Bava Kamma 4a — the Talmud in English

:

“And it is not comparable,”

the damage caused by

the tooth

,

for

the ox’s

intention is not

to cause damage,

is not comparable to the horn,

,

whose intention

the ox’s

is to cause damage.

.

:

“Is it not a kal va-chomer?”

!

For

, as for the tooth,

,

whose intention is not

the ox’s

to cause damage, it is liable,

.

The horn,

,

is it not all the more so

?

:

It was necessary,

to write the law of damage caused by the horn, and we could not have derived it from the law of the tooth, despite the fact that the horn’s intention is to cause damage. For

it might have entered your mind to say

,

just as is the case with a slave and a maidservant,

.

:

A slave

and a maidservant—is it not so that, although

[the question is: is it not so that, despite the fact]

their intention is to cause damage, nevertheless they are exempt,

.

So too here,

I would say the same regarding the horn:

,

.

:

Rav Ashi said: Is it that

the fact that the owners are exempt for damage caused by

a slave and maidservant

,

-

Is there not a significant [special] reason for this? The reason is that if you make the master liable for damage caused by the slave, there is concern

lest his master anger him

[lest his master provoke him,]

and

-

will go and set fire

to

,

,

with the result that

this slave

.

. :

Rather, he challenges

[the Mishna’s challenge to deriving the law of the horn and the tooth from one another]

as follows

[this is its meaning]: “The ox is not comparable to the mav'eh.” The meaning is:

the horn,

whose intention is to cause damage, is not comparable to the tooth, whose intention is not to cause damage.

".

And the Mishna continues and says the tzrichuta also in the opposite direction, “And the mav'eh is not like the ox,” and its explanation is:

“And the tooth, which has benefit in causing its damage, is not like the horn, which has no benefit in causing its damage.”

That is to say, the tooth has the serious characteristic that there is benefit in its causing damage, whereas the horn does not have this serious characteristic. Therefore, had the Torah not written “horn,” I would not have learned it from “tooth.”

But the Gemara challenges this interpretation:

“And ‘foot’—what”

[what did the tanna do with it]? That is to say, the “foot,” which is the third category of the ox, where did the tanna mention it—did he

“leave it out”

[and the tanna left it out and did not mention it in the Mishna]?!

And the Gemara resolves: the tanna mentioned it by implication later in the Mishna [9b], when he taught:

“When it caused damage, the damager is liable

to pay compensation for the damage from the best of the land.” And this is superfluous, because this matter has already been explained. Rather, the tanna came

to include the foot,

to include and bring in the “foot,” to teach that one is liable for its damage.

The Gemara rejects the resolution:

“And let him teach it explicitly,”

that the tanna should teach the foot explicitly, just as he taught the horn and the tooth; and why does he mention the foot only by implication?!

Therefore, the Gemara explains the Mishna in another manner:

“Rather, Rava said”:

What the tanna taught, “ox,” does not refer to horn, as Rav Yehuda explained, but rather

“the tanna taught ‘ox’ for its foot,”

the ox that the tanna of our Mishna mentioned refers to the foot. And

“mav'eh”

that he mentioned refers

“to its tooth”

[to the tooth]. And further it will be explained where the horn is mentioned.

The Gemara continues to explain the tzrichuta according to this:

“And this is what he said,”

what the tanna said in the Mishna, “The ox is not like the mav'eh,” he said as follows:

“The foot, whose damage is frequent, is not like the tooth, whose damage is not frequent.”

That is to say, the foot has a stringency that its damage is frequent [common], but the tooth does not have this stringency. Therefore, had the Torah not written “tooth,” I would not have learned it from “foot.”

And the Mishna continues the tzrichuta also in the opposite direction: “And the mav'eh is not like the ox,”

and

its explanation is:

“The tooth, which has benefit in causing its damage, is not like the foot, which has no benefit in causing its damage.”

That is to say, the tooth has the stringency that there is benefit in its causing damage, whereas the foot does not have this stringency. Therefore, had the Torah not written “foot,” I would not have learned it from tooth.

