Bava Kamma 57a (נז.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba:

from that which is taught:

If he returned it,

the finder of the lost object,

to a place where

its owner will see it,

he is no longer obligated

to

tend to it.

If the lost object was stolen or lost,

the finder

is liable for it.

That is, if the lost object that he found was stolen from him or became lost from him, he is liable to pay its value to the owner of the lost object.

And Rav Yosef proves:

What is the meaning of

“it was stolen or lost”?

Is it not

the intention of the beraita to say that it was

stolen from his house, or lost from his house

of the finder, before he returned it to a place where the owners would see it?

For after he returned it to a place where the owners see it, the beraita states that he is exempt from tending to it.

It follows that a guardian of a lost object has the status of a paid watchman, who is liable for theft and loss, and not that of an unpaid watchman, who is exempt for theft and loss and liable only for negligence!

And Rabba answers:

No,

this is not what the beraita intended to say!

Rather, the intention of the beraita is that it was stolen or lost

from the place to which

the guardian returned it to the owner.

And Rav Yosef was astonished:

But it teaches

in the beraita that if he returned it to a place where the owners would see it, he

is no longer obligated to tend to it,

so how can you say that he is still liable for it?

He said to him

Rabba to Rav Yosef:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he returned it at midday,

when the owners are occupied with their work in the field and do not know that he returned the lost object to the house, so that they could guard it. This is negligence on the part of the guardian of the lost object, for even an unpaid watchman is liable for such negligence.

And it teaches two cases.

The beraita is speaking of two different circumstances,

and this is what it teaches:

If he returned it in the morning

early

to a place where

the owners would see it,

as it is common for them to come and go, when it is common that

they are at home, coming and going,

and see it

and observe it,

he is not obligated to tend to it.

But if

he returned it at midday to a place where

the owners would see it,

when it is not common

at that time

for them to come and go,

as they are not at home,

so that they do not see it

and do not observe it,

and it was stolen or lost, he is liable for it.

He raised an objection

Rav Yosef to Rabba from that which is taught in the continuation of the previous beraita:

He is always liable,

the finder of the lost object, for its theft and loss,

until he returns it to its domain

of the owners.

And Rav Yosef proves:

What is the meaning of

“always”?

Is it not

the intention that

even

if it was stolen or lost

from his house

of the finder, he is liable for it?

Infer from it

that a guardian of a lost object has the status

of a paid watchman!

Rabba said to him:

I concede to you with regard to living creatures,

that if the lost object is a living creature, the guardian is liable even for theft and loss, despite the fact that he is only an unpaid watchman,

because, since they have taken to the unusual route,

as the guardian saw that this animal was accustomed to escape,

it requires extra protection

and he must guard it היטב, and therefore theft and loss are considered negligence with regard to it, for which even an unpaid watchman is liable. And the beraita is indeed speaking of living creatures, but a guardian of lost movable property is never liable for theft and loss.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Yosef:

It is stated with regard to returning a lost object: “You shall surely return them.” If only “return” had been written, I would say

I have only

that a return is considered a proper return

when

he returned the lost object

to the house

of the owner of the lost object. But if he returned it

to his garden or ruin, from where

do we know that he has fulfilled the obligation to return it?

The verse states

“You shall return them.”

This includes a return

in every place,

so that even returning it to his garden or ruin is considered a proper return.

And Rabba proves:

What is the meaning of

“to his garden and to his ruin”?

If you say

that this means that he returned the lost object

to his secure garden and to his secure ruin,

with superior protection, then

that is the same as his house,

so why is a special inclusion necessary for this?

Rather, it is obvious

that he returned it

to his garden that is not secure, and to his ruin that is not secure,

with lesser rather than superior protection—the level of protection for which an unpaid watchman is liable—and the verse comes to include that a guardian of a lost object fulfills his obligation to return it even to a place that is not secure except with lesser protection, because this is the level of protection to which a guardian of a lost object is obligated.

Infer from it

that a guardian of a lost object

has the status of an unpaid watchman!

He said to him

Rav Yosef

in all cases

a return is considered a proper return only

to his secure garden and to his secure ruin.

And as for the difficulty you raised: That is the same as his house!

This teaches us that the owners’ awareness is not required.

The verse comes to include that one who returns a lost object to its owners need not inform them that he returned it to its place; it is sufficient that he returned it.

In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: Everyone

requires the owners’ awareness:

a thief, a robber, and the four guardians, when they return the object to the owners, must inform them of this; and if they did not inform them, it remains in their domain and they are liable for it.

Except for the return of a lost object,

which does not require the owners’ awareness,

for the Torah included many acts of returning it,

as it is stated: “You shall surely return them.”

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And do you not agree?

Do you not think

that a guardian of a lost object has the status of an unpaid watchman!?

But Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One who makes the claim of a thief with regard to a lost object,

a guardian of a lost object who claims that the lost object was stolen from him [and takes an oath to that effect], and it is subsequently discovered that the lost object is in his possession,

pays double payment

to the owners. For this is what we derive from the verses: One who makes the claim of a thief concerning a deposit or a lost object in his possession has the status of the thief himself and pays double.

And if it enters your mind

that a guardian of a lost object

has the status of a paid watchman, why does he pay double payment?

For when he claimed that the lost object had been stolen from him, he did not exempt himself from paying for it at all, since

the principal he must

pay!

He was required to pay the principal—that is, the value of the stolen lost object—as the law of a paid watchman, who is liable for theft and loss. One who makes the claim of a thief is liable to pay double only when he seeks to exempt himself through this claim.

Rather, it is certainly the case that a guardian of a lost object has the status of an unpaid watchman, and therefore, when he makes the claim of a thief, he is exempt from paying for it.

He said to him

Rav Yosef:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he claims, “an armed robber,”

that the thief who stole the lost object from him was armed and took the lost object from him by force. This is considered an unavoidable circumstance, and even a paid watchman is exempt from payment in a case of unavoidable circumstance. Thus, he sought to exempt himself through this claim, despite the fact that he is a paid watchman.

He said to him

Abaye:

An armed robber is a robber!

The obligation of double payment applies only to one who makes the claim of a thief, and not to one who makes the claim of a robber!?

He said to him

Rav Yosef:

I say that an armed robber, since he hides himself from people,

he hides from people,

is a thief!

For although he robs people by force and in public, nevertheless, he hides from other people; a robber is only one who does not conceal himself at all from people.

And since an armed robber is considered a thief, and he pays double for his theft, one who seeks to exempt himself by claiming that an armed robber took it is equivalent to one who makes the claim of a thief, and he pays double.

On the other hand, he is considered an unavoidable circumstance with regard to the fact that a paid watchman is exempt for theft by an armed robber.

It follows that there is a possibility that even a paid watchman can exempt himself through the claim of a thief. It was in such a case that Rabbi Yohanan said that one who makes the claim of a thief with regard to a lost object pays double, despite the fact that he is a paid watchman.

The Gemara now cites beraitot to determine whether an armed robber is considered a thief or a robber.

He raised an objection

Abaye to Rav Yosef from that which is taught: