Bava Kamma 54b (נד:) — the Talmud in English

We still ask:

is it conceivable that when the ox is intelligent

the owner of the pit is

exempt

from liability for it!? From where would we know this, and where did the Torah exempt him?

He said

he resolved the difficulty:

Rabbi Yirmeya:

In fact, the owner of the pit is liable even for an intelligent ox. Rather, our Mishna is stated in the manner of

“it is not necessary”

to state [that is, not only this case, but even the following case]:

that not only this case, but even the following case is included:

It is not necessary [to state]

that

an intelligent ox is liable; but with regard to a deaf-mute, deranged, or minor ox, one might say: Its deafness caused it

to fall into the pit, or its derangement caused it, or

its being a minor caused it

to fall into the pit, and therefore

the owner of the pit should be exempt

from liability—

it teaches us

that our Mishna teaches that even if a deaf-mute, deranged, or minor ox fell into the pit, the owner of the pit is liable to pay for its damages.

Rav Aḥa said to Ravina:

But it was taught in a baraita: If

a person of understanding

fell into it

[the pit],

he is exempt;

and is it not referring to an intelligent ox? Is it conceivable that the intention is to an intelligent ox, so that if it fell into the pit, the owner is exempt from liability for it? It is explicitly stated that he is exempt for an intelligent ox. If so, the difficulty arises: From where did we learn to exempt him?

He said

he resolved the difficulty

for him

Ravina to Rav Aḥa:

No,

not as you interpreted the baraita. “A person of understanding” means

an intelligent person, but with regard to an intelligent ox, the owner is liable.

but for an intelligent ox, the owner is liable.

Rav Aḥa returned and challenged Ravina:

If that is so,

since the baraita’s intention is a person of understanding—is it conceivable that

only a person of understanding is exempt

from liability for him,

but if he is not a person of understanding, he is liable!?

But

“

an ox and not a person is written,”

and the Torah excluded the owner of the pit from liability for a person, even if he is deranged!?

Rather,

because of this difficulty, Ravina interprets the baraita that we learned, “If a person of understanding fell into it, he is exempt,” as follows:

What does

“

a person of understanding” mean?

A species that is a person of understanding—that is, a person, in whom the capacity for understanding exists. Even a deranged person is of the species that is a person of understanding, and the baraita comes to teach that the pit’s owner is exempt with regard to a person.

He again

said to him,

Rav Aḥa to Ravina:

But it was taught in a baraita: If an intelligent ox fell into it, he is exempt;

it is explicitly stated that the pit’s owner is exempt for an intelligent ox!?

Rather, Rava said

to explain our Mishna: The Mishna is not stated in the manner of “it is not necessary,” but rather:

specifically when it is an ox that is deaf, an ox that is deranged, or an ox that is a minor

is the owner of the pit liable for it.

But

if

an intelligent ox fell into it, he is exempt,

the owner of the pit, as we learned in the baraita—

And

what is the reason

that he is exempt for an intelligent ox?

Because

it should have been attentive and proceeded [the ox should have looked and proceeded

and not fallen into the pit].

It was taught likewise

as Rava said:

If a deaf-mute, deranged, or minor ox fell into it, and

an ox

that is blind,

even if it is intelligent,

and

an ox

that is proceeding at night,

even if it is intelligent,

he is liable

for it.

But if

an intelligent ox proceeding during the day fell into it, he is exempt,

the owner of the pit, from liability for it.

Mishna:

One ox and any other animal

are equal

with regard to falling into a pit,

that is, with regard to being liable for their payments when they fall into a pit, even though the Torah said: “And an ox or a donkey

with regard to the exclusion at Mount Sinai

at the time of the giving of the Torah, when the Torah said [Exodus 19:12]: “You shall set boundaries for the people around, saying: Be careful for yourselves, not to ascend the mountain or touch its edge … no hand shall touch it … whether animal or man, it shall not live.”

And with regard to double payment,

as the Torah said [Exodus 22:3]: “If the theft shall surely be found in his possession, from an ox to a donkey to a live sheep, he shall pay double.”