But the Gemara challenges this interpretation as well:

“And horn—what”

[what did the tanna do with it]? That is to say, where did the tanna mention it—would you say that he

“left it out”

[that the tanna indeed left it out and did not mention it]?!

The Gemara answers that the tanna mentioned it by implication: the tanna taught later in the Mishna [9b],

“When it caused damage, the damager is liable

to pay compensation for the damage.” And this is superfluous, except that the tanna came

to include horn,

to include the horn through this.

But the Gemara asks about the resolution:

“And let him teach it”

the horn

“explicitly,”

that the tanna should teach the horn explicitly, just as he taught the foot and the tooth?!

And the Gemara answers:

“He is speaking of those that are forewarned from the outset.”

The tanna of our Mishna speaks [mentions] only of categories that are forewarned from their beginning and pay full compensation for damage. But

“of those initially innocent and ultimately forewarned,”

such as “horn,” where at first the goring ox is “innocent,” paying only half-damage, and only after three gorings does it become forewarned,

“he is not speaking.”

The tanna does not speak of this. Therefore he did not mention it explicitly together with the other categories, but only by implication.

And now the Gemara returns to what it asked above—why did Rav not explain like Shmuel—and asks in the opposite direction:

“And Shmuel,”

who interprets that “mav'eh” is the tooth,

“what is the reason that he did not say like Rav,”

that “mav'eh” is a person?

And the Gemara answers:

“He could say to you,”

Shmuel:

“If it enters your mind,”

if it enters your mind to interpret according to Rav’s words, that mav'eh is

“a person,”

then there is a difficulty:

“Here it teaches in the latter clause,”

for the tanna mentions the human damager in the Mishna at the end of this chapter [15b], among the five “forewarned” that pay full compensation for damage. The tanna counts there, among other things,

“a forewarned ox”

[an ox that gored three times],

“and an ox that damages in the domain of the injured party”

[even an innocent ox if it gored in the injured party’s domain, and this is according to the method of Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that even an innocent ox pays full compensation if it gored in the injured party’s domain],

“and the person.”

Since the tanna taught the human damager in the latter clause, it necessarily follows that mav'eh mentioned in the first clause does not refer to the human damager.

But the Gemara still asks: although the person is mentioned in the latter clause, nevertheless there is a difficulty:

“And let him teach it in the first clause,”

that the tanna should mention the human damager already in the first clause, in the enumeration of the categories of damage [as according to Rav, for whom the tanna mentions it in the first clause]?

The Gemara answers:

“He is speaking of monetary damages,”

the tanna of our Mishna speaks only of liability for damages caused by a person’s property, but

“of bodily damages,”

where he himself caused the damage,

“he is not speaking”

[he does not speak]; therefore the tanna did not mention the human damager in the first clause.

And the Gemara again asks what Rav will answer Shmuel’s claim:

“And Rav,”

who holds that “mav'eh” is a person,

“also,”

what will he answer to Shmuel’s claim:

“Here it teaches ‘person’ in the latter clause,”

and therefore certainly “mav'eh” mentioned in the first clause does not refer to a person?

And the Gemara answers: in the first clause the tanna counted the person among the liable categories of damage, whereas

“that one,”

what he again mentioned in the latter clause,

“came to count it together with the forewarned.”

The tanna came to count it among the forewarned, which pay full compensation from the outset. And the Gemara asks how the tzrichuta of the Mishna is interpreted according to Rav:

“And what is ‘the ox is not like

the mav'eh” that the Mishna said, according to Rav, that mav'eh is the person?

