Bava Kamma 56b — the Talmud in English

And we raise it:

It is obvious that the bandits are liable for damage caused by the animal!

that the bandits are liable for damage caused by the animal?

For

once they took it out,

having removed the animal from its owners’ domain, and having also performed with it an acquisition through pulling, and a change of domain, from that point onward

it stands in their domain,

the animal is acquired by them [through the acquisition of robbery that they performed with it],

for every matter,

for every matter [although they are still liable to return it, since the Torah said: “and he shall return the robbery that he robbed”]. Therefore it is considered as acquired by them even with regard to this: that they are liable to pay for the damage it caused to the property of others, just as a person is liable to pay for the damage caused by his property. And we answer:

It is necessary,

that the bandits did not pull the animal toward themselves; rather, it is referring to a case

where they stood before it.

They stood before it on every side, so that it could go only in the direction of the standing grain, and eat from it.

And this is the novelty of the Mishna: that even in such a case, in which they performed no acquisition at all with the animal, nevertheless they are liable for the damage it causes to others.

For it is like that which Rabba said in the name of Rav Mattana in the name of Rav: One who places another’s animal upon another’s standing grain,

who took Reuven’s animal and placed it upon Shimon’s standing grain,

is liable

to pay the damage.

And the Gemara thought that “one who places another’s animal” means that he held it by the hand and led it to the standing grain, and therefore it asks: If so,

it is obvious

that he is liable!?

And here too the Gemara answers:

It is necessary, that he stood

before it.

And the novelty is that this is considered as though he actually placed the animal upon his fellow’s standing grain.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: “

‘He prodded it’ you told us”!

You explained to us that “one who places another’s animal” means that he prodded it with a stick so that it would go to his fellow’s standing grain, and only then is he liable; but if he merely “stood before it,” he is not liable.

And the bandits as well,

our Mishna, which says that the bandits took it out, is likewise speaking only in a case

where they prodded it

with a stick, and through this acquired it by an acquisition of robbery, and therefore they are liable for its damage. And this is the novelty of the Mishna: that prodding an animal with a stick is considered an acquisition through pulling.

We learned in the Mishna:

He handed it over to a shepherd, the shepherd enters in his place.

And we raise it:

They say, “in his place”—

of whom?

In place of whom does the shepherd enter, becoming liable for damage caused by the animal?

If you say,

if you wish to say

“in the place of the owner of the animal,”

if so, it is difficult, for

we already learned it once!

We already learned this in the Mishna above, in the fourth chapter [44b]: that a bailee enters in place of the owners, becoming liable for damage caused by the animal. Why did Rabbi need to teach us this a second time in our Mishna concerning a shepherd, who is the bailee of the animal, that he enters in place of the owners?

For thus we learned above:

The owners handed it over

their animal

to an unpaid bailee, to a borrower, to a paid bailee, or to a renter; all entered in place of the owners!

Rather,

perhaps you wish to say that “in his place” means

“in the place of the bailee,”

that the owners handed it over to a bailee, and the bailee handed it over to a shepherd, and the Mishna comes to say that the shepherd enters in place of the first bailee, and he is responsible for damage caused by the animal,

and

if so

the first bailee is completely exempt

from damage caused by the animal.

If so, it is difficult:

Let it be said that it is a refutation of Rava!

For Rava said: A bailee who hands [the object] over to a bailee is liable,

the first bailee for damage that occurred to the animal, even if the animal was overcome by accident while with the second bailee, whereas our Mishna says that the first bailee is completely exempt with regard to the animal?

And we answer: The Mishna is indeed speaking of a bailee who handed it over to a shepherd, and this is not difficult for Rava.

For

Rava can say to you: What is “

he handed it over to a shepherd”?

To his assistant!

For the shepherd is the student [assistant] of the first bailee, and in such a case Rava too agrees that the first bailee is exempt, because

it is the practice of a shepherd [

bailee ]

to hand it over to his assistant,

for it is the practice that a shepherd hands it over to his student, and this is as though the owners agreed to it; therefore he is freed from it, and the second enters in his place.

Some say: Since it teaches

in our Mishna

“he handed it over to a shepherd,”

and it does not teach

“he handed it over to another,”

infer

from it: What is “

he handed it over to a shepherd”?

That he

handed

the

shepherd over to his assistant.

And only then is he exempt, because

it is the practice of a shepherd to hand it over to his assistant. But

if

he handed it

the first bailee

over to another,

to an ordinary shepherd who is not his student,

not

is the first bailee exempt from guarding the animal.

And we raised this question:

Let us say that it supports Rava:

Is there proof from our Mishna for Rava,

who said: If a watchman handed [the object] over to another watchman, he is liable.

For our Mishna specifically stated that the first watchman handed it over to his student, implying that had he handed it over to another watchman, he would have remained liable for the animal.

And we reject this:

They said: No!

There is no proof from here for Rava, because

perhaps it states the ordinary manner of the matter,

for it is the ordinary practice that the shepherd hands [the animal] over to his student, and therefore the Mishna stated it in this manner.

And

in fact,

it is the same law

if he handed it over

to another,

he would also be exempt.

It was stated:

A watchman of a lost item,

one who finds a lost item, who is obligated to bring it into his house and guard it until the owners are found.

Rabba said: He is comparable to an unpaid watchman,

the status of a watchman of a lost item is that of an unpaid watchman.

Rav Yosef said: He is comparable to a paid watchman,

his status is that of a paid watchman.

And the Gemara explains the reasoning of Rabba and Rav Yosef:

Rabba said: He is comparable to an unpaid watchman

because

what benefit comes to him!?

For what benefit does he have from the fact that he is guarding the lost item? Thus, he is an unpaid watchman over it.

Rav Yosef said: He is comparable to a paid watchman,

because

through that

benefit that he does not need to give bread to a poor person,

since he derives benefit from the lost item: if a poor person comes while he is occupied with guarding the lost item, he is exempt from giving him charity, because one who is occupied with a mitzva is exempt from [another] mitzva, therefore

he is a paid watchman

over the lost item.

Some explain it in this manner:

Rav Yosef said: He is comparable to a paid watchman.

And the reason for the matter is,

since the Merciful One bound him

against his will,

for he is obligated to guard the lost item,

therefore he is comparable to a paid watchman.

(Mnemonic: returned it, in fact, return, Chiyya, you said, was broken, break)

The mnemonics of the matters from which the Gemara seeks to prove one of the sides in the dispute between Rabba and Rav Yosef.