Bava Kamma 53b — the Talmud in English

It was stated: ![](pamud.bmp "

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a shor

belonging to an ordinary person,

and a shor

that is

disqualified sacrificial property [a shor that was a sacrifice and became disqualified because a blemish occurred in it, and even if it is a firstborn in which a blemish occurred, for although it belongs to a kohen and is eaten anywhere as non-sacred meat, one is not liable for damage that it caused to others],

that gored

together another shor, and only the ordinary person's shor is liable to pay the damage, but the shor of disqualified sacrificial property is not liable:

Abaye said: He pays half the damage.

Ravina said: He pays a quarter of the damage.

And the Gemara establishes their dispute in two possibilities:

The first:

both are with regard to an innocuous [shor],

Abaye and Ravina both spoke about an innocuous shor, but

this one,

Ravina, who holds that he pays only half the damage, is

according to the Rabbis,

who do not obligate one of the partners in causing the damage to pay the entire damage, even when it is impossible to collect from the other partner.

Whereas

this one,

Abaye, who said that the ordinary person pays the full amount of half the damage, even though he had a partner in causing the damage, since if it is impossible to collect from the second, the entire amount is collected from the first, is

according to Rabbi Natan.

And the second form:

If you wish, say: both are according to the Rabbis,

both hold according to the Rabbis, and they did not dispute at all; rather, they spoke about two separate shorim.

This one,

Ravina, who said that he pays a quarter of the damage, spoke

about an innocuous [shor].

Therefore he pays only a quarter of the damage, which is his share of half the payment, which is half the damage.

Whereas

this one,

Abaye spoke

about a forewarned [shor],

and therefore he pays half the damage, which is half the payment of the entire amount.

There are those who say: Abaye said: half the damage; Ravina said: the entire damage.

Both are with regard to a forewarned [shor]: this one according to the Rabbis, and this one according to Rabbi Natan.

If you wish, say: both are according to Rabbi Natan; this one is with regard to a forewarned [shor], and this one is with regard to an innocuous [shor].

Rava said: A shor

belonging to one person,

and a person

second,

who pushed

a person or an object

into a pit

belonging to a third person—the law of their liabilities is divided: a.

With regard to damages,

for example, when they pushed a person there and he was injured in the pit:

all are liable,

they pay the damage among all of them.

b.

With regard to the four matters

pain, medical expenses, loss of work, and humiliation, which a person who injures his fellow adds to the damage] for example, when they pushed the person and he was injured in the pit—c.

And

with regard to

the value of unborn children,

for example, when they pushed a pregnant woman and her children came out:

A person is liable

for the entire payment,

and

whereas

a shor and a pit are exempt,

since a shor and a pit are liable only for damage and not for the four matters, and they are likewise not liable for the value of unborn children.

d.

With regard to ransom

for example, when they pushed the person and he died in the pit, and the shor was forewarned:

and

with regard to the fine of

thirty

shekels

of a slave

for example, when they pushed the slave and he died, and the shor was forewarned:

A shor is liable,

whereas

a person and a pit are exempt,

since the Torah imposed ransom and the thirty [shekels] of a slave only in the case of a shor.

e.

With regard to utensils

for example, when they pushed the utensils and they broke in the pit: v.

and

with regard to

a shor of disqualified sacrificial property

[a blemished firstborn, or sacrificial property that became blemished and was redeemed] that was pushed by them into a pit:

The person and the shor are liable, and the pit is exempt,

since the pit is exempt for utensils [as explained in our Mishna], and for disqualified sacrificial property.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that the pit is exempt for disqualified sacrificial property?

For

the verse said concerning a pit [Exodus 21:34]: “The owner of the pit shall pay money; he shall return it to its owner,

and

and the dead animal

[the carcass]

shall be his,”

and it comes to teach: the Torah made the owner of the pit liable only

for

damage to

one whose dead animal is his,

namely, one who is fit to feed it to dogs;

this one is excluded—

a shor of disqualified sacrificial property—

whose dead animal is not his,

since it is forbidden to feed it to dogs.

And we object:

Does this mean that it was obvious to Rava

that the pit is exempt for damage caused to a shor of disqualified sacrificial property,

yet Rava had a question about it

[Would it really be obvious to Rava that the pit is exempt, when Rava was uncertain about the matter]!?

