Bava Kamma 54a (נד.) — the Talmud in English

And the Rabbis

"

or"

is needed to divide

between an ox and a donkey, so that you should not say: He is not liable unless both an ox and a donkey fall into his pit together.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who interprets “or” as including vessels, would say to you:

The division from “

and it falls

there—an ox or a donkey”

is derived: Since the verse uses the singular form and does not say “and they fall,” it indicates that one is liable for an ox by itself and for a donkey by itself.

And the Rabbis

who require “or” in order to divide between an ox and a donkey say to you: If I had only “and there fell,” I would have interpreted it to mean that he is liable only for both of them together, because

“and there fell”

also frequently

means

a singular expression in relation to many; the Torah sometimes writes a singular expression with reference to several subjects, as in [Exodus 36:1]: “And Bezalel and Oholiab and every wise-hearted man

Another example cited by Rashi is the verse [Deuteronomy 13:3]: “And the sign or the wonder comes to pass,” or the wonder. This is the wording of the verse there: “When a prophet or a dreamer of dreams arises among you, and he gives you a sign or a wonder. And the sign or the wonder comes to pass,” and this requires study;

and likewise [I Samuel 17]: “And the lion came, and also the bear.”

Let us say:

“and there fell”

which implies anyone who falls, is

a generalization;

“an ox and a donkey”

is

a specification;

and we maintain:

When there is a generalization followed by a specification, the generalization includes only what is specified.

If so, let us say:

“an ox and a donkey”

only—

indeed, he is liable for them if they fall into the pit, but

for anything else

other animals,

he is not

liable for them.

The members of the academy said

to resolve the difficulty:

It is written further:

“The owner of the pit shall pay”;

this is

another generalization.

And we maintain:

When there is a generalization, a specification, and a generalization, you may infer only what is similar to the specification:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to living creatures, so too, everything refers to living creatures.

We nevertheless raise a difficulty: From where do we derive from this verse liability for all living creatures? Perhaps

just as the specification explicitly refers to something whose carcass renders one impure through contact and carrying, so too, everything whose carcass renders one impure through contact and carrying; but birds

whose carcasses do not render one impure through contact and carrying—

no!

And we answer:

If so—

if the specification was written in order to include only things resembling the specification in two respects, namely, that they are living creatures and that their carcasses render one impure through contact and carrying—

the Merciful One should have written

one specification

the Torah should have written only one of the two specifications, and not both an ox and a donkey as it does—

Necessarily, the Torah wrote two specifications in order to derive from the second specification, by the principle of “if it is not needed for its own matter,” that where something resembles the specification in two respects [living creatures whose carcasses render one impure through contact and carrying], apply it to something that resembles the specification in only one respect—namely, birds, which are living creatures, but whose carcasses do not render one impure through contact and carrying.

We raise a difficulty against this:

Which

specification

should it have written

which of the specifications could the Torah have written without the other one?!

For

if the Merciful One had written

only

“ox”

alone,

I would have said:

A living creature

that is fit to be offered on the altar—yes

he is liable for it, but a living creature

that is not fit to be offered on the altar—no

he is not liable for it.

And if the Merciful One had written only

“donkey”

alone, then

I would have said:

A living creature

that is sanctified with firstborn sanctity—yes

he is liable for it, but a living creature

that is not sanctified with firstborn sanctity,

such as horses and camels,

no,

he is not liable for it.

If so, it cannot be said that the Torah wrote both specifications in order to include birds. The difficulty still remains: Perhaps one is liable only for something resembling the specification in two respects, namely, that it is a living creature and that its carcass renders one impure through contact and carrying; but from where do we know that he is liable for birds?!

Rather,

because of this difficulty, the Gemara explains a different reason why birds are included and are not excluded because they do not resemble the specification with regard to the impurity of contact and carrying caused by their carcasses:

For

the verse says:

“And the dead shall be his”,

and we include

everything subject to death.

We raise a difficulty:

According both to the Rabbis, who exclude vessels

because it is written “donkey,”

and according to Rabbi Judah, who includes vessels

because it is written “or”—and if not for this, he too would expound “donkey” to exclude vessels—why,

are vessels subject to death?

They are consequently excluded on their own, and there is no need for “donkey” to exclude them.

The members of the academy said

to resolve the difficulty:

The breaking of vessels

is

their death,

and they are included in “and the dead shall be his.” If the Torah had not excluded them through “donkey,” we would have made one liable in the case of a pit even for vessels.

And

we raise another difficulty

according to Rav, who said: The pit for which the Torah imposed liability is for its vapor, but not for its impact:

If so, the difficulty arises:

Both according to the Rabbis,

who require a verse to exclude vessels,

and according to Rabbi Judah,

who imposes liability for vessels in the case of a pit, are

vessels subject to vapor

[does vapor cause damage to vessels?], such that there can be no liability for them?!

The members of the academy said

to resolve the difficulty:

The vessels that the Torah excludes according to the Sages, and for which Rabbi Judah imposes liability, are specifically

with

vessels

new vessels that burst from the vapor

[new vessels that burst because of the vapor of the pit].

We nevertheless raise a difficulty: This verse,

this

“and the dead shall be his”—

from which you learned to include everything subject to death—

is needed for what Rava said, as Rava said: If an ox disqualified from consecrated status falls into a pit, he is exempt,

because

it is stated:

“And the dead shall be his”:

it must be one whose dead animal is his; this excludes one whose dead animal is not his,

as explained above, 53b.

Rather,

because of this difficulty the Gemara retracts its previous explanation. Indeed, do not say that the Torah included everything, even birds, because the Torah said “and the dead shall be his”; rather, it is because

the verse says:

“He shall return the money to its owner”,

in order

to include everything

that

has an owner

for which one is liable if it is damaged in a pit.

If so—if from “he shall return the money to its owner” we include everything—

if “He shall return the money to its owner” serves to include everything—

even vessels and a person as well

he should be liable for them?!

And we answer:

the verse says:

“ox”

but not a person;

“donkey”

but not vessels.

And

we raise a difficulty

according to Rabbi Judah, who includes vessels; granted,

“ox”

excludes a person—

But

“donkey”

what does it exclude

since he does not exclude vessels through it?!

Rather,

Rava said:

“Donkey”

of the pit—

that is, the word “donkey” stated in the section concerning a pit—

according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Judah, and

“sheep”

of the lost property —

that is, the word “sheep” stated in the section concerning the returning of lost property—

according to everyone—

is difficult: Why were they written?

why were they written?

We learned in the Mishna:

If an ox that is deaf-mute, insane, or young falls into it, he is liable:

And we explain:

What is meant by an ox that is deaf-mute, insane, or young?!

If you say: the ox of a deaf-mute, the ox of an insane person, or the ox of a minor,

this cannot be said, because:

As for the ox of a competent person,

is it the case that

he is exempt?

Where did the Torah exempt the owner of the pit when the ox of a competent person fell into it?

Rather,

said

and explained

Rabbi Yohanan

our Mishna:

An ox that is itself

deaf-mute,

an ox that is insane, or an ox that is young.