Bava Kamma 61b (סא:) — the Talmud in English

And the one who says: “a water channel,”

holds that only a water channel interrupts

but a place where rainwater collects does not

interrupt between the fields. Because

those are called receptacles of the land.

They are considered receptacles belonging to the field, and are not a separate entity from it such that they could interrupt and divide the field in two.

MISHNA:

One who kindles a fire within his own property,

how far may the fire spread

and he will be liable?

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: We view it

the fire

as though it were in the middle of a bet kor

in the middle of a field in which thirty se’a are sown [an area measuring 274 by 274 cubits], and if the fire were in the middle of such a field, there would be half of this measure on each side around it; therefore, if the fire crossed this distance, he is exempt.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

the measure is

sixteen cubits

on each side of the fire,

like the width of a public domain,

and beyond that, he is exempt.

Rabbi Akiva says: Fifty cubits

on each side.

Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated: “

He shall surely pay who kindles the fire

”; this indicates that

everything depends on the fire.

The Gemara will explain Rabbi Shimon’s view.

GEMARA:

The Gemara initially understood that Rabbi Shimon intended to say that he must always pay, whether the fire reached a nearby place or a distant one.

And we raised a difficulty:

A

if

Rabbi Shimon does not have a measure for the fire,

meaning that he is not liable for the fire beyond a certain distance,

but we learned

in tractate Bava Batra:

A person may not place an oven inside a house

within his house

unless there is a height of four cubits above it,

so that there is a gap of four cubits between the mouth of the oven and the ceiling, in order that the fire not catch the ceiling and spread toward the houses of the city. The townspeople are entitled to prevent him from endangering their homes.

If he was placing it

the oven

in an upper chamber,

he may not do so

until there is beneath it

beneath the oven

plaster,

a layer of

three handbreadths,

so that the ceiling beneath the oven will not catch fire. [In addition to the four cubits that must be left above the oven.]

And in the case of a stove,

which is smaller than an oven and in which one does not kindle as large a fire as in an oven, a layer of

one handbreadth

beneath the stove is sufficient.

And if it caused damage,

meaning that despite all the distances he maintained, the fire emerged and caused damage to others,

he pays for what he damaged.

Rabbi Shimon says: All these

measures

were stated only so that if it caused damage,

after he maintained the proper distance, he would be

exempt from paying

for the damage.

Thus, Rabbi Shimon holds that there is a limit to the extent to which the owner of a fire is held liable for damage caused by the fire, whereas in our Mishna he holds that he is always held liable for the damage caused by the fire!?

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said:

This is not Rabbi Shimon’s intention—that we always hold him liable. Rather, “everything depends on the fire,” meaning

everything depends on the height of the fire.

If the fire is large and high, it spreads far; then, even if it crossed the measures stated in the Mishna, he is liable.

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And likewise Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

MISHNA:

One who kindles a fire in a grainstack, and there were vessels in it

that were concealed in the grainstack

and they burned,

and the vessels also burned.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He pays

even for

what is inside it;

he is also liable to pay for the vessels concealed within it, since Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that there is an exemption for concealed property in the case of fire.

And the Rabbis say: He pays only

for the

grainstack,

whether it is

of wheat

or whether it is

of barley,

but not for the vessels concealed within the grainstack. For the Rabbis hold that the Torah made one liable for damage caused by fire only for what is exposed, but not for what is concealed.

If there was a restrained kid tied to it

tied to the grainstack, so that it could not flee,

and a slave was near it

near the grainstack, and was not tied and could flee,

and they burned with it,

both burned together with the grainstack,

he is liable

to pay only for the grainstack and the kid; but he is exempt for the slave, since the slave could have fled.

If the

slave was tied to it,

to the grainstack, and could not flee,

and a kid was near it,

and could flee,

he is exempt

for everything. Since he is liable to receive the death penalty for the slave, he is exempt from monetary payment, as we say: “He is subject to the more severe liability.”