The Gemara answers:

“This is what he said,”

thus said the tanna: had a person not been stated, we would not have learned his law from the ox, because

“the ox is not like,”

the ox has a stringency, for if a forewarned ox killed a person, the law is that

“he pays”

its owner

“the ransom,”

“whereas the person,”

if a person killed a person, he

“does not pay the ransom,”

but if he killed intentionally, he is executed, and if he killed unintentionally, he is exiled; but in every case he does not pay ransom. If so, we have found a special stringency that exists in the law of the ox more than in the law of the person: the ox pays the ransom, whereas the person is exempt from ransom. Therefore, had the Mishna stated only the animal damager, I would not have learned the human damager from it, for we have found, with regard to the killing of a person by an ox, that the Torah was more stringent in the law of the owner of the ox than in the law of a person who killed a person.

And the Mishna returns and says also in the opposite direction: “And the mav'eh is not like the ox.” That is to say, had “ox” not been stated, we would not have learned its law from the person, because

“the person, who is liable for four matters, is not like the ox, which does not have the four matters.”

For a person who wounds his fellow is liable to pay the injured party payment for four matters: “pain” [payment for the pain], “healing” [payment for medical expenses], “loss of work” [for absence from work], and “humiliation.” Whereas when an ox wounds a person, its owner is exempt from payment for all four of these matters. If so, we have found a stringency that exists in the law of the human damager more than in the law of the ox. Therefore, had only the human damager been stated, we would not have learned from it the law of the animal damager.

And the Gemara asks Rav, who holds that “ox” includes every matter of the ox, from the continuation of the Mishna, for we learned in our Mishna:

“The common feature among them”

[among the categories of damagers that were mentioned]

“is that it is their way to cause damage.”

And if “ox” mentioned in the Mishna refers also to horn, there is a difficulty: why did the Mishna say, “it is their way to cause damage,”

“is it the way of an ox to cause damage”

by goring with its horn?!

And the Gemara answers: our Mishna speaks

of

an ox that is

forewarned.

But the Gemara asks:

and

is it the case that a

forewarned ox’s way

is to cause damage

by goring?

And the Gemara answers:

“Yes”

[indeed]

“since it became forewarned, it is its way.”

[Since it became forewarned, from now on its way is to gore].

The Gemara again raises an objection to Rav, who holds that maveh is a person: if so, “the common factor among them is that it is their way to cause damage” is also said concerning a person. But

is it a person’s way to cause damage?!

The Gemara answers: the Mishna is speaking

of

a person who causes damage when he is

asleep.

The Gemara asks: But is a person

when asleep, it his way to cause damage?

The Gemara answers: indeed,

since he bends and stretches

bends and stretches his legs while sleeping,

it is his way,

it is his way to damage, in his sleep, the utensils located in his proximity.

And the Gemara continues and raises an objection to Rav from the continuation of the Mishna, for we learned in our Mishna: “the common factor, etc.”'

“and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you.”

This wording is appropriate only with regard to damage caused by a person’s property, its meaning being: their safeguarding is incumbent upon you. But according to Rav, who holds that the Mishna also includes a person who causes damage, this wording is not correct, for

with regard to a person, the safeguarding of his body is incumbent upon him

and the tanna should have stated the wording “your safeguarding is incumbent upon you,” in the second person].

And in order to resolve the difficulty, the Gemara asserts that this difficulty also applies to the beraita, and it is difficult according to everyone:

And according to your reasoning,

according to your reasoning, questioner, that you raised an objection from the wording of the Mishna to Rav and wished to prove in accordance with Shmuel that maveh is the tooth, it will likewise be difficult according to your words:

that which Karna taught

the beraita that Karna taught]:

“There are four primary categories of damage, and a person is one of them.”

And the beraita explicitly mentions a person among the four damagers, and this beraita too concludes like the Mishna: “the common factor among them, etc., and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you.” If so, it will be difficult according to everyone: why is it stated, “and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you”? For

with regard to a person, the safeguarding of his body is incumbent upon him?!

Rather,

necessarily, we must explain the beraita

as Rabbi Abbahu said to the tanna

to the one who taught this beraita]:

teach

you should teach the beraita as follows]:

“A person—the safeguarding of his body is incumbent upon him.”

And what was stated, “and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you,” refers only to the other primary categories of damage.