Bava Kamma 55b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

The Mishna before us is divided into two sections:

The first section of the Mishna explains what level of guarding a person must provide for his property so that it will not cause damage. It also explains the obligation of a robber or a custodian to pay in place of the owners for damage caused by the animal.

The second section explains how the damage is assessed.

The first section:

1.

One who brings a flock of sheep into an enclosure,

which is a fenced area,

and locks the door properly in front of them,

with a door able to withstand an ordinary wind.

And the animal went out

and

caused damage

by eating or trampling,

he is exempt

the owner of the flock is exempt from paying for the damage, since he guarded it properly, because he was not required to do anything more to guard it.

However, if

he did not lock the door properly in front of them,

meaning that he locked it with a door unable to withstand even an ordinary wind,

and the animal went out and caused damage, he is liable

to pay for the damage, since he was negligent in guarding the flock.

2.

The wall

of the enclosure

was breached at night,

for example, the wall collapsed, or the animal dug beneath the wall and caused it to fall.

Or burglars breached

the door of the enclosure,

and the animal went out and caused damage.

The owner of the flock is exempt,

since he had locked the enclosure properly.

3.

Burglars removed the animal

from the enclosure, and it went and caused damage;

the burglars are liable

for the damage, because they acquired the animal for themselves through the legal act of robbery, which makes them liable to pay for damage it causes, as the Gemara will explain.

5.

If he left it,

meaning, the animal’s owner left the animal

in the sun,

in a fenced area without a roof, and because of its distress from the heat of the sun, the animal broke through the properly locked door.

Or he handed it over

the animal

to a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, or a minor.

And it went out and caused damage, he is liable

the owner of the flock is liable, since he was negligent in guarding it when he left it in the sun, and its distress from the heat caused it to break out and leave; or when he handed it to a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, or a minor, because they lack the understanding necessary to guard it.

6.

If he handed it over to a shepherd, the shepherd takes his place

in place of the flock’s owner with regard to the obligation to guard the animal so that it will not cause damage. Therefore, if it caused damage, the custodian must pay for the damage.

7.

The animal fell

into

into a garden

because of circumstances beyond the owners’ control—for example, it fell from the owners’ roof into a neighbor’s garden, or it fell into the garden from a public domain that was higher than the garden—

and benefited,

by eating produce there, or by benefiting from landing on vegetables that saved it from the impact of the ground, although the vegetables themselves were crushed,

the owners pay only for the benefit it received.

The owners pay only according to the benefit the animal received, and not according to the damage it caused.

8.

The animal descended

into

in the ordinary manner

into the garden

and caused damage, it pays for all the damage it caused.

The owners pay the full amount of the damage, since they were negligent in guarding it.

The Mishna now explains, in its second section, how damage to a field is assessed.

The Gemara explains that the Sages derived from the verse [Exodus 22:4], “And it consumes in another’s field,” that the verse teaches that damage to the damaged field is assessed “on the basis of another field.”

That is, the value of the damage is not assessed according to the value of the individual plot itself—how much was lost from what the animal ate or damaged. Rather, the loss is assessed according to the overall value of the field in which the damaged plot is located. This assessment of the loss is lower than an assessment of the plot itself, because, when considering the field as a whole, the loss is not as great as the loss of the plot considered on its own.

How does it pay for all the damage it caused?

They assess a beit se’a,

an area suitable for sowing a se’a of wheat seeds,

in that same field: how much was it worth,

the value of the entire field before this plot was eaten from it,

and how much is it worth,

its value now. The animal’s owner pays the difference.

It follows that the damager does not pay the full value of the plot, because someone who buys a beit se’a in a field while the grain is growing does not reduce the payment because of the missing plot except by a small amount.

Rabbi Shimon

disagrees with this and

says:

This assessment is made only when the animal ate produce that had not yet fully ripened.

But if

it ate fully ripened produce,

that had completely ripened,

it pays for fully ripened produce!

It pays the full amount of the damage.

That is,

if

it ate

a se’a,

it pays

a se’a.

And

if

it ate

two se’a,

it pays

two se’a.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: What is “

properly”

and what is “

improperly,”

as stated in our Mishna? If he locked the flock in properly, he is exempt; and if he locked it improperly, he is liable.

