Bava Kamma 55a (נה.) — the Talmud in English

Why, in the first utterances, was it not stated "

good,"

whereas in the latter utterances

it was stated "

good"?

That is: Why, in the first utterances, with regard to the mitzva of honoring one's father and mother, was it stated only: “So that your days may be long,” and it was not stated: “So that it may be good for you,” whereas in the latter utterances it was stated: “So that your days may be long and so that it may be good for you”?

He said to him

Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil:

Rather than ask me why “good” was stated in them

ask me whether “good” was stated in them: “

good,”

or not, for I do not know whether “good” was stated in them “

good,”

or not—

but

go

to

Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai, who would frequent Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who was expert in aggada!

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil went

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil

to

Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai and asked him the question that he had asked Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba.

Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai said to him

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil:

From him—

from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi—

I did not hear it. Rather, this is what Shmuel bar Naḥum, the maternal uncle of Rav Aḥa bar Rabbi Ḥanina, said to me; and some say:

Shmuel bar Naḥum,

the maternal grandfather of Rav Aḥa bar Rabbi Ḥanina:

This is why “good” was not stated in the first utterances—for these are the ones that were written on the first Tablets—

since their end

the end of those Tablets

was to be broken.

And we challenge this:

What difference does it make that their end was to be broken

what of it!?

Rav Ashi

explained:

He said:

Had “so that it may be good for you” been written on the first Tablets, I would have said:

Heaven forbid—

once the Tablets on which the promise of good was written were broken,

good ceased from Israel.

Rabbi Yehoshua

ben Levi said:

One who sees

the letter

tet

in his dream—it is a favorable sign

for

him.

And we challenge this:

What is the reason?

If you say it is because it is written: “

good,”

and they allude to good from Heaven, then

say

that Heaven alluded to his writing: “

And I will sweep it with the broom of destruction,”

which is an evil thing.

And we answer:

We are speaking of one

“

tet,”

not two; it suggests only “good,” and not the expression of sweeping.

We still challenge this:

Say

that Heaven alluded to his writing: “

Her impurity is on her skirts”!?

And we answer:

“

Tet-bet”—that is what we are speaking of.

We still challenge this:

Say

that Heaven alluded to his writing: “

Her gates have sunk into the earth.”

Rather,

this is why it is a favorable sign for him:

since Scripture began with it

with the letter tet

for good at the outset, for from “

In the beginning”

until “

And God saw the light, that it was good,”

the letter

tet is not written.

And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

One who sees “

a eulogy”

in his dream,

Heaven alluded to him that

they took pity on him from Heaven and redeemed him

[“eulogy”—“pity and redemption”],

and this applies

when he saw a eulogy

in writing

[in writing], that is: He saw the word “eulogy” in his dream, and did not actually see a eulogy in his dream.

We learned in the Mishna: “Whether an ox or any other animal ... for interbreeding” ...

and likewise wild animals and birds are comparable to them:

Reish Lakish said:

Here,

in our Mishna—which states that there is interbreeding among birds—

Rabbi

taught

us

the editor of the Mishna:

A chicken, a peacock, and a pheasant

[a species of quail]—which are birds—

are subject to interbreeding

with

one another, and it is forbidden to mate them with one another. That is: Since Rabbi taught us that birds are subject to interbreeding with one another, we learn that these birds too are subject to interbreeding with one another.

We challenge this:

But is it not

obvious

that if there is interbreeding among birds, these birds too are subject to interbreeding? What distinguishes these from other birds, such that Reish Lakish had to teach us that these too are subject to interbreeding with one another!?

He said

explained

Rav Ḥaviva:

Because

these species

raise their young together

[they grow together], that is: One raises the other’s chicks, and the other raises the first one’s chicks, and

it might have been said: They are one species

and are not subject to interbreeding.

He teaches us

Reish Lakish that these too are subject to interbreeding with one another.

Shmuel said:

A goose and a wild goose

are subject to interbreeding

with

one another,

and it is forbidden to mate them with one another.

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raised an objection to this:

What is the reason!?

If you say it is because this one has a long neck and that one has a short neck

[this one’s beak is long, and that one’s beak is short], and therefore they are considered two species.

If that is so, a Persian camel

[Persian]

and an Arab camel

[Arab],

since this one has a thick neck and that one has a thin neck

[this one’s neck is thick, and that one’s neck is thin],

would they likewise be subject to interbreeding with one another!?

Rather,

Abaye said:

This one—

the wild goose—

its testicles

are recognizable

from the outside, while this one—

an ordinary goose—

has its testicles on the inside, and they are not recognizable externally. Therefore, they are two species and are subject to interbreeding with one another.

Rav Pappa said

another reason

why a goose and a wild goose are subject to interbreeding with one another:

This one—

the wild goose—

can bear only one egg

at a time

in one laying, whereas this one—

an ordinary goose—

can bear

even

several eggs in one laying. When a wild goose has laid one egg, it cannot bear a second egg until it lays the first one, whereas an ordinary goose can bear and continue bearing even several eggs.

Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Reish Lakish: One who mates two species

of animals

that live in the sea

is flogged

for violating the prohibition.

is flogged.

We explain:

What is the reason?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said in the name of Ulla:

It is derived

for the animals of the sea from the expression

“according to their kinds, according to their kinds”

according to its species, according to its species”

stated concerning the land animals.

Reḥava inquired: If one drives a goat and a shibuta, for example, when a goat and a fish were pulling a wagon— the goat on land and the fish in the sea—and a person was driving them, what is the law—does he violate the prohibition against driving animals subject to interbreeding?

The sides of the question are:

Do we say: Since the goat cannot descend into the sea, and the shibuta cannot come up onto dry land, he has accomplished nothing,

What is the ruling when one leads a goat and a shibuta,

such as when a goat and a fish are pulling a wagon—the goat on land and the fish in the sea—and a person is leading them—

what is the ruling

regarding violating the prohibition against leading animals of forbidden mixtures? The two sides of the question are:

since the goat cannot go down into the sea and the fish cannot come up onto dry land, it follows that he has accomplished nothing.

Or perhaps: In any event, he is now driving them,

and ultimately he is driving two species.

Ravina raised an objection to this:

There is no reason for such a doubt.

If that is so—

that this is forbidden—

is it conceivable that if one

held wheat and barley together in his hand,

so that if he dropped and sowed them together in the earth he would violate the prohibition against sowing kilayim,

and sowed

with a single movement of his hand

wheat in the land and barley outside the Land of Israel,

where the laws of kilayim do not apply,

would he likewise be liable

for the prohibition against seed kilayim!?

They said

the members of the academy, distinguishing the cases:

How can these cases be compared!?

There,

in the case of the Land of Israel and outside the Land,

the Land

of Israel

is a place where liability applies, whereas

outside the Land is not a place where liability applies

at all.

But

here,

in the case of dry land and sea,

both one and the other are places where liability applies,

since one who drives two species in the sea is flogged just as he is on dry land, for we derive this from “according to their kinds, according to their kinds.”

We have completed the fifth chapter: “An Ox That Gored a Cow”

We have completed the fifth chapter, “An Ox That Gored a Cow.”

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