Bava Kamma 58b (נח:) — the Talmud in English

And to watch it carefully there,

he should have been especially cautious with it, even lest it give birth there; and this too constitutes negligence with regard to the birth.

And we conclude:

The question remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

How does she pay for what she damaged?

The value of a beit se'a in that field is assessed: how much it was worth and how much it is worth now.

And we raise a question concerning this:

From where are these matters

derived—that the assessment is not based on the value of the individual produce-bed that she ate, but only by assessing it in relation to an area of a beit se'a in that field: how much the entire area is worth less after the damage to the produce-bed?

Rav Mattana said: The verse says [Exodus 22:4]

“

And it consumes in another's field”—

this teaches that the damage is assessed

along with

another field,

in relation to

another field.

And we challenge this: This

particular

verse,

“

And it consumes in another's field,”

is needed

to derive from it that one is liable specifically when the animal damaged property in another person's field,

to exclude

a case where it caused damage in

the public domain,

for which he is exempt. If so, how can one also derive from it that the damage is assessed along with another field?

And we answer:

If so,

if the verse came only to exclude the public domain,

the Merciful One should write

“and it consumes in his fellow's field.”

Alternatively,

it should have written: “And it consumes

another field.”

Why,

then, did the verse say

“

in another field”?

In order to derive this as well:

that the damage is assessed along with another field.

And we challenge this:

And say,

why should we not say that

the entire

verse

came only for this purpose,

that the verse came only to derive that the damage is assessed along with another field, whereas the other derivation,

to exclude the public domain,

from where do we derive it?

And we answer:

If so,

if “in another field” came only to teach the manner in which payment for the damage is made,

the Merciful One should have written it

“in another field”

with regard to payment,

in the place where the Torah speaks of payment for damage. The verse would then read:

“He shall pay from the best of his field and the best of his vineyard in another field.”

Why did the Merciful One need to write it

there—why did the Torah write this

with regard to

"

“

and it consumes,” where it is speaking about the damage caused by the animal?

Conclude from this two things!

The verse came to teach two matters: that one is liable specifically when the animal caused damage in another's field, and not when it caused damage in the public domain; and that the damage is assessed along with another field.

And we raise a question concerning what the Mishna says, that a beit se'a in that field is assessed:

How is it assessed?

How is the value of that beit se'a determined? The Gemara presents a dispute among the amoraim as to how the assessment is performed:

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:

One assesses

one se'a against sixty se'a.

One does not assess the value of a single beit se'a by itself, because in that case the damager would suffer a loss: a beit se'a by itself is expensive, since people generally do not sell such a small plot of land, consisting of only one beit se'a. A poor person who cannot afford to purchase anything larger than a beit se'a pays a high price for it, and consequently the assessment of the damage caused by the absence of one produce-bed in that field is also high.

Rather, two assessments are made. First, one assesses the value of a field of sixty se'a, and on that basis calculates proportionally the value of one beit se'a. Then one assesses how much the value of the beit se'a was diminished because of the absence of this produce-bed that the animal ate. One does not simply calculate the value of the produce-bed in relation to a field of sixty se'a, because in that case the injured party would lose entirely: the absence of one produce-bed in such a large field is not noticeable at all, and the field does not lose value on account of it. But in relation to one beit se'a, the deficiency is noticeable. Therefore, the Mishna stated that one assesses a beit se'a in that field. Rashi.

Rabbi Yannai said:

One assesses

a tarkav,

half a se'a,

against sixty tarkav

—[half-se'a measures], that is, thirty se'a.

According to his view as well, two assessments are made. First, one assesses the value of a field of thirty se'a [and not sixty se'a, because in that case the injured party would lose: the price of a field of sixty se'a is low, since there is little demand for it, as it is too large for an ordinary person and too small for a wealthy person. Consequently, the assessment of the damage would also be low].

After assessing the value of the field of thirty se'a, one calculates the value of one beit se'a, and assesses the reduction in the value of the beit se'a resulting from the animal's having eaten the produce-bed.

Ḥizkiyya said: A stalk against sixty stalks.

Only one assessment is made: the amount that the animal ate is assessed as equivalent to one-sixtieth of that amount, that is, one determines how much the entire produce, whose quantity is sixty times that of the eaten produce, was diminished as a result of the eating.

The Gemara raises an objection

from that which is taught in a beraita:

If it ate a kav or two kav,

a kav being one-sixth of a se'a,

we do not say that it should pay their value

according to their market value,

but rather we view it as though

what it ate

were a small produce-bed, and assess it.

The Gemara proves: What,

is it not

the intent of the beraita to say that the small produce-bed is assessed

by itself,

and not in relation to another field?

This is difficult for all the aforementioned amoraim, who explain that the assessment is made in relation to another field!?

And we answer:

No,

this is not the intent of the beraita. Rather, the intent of the beraita is to say that the produce-bed is assessed

against sixty,

as the aforementioned amoraim explain, each according to his own view.

The Sages taught: One does not assess a kav, because that improves its value, nor a kor,

a kor being thirty se'a,

because that diminishes its value.

And we raise a question concerning this:

What is the tanna saying

in the beraita?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: This is what it means: One does not assess a kav against sixty kav,

if the animal ate a kav, one does not assess it in relation to a field of sixty kav,

because that benefits the damager!

The damager gains from this, because a field of sixty kav commands a low price, as there is little demand for it: it is too much for a poor person and for an average person, and certainly too little for a wealthy person. In addition, the absence of one kav is not noticeable within a field of sixty kav.

Nor a kor against sixty kor,

if the animal ate a kor of grain, one does not assess it in relation to a field of sixty kor,

because that harms the damager.

The damager loses from this, because a field of sixty kor commands a high price: it is difficult to obtain such a large field, and a wealthy person who wishes to purchase such a field is prepared to pay much more than its ordinary value. In addition, the damage is substantial, since the absence of an entire kor is very noticeable in the field.

Rather, each se'a that was eaten is assessed in relation to a field of sixty se'a.

Rav Huna bar Menoaḥ raised an objection to this:

If so, that the assessment is one se'a against sixty se'a,

this

“nor

a field of a kor”

that the beraita stated is not the proper wording. Rather,

“nor a kor”

should it have said;

that is what the tanna should have said, corresponding to the first clause, which states “one does not assess a kav,” and does not say “a field of a kav.”

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Huna bar Menoaḥ said in the name of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika: This is what it teaches:

One does not assess a kav by itself,

that is, how much the kav that it ate was worth,

because that benefits the injured party.

The injured party gains, since the kav is worth a great deal.

Nor a kav within a field of a kor;

one does not assess the kav in relation to a field of a kor,

because that harms the injured party.

The injured party loses through such an assessment, because the absence of one kav is not noticeable in a field of a kor.

Rather, against sixty.

The kav is assessed in relation to sixty kav.

The Gemara relates an incident involving

a certain man who cut down

a

kasba,

a palm tree,

belonging to his fellow.

He came before the Exilarch,

to bring the owner to trial over the loss of the palm tree.

He said to him

—the Exilarch said to the damager:

I saw it myself;

I saw the palm tree,

and three palm trees stood together as one cluster,

there being three palm trees there side by side, as though they were in a single “nest,”

and the three were worth one hundred zuz.

All three together were worth one hundred zuz. Therefore,

go and give him

pay him

thirty-three and one-third

zuz—thirty-three zuz and one-third of a zuz, namely, one-third of one hundred zuz.

The damager said:

Why should I go to court

before the Exilarch, who judges Persian law,

rather than according to Torah law? Why

should I

go to be judged before him?! According to Torah law, the palm tree is not assessed by itself, but in relation to another field.

He went

and the damager came

before Rav Naḥman.

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Against sixty,

the palm tree must be assessed in relation to an area containing sixty palm trees, in accordance with the law of our Mishna.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

If they said

in the Mishna that the damage is assessed as one-sixtieth

with regard to damage caused by one's property,

when one's animal ate and caused damage,

will they say

the same

with regard to damage caused by one's person,

when he himself caused damage deliberately by cutting down the palm tree? Damage caused directly by a person is more severe, and perhaps in such a case they did not ease the damager's burden by assessing the damage as one-sixtieth!?

Abaye said to Rava: As for damage caused by one's person, what is your view,

that you maintain that it is not assessed as one-sixtieth—is this because you inferred it from a beraita,

as it is taught:

one who cuts down and destroys

his fellow's vineyard,

when the grapes are at the stage of

s'madar,

when they are still small, at the very beginning of flowering,

we see how valuable it was

how much the vineyard was worth

beforehand, and how valuable it is afterward,

after the damage?

Yet it does not teach “against sixty”!

It does not say that the damage he destroyed is assessed as one-sixtieth of it. It therefore appears that the rule of one-sixtieth does not apply to damage caused by one's person.

But there is no proof from this.

For

is it so

that

with regard to

damage caused by

his animal, too, is it not taught in a similar manner!?

We find a beraita dealing with damage caused by one's property that does not mention the rule of assessment as one-sixtieth, and nevertheless we interpret it as referring to that rule. If so, we should interpret the beraita concerning damage caused by one's person in the same manner. Thus, there is no proof that a distinction exists between damage caused by one's person and damage caused by one's property!

As it was taught:

an animal

that

entered the injured party’s property, and

severed

cut off the top of a

sapling [

young tree].

Rabbi Yosei says: The enforcers of decrees in Jerusalem,

judges who would impose fines exceeding the actual liability, would

say:

The payment for the damage caused by cutting off the top of a

one-year-old sapling is

two silver coins.

And for cutting off the top of a sapling

two years old—

four silver coins.

It ate

the grain

haziz,

while it was still stalk:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is assessed according to what remains of it.

They wait to see what remains in the field, how much it will be worth when it grows and reaches harvest, and according to that he pays for what was eaten.

And the Sages say:

They do not assess the grain itself that was eaten; rather,

they assess it—

the land—

how valuable it was

how much it was worth to sell when it was still stalk,

and how valuable it is

now, after the damage, and he pays the difference.