Bava Kamma 55a — the Talmud in English

Why in the first utterances was it not said in them "

good",

whereas in the latter utterances ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

it was said in them "

good"?

That is to say: Why in the first utterances, concerning the mitzva of honoring father and mother, was it said only: “So that your days may be lengthened,” and it was not said, “so that it may be good for you,” whereas in the latter utterances it was said: “So that your days may be lengthened and so that it may be good for you”?

He said to him

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba to Rabbi Hanina ben Agil:

Rather than your asking me why “good” was said in them,

ask me: whether “good” was said in them "

good",

or not, for I do not know whether “good” was said in them "

good"

or not—

but

go

away

to Rabbi Tanhum bar Hanilai, who used to frequent Rabbi Joshua ben Levi, who was expert in aggada!

Rabbi Hanina ben Agil went

Rabbi Hanina ben Agil

to him

to Rabbi Tanhum bar Hanilai, and asked him what he had asked Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba.

Rabbi Tanhum bar Hanilai said to him

Rabbi Tanhum bar Hanilai to Rabbi Hanina ben Agil:

From him—

from Rabbi Joshua ben Levi—

I did not hear it, but this is what Shmuel bar Nahum, the maternal uncle of Rav Aha bar Rabbi Hanina, said to me, and some say:

Shmuel bar Nahum

the maternal grandfather of Rav Aha bar Rabbi Hanina:

This is why “good” was not said in the first utterances—for they are those that were written on the first Tablets—

since their end

of those Tablets

was to be broken.

And we challenge this:

But if their end was to be broken, what of it

what difference does that make!?

Rav Ashi said,

explaining:

Rav Ashi:

Had “so that it may be good for you” been written on the first Tablets, I would have said:

Heaven forbid—

since the Tablets on which goodness was written were broken—

goodness ceased from Israel.

Rabbi Joshua

ben Levi said:

One who sees

the letter

tet

in his dream—it is a good sign

it is

for him.

And we challenge this:

What is the reason?

If you say it is because it is written: "

good,"

and they hinted to him goodness from Heaven, but

say

that they hinted to him from Heaven to write: "

And I will sweep it with the broom of destruction,"

which is an evil thing.

And we answer:

One "

tet"

we are saying, and not two, for it signifies only “good,” and not the language of sweeping.

But we still challenge:

Say

they hinted to him from Heaven to write: "

"

Her impurity is on her skirts"!?

And we answer: "

tet bet"

we are saying.

But we still challenge:

Say

they hinted to him from Heaven to write: "

Her gates have sunk into the earth."

Rather,

this is why it is a good sign for him:

since Scripture began with it

with the letter tet

for good at the beginning, for "

In the beginning"

until "

And God saw the light, that it was good,"

tet is not written

“tet.”

And Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said:

One who sees "

a eulogy"

in his dream,

they hinted to him from Heaven that

they had pity on him from Heaven and redeemed him

“hes—ped,”

and this applies

when he saw a eulogy

in writing

in writing, that is to say: he saw the word “eulogy” in his dream, and not that he saw an actual eulogy in his dream.

We learned in the Mishna: One ox and one of every animal ... for diverse kinds ...

and likewise wild animals and birds are analogous to them:

Resh Lakish said:

Here,

in our Mishna—which we learned: there are diverse kinds among birds—

Rabbi

taught us

Rabbi,

the arranger of the Mishna:

A rooster, a peacock, and a pheasant

—it is a species of quail—these are birds—

are diverse kinds

they

of one another

and it is forbidden to mate them with one another. That is to say: Since Rabbi taught us that birds are diverse kinds of one another, we have learned that these birds also are diverse kinds of one another.

And we challenge: But

it is obvious,

that if there are diverse kinds among birds, these birds too contain diverse kinds; and in what way do these differ from other birds, such that Resh Lakish needed to inform us that these too are diverse kinds of one another!?