Rambam, at the beginning of the Laws of Monetary Damages, wrote in similar terms to the Mishna with regard to a damaging ox: “Every living creature in a person’s possession that causes damage—the owners are liable to pay, since their property caused damage, as it is stated: ‘When an ox of a man injures the ox of his fellow, etc.’ One ox and likewise all other animals, beasts, and birds—the verse spoke of an ox only because that is the customary case ; see the Sefer HaMafte’aḥ here. In all the other matters mentioned by the Mishna, an ox is mentioned in the verse [or at least a donkey, as in the mitzva of unloading], and the wording “one ox and any other animal” is therefore understandable. But with regard to the exclusion at Mount Sinai, an ox is not mentioned in the verse, and there would be no reason to mention “the exclusion at Mount Sinai” in our Mishna except because of its latter clause: “And likewise a beast and a bird.” a. This verse is cited in the main text according to Rashi, s.v. “and with regard to double payment” . Although from the Gemara’s words it would seem preferable to cite the verse [Exodus 22:6] concerning one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen: “When a man gives his fellow money or vessels to safeguard … if the thief is not found [as he claimed], then the owner of the house shall approach the judges … concerning every matter of wrongdoing, concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment, concerning every lost item about which he says [the witness] that this is it [the item about which you swore is in your possession], the matter of both of them shall come before the judges; whomever the judges declare guilty shall pay double to his fellow.” b. The Rashba wrote that double payment and returning a lost object apply to every object, not only to living creatures. These were mentioned here only because an ox and a donkey are mentioned in the verse, to say that it is not specifically these [animals], meaning that one should not say that, with regard to living creatures, only these apply. And with regard to returning a lost object,

as the Torah said [Deuteronomy 22:1]: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep straying and conceal yourself from them; you shall surely return them to your brother … so shall you do with his donkey, and so shall you do with his garment, and so shall you do with every lost object of your brother that is lost from him and you find it; you may not conceal yourself.”

With regard to unloading,

as the Torah said [Exodus 23:5]: “When you see the donkey of your enemy crouching under its burden, and you refrain from helping him, you shall surely help along with him.”

With regard to muzzling,

as the Torah said: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.”

With regard to diverse kinds [the mating of two species, and plowing or leading two species together],

as the Torah said [Leviticus 19:19]: “You shall not mate your animal with diverse kinds,” and it said [Deuteronomy 22:10]: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.”

And with regard to Shabbat,

as the Torah said [Deuteronomy 5:14]: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat for the Lord your God; you shall not perform any labor … nor your ox nor your donkey nor any of your animals.”

And likewise a beast and a bird

are the same as them.

If so, why does it say: “an ox or a donkey”? Rather, the verse spoke of the usual case

[that which ordinarily occurs].

Gemara:

The Gemara explains the source of the law that in all these matters mentioned, every animal, beast, and bird is included:

With regard to falling into a pit:

Because

“he shall return money to its owner”

is written,

and we derive:

anything that has owners [every living creature that has owners]

[every living creature that has an owner]

as we said

on the first side.

With regard to the exclusion at Mount Sinai:

as it is written: “

Whether animal or man, it shall not live,”

and a beast is included within the category of animal;

and from the fact that it is written

“whether”,

we learn

to include birds.

With regard to double payment: as we said

concerning that which is written: “When a man gives his fellow money or vessels to safeguard … if the thief is not found [as he claimed], then the owner of the house shall approach the judges …

concerning every matter of wrongdoing,

concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment, concerning every lost object about which he says [the witness] that this is it [the item about which you swore is in your possession], the matter of both of them shall come before the judges; whomever the judges declare guilty shall pay double to his fellow.”

It includes every matter of wrongdoing,

that is, by means of the hermeneutical principle of a generalization, specification, and generalization, we derive that all are included.

With regard to returning a lost object:

as it is written: “So shall you do

for every lost object of your brother.”

With regard to unloading: it derives

“donkey” from “donkey”

from Shabbat:

with regard to unloading it is stated: “You shall not see the donkey of your enemy crouching under its burden,” and with regard to Shabbat it is stated: “You shall not perform any labor … nor your ox nor your donkey nor any of your animals.” Just as on Shabbat all your animals are included, and a beast and a bird are also included, as we will expound below, so too with regard to unloading.

With regard to muzzling: it derives

“ox” from “ox”

from Shabbat:

with regard to muzzling it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing,” and with regard to Shabbat it is stated: “You shall not perform any labor … nor your ox nor your donkey nor any of your animals.” Just as on Shabbat all your animals are included, as well as a beast and a bird, as we will expound below, so too with regard to muzzling.

