Bava Kamma 57a — the Talmud in English

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba:

from that which was taught:

If he returned it,

the finder of the lost object,

to a place where

its owner will see it,

he is no longer obligated

any further

to tend to it.

If the lost object was stolen or lost,

the lost object,

he is liable for it.

That is to say, if the finder of the lost object had the object he found stolen from him or it was lost from him, he is liable to pay its value to the owner of the lost object.

And Rav Yosef proves:

What is the meaning of

“it was stolen or lost”?

Is it not

the intention of the beraita to say that it was

stolen from his house, and lost from his house

of the finder, before he returned it to a place where the owners would see it?

For after he returned it to a place where the owners see it, the beraita states that he is exempt from tending to it.

It follows that the guardian of a lost object has the status of a paid guardian, who is liable for theft and loss, and not that of an unpaid guardian, who is exempt from theft and loss and liable only for negligence!

And Rabba answers:

No,

this is not what the beraita intended to say!

Rather, the intention of the beraita is that it was stolen or lost

from the place to which he returned it

the guardian to the owners.

And Rav Yosef objects:

But it teaches

in the beraita that if he returned it to a place where the owners would see it, thereafter

he is no longer obligated to tend to it,

so how can you say that he is still liable for it?

He said to him,

Rabba to Rav Yosef:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which he returned it at midday,

when the owners are then occupied with their work in the field and do not know that he returned the lost object to the house, so that they could guard it. And this is negligence with regard to the guardian of the lost object, for even an unpaid guardian is liable for this.

And he teaches two cases.

The beraita speaks of two circumstances,

and this is how it teaches:

If he returned it in the morning

in the morning

to a place where

the owners will see it,

for it is common that they enter and leave, for then it is common that

they are in their house and go out and come in,

and see it

and see it,

he is not obligated to tend to it.

But if

he returned it at midday to a place where

the owners will see it,

it is not common

then

that they enter and leave,

for then they are not in their house,

so that they do not see it

and do not see it,

and it was stolen or lost, he is liable for it.

He raised an objection

Rav Yosef to Rabba from that which was taught later in the preceding beraita:

He is always liable,

the finder of the lost object, for its theft and loss,

until he returns it to his domain

of the owners.

And Rav Yosef proves:

What is the meaning of

“always”?

Is it not

the intention that

even

if it was stolen or lost

from his house

of the finder, he is liable for it?

Learn from it

that the guardian of a lost object has the status

of a paid guardian, evidently!

Rabba said to him:

I concede to you concerning living creatures,

that if the lost object is a living creature, the guardian is liable even for theft and loss, although he is only an unpaid guardian,

for since a tendency to run away has taken hold of them,

so that the guardian saw that this animal is accustomed to flee,

it requires additional safeguarding

and he must guard it well, and therefore theft and loss are also considered negligence with regard to it, for which even an unpaid guardian is liable. And the beraita indeed speaks of living creatures, but the guardian of a lost object that is movable property is never liable for theft and loss.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Yosef:

It is stated concerning the returning of a lost object, “You shall surely return them.” If only “return” had been written, I would say

I have only

that returning is considered such

only

when he returned the lost object

to his house

of the owner of the lost object. But if he returned it

to his garden or to his ruin, from where

do we know that he has fulfilled the obligation of returning it?

The verse teaches

“You shall return them.”

This includes returning it

in every place,

for even to his garden or to his ruin it is considered a return.

And Rabba proves:

What is the meaning of

“to his garden and to his ruin”?

If you say,

that this means that he returned the lost object

to his guarded garden and to his guarded ruin,

with superior safeguarding, then

this is his house,

so why is a special inclusion necessary for this?

Rather, it is obvious

that he returned it

to his garden that is not guarded, and to his ruin that is not guarded,

with superior safeguarding, but only with lesser safeguarding, which is the level of safeguarding for which an unpaid guardian is liable; and the verse comes to include that the guardian of a lost object is sufficiently fulfilling his obligation by returning it even to a place that is guarded there only with lesser safeguarding, for this is the level of safeguarding to which the guardian of a lost object is obligated.

Learn from it,

that the guardian of a lost object

has the status of an unpaid guardian, evidently!

He said to him,

Rav Yosef:

Always,

returning is considered such only

to his guarded garden and to his guarded ruin.

And the following was difficult for you: “This is his house!”

This teaches us that we do not require the owners’ knowledge.

The verse comes to include that one who returns a lost object to its owners need not notify him that he returned it to its place; it is sufficient that he returned it.

As Rabbi Elazar, for Rabbi Elazar said: Everyone

requires the owners’ knowledge,

a thief, a robber, and the four guardians who returned the object to the owners must notify him of this; and if they did not notify him, it is still in their domain, and they are liable for it.

Except for returning a lost object,

which does not require the owners’ knowledge,

for the Torah included many acts of returning in it,

as it is stated, “You shall surely return them.”

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And do you not hold?

Do you not hold

that the guardian of a lost object has the status of an unpaid guardian!?

But Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who makes the claim of theft concerning a lost object,

a guardian of a lost object who claims that the lost object was stolen from him [and swears to this], and afterward it becomes clear that the lost object is in his possession,

pays a double payment

to the owners. For this is what we derive from the verses: one who makes the claim of theft concerning a deposit or a lost object in his possession has the status of the thief himself and pays double.

And if it enters your mind

that the guardian of a lost object

has the status of a paid guardian, why does he pay a double payment?

For when he claimed that the lost object had been stolen from him, he had not exempted himself at all from paying for it, since

the principal he must

pay!

He had to pay the principal, meaning the value of the lost object that was stolen, as is the law of a paid guardian, who is liable for theft and loss. But one who makes the claim of theft is liable for double only when he wishes to exempt himself by means of this claim.

Rather, certainly, the guardian of a lost object has the status of an unpaid guardian; therefore, when he makes the claim of theft, he becomes exempt from paying for it.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which he claims, “an armed bandit,”

for the thief who stole the lost object from him was armed and forcibly took the lost object from him. This is considered coercion, and even a paid guardian is exempt from paying in a case of coercion. Thus, he sought to exempt himself by means of this claim, despite the fact that he is a paid guardian.

He said to him,

Abaye:

An armed bandit is a robber!

And there is a liability for double payment only when one makes the claim of theft, and not when one makes the claim of robbery!?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef:

I say that an armed bandit, since he hides from people,

he hides from people,

is a thief!

For although he robs people forcibly and publicly, nevertheless he hides from other people; whereas a robber is only one who does not hide at all from people.

And since the armed bandit has the status of a thief, and he pays double for his theft, therefore one who comes to exempt himself by claiming “an armed bandit” has the status of one who makes the claim of theft, and pays double.

On the other hand, he has the status of one acting under coercion with regard to the fact that a paid guardian is exempt from theft by an armed bandit.

And it follows that there is a possibility that even a paid guardian can exempt himself by making the claim of theft. And in such a case Rabbi Yohanan said that one who makes the claim of theft concerning a lost object pays double, despite the fact that he is a paid guardian.

The Gemara now brings beraitot to establish whether an armed bandit has the status of a thief or of a robber.

He raised an objection

Abaye to Rav Yosef from that which was taught: