Bava Kamma 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

And just as we explained the beraita,

so too,

the same should be said with regard to our Mishna, according to Rav:

teach [

you should read it as follows]:

a person is responsible for guarding his body,

and what the Mishna says, “and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you,” refers to the other primary categories of damage.

The Gemara now returns to explaining “maveh” in our Mishna and raises an objection:

Rav Mari raised an objection

[he challenged]

and said:

Since it was explained above [3b] that neither the verse Rav cited to support his interpretation that “maveh” means a person, nor the verse Shmuel cited to support his interpretation that “maveh” means a tooth, corresponds precisely to their interpretations, if so, one may object:

let us say

[let it be said] that the meaning of

maveh

in our Mishna is neither a person nor a tooth, but rather

this is water.

For if a person poured his water into the public domain, and another person came and his garments became soiled by this water, the one who poured it is obligated to pay for the damage. And the proof for this interpretation is

as it is written

in the Book of Isaiah [

As fire kindles brushwood

[just as fire burns that which is consumed],

water bubbles because of fire” [

[like water that forms bubbles when placed upon fire ]]. Thus, the expression “bubbles” is used with regard to water.

The Gemara answers:

Is it written

[is it written]

“water bubbled”

in the plural, so that it could be understood that the word “bubbled” refers to the water that causes the fire to bubble? It is not written that way. Rather,

“water bubbles because of fire” is written,

in the singular and feminine form, meaning that it refers to the fire, which causes the water to bubble. The Gemara raises the objection again:

Rav Zevid raised an objection

[he challenged]

and said:

If so,

let us say

[let it be said],

maveh

which is taught in our Mishna

is this “fire”!?

For

indeed,

when “bubbles” is written, it is written with reference to “fire,”

for “bubbles” refers to “fire,” as explained.

The Gemara resolves: It is impossible to say that “maveh” means fire, because

if so,

if you say this, it will be difficult:

what is meant by “the maveh and the kindling”

what is the explanation of what we learned in the Mishna, “the maveh and the kindling”? For if you say that “maveh” means fire, what is “the kindling”? Rather, certainly “the kindling” is fire, and “maveh” is either a person or a tooth, as Rav and Shmuel maintain.

And if you would say

perhaps you would say that it is possible to interpret “maveh” as fire, and that the reason the Mishna also mentions “the kindling” is in the category of

an explanation he is explaining

that “maveh” is “the kindling,”

this cannot be said.

For if so,

if you say this, it will be difficult: Were

four

primary categories of damage taught in the Mishna? According to your words, there were only

three

primary categories,

they would be,

namely: the ox, the pit, and the fire. Yet the tanna of the Mishna began by saying, “Four primary categories of damage.”

And if you would say

perhaps you would say that “maveh” means fire, and resolve the matter by saying that the tanna did indeed teach four primary categories of damage, because

the tanna taught an ox that contains two,

meaning that by teaching “ox,” the tanna included the two primary categories of “tooth” and “foot,” and together with the pit and the fire, they are four.

This cannot be said! For

if so,

there is no understanding of the explanatory necessity presented by the Mishna: “

And neither this nor that

[neither the ox nor the maveh]

which possess a living spirit,”

and if “maveh” is

fire, what living spirit does it possess!?

What living spirit is there in fire?

Furthermore

[and additionally], the continuation of the explanatory necessity is also incomprehensible according to this interpretation, because the Mishna explains that the ox and the maveh are not “like the fire, which does not possess a living spirit” [if it had stated “ox and maveh,” I would not have known fire]. And if “maveh” means fire,

what

[what is the meaning of] “

like the fire,”

from which one cannot derive the law of fire through maveh? But maveh itself is fire! Therefore, it is impossible to say that “maveh” means fire. Rather, it is either a person [as Rav maintains] or a tooth [as Shmuel maintains].

The Gemara now brings a beraita that enumerates thirteen primary categories of damage, unlike our Mishna, which enumerates only four:

Rabbi Oshaya taught

in a beraita:

There are thirteen primary categories of damage:

The first four items enumerated by the beraita are the four categories of guardians, who are liable for damage to a deposited item when they did not guard it properly. They are:

a.

an unpaid guardian,

one who undertook to guard another’s property without compensation, and who must pay the depositor if the deposit was damaged because of his negligence in guarding it.

b.

and a borrower,

one who receives an item from another to use without charge, and who must pay for damage to the deposit even if it occurred through circumstances beyond his control.

c.

a paid guardian –

one who undertook to guard another’s property in exchange for payment [“a paid guardian”], and who must pay if the deposit was stolen or lost, and all the more so if it was damaged because of his negligence in guarding it.

d.

and a renter,

one who receives an item from another to use in exchange for payment of rent; his law is that of a paid guardian.

The beraita also enumerates the five types of payment for damage for which one who injures another is liable:

e.

injury,

one who injures another’s body pays the injured party for the amount by which he is now worth less than he was initially.

f.

pain,

he pays the injured party for the pain he suffered.

g.

and medical expenses,

he pays for the costs of medical treatment.

h.

loss of livelihood,

he pays him compensation for the days during which the injured party was bedridden and unable to work and earn a living.

i.

and humiliation,

payment for the shame with which he humiliated him.

And

Rabbi Oshaya also enumerated in the beraita the

four

primary categories of damage

of the Mishna

[those enumerated in our Mishna]. They are:

j. The ox

xi. The pit

xii. The maveh

xiii. And the kindling

That is thirteen

They are together thirteen primary categories of damage.

The Gemara discusses this:

And as for our tanna,

the tanna of our Mishna,

for what reason did he not teach these,

why did he not also teach the nine additional primary categories of damage that Rabbi Oshaya taught in his beraita?

The Gemara explains that its question applies only according to Rav, and not according to Shmuel:

Granted, according to Shmuel,

who interprets “maveh” as tooth, this is understandable, because only

monetary damage is under discussion,

our Mishna speaks only of damage caused by one’s property, but

bodily damage is not under discussion.

Our Mishna does not speak of damage caused by the person himself. Therefore, the Mishna did not mention the five payments for which one who injures another is liable, nor the obligations of the four guardians, since their liability results from their failure to guard properly, and the damage is therefore regarded as though the guardians themselves caused it.

But according to Rav,

who said that “maveh” means a person who causes damage, and that our Mishna also discusses bodily damage, it is difficult:

let him teach,

why did the tanna not also teach in the Mishna these nine primary categories of damage?

The Gemara answers:

The tanna taught

“maveh,” whose meaning is

a person, and

included within it

all forms of damage caused by a person,

all the ways in which a person causes damage, which also include these nine primary categories of damage; he did not enumerate them separately.

The Gemara now asks about Rabbi Oshaya:

And according to Rabbi Oshaya as well, he already taught “a person,”

which includes all damage caused by a person; why, then, did he teach the additional nine separately in the beraita? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya taught in his beraita

two types of person,

because there are two types of liability for a person who causes damage: a person who damages another’s body and a person who damages another’s property. Therefore,

he taught

Rabbi Oshaya taught

a person who damaged a person,

the liabilities of a person who damages another person, namely, injury, pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation.

And he taught

and also taught the liability of

a person who damaged an ox.

Whereas in our Mishna, which mentions a person [“mav‘eh”], the reference is to a person who damaged an ox, since, as with the “pit” mentioned in our Mishna, it discusses only damage caused to an ox that fell into a pit, for a pit is exempt for the death of a person— so too, the person who causes damage mentioned in our Mishna refers to a person who damaged an ox.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if Rabbi Oshaya distinguishes between a person who damages an ox and a person who damages another person, in order to mention them separately, then

an ox as well—let him teach two types of ox

so that Rabbi Oshaya would likewise divide an ox that causes damage into two types of damage:

let him teach an ox that damaged an ox, and let him teach an ox that damaged a person—

why did he not mention them separately, but instead included them all under “ox”?

The Gemara replies:

What is this?!

What is the purpose of making this distinction?

Granted,

it is appropriate to divide the two types of damage caused by a person, since their laws differ, as

a person who damaged an ox

only

pays for the damage,

and no more, whereas

a person who damaged another person pays

in addition to the damage

four payments.

Therefore, there is reason to mention them separately.

But an ox—

what is the purpose of mentioning the different laws of an ox separately?

What difference is there whether an ox damaged an ox, or whether an ox damaged a person,

what difference is there whether the ox damaged an ox or damaged a person, when

in either case, it pays only for the damage?

The law of both is identical: it pays only for the damage. Since their laws are identical, why should they be divided?

The Gemara returns to discussing Rabbi Oshaya’s statement, in which he added to the cases in our Mishna a person who damaged another person:

But the unpaid bailee, the borrower, the paid bailee, and the renter—for they are cases of a person who damaged an ox, and yet he teaches them!?

The four bailees who are liable to pay for a deposit that was damaged are cases of “a person who damaged an ox.” If so, why did Rav Oshaya teach them separately? They are already included in the person mentioned in the Mishna.

The Gemara answers: There are also two types of a person who damaged an ox, and therefore Rabbi Oshaya

teaches damage caused by direct action,

a person who damaged an ox directly [that is, through his own action], and

teaches damage that occurs indirectly,

Rabbi Oshaya added to the cases in the Mishna the liability of bailees, who did not cause the damage through an actual act; rather, the damage occurred indirectly, because they failed to guard the object.

The Gemara now cites another beraita, which enumerates twenty-four primary categories of damage:

Tanna

[taught]

Rabbi Hiyya

in a beraita:

There are twenty-four primary categories of damage

:

a.

Double payment:

One who secretly steals another person’s property, without the owners seeing the act of theft, is called a “thief,” and must pay the owners double, if witnesses testify against him in court that he stole.

b.

And fourfold and fivefold payments:

One who steals a sheep and slaughters or sells it pays the owner of the sheep a fourfold payment [four times its value]. And if he steals an ox and slaughters or sells it, he pays a fivefold payment [five times its value].

c.

And a thief:

One who pays only the principal, for example, one who admits on his own that he stole, in which case he is exempt from the double payment and pays only the principal, because the double payment is a fine, and one who admits to liability for a fine is exempt.

d.

And a robber:

One who forcibly, openly, and publicly robs another person’s property must return the stolen property or its monetary value [the principal alone].

e.

And conspiring witnesses:

Two false witnesses who testified in court to make a person liable for money, and two other witnesses came and exposed them as conspiring witnesses [saying to the witnesses: You were with us at that time, and you did not see the act about which you are testifying, since you were elsewhere at that time], must pay that person the money that they had schemed to make him pay.

f.

And one who rapes

a virgin, paying a fine of fifty silver coins to her father.

g.

And one who seduces

a virgin, who likewise pays a fine of fifty silver coins to her father.

h.

And one who spreads an evil report

about his wife, claiming that she had committed adultery before their marriage, and pays a fine of one hundred silver coins.

i.

And one who renders impure

his fellow’s pure food, for example, by touching it while in contact with a creeping creature, thereby rendering a koen’s teruma forbidden to eat.

j.

And one who mixes

teruma produce with his fellow’s non-sacred produce, thereby causing him a loss, because he renders the produce forbidden for consumption by non-koanim, so that he must sell it to koanim at a low price.

k. And one who pours libations

his fellow’s wine as a libation to idolatry, thereby rendering it forbidden to derive benefit from.

And

he likewise enumerates

these thirteen

[thirteen] primary categories of Rabbi Oshaya.

Behold,

we have here together

twenty-four

primary categories of damage.

The Gemara discusses this:

And Rabbi Oshaya,

who enumerates only thirteen primary categories,

what is the reason he did not teach these,

why did he not also add the primary categories enumerated by Rabbi Hiyya? The Gemara answers:

He deals with monetary liabilities; he does not deal with fines.

The Torah’s payment obligations are divided into two types: monetary payments and fines. Monetary payments are payments whose amount corresponds to the damage one caused or the loss one caused his fellow. Fines, by contrast, include payments whose amount is fixed, such as those paid by one who rapes or seduces, or payments whose amount exceeds the damage caused, such as double payments and fourfold and fivefold payments. Rabbi Oshaya enumerated only those damages for which the Torah imposes a monetary liability, but not those for which the liability is in the category of a fine. Therefore, he did not enumerate the additional primary categories taught by Rabbi Hiyya, because they involve fines.

But the Gemara continues to discuss the matter:

A thief and a robber involve monetary liability—

a thief who admitted, paying only the principal corresponding to what he stole, and likewise a robber who pays the principal corresponding to what he robbed, whose liabilities involve not a fine but a monetary obligation—

let him teach them;

why did Rabbi Oshaya not teach them among the primary categories of damage?

The Gemara answers:

He already taught it through the unpaid bailee and the borrower.

Rabbi Oshaya already taught among the primary categories of damage the unpaid bailee, whose liability also includes a case of theft and robbery—for example, if the bailee claimed that the deposit had been stolen from him and was thereby exempt from payment, and afterward the stolen item was found in his possession, in which case the bailee’s law with regard to payment is that of a thief [as explained below, on 63b]. Likewise, if the bailee falsely claimed that it had been robbed, his law is that of a robber. Therefore, Rabbi Oshaya did not teach them separately.

But according to this, the Gemara asks concerning Rabbi Hiyya:

And Rabbi Hiyya as well—he already taught the unpaid bailee and the borrower!

He too taught the law of the “unpaid bailee”; why, then, did he again teach the laws of the thief and the robber separately?

The Gemara answers:

He taught a monetary liability involving property that came into his possession permissibly

Rabbi Hiyya divided and taught the “unpaid bailee,” which includes a case of theft or robbery involving property that came into his possession permissibly [for initially the bailee received the property permissibly, for safekeeping, and only afterward, when he lied and claimed that it had been stolen from him, did his law become that of a thief],

and he taught a monetary liability involving property that came into his possession impermissibly

and he also taught the thief and the robber, whose stolen or robbed property came into their possession impermissibly.