Bava Kamma 61a (סא.) — the Talmud in English

But according to the one who says

“concealed property in a fire,”

he was asking

David,

“What need did he have for the verses?” Why is barley mentioned once and lentils once, given that he asked only about one stack whether one is liable for concealed property in a fire?

Why does the verse mention barley once and lentils once? After all, he asked only about one stack, whether one is liable for concealed property damaged by fire?

And we answer:

That one who says:

“Concealed property”

and one of these two

he was asking. David asked the Sanhedrin two questions: the question of concealed property in a fire and one of the other two questions, either “to burn” or “to exchange.” Each question concerned a different stack. Therefore, barley is mentioned once and lentils once.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, according to the one who says these two,

whether according to the one who says “to burn” or according to the one who says “to exchange,”

this is why it is written

“But David refused to drink them,”

because David did not wish to make use of the permission granted to him by the Sanhedrin to burn the stacks or to exchange them without the owners’ permission,

for

he said: Since there is a prohibition

for every person in Israel in doing so,

I do not want

to rely on the fact that I am king and that a king is permitted to do so.

But according to the one who says

“concealed property in a fire,”

he was asking,

the following difficulty arises:

After all, it was a halakhic ruling that they sent him,

for the Sanhedrin merely sent him the halakhic ruling as to whether the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda or the Rabbis concerning concealed property in a fire. If so,

what is the meaning of

“But David refused to drink them”?

What relevance is there to saying that he did not wish to accept the halakhic ruling? And we answer:

He did not state it in their names.

David did not wish to state the ruling in the name of the three warriors who risked their lives and passed through the Philistine camp in order to reach the Sanhedrin and ask his question.

David said

:

“Thus have I received by tradition from the court of Samuel the Ramathite: Anyone who gives himself over to die for the words of Torah—the halakhic statement is not said in his name!” (See an additional note at the end of the book from the editor-in-chief.)

see an additional note at the end of the book from the editor-in-chief).

And it is written later in the verse:

“And he poured them out before the Lord.”

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, according to the one who says these two—

“to burn” and “to exchange”—as explained above, David did not wish to drink them because he did not want to rely on the permission granted to him by the Sanhedrin. It is therefore understandable that it is written that he poured them out before the Lord, namely,

because he acted for the sake of Heaven.

He did not wish to permit himself something forbidden to everyone else, and this is considered as though he had poured out these waters before the Lord.

But according to the one who says

“concealed property in a fire,”

and the reason he did not wish to drink them was that he did not state the ruling in their name, if so,

what is the meaning of

“And he poured them out before the Lord”?

And we answer:

He stated them in the name of the Gemara.

David did not state the halakhic ruling in his own name; rather, he said that this was the received tradition. This is called pouring them out before the Lord.

Mishna:

If it passed over

the fire

a fence that was four cubits high,

which stood between the fire and another person’s field,

or

if it passed

through a public domain,

which was sixteen cubits wide [corresponding to the width of the wagons in the wilderness camp, where there was a “public domain”],

or a river, he is exempt,

as he is compelled by circumstances beyond his control.

Gemara:

We challenge the Mishna, which states that if it passed over a fence four cubits high, he is exempt:

But was it not taught

in a beraita:

If it passed over a fence that was four cubits high, he is liable!?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: The tanna of our Mishna

of the Mishna

is counting

and proceeds

from above downward:

Six cubits

high—

exempt.

Five cubits

high—

exempt.

Less than five cubits

to

a height of

four cubits

—and four cubits themselves are also included in “to, including the endpoint”—is likewise

exempt.

Whereas

the tanna of the outside

the tanna of the beraita

is counting from below upward

and proceeds from below upward:

Two cubits

high—

liable.

Three cubits

high—

liable.

Above three cubits

to

a height of

four cubits,

while four cubits themselves are not included in this phrase—“to, but not including the endpoint”—is also

liable.

It follows that the tanna of the beraita also agrees that at a height of four cubits he is exempt. The statement in the beraita that “four cubits—liable” means that up to four cubits he is liable, while at exactly four cubits he is in fact exempt. And the statement in the Mishna that at four cubits he is exempt means that at exactly four cubits he is also exempt.

Rava said: The four cubits that they said render him exempt—even in a field of thorns.

Even if the field beyond the fence that caught fire was full of thorns, which the fire readily grasps, nevertheless a fence four cubits high is sufficient to exempt the owner of the fire.

Rav Pappa said: And from the edge of the thorns upward,

the fence must be

four cubits

high. The fence must not only be four cubits higher than the fire; in relation to the thorns on the other side as well, the fence must be four cubits higher than the upper edge of the thorns.

Rav said: They taught

in the Mishna that he is exempt if the fence was four cubits high

only with regard to a rising flame,

where the fire rises upward in a column.

But with regard to a bent flame,

if the wind bends the fire to the sides,

even

if the fence was

up to one hundred cubits high, he is liable.

Since, due to the wind, the flame may leap over the tall fence.

And Shmuel said

the opposite:

The Mishna

speaks specifically

of a bent flame,

and only then must the fence be four cubits high.

But with regard to a rising flame,

if the fire rises upward and is not bent sideways by the wind,

even

if the fence was only

of any height, he is exempt.

It was taught in accordance with Rav

that the Mishna speaks only of a rising flame:

In what case is this statement said,

that which the Mishna says—that if the fire passed through a public domain he is exempt? It is only

with regard to a rising flame,

when the fire is high and rises upward.

But with regard to a bent flame,

when the fire is low

and wood is available to it,

so that the fire proceeds while catching onto the wood on the ground,

even

if the fire traveled a distance

of one hundred mil, he is liable.

If it passed over

the fire a river

or a pool

[the Gemara below will explain what a “pool” is]

that are eight cubits wide, he is exempt.

Thus, the beraita interprets the Mishna as referring only to a rising flame, in accordance with Rav.

We learned in the Mishna: Or

through a public domain

he is exempt.

And we raise a difficulty:

Who is the tanna?

Who is the tanna of our Mishna who holds that the measure of the distance over which the fire must pass in order to exempt the owner of the fire is sixteen cubits?

And we answer:

Rava said: It is Rabbi Eliezer!

As we learned

in a Mishna below [on the second side]:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

If the fire passed

sixteen cubits, like the width of a public domain, he is exempt.

We learned in the Mishna:

Or a river

he is exempt.

Rav said:

The Mishna is speaking of

an actual river,

such that if the fire crossed it, he is exempt.

And Shmuel said:

The Mishna is speaking of

a canal used for irrigation,

a small stream from which water is drawn to irrigate the fields; and even in that case he is exempt.

And we explain:

The one who says: an actual river,

which is wide, holds that

even though there is no water

in the river, he is nevertheless exempt because of its width.

And the one who says: a canal used for irrigation,

which is not wide, holds that

if there is water in it,

only then is he exempt because of the water,

but

if

there is no water in it,

in the stream,

no,

he is not exempt.

We learned there

in tractate Peah:

And these interrupt for the purpose of peah:

The matters listed below divide a field with regard to peah, causing it to be considered two fields, so that peah must be left separately from each one:

a stream, a pool, and a private path

four cubits wide,

and a public domain

sixteen cubits wide. All of these, when they pass through the field, divide it and cause it to be considered two fields with regard to peah.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is the meaning of

“a pool”?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: A place where rainwater

collects.

Rainwater gathers there.

Rav Beivai said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: A channel of water that distributes water to its banks,

from which the fields are irrigated.

And we explain:

The one who says: a place where rainwater collects

holds that

certainly a channel of water

interrupts the field.