Bava Kamma 3b — the Talmud in English

And if he did not declare them ownerless,

if it is speaking of a case where he did not declare the stone and the knife ownerless, even then it is not plausible that Rav Pappa's words refer to them, for

if according to Shmuel, who says that all

every obstacle, including one belonging to him

we learned from his pit

to obligate liability for them, then

it is

it is a derivative of

pit,

and since the reasons for liability in their case resemble a pit, there is no rationale for distinguishing in their law, as the Gemara will say below.

And if according to Rav, who says that all

every obstacle that he did not declare ownerless

we learned from his ox

to obligate liability for it [for just as his ox, which is his property, if it caused damage he is liable, so too anything that is his property, if it caused damage he is liable], then

it is

a derivative of

ox,

and not a derivative of pit, and it has already been explained that Rav Pappa's words were not said concerning a derivative of ox, for its law is like that of the ox.

And the Gemara continues: even according to Shmuel, who holds that this is a derivative of pit [and likewise when he did not declare it ownerless, according to everyone], it is not plausible that Rav Pappa's words were said concerning this , for:

What is different,

in what way is the

pit,

the special stringency of which is that

its initial making is for damage,

from the beginning of its making it stands ready to cause damage,

and

it is

your property,

meaning, the damage comes about through you.

And

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it should not cause damage is imposed

upon you.

Behold, these too, the derivatives of the pit [his stone, his knife, and his burden], also have

their initial making for damage,

from the outset, when they were made into a pit [that is, when they were placed there], they stood ready to cause damage,

and

they are

your property,

for the damage comes about through you,

and

the obligation of

guarding them

so that they should not cause damage is imposed

upon you.

And since they completely resemble the primary category, there is no rationale for their law to differ from the law of the pit.

The Gemara concludes:

Rather,

indeed,

the derivative of pit

its law is

like a pit!

And when Rav Pappa said,

and as for what Rav Pappa said, that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the primary category,

it was concerning the derivative

of

the mav'eh

that he said so.

The Gemara discusses this:

The derivative of the mav'eh, which you assumed does not have the law of the primary category,

what is it?

If

we explain

according to

Shmuel, who says

below on the page

“The mav'eh is the tooth,”

that the primary category “mav'eh” that we learned in the Mishna refers to “tooth,” then

the derivative of the mav'eh means the derivative of tooth;

this

has already

been established

that the derivative of tooth

its law is

like tooth,

and Rav Pappa's words were not said concerning the derivative of tooth. If so, according to Shmuel, it is impossible to establish Rav Pappa's words concerning a derivative of the mav'eh.

And if

we explain

according to

Rav, who

disagreed with Shmuel and

said

that the primary category

“mav'eh”

that we learned in the Mishna is

“this is a person”

the damaging person, if so it is impossible to say that Rav Pappa's words were said concerning the derivative of the mav'eh, for if the meaning of “mav'eh” is a damaging person,

what primary categories and what derivatives are there in it?

And are there primary categories and derivatives in a damaging person!? [That is, since there are no derivatives, it is not considered a primary category either.] Consequently, it is impossible to say that Rav Pappa's words were said concerning derivatives of the person.

And should you say

perhaps you will say that the

primary category

of the damaging person is a damaging person when he is

awake, and the

derivative

is a damaging person when he is

asleep, and Rav Pappa said concerning this derivative that its law is not like that of the primary category.

It is impossible to say so, for

we learned,

we learned in the Mishna [below, 26a]:

A person is always forewarned,

whether unwitting or deliberate,

whether awake or asleep,

and he pays full damages. It is thus stated explicitly that the law of one who is asleep is like the law of one who is awake; and even if we say that one who is asleep is a derivative, it has been explained that its law is like that of its counterpart, like the primary category.

And the Gemara attempts to find a derivative of the person, concerning which Rav Pappa's words were stated:

Невозможно сказать и так, поскольку

ведь мы учили в Мишне [ниже, 26а]:

«Человек несет ответственность всегда»,

Человек всегда отвечает,

и когда действует по ошибке, и когда действует умышленно,

Rather,

one may say: his spittle and his nasal discharge, the spittle of a person and the nasal discharge of a person that caused damage, which are in the category of a “derivative”—concerning them Rav Pappa said that their law is not like that of the primary category.

Напротив,

следует сказать:

слюна

The Gemara rejects the possibility of saying so:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner is it speaking, that they caused damage? If they cause damage while they are moving, if they caused damage in the course of their movement, for example, they fell on a silk garment and soiled it, or fell into liquids and made them repulsive, then it is his force, for they caused damage through the force of the person, and they are considered a primary category like the damaging person himself, and they are liable like him. And if after they came to rest, if they caused damage after they came to rest on the ground, and a person slipped on them and was injured , then this is not a derivative of the person at all, but rather both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, who disagreed concerning an obstacle whose owner did not declare it ownerless, whether its law is like that of a pit or like that of an ox—but when he declared it ownerless, as here, where he certainly declared them ownerless, both agree that it is a pit, for they are a derivative of a pit. And it has already been explained that the derivative of a pit is like a pit. And the Gemara concludes:

Гемара отвергает такую возможность:

В каком случае это возможно,

то есть при каких обстоятельствах они причинили ущерб?

Если они причиняют ущерб во время движения,

если они причинили ущерб в процессе движения, например упали на шелковую одежду и испачкали ее или упали в жидкости и сделали их непригодными для питья, тогда

это его сила,

то есть они причинили ущерб силой человека и считаются основным источником, как сам человек, причиняющий ущерб; поэтому ответственность за них такая же, как за него.

И

если после того, как они остановились,

если они причинили ущерб после того, как упали на землю, а человек поскользнулся на них и получил повреждение, тогда это вообще не производный случай человека, а

Rather,

certainly,

the derivative of the mav'eh

its law is

like the mav'eh, and Rav Pappa's words were not said concerning the “mav'eh.”

Напротив,

безусловно,

производный случай мефаэ

по своему закону

And when Rav Pappa said,

and as for what Rav Pappa said, that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the primary category,

it was concerning the derivative of fire that he said so. And the Gemara comes to reject this assumption, and asks: the derivative of fire, which you assumed Rav Pappa's words refer to, what is it? If you say that the intention is his stone, his knife, and his burden, which he placed at the top of his roof and which fell in an ordinary wind,

and caused damage,

and it is a derivative of fire because another force [the wind] is involved in them.

то есть о производном случае

огня

он это сказал.

Гемара отвергает это предположение и спрашивает:

Каков производный случай огня,

о котором, как ты предположил, сказаны слова Рав Паппы,

что это?

What are the circumstances?

In what manner is it speaking, that they caused damage?

If they cause damage while they are moving,

if they caused damage in the course of their movement [their fall], for example, they fell on vessels and broke them, then

it is

they are a derivative of

fire. And it is not plausible that their law is not like that of the primary category, for: What is different, in what way is the fire, the special stringency of which is that another force is involved in it, and it is

your property,

meaning, the damage comes about through you,

and

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it should not cause damage is

upon you.

Чем отличается,

чем отличается

огонь,

его особая строгость заключается в том,

что в нем участвует внешняя сила,

и

он

твоя собственность,

то есть ущерб причиняется посредством тебя,

Behold,

these too,

these derivatives of fire, also have

another force involved in them, and

they are

your property, for the damage comes about through you, and the obligation of guarding them so that they should not cause damage is upon you. And since they resemble the primary category, there is no rationale for their law to differ from the law of the primary category.

и эти также,

эти производные случаи огня тоже

имеют в себе участие внешней силы, и

они

твоя собственность,

поскольку ущерб причиняется посредством тебя,

и

обязанность

беречь их,

чтобы они не причинили ущерба,

возложена на тебя.

И поскольку они подобны основному источнику, нет основания считать, что их закон будет отличаться от закона основного источника.

Rather,

indeed,

the derivative of Fire

has the same law

as Fire! And when Rav Pappa said this, he was referring to the derivative of Foot

Rav Pappa’s statement concerned the derivative of Foot, whose law is not like that of its primary category.

The Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—raises a difficulty:

did we not already establish [that is, did we not already conclude]

that

the derivative of Foot

has the same law

as Foot?!

The Gemara explains its words: Indeed, all derivatives of Foot have the same law as Foot, except for

half-damage caused by pebbles

where an animal was walking and kicked up pebbles with its feet, and those pebbles broke utensils; in that case, the owner pays only half the damage,

because this was received as an established halakha

as a law that Moses received at Sinai.

These pebbles that caused damage are a derivative of Foot, but nevertheless their law is not the same as Foot, and the owner pays only half the damage for them. This is what Rav Pappa said: There is a derivative whose law is not like that of its primary category, and whose law is not like that of the primary category.

The Gemara asks:

And why is it called a derivative of Foot

since it pays only half the damage, like Horn, rather than the full damage, why is it called a derivative of Foot and not a derivative of Horn?

The Gemara answers: To

pay from the owner’s other property

if the animal caused damage exceeding its own value, the owner pays the damages from his other property, as is the law with Foot. Therefore, it is called a derivative of Foot and not a derivative of Horn, because in the case of Horn the owner pays only “from its body,” meaning from the body of the damaging animal [or he pays from his property only up to the value of the damaging animal; Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael disagree about this below, in the chapter “The One Who Sets Aside”]. If the value of the damaging animal is less than half the damage, the injured party bears the loss.

But the Gemara challenges this answer:

But Rava raised this very question

Rava was uncertain about this matter:

Rava asked: With regard to the half-damage

that is paid for

pebbles,

does the owner pay only

from the body

of the damaging animal,

paying

as in the case of Horn,

or does he pay from his other property?

Since it is uncertain whether the owner pays from his other property, it certainly cannot be called a derivative of Foot for that reason! The Gemara answers: Indeed,

Rava is uncertain about it [he raises the question], but

that is, he is uncertain; but

for Rav Pappa it is obvious

that the owner pays from his other property. Therefore, it is called a derivative of Foot.

The Gemara asks: In any event,

according to Rava, who is uncertain [who raises the question] whether the owner pays from his other property,

why

is it called a derivative of Foot,

and not a derivative of Horn?

The Gemara answers:

To exempt it in the public domain,

when it caused damage through pebbles in the public domain, it is exempt, just as Foot is exempt in the public domain [as derived from the verse “and he sent forth … and it consumed in another’s field,” from which the Sages exclude damage not caused in the public domain]. Horn, however, is liable in the public domain. Since the law of pebbles in this respect is like that of Foot, pebbles are therefore called a derivative of Foot and not of Horn.

Now the Gemara explains what “Maveh,” one of the items mentioned in the Mishna, means:

Our Mishna lists the four primary categories of damage:

Maveh and Fire.

The Gemara discusses this:

What is Maveh?

The Gemara presents a disagreement between Rav and Shmuel over the meaning of “Maveh”:

Rav said: Maveh

which we learned in the Mishna

is a person

who causes damage with his body.

And Shmuel said: Maveh

which we learned in the Mishna

is Tooth [an animal eating for its pleasure in another’s field].

The Gemara explains that both relied on verses to support their respective interpretations:

Rav said: Maveh is a person,

as we find in the words of the prophet [Isaiah 21]:

“The watchman said”

[the Holy One, blessed be He]:

“The morning has come”

[the time of redemption for the righteous is arriving],

“and also the night”

[darkness will also come upon the wicked].

“If you seek, seek;

return and come” [if you ask that the End be hastened, return in repentance and ask for forgiveness].

Thus, with regard to a person, the expression “seek” is mentioned, and this is the expression underlying “Maveh.” And Shmuel said: Maveh is Tooth, as it is written,

as we find in the words of the prophet [Obadiah 1]:

“How Esau has been searched out; his hidden places have been uncovered”

[

The Gemara asks:

What indication is there

how does this verse indicate that Maveh is Tooth?

The Gemara answers that the proof is based on the translation of the verse:

The proof is

as Rav Yosef translated it

[as Rav Yosef cited it in the name of the Targum Jonathan ]:

“How Esau’s houses were searched out,”

[how they searched through Esau’s houses],

“his hidden treasures were revealed,”

his concealed treasures were uncovered. Thus, “were uncovered” in the language of the translation is an expression of revelation. Therefore, he explains that “Maveh” is Tooth, because Maveh derives from a term meaning “revealed,” and this is Tooth, which is sometimes exposed and sometimes covered.

his concealed treasures were exposed. Thus, in the language of the translation, “were revealed” is an expression of uncovering. Accordingly, he explains that “Maveh” is Tooth, since Maveh derives from an expression of being exposed, and this is Tooth, which is sometimes exposed and sometimes covered.

And the Gemara explains:

And Rav, what is the reason that he did not say like Shmuel?

Since it is possible to interpret it also as the expression “revealing,” with the reference being to the tooth, why did Rav not interpret it so?

He could say to you

Rav:

Do we learn “Niv'eh”?!

Do we learn “Niv'eh” in the Mishna?! That is, if it is as you say, that Mav'eh is an expression of revealing, the tanna should have called the tooth “Niv'eh,” whose meaning is that it itself is revealed, and not “Mav'eh,” whose meaning is that it reveals something else.

And the Gemara asks again:

And Shmuel, what is the reason that he did not say like Rav?

Since it is possible to interpret it also as referring to a person who causes damage, why did Shmuel not interpret it so? The Gemara answers:

He could say to you

Shmuel:

Do we learn “Bo'eh”?

Do we learn “Bo'eh” in the Mishna?! That is, according to you, that the tanna called the person Mav'eh in accordance with the language of the verse, it would have been appropriate to call him “Bo'eh,” from the expression “Be'iy”.

And the Gemara returns and asks concerning Rav’s reasoning:

Since the verses are precise neither according to this one nor according to that one,

for the verses are not precise and do not correspond either to Rav’s interpretation or to Shmuel’s interpretation, and if so, the question returns:

Rav, what is the reason that he did not say like Shmuel?

The Gemara answers:

The tanna,

the tanna in the Mishna teaches

an ox, and

this includes within it

all the matters of an ox,

all the types of damage-causing agents of an ox, which are: horn, tooth, and foot. And if so, the tooth has already been taught in our Mishna; therefore Rav interprets Mav'eh as a person.

And the Gemara objects:

And Shmuel too—does it not teach an ox,

for the Mishna teaches an ox, which includes the tooth, so how does he interpret Mav'eh as the tooth?!

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Yehuda said:

Shmuel holds that

the tanna teaches an ox for its horn,

the ox mentioned in the Mishna refers only to “horn,” and the tooth is not included in this,

and

therefore he teaches

Mav'eh for its tooth.

The Mishna establishes a tzrikhta between the ox and the Mav'eh: “The ox is not like the Mav'eh.” And as was explained above, the intention is that the ox is more stringent than the Mav'eh. After Rav Yehuda explained what the ox is and what the Mav'eh is, the Gemara presents how he explains the tzrikhta according to Shmuel.

The horn is not like,

the stringent horn,

which

thus

has no benefit in its causing damage, like the tooth,

the lenient one,

which has benefit in its causing damage.

And therefore, had the Torah written only the obligation of payment for damage caused by the horn, we would not have been able to derive from it the obligation of payment for damage caused by the tooth.