Bava Kamma 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

And a proof of this is:

and so it is

written

says

(I Kings 14:10): “

As one burns

the dung completely.”

Just as the tooth, called “dung,” consumes the food completely. [The tooth is called galal, from the language of revelation, because at times the tooth is exposed and at times it is covered

. The Gemara now discusses why the tanna in the beraita had to bring proof both for the derivation concerning the tooth and for the derivation concerning the foot:

The Master said

in the beraita:

“And he sent forth”—this is the foot,

and the tanna brought proof for this:

“And so it says: ‘Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey.’”

The Gemara infers from the tanna’s words:

The reason

that he interprets and says that “and he sent forth” refers to the foot is only because

the Merciful One wrote

an additional verse

, “Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

If not so, with what could you establish it!?

Even without the proof from the verse “Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey,” we would likewise interpret “and he sent forth” as referring to the foot, for how else could you establish it, if not as referring to the foot?

If

you wish to establish it as referring to the

horn,

but

it is written,

for liability for the horn has already been stated in the Torah.

And if

you wish to establish it as referring to the

tooth,

but

it is written,

for its liability has already been stated in the verse “and it shall consume in another’s field.” If so, why did the tanna have to bring proof from elsewhere for the Torah’s intention that “and he sent forth” refers to the foot!?

The Gemara answers:

It was necessary;

the tanna had to bring proof for this, because without the proof

it might enter your mind to say

that

both this and that

[this and that], both “and he sent forth his animal” and “and it shall consume in another’s field,” were stated

with regard to the tooth

[to render one liable for damage caused by the tooth].

And this—the verse “and it shall consume in another’s field,” whose meaning is that it consumes completely—comes to render one liable in a case

it completely destroys the principal

where it consumes the principal

[where the tooth consumed all the produce of the field, that is, the entire “principal” of the field, by eating it], such as where it consumed a plot in a manner that prevents it from growing again.

And this—what is stated, “and he sent forth his animal”—the verse comes to render one liable even in a case

the verse

where it does not consume the principal

[where it did not consume the “principal” through its eating], such as where it ate young grain [grain at the beginning of its growth] that is destined to grow again, although not to the extent that it had initially. We would therefore say that the verse comes to include liability even in such a case, therefore

it teaches us

the tanna in the beraita that the verse “those who send forth the foot” teaches that “and he sent forth his animal” comes to render one liable for damage caused by the foot, and not for damage caused by the tooth.

But the Gemara asks:

And now that we have established it as referring to the foot,

now, according to the conclusion, that the verse “and he sent forth” comes to impose liability for damage caused by the foot, while the tooth is learned only from the verse “and it shall consume,” so, damage caused by the

tooth

in a case

where it does not consume the principal—where do we derive it,

from where did we learn to impose liability for damage caused by the tooth when it does not consume the principal?

The Gemara answers:

Comparable to the foot

[similar to the foot]; that is, the law of the tooth is learned by analogy from the law of the foot, which is written together with it in the same verse:

Just as

just as

the foot—it makes no difference

[the law does not differ] whether it

consumes the principal, and it makes no difference

[and it does not differ] whether it

does not consume the principal,

in both cases one is liable,

so too

the

tooth,

there is no distinction with regard to it, and

it makes no difference whether it consumes the principal or whether it does not consume the principal,

one is liable.

The Gemara now raises a similar difficulty concerning the second part of the beraita:

The Master said

in the beraita: “

‘And it shall consume’—this is the tooth.”

And the tanna brings proof for this:

“And so it says: ‘As one burns the dung completely.’”

The Gemara discusses the words of the beraita: The tanna’s words imply

that the reason

we know that “and it shall consume” refers to the tooth is because we find

that the Merciful One wrote, ‘As one burns the dung completely.’

The difficulty is:

But

if

if not so, with what could we have established it!?

Even without the proof, “and it shall consume” should be established as imposing liability for damage caused by the tooth, for with regard to which damager could we establish it?

If

you wish to establish it as referring to the

horn,

but

it is written,

for its liability has already been stated in the verse.