And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda: If one kindles a fire in another’s building

[a large tower] of another,

he pays

for everything inside it,

and there is no exemption for concealed property, because

this is the way people place things in houses,

all their possessions. For an object that is ordinarily concealed, there is no exemption for concealed property.

GEMARA:

Rav Kahana said: The dispute

between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis in our Mishna applies specifically

when one kindles within his own property, and the fire

spread and

consumed property within another’s property.

For Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for damage caused by “concealed”

property

in a fire,

and the Rabbis exempt

for “concealed” property.

But when one kindles within another’s property, everyone agrees: He pays

for

everything inside it,

since one has no permission to kindle within another’s property, and he is like one who destroys with his hands, for which there is no exemption for concealed property.

Rava said

to Rav Kahana:

If so, instead of teaching in the latter clause

of the Mishna: “

The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda: If one kindles a fire in a building, he pays for everything inside it, since this is the way people place things in houses.”

But the case of one who kindles a fire in a building is one in which he kindles within another’s property,

and nevertheless the Mishna says that the reason he is liable there for concealed property is that it is customary to conceal things in a building. If, as you say, whenever one kindles within another’s property there is no exemption for concealed property, why did the Mishna need to distinguish between a grainstack and a building?

Let them dispute and teach it with regard to that case.

After all, even with regard to the grainstack itself, where it is not customary to conceal things, the Mishna could have distinguished and said:

In what case is this statement said,

that the Rabbis exempt him for vessels concealed in the grainstack?

When one kindles within his own property and the fire spreads and consumes property within another’s property. But when one kindles within another’s property, everyone agrees that he pays for everything inside it.

And all the more so in the case of a building, where it is customary to conceal things, they should be liable for concealed property!

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: They disagree in two respects,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis:

They disagree when one kindles within his own property and the fire spreads and consumes property within another’s property.

For Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for

“concealed”

property in a fire.

He does not hold at all that there is an exemption for concealed property in a fire; therefore, he holds him liable both for objects that are ordinarily concealed and for objects that are not ordinarily concealed.

And the Rabbis hold: He is not liable

for concealed property in a fire. Even for objects that are ordinarily concealed, he is exempt. This is a scriptural decree exempting concealed property in a fire, and there is no distinction whether it is customary to conceal the object or not.

And they also disagree when one kindles within another’s property:

For Rabbi Yehuda holds: He pays for everything inside it, and even if

a

purse

was concealed in the grainstack, although it is not customary to conceal it there, he is liable for it.

And the Rabbis hold: For vessels that are ordinarily concealed in a grainstack, such as threshing boards

threshing implements

and cattle implements, he pays

for them. But

for vessels that are not ordinarily concealed in a grainstack,

such as a purse,

he does not pay.

In this case, of one who kindles within another’s property, even the Rabbis concede that the exemption for concealed property does not apply, because the section concerning damage caused by fire—which states “or the standing grain,” from which the Gemara above [60a] derives the exemption for concealed property—speaks only of one who kindles within his own property, as it says: “When a fire goes forth,” implying that he kindled it in his own property and the fire went forth into another’s property.

Nevertheless, the Rabbis maintain that logically a person should not be held liable for concealed property that is not ordinarily concealed, since he could not have anticipated that the object was concealed there. Therefore, when one kindles within another’s property, they hold him liable only for an object that is ordinarily concealed.

It follows that according to the Rabbis, in order to be liable for concealed property, two conditions are required: a. He kindled within another’s property. b. It must be an object that is ordinarily concealed.

Therefore, when the Mishna wishes to state that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda and hold one liable for concealed property, it mentions the case of one who kindles a fire in a building, which includes both the condition of kindling within another’s property and the condition that it is customary to conceal things there.

The Sages taught: One who kindles a fire in a grainstack, and there were vessels

concealed in it,

and they burned:

Rabbi Judah says: He pays

for

everything that was inside it.

And the Sages say: He pays only for a stack of wheat or

for

a stack of barley

alone, but not for the vessels buried within it.

And they view

the

place

of the

vessels

buried in the stack

as though

that place

were full of grain,

and he pays according to the value of the grain that could have fit in that place.