Bava Kamma 61b — the Talmud in English

And the one who says: a water channel,

holds that specifically a water channel interrupts,

but a place where rainwater collects does not

interrupt between the fields. Because

those are called basins of the land.

They are considered receptacles of the field, and they are not a separate thing from it, so that they should interrupt and divide the field into two.

Mishna:

One who kindles within his own property,

how far does the fire pass

and become liable?

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: We view it

the fire

as though it were in the middle of a field of a kor.

In the middle of a field in which thirty se'a are sown [and its area is two hundred seventy-four by two hundred seventy-four cubits]. And if the fire is in the middle of such a field, there is on each side around it half of this measure; and if the fire passed this distance, he is exempt.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

the measure is

sixteen cubits

on each side of the fire,

like the way of a public domain,

and beyond this he is exempt.

Rabbi Akiva says: fifty cubits

on each side.

Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated: “

He shall surely pay, the one who kindled the fire

”; it implies that

everything depends on the fire.

And in the Gemara Rabbi Shimon's position will be explained.

Gemara:

The Gemara thought that Rabbi Shimon intended to say that he must always pay, whether the fire reached near or whether it reached far.

And we raised an objection:

And

if

Rabbi Shimon has no measure for the fire,

meaning that he is not liable for the fire except up to a certain distance?

But we learned

in tractate Bava Batra:

A person may not set up an oven inside the house

within his house

unless there is above it a height of four cubits,

so that there is a space of four cubits from the mouth of the oven to the ceiling, so that the fire should not seize the ceiling and spread toward the houses of the city. And the townspeople may prevent him from endangering their houses.

If he was setting it up

the oven

in an upper story,

he may not

unless there is beneath it

beneath the oven

plaster

of

three handbreadths,

so that the ceiling beneath the oven should not catch fire. [In addition to the four cubits that must be left above the oven.]

And with a stove,

which is smaller than an oven and in which one does not kindle as large a fire as in an oven, it is sufficient to have plaster of

one handbreadth

beneath the stove.

And if it caused damage,

meaning that despite all the distances he maintained, the fire emerged and caused damage to others,

he pays for what he damaged.

Rabbi Shimon says: These

all the

measures were stated only so that if it caused damage,

after he distanced it according to law he should be

exempt from paying

the damage.

It follows that Rabbi Shimon holds that there is a limit up to which the owner of the fire is held liable for the fire's damages, whereas in our Mishna he holds that he is always held liable for the damage caused by the fire!?

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said:

This is not Rabbi Shimon's intention, that we always hold him liable, but “everything depends on the fire.” That is,

everything depends on the height of the fire,

for if the fire is large and high, it spreads far away, and then even if it passed the measures stated in the Mishna, he is liable.

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Shimon.

And likewise Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Shimon.

Mishna:

One who kindles a grain stack, and there were vessels in it,

which were concealed in the grain stack,

and they burned,

and the vessels also burned.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He pays

even for

what is inside it,

he is also liable to pay for the vessels concealed inside it, for Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that there is an exemption for “concealed” in the case of fire.

And the Sages say: He pays only

for the

grain stack

alone, whether it is

of wheat

or whether it is

of barley,

but not for the vessels concealed inside the grain stack, because the Sages hold that the Torah imposed liability for fire damages only for what is exposed, and not for what is “concealed.”

If there was a tied kid with it

tied to the grain stack, so that it could not flee,

and a slave was near it

to the grain stack, and he was not tied and could flee,

and he burned with it,

both burned with the grain stack,

he is liable

to pay only for the grain stack and the kid, but concerning the slave he is exempt, since he could have fled.

If the

slave was tied to it

to the grain stack and could not flee,

and a kid was near it,

and it could have fled,

he is exempt

from everything, for since he is liable to death for the slave, he is therefore exempt from payment, as we say: “he stands before the greater liability.”

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehuda: When one kindles a large building

of his fellow,

that he pays

for everything inside it,

and there is no exemption of “concealed,” because

it is the way of people to place things in houses

all their possessions. And concerning something that is ordinarily concealed, there is no exemption of “concealed.”

Gemara:

Rav Kahana said: The dispute

of Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages in our Mishna is specifically

when one kindles within his own property, and the fire

passed

and consumed within another's property.

For Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for damage caused by “

concealed

” by fire.

And the Rabbis exempt

from “concealed.”

But when one kindles within another's property, everyone agrees: He pays

for

everything inside it,

for in another's property he has no permission to kindle, and he is like one who destroys with his hands, for which there is no exemption of “concealed.”

Rava said

to Rav Kahana:

If so, instead of teaching in the final clause

of the Mishna: “

The Sages concede to Rabbi Yehuda, when one kindles the large building, that he pays for everything inside it, for it is the way of people to place things in houses.”

But the case of one who kindles the large building is one in which he kindles within another's property,

and nevertheless the Mishna says that the reason he is liable there for “concealed” is because it is customary to conceal things in the large building. If, as you say, that in every case of one who kindles within another's property there is no exemption of “concealed,” why did the Mishna need to distinguish between a grain stack and a large building?

Let him divide and teach it concerning that case itself.

Was it not possible for the Mishna to distinguish even concerning the grain stack itself, where it is not customary to conceal things, and say:

In what circumstance are these words said,

that the Sages exempt him from payment for the vessels that were concealed in the grain stack?

When one kindles within his own property and the fire passed and consumed within another's property. But when one kindles within another's property, everyone agrees that he pays for everything inside it.

And all the more so in a large building, where it is customary to conceal things, he is liable for “concealed”!

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: They dispute in two matters,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages:

They dispute when one kindles within his own property and the fire passed and consumed within another's property.

For Rabbi Yehuda holds that he is liable for “

concealed

” by fire.

For he does not hold at all that there is an exemption for “concealed” by fire, and therefore he is liable both for things that are ordinarily concealed and for things that are not ordinarily concealed.

And the Rabbis hold: He is not liable

for “concealed” by fire. And even for things that are ordinarily concealed, he is exempt, because it is a scriptural decree to exempt “concealed” by fire, and there is no difference whether it is customary to conceal them or not.

And they also dispute when one kindles in another's property:

For Rabbi Yehuda holds: He pays for everything inside it, even

if concealed in a grain stack there was

a purse

which is not ordinarily concealed there; he is liable for it.

And the Rabbis hold: For vessels that are ordinarily concealed in a grain stack, such as threshing boards

threshing implements

and cattle implements, he does pay

for them. But

vessels that are not ordinarily concealed in a grain stack,

such as a purse,

he does not pay.

And in this case, of one who kindles in another's property, even the Rabbis concede that the exemption of “concealed” does not apply, because the passage concerning fire damages—which says there, “or the produce,” from which the Gemara above [60a] learns the exemption of “concealed”—speaks only of one who kindles within his own property, as it says, “When a fire goes out,” implying that he kindled in his own property and the fire went out to another's property.

However, nevertheless the Rabbis hold that logically one should not impose liability on a person for concealed property that is not ordinarily concealed, because he could not have been expected to consider that the object was concealed there; therefore, when one kindles in another's property, they hold him liable only for something that is ordinarily concealed.

And it follows that according to the Rabbis, in order to become liable for concealed property, two conditions are required: a. That he kindled within another's property. b. That it be ordinarily concealed.

And therefore, when the Mishna wishes to say that the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehuda and impose liability for concealed property, it states the case of one who kindles the large building, which contains both the condition of kindling in another's property and the condition that it is ordinarily concealed.

The Sages taught: One who kindles a grain stack, and there were vessels

concealed,

and they burned:

Rabbi Judah says: He pays

for

everything that was inside it.

And the Sages say: He pays only for a stack of wheat or

for

a stack of barley

alone, and not for the utensils concealed within it.

And they regard

the

place

the

utensils

concealed in the stack

as though

that place

were full of produce, and he pays according to the value of the produce that could have entered that place.

and he pays according to the value of the produce that could have fit in that place.