He said,

explaining,

Rav Haviva:

Because

these species

grow together

they grow as one, that is to say: this one raises the chicks of that one, and that one raises the chicks of this one, and lest you say: One species it is

—it is one species

and it is not diverse kinds.

It teaches us

Resh Lakish that these too are diverse kinds of one another.

Shmuel said:

A goose and a wild goose

are diverse kinds

they

of one another, and it is forbidden to mate them with one another.

and it is forbidden to mate them with one another.

Rava bar Rav Hanan raised an objection against this:

What is the reason!?

If you say it is because this one has a long neck and that one has a short neck

this one has a long beak and this one has a short beak, and therefore they are considered two species.

If that is so, a Persian camel

Persian

and an Arab camel

Arab,

for this one has a thick neck and that one has a thin neck

this one has a thick neck and this one has a thin neck,

would they likewise be diverse kinds of one another!?

Rather,

Abaye said:

This one—

the wild goose—

its eggs

are recognizable

from the outside, and this one—

the ordinary goose—

its eggs are from the inside, and they are not recognizable on the outside; therefore they are two species, and they are diverse kinds of one another.

and they cannot be seen from outside. Therefore, they are two species and are forbidden mixtures with one another.

Rav Pappa said

another reason why a goose and a wild goose are diverse kinds of one another:

This—

the wild goose—

bears one egg

only

in one laying, and this—

the ordinary goose—

bears

even

several eggs in one laying, for when the wild goose bears one egg, it does not bear a second egg until it lays the first, whereas the ordinary goose bears and bears again, even several eggs.

When a wild goose is carrying one egg, it cannot carry a second egg until it lays the first; whereas an ordinary goose can carry an egg, and then carry another, even several eggs.

Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Resh Lakish: One who mates two species

of non-domesticated animals

of the sea,

he

is flogged.

We explain:

What is the reason?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said in the name of Ulla:

It is derived

the animals of the sea

“

according to its species, according to its species”

from the dry land.

Reḥava inquired: If one drives a goat and a shibuta, for example, when a goat and a fish were pulling a wagon— the goat on land and the fish in the sea—and a person was driving them, what is the law—does he violate the prohibition against driving animals subject to interbreeding?

Rahava raised a question:

Do we say: Since the goat cannot descend into the sea, and the shibuta cannot come up onto dry land, he has accomplished nothing,

One who drives with a goat and a shibuta,

for example, where a goat and a fish were pulling a wagon, the goat on dry land and the fish in the sea, and a person was driving them,

what is it

that he should violate the prohibition of driving with diverse kinds? And the sides of the question are:

Do we say: Since the goat does not descend into the sea, and the shibuta does not ascend onto dry land, he has done nothing,

since the goat cannot descend into the sea and the fish cannot ascend onto dry land, it follows that he has done nothing.

Or perhaps: At present, in any event, he is driving,

ultimately, he is driving two species.

Ravina raised an objection against this:

What place is there for doubt in this?

Rather, if that is so—that there is a prohibition—

and is it indeed the case that if

he held wheat and barley together in his hand,

so that if he dropped them together and sowed them in the earth he would violate the prohibition of sowing diverse kinds,

and sowed

with the scattering of his hand

wheat in the Land and barley outside the Land,

where diverse kinds do not apply,

would he likewise be liable

because of the prohibition of diverse kinds of seeds!?

They said,

the members of the academy, to distinguish:

Is this comparable!?

There,

the Land of Israel and outside the Land,

the Land

of Israel

is a place of liability, whereas

whereas

outside the Land is not a place of liability

.

But

here,

dry land and sea,

both this and that are places of liability, for one who drives two species in the sea is flogged as in dry land, since we expound “according to its species, according to its species.”

since one who leads two species in the sea receives lashes just as one who leads them on land, for we derive this from “according to their kinds, according to their kinds.”

We shall return to you, chapter “An Ox That Gored a Cow”