Bava Kamma 54a — the Talmud in English

And the Rabbis: ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location") "

or"

he needs it to divide

between an ox and a donkey, so that you should not say: He is not liable until an ox and a donkey fall into his pit together.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who expounds “or” to include utensils, would say to you:

to divide from “

and there fell

an ox or a donkey”

is derived, because since it is written in the singular, and it did not say “and they fell,” it implies that he is liable for an ox by itself and for a donkey by itself.

And the Rabbis,

who required “or” in order to divide between an ox and a donkey, would say to you: If only from “and there fell,” I would have interpreted that he is liable only for both of them together, because “

and there fell”

also very much

likewise

implies; at times the Torah writes the singular in reference to the plural, as, for example [Exodus 36:1]: “And Bezalel and Oholiab and every wise-hearted man

who makes.”

And we raise an objection: From where is it derived to include from the essence of the verse all living creatures? Is it not possible to say: “

Let us say: ‘

And there fell’”—

which implies anyone who fell—is

a generalization; “‘

an ox and a donkey’” is

a

specification; and

we have established: “

A generalization and a specification: only what is in the specification is included in the generalization.”

And if so, let us say: “

an ox and a donkey”

only—

indeed, he is liable for them if they fell into the pit, but

for anything else, [A0041]other living creatures,

[other living creatures]—

he is not

liable for them.

They said,

the members of the academy, to resolve this:

It is further written: “

The master of the pit shall pay”;

this is

a return and a generalization, and

we have established: “

A generalization, a specification, and a generalization: you may infer only that which is similar to the specification.”

Just as the specification explicitly refers to living creatures, so too, all living creatures.

And we still raise an objection: From where do we know from this verse to make one liable for all living creatures? Is it not possible to say: “

Just as the specification explicitly refers to something whose carcass imparts impurity through contact and carrying, so too, everything whose carcass imparts impurity through contact and carrying; but birds”—

whose carcass does not impart impurity through contact and carrying—

no!

And we resolve it:

If so—

that the specification was written in order to include only things similar to the specification in two aspects, namely, that they are living creatures and that their carcasses impart impurity through contact and carrying—

let the Merciful One write

one specification, [A0066]let the Torah write only one of the two specifications, and not an ox and a donkey as it is written—

[the Torah should have written only one of the two specific terms, rather than both “ox” and “donkey” as it does].

And necessarily, therefore, the Torah wrote two specifications in order to learn from the second specification, by the principle of “if it is not needed for its own matter,” that which is similar to the specification in two aspects [living creatures, and their carcasses impart impurity through contact and carrying]; apply it to that which is similar to the specification in only one aspect, namely, birds, which are living creatures but whose carcasses do not impart impurity through contact and carrying.

And we raise an objection against this:

Which

specification

should it write [A0073]—could the Torah have written one specification without the second specification!?

[could the Torah have written either specific term without the other]!?

For if

the Merciful One had written

only “

an ox”

alone,

I would have thought:

A living creature that

is fit to be offered on the altar, yes—

indeed, one is liable for it—but a living creature

that is not fit to be offered on the altar, no,

one is not liable for it.

And if the Merciful One had written only “

a donkey,”

then

I would have thought:

A living creature that

is sanctified by the firstborn, yes—

indeed, one is liable for it—but a living creature

that is not sanctified by the firstborn,

such as horses and camels,

no,

one is not liable for it.

And if so, it is impossible to say that the Torah wrote the two specifications in order to include birds; and the difficulty still stands: perhaps one is liable only for that which is similar to the specification in two aspects, namely, that it is a living creature and that its carcass imparts impurity through contact and carrying—but from where do we know that one is liable for birds!?

Rather,

on account of this difficulty the Gemara explains another reason for how we know that one is also liable for birds, and that we do not exclude them because they are not similar to the specification with regard to impurity through contact and carrying from their carcasses:

For

the verse says: “

And the dead shall be his,” and

we include:

every matter of death.

And we raise an objection:

Whether according to the Rabbis, who exclude utensils

because it is written “a donkey,”

or whether according to Rabbi Yehuda, who includes utensils

because it is written “or”—and if not for this, he too would expound “a donkey” to exclude utensils—can it be that

utensils are subject to death?

And it follows that they are excluded by themselves, and “a donkey” is not needed to exclude them.

They said,

the members of the academy, to resolve this:

Their breaking

of utensils

is their death,

and they are included in “and the dead shall be his”; and if the Torah had not excluded them through “a donkey,” we would have made one liable in the case of a pit even for utensils.

And

we still raise an objection

against Rav, who said: The pit for which the Torah made one liable is for its vapors and not for its impact;

if so, the difficulty is:

Whether according to the Rabbis,

who needed a verse to exclude utensils, and

whether according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who makes one liable for utensils in a pit, can it be that

utensils are subject to vapors [A0132]—can vapors cause damage to utensils?—and it is not applicable to become liable for them!?

[can the breath harm vessels]? There is no liability for them!?

They said,

the members of the academy, to resolve this:

The utensils that the Torah excluded according to the Sages, and for which Rabbi Yehuda makes one liable, refer specifically to

new

utensils,

which burst from the vapors [A0139]—in new utensils, which burst from the vapors of the pit.

[new vessels that burst because of the pit’s breath].

And we still raise an objection: Behold, this “

and the dead shall be his”—

from which you learned to include every matter of death—

is

needed for the teaching of Rava, for Rava said: An ox of consecrated animals unfit for the altar that fell into a pit—the owner is exempt,

because

it is stated: “

And the dead shall be his,”

for one whose dead one is his; this one is excluded, whose dead one is not his,”

as explained above, 53b.

Rather,

on account of this difficulty the Gemara retracts, and indeed do not say that the Torah included every matter, even birds, because the Torah said “and the dead shall be his”; rather, because

the verse says: “

He shall restore money to its owner,”

in order

to include every

matter

that has owners,

for which one is liable if it is damaged in a pit.

If so—

if from “he shall restore money to its owner” we have to include everything—

even utensils and a human being as well

should one be liable for them!?

And we resolve it: For

the verse says: “

an ox”

but not a human being; “

a donkey”

but not utensils.

And

we raise an objection

against Rabbi Yehuda, who includes utensils: Granted, “

an ox”

excludes a human being—

but “

a donkey”

what does it exclude, since it does not exclude utensils from it!?

since it does not exclude vessels!?

Rather,

Rava said: “

A donkey”

of a pit—

that is, the word “donkey” stated in the passage of the pit—

according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Yehuda, and “

a sheep”

of a lost item —

that is, the word “sheep” stated in the passage concerning returning a lost item—

according to everyone—

is difficult,

why were they written?

We learned in the Mishna: “

If an ox, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor fell into it, he is liable”:

And we explain:

What is meant by ‘an ox, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor’!?

If you say: the ox of a deaf-mute, the ox of an imbecile, the ox of a minor,

this cannot be said, for:

But the ox of a competent person—

can it be that

he is exempt?

And where did the Torah exempt the owner of the pit when the ox of a competent person fell into it?

Rather,

said

Rabbi Yochanan

explained

our Mishna:

An ox that is itself

deaf,

an ox that is itself an imbecile, an ox that is itself a minor.