A door able to withstand an ordinary wind—

this is “

properly.”

And

one unable to withstand an ordinary wind—

this is “

improperly.”

Rabbi Mani bar Patish said: Who is

the

tanna

in our Mishna, who holds that our Mishna, which deals with the liability of an animal that is

“accustomed to cause damage,”

holds

that lesser guarding is sufficient for it?

After all, our Mishna speaks of a flock of sheep, which causes damage only through eating and trampling, and not through goring. Eating and trampling are acts to which an animal is accustomed from the outset, and nevertheless the Mishna says that it is sufficient to guard them by locking them behind a door able to withstand only an ordinary wind—that is, lesser guarding.

Thus, our Mishna holds that an animal accustomed to cause damage requires only lesser guarding. Who is the tanna who holds this?

It is Rabbi Yehuda!

As we learned

at the end of the fourth chapter:

If its owners tied

their ox

with a rope,

or

locked a door properly in front of it,

with a door able to withstand an ordinary wind—that is, lesser guarding—

and it went out

the ox

and caused damage, whether it was an innocuous ox or an ox accustomed to cause damage,

whether the ox was innocuous or accustomed to cause damage,

the owners are liable

for the damage it caused,

the words of Rabbi Meir,

who holds that lesser guarding is insufficient; the owners must provide ideal guarding [that is, tie it with an iron chain or lock a door in front of it that can withstand even an extraordinary wind].

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If the ox was

innocuous,

it is

liable,

because an innocuous ox requires ideal guarding. But if the ox was

accustomed to cause damage,

it is

exempt,

because lesser guarding is sufficient for an ox accustomed to cause damage.

As it is stated

regarding an ox accustomed to cause damage: “

And its owner did not guard it.”

This implies that he is liable for the damage specifically because he did not guard it at all,

but this ox is guarded!

For lesser guarding is also considered guarding. [The Gemara there explains this interpretation.]

Rabbi Eliezer says: There is no guarding

sufficient for an ox accustomed to cause damage

except a knife!

That is, its owner must slaughter it. Even if he guarded it with ideal guarding, and the ox knocked down the wall, went out, and caused damage, the owner is liable for it.

We have learned that there are three disputes concerning the required guarding of an ox accustomed to cause damage:

a. According to Rabbi Meir, it requires ideal guarding.

b. According to Rabbi Yehuda, lesser guarding is sufficient.

c. According to Rabbi Eliezer, even ideal guarding is insufficient for an ox accustomed to cause damage.

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna who holds that lesser guarding is sufficient for an animal accustomed to cause damage. The Gemara now assumes that all animals accustomed to cause damage have the same legal status regarding the degree of guarding required of them. If so, our Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

And we reject this:

You may even say

that our Mishna can be explained even according to the method of

Rabbi Meir

!

Although he holds that an ox accustomed to cause damage requires ideal guarding, that applies only to damage of “goring,” to which it becomes accustomed after goring three times.

But with regard to damage through “eating and trampling,” which is the subject of the Mishna, and to which animals are accustomed from the outset, Rabbi Meir agrees that ideal guarding is not required.

Because

eating and trampling are different, since the Torah reduced the guarding required for them.

For the Torah explicitly revealed that lesser guarding is sufficient for them.

As Rabbi Elazar said—and some say that it was taught in a tannaitic source: The Torah reduced the guarding required for four things.

And these are: a pit, fire, eating, and trampling.

Where do we find that the Torah reduced the guarding required for them?

1.

A pit—

as it is written: “

When a person opens a pit, or when a person digs a pit, and does not cover it.”

This implies that he is liable only when he did not cover the pit at all.

If he covered it,

even with only a cover,

he is exempt

from liability for it. The Torah did not require him to fill the pit with earth [which would be ideal guarding]; it was satisfied with merely covering it, that is, with a small degree of guarding.

2.

Fire—

as it is written: “

The one who kindled the fire shall surely pay, the one who kindled the conflagration.”