If it is diverse kinds with regard to plowing,

because

it derives:

“ox” from “ox”

from Shabbat:

with regard to diverse kinds in plowing it is stated: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together,” and with regard to Shabbat it is stated: “You shall not perform any labor … nor your ox nor your donkey nor any of your animals.” Just as on Shabbat all your animals are included, as well as a beast and a bird, as we will expound below, so too with regard to diverse kinds in plowing.

If it is diverse kinds with regard to mating,

because

it derives:

“your animal” from “your animal”

from Shabbat:

with regard to diverse kinds in mating it is stated: “You shall not mate your animal with diverse kinds,” and with regard to Shabbat it is stated in the first version of the Ten Statements [Exodus 20:10]: “You shall not perform any labor—you, your son, your daughter, your servant, your maidservant, and your animal.” Just as on Shabbat all your animals are included, as well as a beast and a bird, as we will expound below, so too with regard to diverse kinds in mating.

And with regard to Shabbat

itself,

from where do we derive it?

As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:

In the first version of the Ten Statements it is said [Exodus 20:10]: “You shall not perform any labor—you, your son, and your daughter,

“You shall not perform any labor, you, your son, and your daughter,

your servant, your maidservant, and your animal,”

and an ox and a donkey are not mentioned—

And

if

in the final version of the Ten Statements it were said: “You shall not perform any labor—you, your son, your daughter, your servant, and your maidservant,

“You shall not perform any labor, you, your son, your daughter, your male slave, and your female slave,

and your ox, your donkey, and all your animals,”

would not the ox and the donkey have been included within all your animals

[“all your animals”],

and why were they singled out

to be written explicitly?—

In order

to tell you: Just as an ox and a donkey mentioned here

with regard to Shabbat,

a beast and a bird are the same as them,

as will be explained below,

so too every

place where an ox or a donkey is mentioned,

a beast and a bird are the same as them.

And we challenge this:

Say:

“animal”

[“and your animal”]

in the first version of the Ten Statements

is a

generalization;

“your ox and your donkey”

in the final version of the Ten Statements

is a

specification. And we have an established principle:

“

A generalization and a specification: only what is specified is included in the generalization.”

If so, let us say:

An ox and a donkey, yes; nothing else, no!?

They said

the members of the academy to resolve the difficulty: “

And all your animals”

in the final version of the Ten Statements returns and serves as a generalization,

and we have an established principle: “

A generalization, specification, and generalization—you derive only things similar to the specification”;

just as the specification explicitly refers to living creatures, so too everything refers to living creatures.”

And we challenge this:

But say: Just as the specification explicitly refers to something whose carcass imparts ritual impurity through contact and through carrying, so too everything whose carcass imparts ritual impurity through contact and through carrying; but birds,

whose carcasses do not impart ritual impurity through contact and through carrying,

no!?

The members of the yeshiva said

to reconcile this:

If so—

that the verse includes only those similar to the stated example in two respects, namely, that they are living creatures and that their carcasses impart ritual impurity through contact and carrying—

the Merciful One should have written

only

one example, namely either an ox or a donkey, and we would say: Just as the example explicitly refers to something that is a living creature and whose carcass imparts ritual impurity through contact and carrying, so too, anything that is a living creature and whose carcass imparts ritual impurity through contact and carrying is what the Torah prohibited—

And since the Torah wrote two examples, it necessarily follows that if the second example is not needed for one who resembles the example in both respects, apply it to one who resembles the example in only one respect, namely, that it is a living creature, even though its carcass does not impart ritual impurity through contact and carrying.

And we challenge this:

Which—

of the two examples, which are an ox and a donkey—

should the Merciful One write!?

But

if the Merciful One had written

“ox”

alone,

I would have said:

A living creature

that is fit to be sacrificed on the altar, yes,

but a living creature

that is not fit to be sacrificed on the altar, no;

therefore

the Merciful One wrote

also

“donkey.”

And if the Merciful One had written

“donkey”

alone,

I would have said:

A living creature

that is sanctified by the firstborn law, yes,

but a living creature

that is not sanctified by the firstborn law,

such as horses and camels,

no;

therefore

the Merciful One wrote

“ox.”

And since both examples were necessary, the question arises: From where is it derived to include even birds, whose carcasses do not impart ritual impurity through contact and carrying, and which do not resemble the example of an ox and a donkey!?

