Bava Kamma 53b (נג:) — the Talmud in English

It was stated:

an ox

belonging to a person,

and an ox

that is

an animal disqualified from consecrated status [an ox that had been a sacrifice and became disqualified because it developed a blemish—even if it was a firstborn animal that developed a blemish, which, although it belongs to a koen and may be eaten anywhere as non-sacred food, does not give rise to liability for damage it causes],

that gored

another ox together, and only the non-sacred ox is liable to pay the damages, while the ox disqualified from consecrated status is not:

Abaye said: He pays half the damages.

Ravina said: He pays one-quarter of the damages.

The Gemara establishes their dispute in two possible ways:

The first is:

Both are referring to a tam ox,

Abaye and Ravina both spoke of a tam ox, but

this one,

Ravina, who holds that he pays only half the damages, follows the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who do not obligate one of the partners responsible for the damage to pay the entire damages, even when it is impossible to collect from the other partner.

Whereas

this one,

Abaye, who said that the non-sacred owner pays the entire amount of half-damages, despite having a partner in causing the damage, since if it is impossible to collect from the other, the entire amount is collected from the first, follows the opinion of

Rabbi Natan.

And the second formulation is:

Alternatively, both follow the opinion of the Rabbis,

both hold in accordance with the Rabbis, and they did not disagree at all; rather, they spoke of two different oxen.

This one,

Ravina, who said that he pays one-quarter of the damages, was speaking

of a tam ox.

Therefore, he pays only one-quarter of the damages, which is his share of half the payment, the payment being half-damages.

Whereas

this one,

Abaye was speaking

of a mu'ad ox,

and therefore he pays half the damages, which is half the payment of the entire amount.

There are those who say: Abaye said: Half-damages; Ravina said: The entire damages.

Both are referring to a mu'ad ox: This one follows the Rabbis, and this one follows Rabbi Natan.

Alternatively, both follow Rabbi Natan: This one is referring to a mu'ad ox, and this one to a tam ox.

Rava said: An ox

belonging to one person,

and a person

second,

who pushed

a person or an object

into a pit

belonging to a third person, the law governing their liabilities differs: a.

With regard to damages,

for example, where they pushed a person there and he was injured by the pit:

all of them are liable,

and together they pay the damages.

b.

With regard to the four types of indemnity [pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, which a person who injures another adds to the payment for damage]

for example, where they pushed the person and he was injured in the pit—c. And

with regard to

the value of the offspring,

for example, where they pushed a pregnant woman and she miscarried:

The person is liable

for the entire payment,

while

the

ox and pit are exempt,

since an ox and a pit are liable only for damage, and not for the four types of indemnity,

and they are likewise not liable for the value of the offspring. d.

With regard to ransom

for example, where they pushed the person and he died in the pit, and the ox was a mu'ad;

and with regard to the fine of

thirty

shekels

for a slave

for example, where they pushed the slave and he died, and the ox was a mu'ad:

for a slave

The ox is liable,

while the person and pit are exempt, since the Torah imposed liability for ransom and the thirty [shekels] for a slave only in the case of an ox. e. With regard to vessels, for example, where they pushed vessels and they broke in the pit; and

whereas

the person and the pit are exempt,

because the Torah imposed liability for ransom and for the thirty shekels for a slave only in the case of an ox.

f.

with regard to an ox disqualified from consecrated status [a blemished firstborn animal, or consecrated animals that developed a blemish and were redeemed]

that was pushed into the pit by them:

The person and the ox are liable, while the pit is exempt,

since the pit is exempt for vessels [as explained in our Mishna] and for animals disqualified from consecrated status.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that the pit is exempt for animals disqualified from consecrated status?

Because

the verse says with regard to a pit [Exodus 21:34]: “The owner of the pit shall pay money; he shall return it to its owner,

and the dead animal

[the carcass]

shall be his,”

and it comes to teach that the Torah imposed liability on the owner of a pit only

for

damages caused to

one whose dead animal is his,

meaning one who is permitted to feed it to dogs;

this one—

the ox disqualified from consecrated status—

whose dead animal is not his,

since it is forbidden to feed it to dogs, is excluded.

meaning an animal that he is permitted to feed to dogs.

And we ask:

Does this mean that it was obvious to Rava

that the pit is exempt for damage caused to an ox disqualified from consecrated status,

but Rava had raised the question [Is it really obvious to Rava that the pit is exempt, when Rava was uncertain about the matter]!?

For Rava asked: What is the law concerning an ox disqualified from consecrated status that fell into a pit—

whether the owner of the pit is liable for it?

And these are the sides of the uncertainty:

This

verse, “

and the dead animal shall be his,”

comes to teach:

one whose dead animal is his is included; this one—

the ox disqualified from consecrated status—

whose dead animal is not his is excluded.

Or perhaps: “

and the dead animal shall be his”

comes for the

owners—

of the animal—

to tend to the carcass,

that is what it comes to teach.

