Bava Kamma 58a — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

Rather,

Rav, by way of ")

stated the “it is not necessary” formulation:

It is not necessary [to say this] with regard to [the animal that] ate, for it pays what it benefited by,

since it benefited by its eating.

But [with regard to] being struck, one might say

that there is no payment obligation for the benefit by which his animal was saved from being struck, and its law is like the law of

“one who drives away a lion from the property of his fellow.”

For such is the law if a person drove away a lion that had come to prey upon his fellow’s sheep: the owner of the sheep is not obligated to pay him for the fact that he benefited him by saving his property; rather, we say that he performed only a mitzva, and there is no payment obligation for this. Here too, the owner of the field saved his fellow’s animal from being struck by means of his produce,

and he likewise does not pay for what it benefited by.

Rav teaches us

that even when it was struck, it pays what it benefited by.

And we raise an objection to this:

And say that this too is so!

Why indeed is being struck not like one who drives away a lion, so that he should be exempt from paying for the benefit!?

And we answer:

One who drives away a lion from the property of his fellow, [does so] with his consent

—

the one who drives it away does so of his own will. But

this one,

the animal that was struck,

[does so] not with his consent!

For the owner of the field did not save his fellow’s animal from his own will; rather, the animal fell there on its own, and therefore the owner of the animal is obligated to pay him.

Alternatively: one who drives away a lion from the property of his fellow has no loss

—the one who drives it away does not lose anything through his saving it. But

this one,

with regard to being struck,

does have a loss

—the owner of the field, through the crushing of his produce. Therefore they must pay him what the animal benefited by. And we raise an objection to this:

How did it fall?

How did the animal fall into the garden, of which the Mishna says that it pays what it benefited by?

Rav Kahana said: [it means] that it slipped,

that the animal slipped

in its urine

in the public domain, and from there fell into the garden.

Rava said: [it means] that its fellow pushed it

into the garden.

And the Gemara explains the dispute:

The one who says that its fellow pushed it

holds:

all the more so

when

it slipped in its urine,

which is a greater accident, that it pays only what it benefited by and not what it damaged.

And the one who says that it slipped in its urine

holds that specifically here, where it is a complete accident, which the owners could not have imagined would happen, they pay only what it benefited by.

But if its fellow pushed it, it was negligence,

the owners were negligent,

and it pays what it damaged,

Because

he says to him,

the owner of the garden to the owner of the animal:

You should have led them for me one by one, one by one!

You should have led the animals one by one, so that one would not push the other.

Rav Kahana said: [the Mishna] taught

in our Mishna, that when it fell into the garden it pays only what it benefited by,

only when it ate

only

in that garden bed

into which it fell, since just as it was an accident with regard to the fall, so it was an accident with regard to that eating, for it cannot restrain itself from eating that garden bed which it sees beneath it.

But

if it went

from garden bed to garden bed

and ate there,

it pays what it damaged.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: even if

it went

from garden bed to garden bed, and even if

for

the entire day

it wandered there and ate, it pays only what it benefited by,

until it leaves

the garden,

and returns

to it

with the knowledge of

the owners.

Rav Pappa said: do not say

that the intention of Rabbi Yohanan, who says “until it leaves and returns with the knowledge,” is

“until it leaves with the knowledge,”

that the owners know that it left the garden,

and returns

to the garden bed

with the knowledge

of the owners; that is, after it returns to its place, the owners do not properly lock it in, and therefore it returns and goes out to the garden to eat there, and this is as though it returns to it a second time with the knowledge of its owners, since he did not lock it in properly.

Rather, once it left with the knowledge,

that its owners knew that it left the garden and returned to its place,

even though it returned

a second time to the garden

without the knowledge,

from then on its owner properly locked it in, and this is not a “return” with the knowledge of the owners; nevertheless, it pays what it damaged.

What is the reason?

For he guarded it properly?

Because

he says to him,

the owner of the garden to the owner of the animal:

Since it has become accustomed,

since it became accustomed to eating in this garden, from now on,

whenever it escapes,

whenever it flees from its place,

it runs there,

it will immediately run to this garden. Therefore, proper locking is no longer sufficient for it, as with all animals, namely, lesser guarding; rather, it requires superior guarding.

And since you guarded it only with ordinary guarding, this is negligence on your part, and you are liable for its damage.

We learned in the Mishna:

It descended in its usual manner and damaged; it pays what it damaged.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a problem: It descended in its usual manner and damaged through “birth fluids,”

that it gave birth to a young one there and damaged the produce through the “birth fluids” issuing at the time of birth.

What is [the law]?

Are the owners obligated to pay?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the uncertainty:

According to the one who says: its beginning was through negligence and its end through an accident, he is liable, you need not ask

that he is certainly liable, because its beginning was through negligence: he should have guarded it even without the birth, so that it would not descend and eat; and its end was through an accident, for it ate nothing, but damaged through the birth fluids, which is an accident, since the owners did not know that it would give birth there.

When you need to ask is according to the one who says: its beginning was through negligence and its end through an accident, he is exempt—what is [the law]?

Do we say: since its beginning was through negligence and its end through an accident

it is,

then it is

exempt.

Or perhaps: here, the entire matter is negligence! Since he sees that she is close to giving birth,

for since the owners see that she is close to giving birth, then

he should have guarded her;

they should have guarded her,