Bava Kamma 58a (נח.) — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

Rather,

Rav, in the manner of

was stating the phrase “it is not necessary”:

It is not necessary to say that if it ate, since it pays the benefit it derived,

for it benefited through its eating.

But if it was struck, one might say

that there is no obligation to pay for the benefit through which his animal was saved from being struck, and its case is like that of

“one who drives away a lion from another’s property.”

For that is the law when a person drives away a lion that was about to prey upon another’s flock: the owner of the flock is not obligated to pay him for benefiting him by saving his property. Rather, we say that he performed merely a mitzva, and there is no obligation to pay for this. Here too, the owner of the field saved his fellow’s animal from being struck by means of his produce,

and it likewise does not pay for the benefit it derived.

Rav teaches us

that even when it was struck, it pays the benefit it derived.

And we raise a difficulty:

But say that this is indeed so!

Why, in fact, is a case where it was struck not like one who drives away a lion, so that it should be exempt from paying for the benefit it derived?!

And we answer:

One who drives away a lion from another’s property does so of his own accord;

he does so willingly,

whereas

this

animal that was struck

does not do so willingly!

The owner of the field did not save his fellow’s animal from being struck voluntarily; rather, the animal fell there on its own. Therefore, the animal’s owner is obligated to pay him.

Alternatively: One who drives away a lion from another’s property suffers no loss,

as the one who drives it away loses nothing through saving the property. But

this

case, where it was struck,

does involve a loss

for the owner of the field, through the crushing of his produce. Therefore, they must pay him the benefit that the animal derived. And we raise a difficulty:

How did it fall?

How did the animal fall into the garden, concerning which the Mishna says that it pays the benefit it derived?

Rav Kahana said: It was that the animal slipped,

the animal slipped

in its own urine

in the public domain, and from there fell into the garden.

Rava said: It was that another animal pushed it

into the garden.

And the Gemara explains the disagreement:

The one who says that another animal pushed it

holds:

All the more so

if

it slipped in its own urine,

which is an even greater case of an unavoidable accident, it pays only the benefit it derived and not the damage it caused.

And the one who says that it slipped in its own urine

holds that only in this case, which is a complete unavoidable accident that the owners could not have anticipated, does it pay only the benefit it derived.

But if another animal pushed it, it was negligence,

the owners were negligent,

and it pays for the damage it caused.

Because

the owner of the garden can say

to the animal’s owner:

“You should have led them one at a time, one at a time!”

You should have led the animals one at a time, so that one would not push the other.

Rav Kahana said: We learned

in our Mishna, that when it fell into the garden it pays only the benefit it derived,

only when it ate

only

from the same garden bed

into which it fell, since just as its fall was an unavoidable accident, so too its eating from that bed was an unavoidable accident: it could not restrain itself from eating the bed that it saw beneath it.

But

if it proceeded

from one garden bed to another

and ate there,

it pays for the damage it caused.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even if

it proceeded

from one garden bed to another, and even if

it

for the entire day

wandered there and ate, it pays only the benefit it derived,

until it leaves

the garden

and returns

to it

with the knowledge of

the owners.

Rav Pappa said: Do not say

that Rabbi Yohanan’s intent when he says “until it leaves and returns with the knowledge” is

“until it leaves with their knowledge,”

meaning that the owners know that it left the garden,

and returns

to the garden bed

with the knowledge

of the owners—that is, after it returns to its place, the owners fail to lock it in properly, and it once again leaves for the garden to eat there. This is considered as though it returned to it a second time with the knowledge of its owners, since they did not lock it in properly.

Rather, once it left with their knowledge,

meaning that its owners knew that it had left the garden and returned to its place,

even if it returned

to the garden a second time

without their knowledge,

meaning that from then on its owners locked it in properly and this return was not with their knowledge, nevertheless it pays for the damage it caused.

What is the reason?

After all, he guarded it properly.

Because

the owner of the garden can say

to the animal’s owner:

“Since it has learned,

once it became accustomed to eating in this garden, from now on,

whenever it escapes,

whenever it flees from its place,

it runs there,

it will immediately run to this garden. Therefore, it is not enough now to lock it properly as one does with all animals, namely, with minimal safeguarding; it requires excellent safeguarding.”

And since you guarded it only with ordinary safeguarding, this is negligence on your part, and you are liable for the damage it causes.

We learned in the Mishna:

If it descended in the usual manner and caused damage, it pays for the damage it caused.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: If it descended in the usual manner and caused damage through “birthing fluids,”

meaning that it gave birth there and damaged the produce with the “birthing fluids” emitted during labor,

what is the law?

Are the owners obligated to pay?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma:

According to the one who says that if the beginning was negligence and the end an unavoidable accident, one is liable, you have no dilemma:

he is certainly liable, because the beginning was negligence: the owners should have guarded it even without regard to the birth, so that it would not descend and eat; and the end was an unavoidable accident, because it ate nothing, but merely caused damage through the birthing fluids, which is an unavoidable accident, since the owners did not know that it would give birth there.

Your dilemma is according to the one who says that if the beginning was negligence and the end an unavoidable accident, one is exempt: what is the law?

Do we say: Since its beginning was negligence and its end an unavoidable accident,

it is,

it is therefore

exempt.

Or perhaps: Here, the entire matter is negligence! For since he saw that it was close to giving birth,

since the owners saw that it was close to giving birth, therefore

he should have guarded it;

they should have guarded it,