Bava Kamma 56a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rather,

the beraita is speaking

of a dilapidated wall,

which was in any event destined to collapse, and by breaking the wall he caused no loss. Therefore, the entire discussion concerns only the animal’s escape, for which he is exempt by virtue of gerama.

The Master said: “One who bends his fellow’s standing grain before

the fire.”

And we raise an objection:

What are the circumstances?

If you say that it reached it,

meaning that the fire reached the grain after he bent it,

by an ordinary wind,

if so,

he should also be liable according to human laws!

For it is as though he ignited the grain directly. And we answer:

Rather, that it reached it

here the case is one in which the fire reached it only

by an extraordinary wind,

and he could not have been expected to anticipate that the fire would in fact reach the grain as a result of his bending it; therefore, he is not liable according to human laws.

And Rav Ashi said:

Not in this manner was it stated in the beraita, that he bent his fellow’s grain. Rather,

“covered” was stated,

meaning that when he saw the fire approaching his fellow’s grain, he covered it with sheets, thereby causing his fellow a loss, since by covering the produce he caused the one who kindled the fire to be exempt from paying for the fire he had kindled,

because he rendered it “

covered

by the fire.

This is because there is a scriptural decree that one is not liable for fire damage caused to an object that was hidden and covered at the time it was burned; therefore, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Master said: “One who hires false witnesses.”

And we raise an objection:

What are the circumstances?

If you say that it is for himself,

meaning that he hired them in order to extract money from his fellow for himself, if so,

he must pay the money.

He must return that money, which he unlawfully extracted from his fellow and which is now in his possession,

and he should also be liable according to human laws

for returning this money! And we answer:

Rather, it is for his fellow.

He hired false witnesses to extract money from Reuben for Simeon, and not for himself. Therefore, he should not be held liable for this according to human laws, since he caused the damage through gerama, and not directly.

The Master said:

“And one who knows testimony on behalf of his fellow and does not testify for him.”

And we raise an objection:

What is the case under discussion?

If you say that it is with two witnesses,

meaning that besides him there is another witness who knows the same testimony, if so,

it is obvious

that he is liable for this according to the laws of Heaven, for

it is a Torah obligation!

It is an explicit verse concerning a witness who refuses to come and testify on behalf of his fellow regarding testimony that he knows is to his benefit [Leviticus 5:1]: “

If he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity”!?

And we answer:

Rather, it is with one.

Only he knows the testimony, whereas the verse speaks specifically of a case in which there are two witnesses, who, had they testified, would have obligated the defendant to pay money. But a single witness has the power only to obligate an oath, not a monetary payment. Nevertheless, he too is liable according to the laws of Heaven for refraining from testifying, since perhaps his testimony would have prevented the defendant from swearing falsely, and he would have admitted and paid. It follows that by refraining from testifying, he caused his fellow a loss.

And we raise an objection:

Is that all!?

Are there no other forms of damage for which one is liable only according to the laws of Heaven?

But there is

(Mnemonic: One who performs, with poison, and one who sends, his fellow, hired

the mnemonic for the five beraitot that the Gemara will cite below, in which liability at the hands of Heaven is stated]:

One who performs work with the water of purification

of the red heifer—for example, he used it as a weight— or

with the purification heifer,

the red heifer itself; both become disqualified through work,

is exempt according to human laws

from paying for the damage he caused, because the damage is not perceptible in the body of the object upon which the work was performed, and “imperceptible damage” is not considered damage,

but is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

b.

But there is: One who places poison before his fellow’s animal is exempt according to human laws and liable according to the laws of Heaven?

c.

But there is: One who sends a fire with a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,

and they ignite another person’s property,

is exempt

the sender

according to human laws, but liable according to the laws of Heaven. d. But there is: One who frightens

terrifies

his fellow

without performing an act upon his body—for example, he suddenly shouts into his ear and the other person is frightened—

is exempt according to human laws, but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

e.

But there is: If his jug broke in the public domain and he did not remove it

the fragments, or

his camel fell

in the public domain

and he did not raise it,

and a person stumbled over them and was injured,

Rabbi Meir holds him liable for the damage.

But the Sages say: He is exempt according to human laws, but liable according to the laws of Heaven?

And we answer:

No; in this matter, there are many,

indeed, there are other cases in which one is liable according to the laws of Heaven, but the beraita lists only these four, because

these were necessary for him to state,

as each contains a novel point that the tanna needed to teach:

For

you might have said

that one might say that even

he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven;

therefore,

it teaches us

the tanna in the beraita that one is liable for them according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara explains the novel point in each case:

One who breaches a fence before his fellow’s animal—

You might have said: Since it is destined to be breached,

meaning that the dilapidated fence was in any event about to collapse, and if so,

what did

this one who breached it accomplish? Therefore,

he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven;

it teaches us

that he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

One who bends his fellow’s standing grain, also

contains a novel point—

You might have said: Let him say,

the one who bent the grain might claim:

“How could I have known that an extraordinary wind would come!?”

