Bava Kamma 62b — the Talmud in English

but remained in his refusal to sell, and he takes it from him against his will; then the sale is not valid, and therefore he is called a hamsan, despite the fact that he paid him for it. Mishna:

A spark,

a spark of fire,

that emerged from beneath the hammer and caused damage, is liable

the one striking with the hammer for the damage.

A camel that was laden with flax, and passed through the public domain, and its flax entered the shop and caught fire,

the flax caught fire

from the shopkeeper’s lamp,

which was burning inside the shop,

and ignited

the burning flax

the

large building

[a large house], then

the owner of

the

camel is liable

for the damage to the building, because he should not have increased the loading of his flax on the camel so much that it would enter the shop.

[If] the

the

shopkeeper

the

lamp outside

the shop, and as a result the flax that was on the camel caught fire and burned the building,

the shopkeeper is liable,

because he is the one at fault.

Rabbi Judah says: With a Hanukkah lamp,

if the lamp that the shopkeeper placed outside was a Hanukkah lamp, he

is exempt,

because he did this with permission, for it is a mitzva to place a Hanukkah lamp outside at the entrance of the house, on account of publicizing the miracle.

Gemara:

Ravina said in the name of Rava: Infer from Rabbi Judah,

who exempts in the case of a Hanukkah lamp, that

it is a mitzva to place it

the Hanukkah lamp

within ten

handbreadths of the ground.

If it enters your mind

that it is also possible to place it

above ten

handbreadths, then

why did Rabbi Judah say

that

with a Hanukkah lamp

the shopkeeper

is exempt? Let the owner of the building say

to the shopkeeper:

You should have placed it,

you should have placed the Hanukkah lamp

above the camel and its rider,

so that the building would not be burned when a camel laden with flax passed by; and since you did not do so, you were negligent, and you are liable to pay!

Rather, is it not so? Infer from it: It is a mitzva to place it within ten

handbreadths of the ground, and therefore he had no possibility of placing it above the camel.

And we reject the proof:

They said: In truth, I can say to you

that it is possible to place the Hanukkah lamp

even above ten

handbreadths.

What will you say,

that if so the owner of the building will say to the shopkeeper:

You should have placed it

the Hanukkah lamp

above the camel and its rider.

This is not an argument:

Since he is occupied with a mitzva,

since the shopkeeper is occupied with the mitzva of the Hanukkah lamp,

the Sages did not burden him to this extent,

the Sages did not burden him to such an extent that he should place the lamp so high, above the camel. And therefore he is not considered negligent.

Rav Kahana said: Rav Natan bar Minyomi expounded in the name of Rabbi Tanḥum: A Hanukkah lamp that one placed above twenty cubits is invalid.

For people do not see it at such a height, and there is no publicizing of the miracle here,

as with a sukkah and

the beam of the

alley,

for they too are invalid above twenty cubits.

We return to you, chapter “The One Who Enters.”

A. This chapter deals, for the most part, with matters of theft, one who makes the claim of a thief, slaughter and sale, and also with what branches from this concerning witnesses who falsely plotted to obligate a person for theft, slaughter, or sale.

B. A thief pays double payment; and if he slaughtered or sold the ox or the sheep that he stole, he pays five cattle in place of the ox, and four sheep in place of the sheep.

C. A bailee to whom they entrusted any object, and who claimed that the object had been stolen from him in a manner by which he is exempt from payment according to the laws of guardianship imposed upon him, and swore concerning this, and the object was found in his possession—he pays double payment. And if the deposit was an ox or a sheep, and he claimed concerning it that it had been stolen, and swore concerning it, and afterward slaughtered or sold it, he pays four and five.

These laws are explained in our Mishna, and in the sugya concerning it.

Mishna:

Greater

is

the measure of double payments

that a thief pays, or that a bailee who “makes the claim of a thief” concerning a deposit in his possession pays, when it is found to be in his possession—

than the measure of four and five payments

that a thief pays if he slaughtered or sold his theft, [or the deposit after he made the claim of a thief concerning it]; that is: the measure of double payments applies in a greater measure than four and five payments:

For the measure of double payments

that is paid for theft or when one makes the claim of a thief

applies both to an object that possesses the breath of life and to an object that does not possess the breath of life.

And

whereas

the measure of four and five payments

that is paid for slaughter or sale

applies only to an ox and a sheep, as it is stated: “

When a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it,

he shall pay five cattle in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep.”

But concerning the following matter there is no difference between double payment and four and five payments:

The one who steals after a thief [

the one who steals from the thief’s house]

does not pay double payment

to either the one robbed or the thief.

And

also

neither does one who slaughters nor one who sells after the thief

that is: one who steals from the thief’s house and slaughters or sells it does not

pay four and five payments.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The measure of double payments is greater than the measure of four and five payments, for the measure of double payments applies both to an object that possesses the breath of life and to an object that does not possess the breath of life, whereas the measure of four and five payments applies only to an ox and a sheep. The Gemara infers:

whereas

the following difference between double payment and four and five payments, namely: “

The measure of double payments applies both to a thief and to one who makes the claim of a thief,”

just as a thief pays double payment, so one who claims concerning a deposit entrusted to him that it was stolen, and the theft is found in his possession, pays double payment. “

And

whereas

the measure of four and five payments applies only to a thief,”

for if, after the bailee claimed concerning the animal that it had been stolen, he himself went and slaughtered or sold the animal, he does not pay four and five payments—

This distinction

is not taught

in our Mishna. If so:

Our Mishna

supports Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba

who makes one liable for slaughter and sale after he made the claim of a thief!

For Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who makes the claim of a thief concerning a deposit,

he

pays double payment;

and if he

slaughtered or sold

the deposit in his possession after he made the claim of a thief concerning it, he

pays four and five payments.

Our Mishna supports this law, because for this reason the Mishna did not distinguish in this matter between double payment and four and five payments.

Some say [

there are those who stated this teaching in another manner]:

Let us say,

is it indeed said that our Mishna—which did not distinguish between double payment and four and five payments concerning one who makes the claim of a thief—

supports Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, for Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who makes the claim of a thief concerning a deposit pays double payment; if he slaughtered or sold it, he pays four and five payments?

And concerning this they said in the beit-midrash: Do not support Rabbi Yohanan’s statement from our Mishna, because

does

whether

it teach

in our Mishna

“There is no difference between”

the measure of double payments and the measure of four and five payments except for the distinction that we learned in our Mishna, so that we could compel from this that there are no additional differences between them!?

But it did not teach this; rather,

“Greater”

it teaches

in our Mishna—

And if so, it may be said that

the tanna [

taught] one distinction,

and left aside

additional distinctions between double payment and four and five payments, such as in the case of one who makes the claim of a thief.

We learned in the Mishna:

That the measure of double payments applies

both to an object that possesses the breath of life and to an object that does not possess the breath of life:

And the Gemara explains:

From where are these matters

that double payments apply even to an object that does not possess the breath of life?

For the Sages taught:

It is written in the Torah in the section of the “gratuitous guardian”: “

When a man gives to his fellow money or vessels to guard, and it is stolen from the man’s house [and the bailee said that the deposit was stolen from his house].

If the thief is found [the tannaim below, 63b, disagreed concerning the interpretation of the verse: some say according to its plain meaning, and the verse is speaking of a thief; and some say: if it is found that the bailee himself stole it] he shall pay double [the thief, or the bailee who claimed: ‘It was stolen from me’].

If the thief is not found [when the bailee made the claim], and the master of the house is brought before God [and the bailee has already been brought before the court for an oath], whether or not he extended his hand to his fellow’s property.

[then] for every matter of wrongdoing [when he is found to have lied in his oath], concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment [that had been entrusted to him], or concerning any lost item [that he found] about which he says [the witness, meaning two witnesses] that this is it [the very item about which you swore that it was stolen, and it is in your possession], the matter of both of them shall come before the judges [so that the court will investigate the testimony of the two witnesses, and the one whom the judges find guilty] shall pay double to his fellow” [that is, if the witnesses are fit witnesses and they establish the bailee’s guilt, the bailee pays double; but if they establish that the witnesses were plotting witnesses, the witnesses pay the bailee the amount they plotted to cause him to lose]. This is the section concerning one who claims that an entrusted item was stolen.

For every matter of transgression [in which he is found to have lied in his oath], concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment [that were entrusted to him, or] concerning any lost object [that he found], which he says [the witness, that is, two witnesses] that this is it [the object concerning which you swore that it was stolen; it is with you], before God [the judges] shall come the matter of both of them [the two witnesses, so that the court will investigate the testimony, and whom God [that is, the judges] shall condemn, he shall pay double to his fellow”—[that is: if the witnesses are valid and they condemn the guardian, then the guardian shall pay double; and if they condemn the witnesses, who were found to be plotting witnesses, then they shall pay the guardian double, as they plotted to cause him loss], and this is the section of “one who makes the claim of a thief.”

And we learn, according to the hermeneutical principle that “with a generalization, specification, and generalization, you infer only something similar to the specification,” for what did the Torah make one who makes the claim of a thief liable for double payment? “

For every matter of transgression,”

this is

a generalization. “

Concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment,”

this is

a specification. “

Concerning any lost object,”

the verse

returned

and

generalized—

And this is the hermeneutical principle in the Torah: “

With a generalization, specification, and generalization, you infer only something similar to the specification.”

Just as the specification—

an ox, a donkey, a sheep, a garment—

explicitly indicates: an object that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value [

it itself is worth money],

so too every object that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value

is subject to double payment.

Excluded

from the law of one who makes the claim of a thief and from the law of double payment generally are

land, which

are

not movable property.

And likewise

slaves, which

are

likened to land

in the verse: “You shall take them as an inheritance for your sons after you, to inherit as a permanent holding; you shall work through them forever”; and just as one does not pay double payment for land, so he does not pay double payment for slaves.

And likewise

debt documents

that were entrusted to a guardian,

which, even though they are

indeed

movable property,

they

do not have monetary value in their substance,

but rather they cause one to collect money from the borrower. And

excluded

also is the

sanctified property.

For “when a man gives to his

fellow,”

is written

at the beginning of the matter, and the guardian is not the fellow of sanctified property. You might say:

If so, just as the specification

an ox, a donkey, and a sheep—

explicitly indicates: an object whose carcass imparts impurity through contact and carrying, so too every object whose carcass imparts impurity through contact and carrying

is subject to double payment—

but fowl

whose carcass does not impart impurity through contact and carrying —

not

are they subject to double payment?

And before the Gemara clarified from where we know to include birds for double payment, the Gemara was astonished at the very posing of the question:

And can you really say so,

that he is liable for double payment only for an object whose carcass imparts ritual impurity through contact and carrying!?

But

even

“a garment”

is written

in the Torah among the particulars, and a garment, which is clothing, does not impart ritual impurity through contact and carrying; so again we can learn even those whose carcasses do not impart ritual impurity through contact and carrying from “a garment,” since in any event they resemble the particular of “a garment”!?

They said

the students of the academy, to explain:

We are speaking

only about living creatures,

we are saying,

namely:

say [perhaps we should say]:

perhaps we should say

with regard to living creatures, an object whose carcass imparts ritual impurity

through contact and carrying, yes,

he is indeed liable for double payment for it—

But

an object whose carcass does not impart ritual impurity through contact and carrying—

no,

he is not liable for double payment for them.