This implies that he is not liable for damage caused by fire

until he acts

like one who kindles it,

meaning that the owner was completely negligent in guarding the fire, so that it is as though he himself kindled the conflagration. But if he guarded the fire even slightly, he is not liable for the damage it caused.

3.

Eating—

as it is written: “

For when a person consumes a field or vineyard and sends out his animal,

and it consumes in another’s field” [the end of the verse refers to damage through eating, as the Gemara will explain below]. This implies that he is not liable for damage caused by his ox’s eating in another’s field

until he acts like

“and it consumes,”

“and it consumes,”

meaning that he was negligent in guarding it, so that it is as though he fed it by hand from another’s field. But if he guarded it, even slightly, he is not liable for damage through eating.

4.

Trampling—

as it is written: “

And he sends out

his animal” [which refers to damage through trampling, as stated below]. This implies that he is not liable for damage through trampling

until he acts like

“and he sends out,”

meaning that he was negligent in guarding it, as though he himself led the animal into another person’s field and it damaged the field. But if he guarded it even slightly, he is no longer liable for damage through trampling.

The Gemara explains how we learn from the verse cited above that it refers to damage through eating and trampling.

And it was taught: “

And he sends out”—

this refers to trampling.

And similarly it says

in Isaiah [32:20]: “

Those who send out the foot of the ox and the donkey.”

Thus, “sending out” is an expression referring to an animal’s foot. “

And it consumes”—

this refers to eating.

And similarly it says

in I Kings [14:10]: “

As a creature consumes”

[the tooth, which is sometimes exposed and sometimes covered; or from the word “excrement,” which results from the animal’s eating]

“to its completion.”

Thus, “consuming” refers to an animal’s eating.

The Gemara returns and says:

The reason

that he is liable for eating and trampling is

because he acts like

“and he sends out” and “

and

it consumes,”

meaning that he was negligent in guarding.

If he did not act

like “and he sends out” and “and it consumes,” but guarded it slightly,

no!

He is not liable for the damage they caused.

Rabba said: Our Mishna also proves this precisely:

lesser guarding is sufficient only for eating and trampling, and not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s view that lesser guarding is sufficient for every ox accustomed to cause damage.

As it teaches

in our Mishna: “The one who brings in

a flock.”

And seemingly one might object:

Since we have been dealing with an ox throughout,

the entire tractate until now has spoken of an ox. If so,

let it teach

also in our Mishna

“ox,”

what is different,

and why did the tanna change the wording by

teaching

in our Mishna

“flock”

instead of “ox”?

Is it not

because

the Torah reduced the guarding required for them,

for eating and trampling?

And the source for this is:

is it not

because

here,

with a flock,

goring is not written about it.

That is, a flock does not cause damage by goring; rather,

eating and trampling are what is written about it,

it causes damage only through eating and trampling.

Therefore, the Mishna specifically changed the wording here to “flock,”

and it thereby teaches us that eating and trampling

alone require only lesser guarding, because

they are accustomed to cause damage,

and from the first act of damage they require payment for the full damage. But with regard to “goring,” to which the animal is not accustomed from the outset, lesser guarding is insufficient; it requires ideal guarding.

And we conclude: indeed,

it can be inferred from this!

It was taught: Rabbi Yehoshua said: There are four things which, if one does them, he is exempt under human law,

meaning that a court does not obligate him to pay for the damage he caused, since he merely caused the damage indirectly and did not perform it with his own hands; indirect causation in matters of damage is exempt under human law,

but he is liable under the laws of Heaven.

Тот, кто проломил ограду перед животным своего товарища,

And these are:

1.

One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal,

and the animal fled and was lost to its owner.

2.

And one who bends another person’s standing grain in front of a fire,

meaning that he bends the grain toward the fire so that it will burn when the fire reaches it.

3.

And one who hires false witnesses to testify

against another person and cause him a loss.

4.

And one who knows testimony concerning another person

that could benefit him in monetary litigation,

but does not testify for him.

The Master said: “One who breaches a fence in front of another person’s animal.”

And we inquire about this:

What are the circumstances

in which this case is speaking?

If we should say

if we want to say

with a sound wall,

that the wall which he breached was strong? If so,

in human courts also he should be obligated

to pay him for the wall which he broke with his hands?