this, the Sages made an ordinance, that he would be able to swear how much the Sages made an ordinance similar to that of the robbed person, who swears how much the robber robbed from him, and the robber is liable to pay him that amount.

Ameimar inquired:

Did they

make the ordinance of “

the robbed person”

for a moser, one who causes another’s property to be taken from him? Did the Sages also make an ordinance here, that the person against whom the informer informed should swear how much property the informer caused him to lose through his informing, and the informer would pay him that amount?

Or not?

According to the one who says that we do not adjudicate the law of indirect causation,

for they do not hold a person liable for causing his fellow a loss, but only for a loss that he caused him directly,

you do not need to ask,

there is no question here whether they made the ordinance of “the robbed person” for a moser or not, since even if it were clear how much the informer caused him to lose through his informing, he would not be liable to pay him,

for

according to him, even the essential law of

informing is likewise not adjudicated.

Since the informer merely caused the loss, we do not adjudicate him liable to pay for it at all.

Rather, you do need to ask according to the one who says that we adjudicate the law of indirect causation,

according to whom one is also obligated to pay for causing a loss. And if we knew how much the informer caused him to lose through his informing, we would obligate him to pay him. Now the question is: Did they

make the ordinance of “

the robbed person”

for a moser, so that he swears and collects,

so that the one who suffered the loss would swear how much the informer caused him to lose and collect payment for it from him?

Or not,

perhaps they did not make this ordinance for a moser? And we conclude:

Let it stand unresolved!

There was a certain man who kicked

who kicked

his fellow’s strongbox,

a box in which money is placed,

and threw it into the river,

he threw it into the river.

Its owner came,

the owner of the box arrived,

and said: “This and this was inside it!”

Such-and-such an object and such-and-such an object were in the box.

Rav Ashi sat and examined the matter: In such a case, what is the law?

Is the damager liable to pay for the object that the injured party claims was inside the box? [As the Gemara will immediately explain the two sides of the uncertainty].

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ivia—and some say,

and some say that

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ivia,

said this

to Rav Ashi:

But

is this not our Mishna!

For this law is explained in our Mishna.

For we learned: And the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehuda, in the case of one who kindles the building, that he pays for everything that is inside it, since it is the way of people to place things in houses.

It is evident that it is the way of people to place every object and every object in their houses; and if so, the one who caused the damage should have taken into consideration every object, lest it be found inside this chest. And why should we not obligate him to pay for everything that the injured party claims was inside the chest?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

If he is claiming money,

if the injured party were claiming that there was money inside the chest,

here too!

Certainly we would obligate the one who caused the damage to pay, since it is the way to place money in a chest.

Rather,

here

with what are we dealing?

With one who is claiming a pearl.

The injured party is claiming that there was a pearl there.

And therefore it is subject to uncertainty:

What,

is the one who caused the damage obligated to pay for this or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do people place pearls in chests,

is it the way of people to place a pearl in a chest,

or not,

for it is not the way of people to do so, and therefore the one who caused the damage can claim: Since it is not the way to place a pearl in a chest, it did not occur to him that there was a pearl in the chest, and he is exempt from paying for it.

And we conclude:

teyku!

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If one claims a silver cup in the building,

one whose building [house] was burned, and who claims that he had a silver cup there,

what

is the ruling? Do we believe him that he possessed such a valuable object and obligate the one who kindled the fire to pay him for it, or perhaps we do not believe him?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

We see:

we see

whether he is a person of means,

if he is wealthy,

who has a silver cup,

who is accustomed to keep a silver cup in his possession,

or alternatively, he is a trustworthy person,

or he is a trustworthy person,

with whom people deposit,

for people deposit deposits with him, and it is possible that someone deposited a silver cup with him,

he takes it by oath.

He swears that he had a silver cup in his possession [as explained above, that they instituted the ordinance of the robbed party with regard to his fire], and the one who kindled it pays him for it.

But if not,

if he is neither a wealthy person nor a trustworthy person,

it is not within his power!

He has no standing to make such a claim, and we do not believe him that he had a silver cup in his possession. And the one who kindled it is not obligated to pay him for it.

Rav Adda, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: What

is the difference

between a gazlan and a hamsan? ,

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

A hamsan gives money.

A hamsan is called one who robs an object from his fellow and pays him for it.

A gazlan does not give money.

One who robs without paying is called a gazlan.

Rav Abba said to him:

Rav Abba

If he gives money,

do you call him “a hamsan”!?

But Rav Huna said: If they force him and he sells,

one whom they “hang,” meaning that they forced him, until he agreed to sell from his property,

his sale is a sale!

The sale is valid, and he cannot retract. And why is he called a hamsan?

Rav Ashi said to him:

It is not difficult.

This

is when he said, “I want [to sell],”

when the seller agrees after the fact to sell, then the sale is valid and he is not called a hamsan.

That

is when he did not say, “I want [to sell],”