Rather,

the Gemara resolves the matter in another way: From where is it derived to include other things besides the example, and why do we not say, “In a generalization followed by a specification, only that which is specified is included”? Because

“and all your animals”

is not a generalization, but

an amplification

is,

and the verses are not expounded according to the principle of a generalization followed by a specification, but according to the principle of an amplification and a limitation; and according to this principle, the final amplification includes everything.

And we challenge this:

But

is it so that

whenever the Merciful One writes

“all”,

it is an amplification

and not a generalization!?

But with regard to the second tithe,

where

it is written

“all,”

we expound it according to

the principle of

“a generalization followed by a specification”!?

As it is taught:

It is written: “And if the way is too long for you, so that you cannot carry it, because the place is too far from you, which the Lord your God will choose to set His Name there, when the Lord your God blesses you; then you shall exchange it for money, and bind up the money in your hand, and go to the place that the Lord your God will choose. And you shall spend the money on whatever your soul desires, on cattle, or on sheep, or on wine, or on strong drink, or on whatever your soul wishes.” And we expound it:

“And you shall spend the money on whatever your soul desires”:

this is

a generalization;

“on cattle, or on sheep, or on wine, or on strong drink”:

this is

a specification;

“or on whatever your soul wishes”:

it returns and generalizes;

“a generalization, a specification, and a generalization—you may infer only what is similar to the specification”:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to produce from produce

—wine comes from grapes, and strong drink comes from dates—

and produce of the ground,

so too, everything that is produce from produce

—to exclude truffles, mushrooms, water, and salt—

and produce of the ground

—to exclude fish.

Thus, although the word “all” is stated, it is nevertheless expounded according to the principle of a generalization followed by a specification, and not according to the principle of an amplification and a limitation!?

The members of the yeshiva said

to reconcile this:

“Whatever”—

as it is written with regard to the second tithe—

is a generalization

.

“All”—

as it is written with regard to Shabbat—

is an amplification

.

Alternatively,

“all”

is indeed always a generalization

and not an amplification—

However, this

“all”

here,

with regard to Shabbat, necessarily

is an amplification, since it would have been sufficient for Him to write:

“and your animal,”

as it is written in the first tablets, but He wrote

“and all your animals”;

conclude from this that it is an amplification.

And we explain:

Now that you have said that

“all”

mentioned with regard to Shabbat

is an amplification—

“Your animal,”

in the first tablets

—

where “living creature” was not stated—

and

“ox and donkey,”

in the latter tablets—what do I need them for!?

That is to say: According to this principle, every limitation comes to exclude one thing; what do these limitations come to exclude?

The members of the yeshiva said

to explain:

“Ox”

was written as a reference, in order

to derive from

“ox, ox”

the prohibition against muzzling,

as we said above.

for the prohibition against muzzling ,

And

“donkey” was written as a reference, in order

to derive from

“donkey, donkey”

the obligation to unload,

as we said above.

And

“your animal”

was written as a reference, in order

to derive from

“your animal, your animal”

the prohibition of crossbreeding,

of mating diverse species, as we said above.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if we derive the prohibition of plowing with diverse species from Shabbat,

even a person

and another species

should be prohibited

because of the prohibition of plowing with diverse species,

since with regard to Shabbat, a male slave and a female slave were prohibited from labor just like an animal, as it is stated: “You shall not perform any labor ... you, and your son, and your daughter, your slave and your maidservant, and your ox and your donkey and all your animals”!

due to the prohibition of mixing species when plowing. After all, concerning Shabbat, a male slave and a female slave were prohibited from performing labor just like an animal, as it is stated: “You shall not perform any labor ... nor your male slave, nor your female slave, nor your ox, nor your donkey, nor any of your animals

And

why,

then, did we learn: “A person is permitted with all of them”

—

with all the species—

to plow and to pull

a carriage!?

Rav Pappa said: The people of Pappunya know the reason for this matter

—

and who are they

—

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov:

When

the verse says: “You shall not perform any labor ... your slave and your maidservant ...”

“so that your slave and your maidservant may rest like you,”

the verse taught, when it repeated the prohibition of labor with regard to a male slave and a female slave:

for rest

—

rest,

I compared him

with an animal,

but not with anything else,

such as the prohibition of plowing with diverse species.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil asked Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: