Bava Kamma 59b (נט:) — the Talmud in English

4

He would finish with black shoes.

He would wear black shoes, as was the custom of mourners,

and he stood

in

the marketplace of Nehardea.

The people of the Exilarch’s house found him

The people of the Exilarch met him and

said to him: Why are these shoes different?

Why are you wearing black shoes, as mourners do

? He said to them: I am mourning for Jerusalem,

because I am mourning over the destruction of Jerusalem!

They said to him: Do you consider yourself

Are you so distinguished

as to mourn for Jerusalem?

They assumed that it was arrogance.

The people of the Exilarch regarded this as an arrogant practice on the part of Eliezer Zeira.

They brought him and imprisoned him,

They imprisoned him because of this.

He said to them

Eliezer Zeira said: Release me, for

I am a great man!

They said to him: How do we know

that you are a great man?

He said to them: Either you ask me a matter,

or you ask me a question of halakha,

or I will ask you a matter.

Or I will ask you, and through this you will be able to ascertain that I am indeed a great man.

They said to him

The people of the Exilarch said to him:

You ask,

you ask!

He said to them: With regard to one who cuts unripe dates,

one who cuts dates from another’s palm tree while they are still unripe,

what does he pay?

They said to him: He pays the value of unripe dates,

whatever they are worth now, while they are unripe.

He said to them:

But they were destined to become dates,

they were destined to grow and become ripe dates, which are worth more

! They said to him:

Indeed,

he pays the value of dates

as though they were ripe.

He said to them: But he did not take ripe dates from him!

He did not steal ripe dates from him, but rather unripe fruit; why should he pay as though they were ripe

? They said to him: You tell us,

tell us what the law is!

He said to them: By sixty.

One assesses how much the value of the surrounding field has decreased, in an area sixty times the size of the palm tree, as a result of cutting off the dates, and he pays the difference. In this manner, he also pays for the dates as though they were ripe, because one who purchases a field in which fruit grows takes into account, to some extent, the future appreciation of the fruit, and pays for the field accordingly. It follows that the future appreciation is also included in the assessment of the depreciation.

They said to him: Who says according to you?

Who rules this way

? He said to them: Samuel is alive and his court is in existence,

and it is possible to ascertain whether this is indeed the law.

They sent the matter before Samuel.

They sent the question to Samuel.

He said to them: He has spoken well to you,

the damage is assessed

by sixty!

And they released him

from prison.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: If it ate fully ripened produce

it pays for fully ripened produce: if a se'a, a se'a; if two se'a, two se'a.

And we raised a question about it:

What is the reason

for Rabbi Shimon’s ruling that, in the case of fully ripened produce, he pays according to the value of the produce itself, and not relative to the field?

And we answer: Because he holds that

with regard to that which the Torah said,

“and it consumes in another’s field,”

from which we derive:

It teaches that the assessment is made on the basis of the field

by assessing it relative to another field, rather than assessing the produce itself that was eaten.

This applies

only to produce that is not fully ripened, which is

something that requires the field,

as it still needs to grow in the field. But

this

fully ripened produce,

which does not require the field, he must pay for according to its own value,

he pays according to the value of the produce itself.

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Rav ruled

in an actual legal case,

in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

And he issued a definitive ruling,

teaching the students the established halakha for future generations, that the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba explains:

Rav ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir, as it is taught:

The husband

wrote to

a first purchaser

a

deed of sale for one field,

but she did not sign it for him

the woman did not sign for the first purchaser regarding the sale, thereby not acknowledging her husband’s sale. That is, she did not relinquish her right to collect her marriage contract from that land. The husband then wrote a deed of sale for another field

to

a second purchaser,

and she signed it for him,

the woman thereby relinquishing her right to collect her marriage contract from that land. The husband died, and left no other property from which her marriage contract could be collected.

This woman

lost her marriage contract!

She cannot collect it either from the first purchaser or from the second. She cannot collect from the first, even though she did not sign for him, because he was the first purchaser; when he purchased the field, the second field still remained in the husband’s possession, and he could say to the woman: I left you a place from which to collect your marriage contract. Therefore, even though the husband subsequently sold the second field to someone else, she cannot collect from me; rather, she should collect from the second field, which was “unencumbered property” when I purchased.

Nor can she collect from the second field, since she signed for him and relinquished her lien on that field,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Although she cannot collect from the first purchaser, since he left her a place from which to collect, nevertheless she can collect from the second purchaser despite having signed her relinquishment for him, because

she can say: I acted only

for the sake of

maintaining peace with my husband!

I did not intend at all to relinquish the field as security for my marriage contract. Therefore,

what claim do you have

against

me,

to take from me the field that is encumbered to me

? And he ruled

Rav

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, as we learned:

in our Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: If it ate fully ripened produce, it pays for fully ripened produce: if a se'a, a se'a; if two se'a, two se'a.

Mishna:

One who makes a grain pile,

one who makes a pile from his produce

within another’s field without the owner’s permission,

the owner of the field,

and the field owner’s animal eats it, he is exempt

the owner of the field is exempt from paying for the produce, since the pile was made without permission.

And if the field owner’s animal is injured by it,

the animal of the field owner,

the owner of the pile is liable

to pay for the damage.

And if he made the pile

in another’s field

with permission

of the field owner, and the field owner’s animal ate the produce,

the field owner is liable

to pay him for the produce.

Gemara:

And we raised a question about it:

Can we say that we learned

in our Mishna

not in accordance with Rabbi?

For if it is in accordance with Rabbi, he says

that Rabbi holds that the homeowner is not liable for damage caused by his animal to another person’s produce that the latter brought into his property, even with permission,

until the homeowner accepts responsibility

explicitly

to guard

the produce. But granting permission alone does not constitute acceptance of responsibility. It is as though he said to him: Enter and guard your own produce yourself. Therefore, he is not liable for damage caused to it by his animal.

Whereas our Mishna indicates that the field owner’s granting permission alone is sufficient to make him liable when his animal eats another’s grain pile.

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with the guardian of the threshing floors

the guardian of the granaries,

we are dealing

with a valley in which all the owners of the fields make their grain piles in one place, side by side, and appoint a guard there, and this guard gave him permission to make his pile there. In such a case even Rabbi concedes that the guard is liable for damage caused to the produce.

Since he said to him

the guard

“Enter and make your pile!”

giving him permission to make his pile there,

“Enter, and I will guard it for you,” he meant.

It is as though the guard said to him: Make your pile here, and I will guard it!

Therefore, the guard is liable for the damage. But a homeowner’s granting of ordinary permission does not make him liable for guarding the property.

Mishna:

One who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,

and they went and ignited it among the property of others,

is exempt

the sender

under human laws,

as the court does not obligate him to pay for what was burned,

but he is liable under the laws of Heaven.

If he sent

the fire

by the hand of

a mentally competent

person, the competent person is liable

to pay for the damage.

One brought the fire

the flame,

and another brought the wood

afterward and ignited it with the fire, and the fire spread and caused damage,

the one who brought the wood is liable,

because had he not brought the wood, the fire would not have spread and caused damage.

One brought the wood

first,

and another brought

afterward

the fire,

and ignited the wood,

the one who brought the fire is liable,

since he caused the conflagration.

Another came and fanned it,

he blew on the fire and raised the flame,

the one who fanned it is liable,

and the two who initially brought the fire and the wood are exempt.

If the wind fanned

the fire,

all of them are exempt.

Gemara:

Reish Lakish said in the name of Ḥizkiyya: They taught

in the Mishna that one who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is exempt under human laws only when

he gave him

the sender

a coal, and he fanned it,

the deaf-mute fanned it until it became a flame, and it went out and caused damage.

But

if

he gave him a flame, he is liable,

the sender.

What is the reason?

Because

his actions

the sender’s actions, in giving him a flame that was ready to cause damage,

caused

the conflagration.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if he gave him a flame

as well,

he is exempt

the sender.

What is the reason?

Because

the tongs

[a term derived from “tongs”]

of the deaf-mute caused

it.

The deaf-mute’s grasping the flame, taking it and carrying it to the grain pile, caused the conflagration.

And he is not liable

the sender

until he gives him

to the deaf-mute

branches

thorns,