For Rava asked: What is the law when a shor of disqualified sacrificial property falls into a pit

that its owner—the owner of the pit—should be liable for it?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

This

verse,

“and the dead animal shall be his,”

comes to teach:

one whose dead animal is his; this one is excluded—

a shor of disqualified sacrificial property—

whose dead animal is not his.

Or perhaps:

“and the dead animal shall be his,”

for the

owners—

of the animal—

to handle the carcass

is what it came for;

that is, if the carcass has value, we do not say that the owner of the pit must pay against the entire value of the animal and take the carcass, but rather the owners of the animal take it, and the owner of the pit pays only the difference, because “and the dead animal shall be his” means the injured party.

It follows that Rava was uncertain whether the owner of the pit is exempt for a shor of disqualified sacrificial property, whereas here Rava stated as an obvious matter that he is exempt!?

And we answer:

After the question,

after Rava was uncertain whether the owner of the pit is exempt for it,

he subsequently resolved it,

Rava resolved that he is exempt, and Rava’s statement in our discussion was after he had resolved it.

And we object: according to what Rava resolved, that “and the dead animal shall be his” comes to teach that a pit is exempt for disqualified sacrificial property:

but

“the owners handle the carcass”

of an animal that died in a pit—as explained in the Mishna and the beraita above 9b and 10b—

from where does he have it

Rava, since “and the dead animal shall be his” is expounded with regard to disqualified sacrificial property!?

And we answer:

He derives it

for Rava that “the owners handle the carcass” when it dies in a pit

from

“and the dead animal shall be his”

that

is written with regard to

a shor,

as it is written [Exodus 21:35]: “When one person’s shor injures his fellow’s shor ... and if it is a shor accustomed to gore ... he shall surely pay shor in place of shor, and the dead animal shall be his.”

And we object:

What did you see that

“and the dead animal shall be his”

of the shor you derive as ‘the owners handle the carcass,’

and you make the shor liable for goring a shor of disqualified sacrificial property, whereas

“and the dead animal shall be his”

of the pit you derive as ‘one whose dead animal is his,’

and exempt it for disqualified sacrificial property [from where does Rava know that “and the dead animal shall be his” stated with regard to a shor comes to teach “the owners handle the carcass,” whereas “and the dead animal shall be his” stated with regard to a pit comes to teach the law concerning disqualified sacrificial property]!?

For

perhaps I should reverse it:

perhaps we should expound them in the opposite manner: “and the dead animal shall be his” of the pit, for “the owners handle the carcass,” and it should be liable for a shor of disqualified sacrificial property, whereas “and the dead animal shall be his” stated with regard to the shor comes to exempt the shor that gored disqualified sacrificial property!?

And we answer:

It is logical

to expound the

exemption

[from payment for disqualified sacrificial property]

with regard to a pit, since

we find in it another exemption, that

it exempted utensils.

And we object to this:

On the contrary,

let us expound the

exemption with regard to the shor, since it exempted half the damage

in the case of an innocuous horn!?

And we answer:

The entire damage—

similar to the exemption with regard to a shor of disqualified sacrificial property—

at least we do not find

an exemption with regard to a shor, whereas with regard to a pit we find exemption from all the damage concerning utensils; therefore it is logical that the complete exemption for a shor of disqualified sacrificial property was stated with regard to a pit and not with regard to a shor.

We learned in the Mishna:

an ox and its vessels fell into it and were broken,

a donkey and its vessels, and they were torn, he is liable for the animal and exempt concerning the vessels:

The Gemara explains that

our Mishna’s ruling—

our Mishna, which holds that a pit is exempt concerning vessels—

is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for damage to vessels in a pit.

And we explain:

what is the reason of the Rabbis,

who exempt the pit concerning vessels:

Because Scripture says concerning a pit [Exodus 21:34: " ונפל שמה שור או חמור ",

concerning a pit [Exodus 21:34]: “

An ox or a donkey fell there,”

and we expound: "

“An ox”

but not a person. "

“A donkey”

but not vessels,

and not anything that is not a living creature.

And Rabbi Yehuda—

who holds that a pit is liable for vessels—would say to you: "

“Or” ["

an ox or a donkey"]

comes to include vessels

for liability.