For above we said that the fire reached it only by an extraordinary wind; therefore,

the one who bent it should not be liable according to the laws of Heaven either.

наклонившего.

It teaches us otherwise.

And according to Rav Ashi, who likewise said: “

‘Covered’ was stated,

meaning that he covered his fellow’s grain, there is a novel point here, because

you might have said

that he could claim:

“I merely covered it for you!”

I intended to cover the grain so that it would not burn immediately; therefore,

he should not be liable according to the laws of Heaven either,

it teaches us

that he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

And one who hires false witnesses, also

contains a novel point—for

you might have said: Let him say,

the one who hired the false witnesses might claim: The witnesses should not have listened to me and violated the Torah prohibition against testifying falsely, because

“The words of the Master and the words of the student—which should one heed?”

Therefore,

he should not be liable according to the laws of Heaven either.

It teaches us

that he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

And one who knows testimony on behalf of his fellow and does not testify for him, also

contains a novel point—

you might have said

that the witness could claim: I cause him no loss by not testifying on his behalf, since a single witness has the power to obligate him only to take an oath and not to pay money, and

who can say that if

(I were to come

and testify for him,

who can say that it is certain that if I had come and testified, and thereby obligated him to swear so that he would be believed against my testimony, he indeed

would have admitted,

that person would have admitted the truth—that he truly owed money—in order to avoid taking a false oath?

Perhaps he would have

persisted in his denial and

sworn falsely,

so it would emerge that by refraining from testifying I did not cause the claimant any monetary loss. Therefore,

we should not be liable according to the laws of Heaven either.

It teaches us

that he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

We learned in the Mishna:

“It was breached at night, or bandits breached it,”

and it went out and caused damage, he is exempt.

Rabba said:

What is stated in the Mishna, that when it was breached at night he is exempt,

and this is so

only in a case

where it dug

the animal beneath the wall and brought it down, for this is considered “an unavoidable circumstance” with regard to the owners, and therefore they are exempt.

And we raised the matter:

But if it did not dig

the animal, but rather the wall fell on its own,

what

will you say? Will

the owners be liable

then? But this presents a difficulty:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner is this speaking?

If you say it is a sound wall,

beneath which it dug, if so, even

when it did not dig,

but the wall fell of itself,

why is he liable

the owners for this? And is it that

what could he have done

to prevent its falling? For this too is “an unavoidable circumstance” for the owners, since the wall was sound!?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it is speaking

of a dilapidated wall,

which was liable to fall, and therefore when the wall fell of itself, the matter is considered to have fallen under the “negligence” of the owners, and therefore they are liable—

This too cannot be said!

For if so, also

when

the wall did not fall, but

it dug

the animal beneath the wall and brought it down,

why is he exempt

the owners? For such a matter is,

“its beginning was in negligence”

with regard to the falling of the wall,

“and its end was through an unavoidable circumstance”!

For in the end the wall did not fall of itself, but the animal dug beneath it, which is considered “an unavoidable circumstance” for the owners.

This works out well according to the one who says

“its beginning was in negligence and its end was through an unavoidable circumstance, he is exempt.”

But according to the one who says

“its beginning

was in negligence and its end was through an unavoidable circumstance, he is liable,” what is there to say?

Why are the owners exempt?

And we answer:

Rather, the Mishna,

our Mishna is speaking

of a sound wall,

and therefore the owners are exempt.

And even if it did not dig,

but rather the wall fell of itself, for in any event the owners are in the category of “an unavoidable circumstance.”

And when Rabba’s statement was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter part

of the Mishna;

it was stated.

For it teaches:

“He placed it in the sun, or handed it over to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and it went out and caused damage, he is liable.”

And concerning this

Rabba said:

The owners are liable when he placed it in the sun

even if it dug

and the animal brought down the wall and went out, and even if the wall was sound.

It is not necessary where it did not dig

but rather the animal breached the door; in that case, certainly the owners are liable,

for the whole matter is negligence,

as the owners should have known that, because of the distress of the sun, it might breach the door and go out.

Rather, even if it dug

beneath the wall,

also

they are liable.

Lest you say, its beginning was in negligence

with regard to breaching the door,

and its end was through an unavoidable circumstance

with regard to the digging, and the owners should be exempt.

It teaches us

Rabba,

that the whole matter is negligence

and that even with regard to the digging, the matter is considered negligence for the owners.

What is the reason?

For the injured party can say

to the owners:

You certainly knew that, since you left it,

you left your animal

in the sun, every stratagem

that

it has to carry out, it carries out and goes out!

It is liable to do everything in order to leave there, to free itself from the distress, and even to dig beneath the wall. It follows that both its beginning and its end were through negligence.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Bandits took it out; the bandits are liable.”