That is to say: If the carcass has value, we do not say that the owner of the pit must pay the full value of the animal and take the carcass; rather, the owners of the animal take it, and the owner of the pit pays only the difference, because “and the dead animal shall be his” refers to the injured party.

owners

Thus, Rava was uncertain whether the owner of the pit is exempt for an ox disqualified from consecrated status, whereas here Rava stated as an obvious matter that he is exempt!?

And we answer:

After the question,

after Rava was uncertain whether the owner of the pit is exempt for it,

he subsequently resolved it as exempt; and Rava’s statement in our sugya was made after he had resolved it.

And we ask: According to the resolution reached by Rava, that “and the dead animal shall be his” comes to teach that a pit is exempt for animals disqualified from consecrated status:

But “

the owners tend to the carcass”

of an animal that died in a pit—as explained in the Mishna and beraita above, 9b and 10b—

from where does he derive it

Rava, since “and the dead animal shall be his” is expounded with regard to animals disqualified from consecrated status!?

“the owners are responsible for the carcass”

And we answer:

He derives it

Rava, that “the owners tend to the carcass” when it dies in a pit,

from “

and the dead animal shall be his,” which is written with regard to an

ox,

as it is written [Exodus 21:35]: “When one man’s ox injures his fellow’s ox … and if it was a goring ox … he shall surely pay ox for ox, and the dead animal shall be his.”

And we ask:

What do you see that “

and the dead animal shall be his”

written with regard to an ox, you derive to mean that the owners tend to the carcass,

and you impose liability on the ox for goring an ox disqualified from consecrated status, whereas “

and the dead animal shall be his”

written with regard to a pit, you derive to mean that it is for one whose dead animal is his,

and thereby exempt it for animals disqualified from consecrated status [how does Rava know that “and the dead animal shall be his” written with regard to an ox comes to teach that the owners tend to the carcass, whereas “and the dead animal shall be his” written with regard to a pit comes to teach the exemption for animals disqualified from consecrated status]!?

And behold,

I shall reverse it:

Perhaps we should expound them in the opposite manner: “And the dead animal shall be his” with regard to a pit teaches that “the owners tend to the carcass,” and the pit is liable for an ox disqualified from consecrated status; whereas “and the dead animal shall be his” stated with regard to an ox comes to exempt the ox that gored an animal disqualified from consecrated status!?

written concerning a pit, you derive to mean that it applies to one whose dead animal belongs to him

and that the pit is exempt for an animal disqualified from consecrated offerings [how does Rava know that “and the dead animal shall be his” written concerning an ox comes to teach that the owners are responsible for the carcass, whereas the same phrase written concerning a pit comes to teach the exemption for an animal disqualified from consecrated offerings]!?

And we answer:

It is reasonable

to expound the

exemption [from payment for animals disqualified from consecrated status]

with regard to a pit, since we find another exemption in its case, for it exempts vessels. And we challenge this:

On the contrary,

let us expound the

exemption with regard to an ox, since it exempts half the damages

in the case of a tam ox!?

And we answer:

The entire damages—

analogous to the exemption for an ox disqualified from consecrated status—

at least we do not find

an exemption with regard to an ox, whereas with regard to a pit we find exemption from the entire damages in the case of vessels. Therefore, it is reasonable that the complete exemption for an ox disqualified from consecrated status is stated with regard to a pit, and not with regard to an ox.

let us derive the

exemption with regard to an ox, since it exempts one from half the damage

in the case of a docile ox’s first act of goring!?

And we answer:

the entire damage—which is comparable to the exemption for an animal disqualified from consecrated offerings—

at least we do not find

an exemption in the case of an ox, whereas in the case of a pit we find an exemption from the entire damage with regard to vessels. Therefore, it is reasonable that the complete exemption for an animal disqualified from consecrated offerings applies to a pit and not to an ox.

an exemption with regard to a shor, whereas with regard to a pit we find exemption from all the damage concerning utensils; therefore it is logical that the complete exemption for a shor of disqualified sacrificial property was stated with regard to a pit and not with regard to a shor.

We learned in the Mishna, the foundational compilation of early rabbinic teachings:

“An ox and its equipment fell into it and were broken,”

“or a donkey and its equipment fell into it and were torn; he is liable for the animal but exempt for the equipment”:

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, explains that

this Mishna—

which holds that one who creates a pit is exempt for damage to vessels—

is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for damage to vessels caused by a pit.

And we explain:

What is the reason of the Rabbis,

who exempt the pit for damage to vessels?

Because the verse says

concerning a pit [Exodus 21:34]: “

An ox or a donkey fell there,”

and we expound it: “

Ox”

but not a person. “

Donkey”

but not vessels,

and not anything that is not a living creature.

And Rabbi Yehuda—

who holds that a pit is liable for damage to vessels—says to you: “

Or” [“

ox or donkey”]

includes vessels

for liability.