And if

you wish to establish it as referring to the

foot,

but

it is written,

for it has already been learned from “and he sent forth his animal.” Why, then, did the tanna have to bring proof from elsewhere for the Torah’s intention in “and it shall consume”? The Gemara answers:

It was necessary;

the tanna had to bring proof from elsewhere, because without the proof

it might enter your mind to say

that

both this and that

[this and that], both “and he sent forth his animal” and “it shall consume in another’s field,” were stated

with regard to the foot

[to impose liability for damage caused by the foot].

This—

what is stated, “and it shall consume in another’s field” , comes to impose liability even where

it goes on its own,

that it went by itself to another field and caused damage.

This—what is stated, “and he sent forth his animal” [from the language of agency]—comes to impose liability where

comes to impose liability where

he sent an agent,

that its owner sent it with the intention that it graze in another’s field.

It teaches us

the tanna in the beraita that from the verse “as one burns the dung completely” we learn that “it shall consume in another’s field” comes to impose liability for damage caused by the tooth, and not for damage caused by the foot.

The Gemara asks:

And now that we have established it as referring to the tooth,

now, according to the conclusion, that the verse “and it shall consume in another’s field” comes to impose liability for damage caused by the tooth, while the foot is learned only from the verse “and he sent forth,” so,

the foot that goes on its own—where do we derive it,

from where did we learn to impose liability for damage caused by the foot when it goes on its own?

The Gemara answers:

Comparable to the tooth;

the law of the foot is learned by analogy from the law of the tooth, which is written together with it:

Just as the tooth—it makes no difference

[the law does not differ] whether

it sent an agent

to graze

in another’s field and ate there,

it makes no difference

[and the law does not differ] where

it went on its own,

where the animal went by itself to graze in another’s field and ate—in both cases one is liable.

So too

the

foot,

there is no distinction with regard to it:

it makes no difference whether he sent an agent,

and

it makes no difference whether it went on its own,

one is liable.

The Gemara objects that from “and he sent forth” we could have learned both of the avot:

Let the Merciful One write only “and he sent forth,”

let the verse state only “and he sent forth his animal,”

and it would not need

to state

“and it shall consume

in another’s field,” since

it implies

from “and he sent forth”

the foot, and it implies the tooth,

for it is interpreted as referring both to damage caused by the foot and to damage caused by the tooth.

The Gemara brings the proofs for this:

It implies the foot,

as was explained in the beraita,

as it is written: “Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey,” and it implies

also

the tooth, as it is written

[in the passage of Haazinu, Deuteronomy 32:24]:

“And the teeth of beasts I will send against them” .

Thus, the expression “and he sent forth” implies damage caused by the tooth as well; if so, from “and he sent forth” alone we already know to impose liability both for damage caused by the foot and for damage caused by the tooth. The difficulty is: Why, then, was “and it shall consume in another’s field” stated?

The Gemara answers:

Were it not for the additional verse,

if the Torah had not added and stated “and it shall consume,”

I would have said

that the Torah’s intention in “and he sent forth” is not to impose liability for both the foot and the tooth, but

either this or that,

only one of them, either this or that:

Either

the Torah’s intention in “and he sent forth” is to impose liability only for damage caused by the

foot,

and not for damage caused by the tooth, and I would say this because the foot has the stringency

that its damage is common,

since an animal ordinarily walks and causes damage in the course of its walking; therefore, the Torah was more stringent and required its owner to guard it. But for damage caused by the tooth, which lacks this stringency, it did not impose liability.

Or

I would interpret the Torah’s intention as imposing liability for damage caused by the

tooth,

and I would say this because the tooth has the stringency

that it derives pleasure from causing damage,

since the animal causes this damage for its own enjoyment; therefore, the Torah was more stringent and required its owner to guard it. But for damage caused by the foot it did not impose liability. Therefore, the Torah added “and it shall consume” to teach us about the tooth, and consequently from “and he sent forth” we learn the foot.

But the Gemara rejects this answer:

Granted,

the tooth and the foot

are equally weighted;

they are equal, and neither is considered more stringent than the other, since each has its own stringency.

And

if so,

let both of them come,

let us derive both of them—the tooth and the foot—from “and he sent forth,”

for which of them could you exclude,

for which one would you exclude from the derivation and not learn it? That is, since they are equal, it is impossible for us to derive only one av; for which of them would you exclude and fail to learn it, given that they are equal?

The Gemara answers:

It was necessary;

although we could have derived both from “and he sent forth,” nevertheless, the Torah had to write “and it shall consume” as well.

For if only “and he sent forth” had been written,

it might enter your mind to say

we would have thought

this matter

[this matter], that the Torah imposed liability for damage caused by the tooth and the foot, applies only

where he sent an agent,

where its owner sent it to graze in another’s field and it caused damage, as implied by the Torah’s expression, “and he sent forth his animal,”

but if it went on its own, no.

If the animal went by itself to graze in another’s field, the Torah did not impose liability upon its owner. Therefore

it teaches us,

the Torah stated the verse “and it shall consume in another’s field,” so that from it we would learn to impose liability for the tooth when it goes on its own. Once we know that there is liability for the tooth, we derive from the tooth also with regard to the foot that one is liable for it even when it goes on its own.

Now the Gemara returns to Rav Pappa’s statement that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the primary category. Earlier, we assumed that he was referring to the derivatives of tooth and foot. The Gemara now examines this assumption and asks:

What is a derivative of tooth?

The Gemara answers: An animal

that rubbed itself against a wall for its pleasure

and knocked it down. Likewise, an animal

that soiled produce for its pleasure,

rolling on the produce for its pleasure, as horses and donkeys do, thereby damaging the produce. Since it caused these damages for its pleasure, they are derivatives of tooth, whose defining feature is “there is pleasure in its damage”: The damage caused by eating the produce is done for its pleasure.

After the Gemara has explained what the derivatives of tooth are, it rejects the assumption that Rav Pappa’s statement referred to them, since this is not plausible, as follows:

What difference is there,

in what way does the

tooth differ,

whose distinctive stringency is

that there is pleasure in its causing damage, and

the damaging agent

is your property, and

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it will not cause damage rests

upon you?

But

these too,

the derivatives of tooth, also

involve pleasure in their causing damage, and

they

are your property, and

the obligation of

guarding them

so that they will not cause damage rests

upon you.

Since the derivatives are entirely similar to the primary category, there is no reason for their law to differ from the law of the primary category.

The Gemara concludes:

Rather,

indeed,

the derivatives of tooth

have a law

like

that of the

tooth!

And when Rav Pappa said

that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the primary category, he was referring only

to a derivative [literally: concerning a derivative]

What is a derivative of the foot —

of foot;

he said this regarding it.

But the Gemara examines whether this assumption is correct and asks:

What is a derivative of foot

— what is it?

An animal that

caused damage with its body in the course of walking,

for example, while walking it pushed vessels with its body and broke them. Likewise, vessels became attached

to its hair,

and it dragged them

in the course of walking

until it broke them. Likewise, if it did not cause damage with its body or with something attached to it, but caused damage in the course of walking

with a load carried upon it ,

together with the burden in its sack. Likewise, if it caused damage

with a bit [

a bridle]

that was

in its mouth, or

with a bell [

a clapper]

that

was hanging

from its neck. All of these are derivatives of foot. The defining stringency of foot is that “its damage is common,” since it occurs in the course of walking. These derivatives as well, since they occur in the course of walking, involve damage that is common.

All these are derivative categories of foot. The characteristic that defines foot is that “its damage is common,” since it occurs through the animal’s walking. These derivative categories likewise cause common damage, since they occur through walking.

After the Gemara has explained what the derivatives are, it rejects the assumption that it was concerning the derivatives of foot that it was said that their law is not like that of the primary category, since this is not plausible, as follows:

What difference is there,

in what way does the

foot

differ, whose distinctive stringency is that

its damage is common, and

the damaging agent

is your property, and

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it will not cause damage rests

upon you?

But

these too,

the derivatives of foot, also

involve damage that is common,

since they occur in the course of walking,

and

they

are your property, and

the obligation of

guarding them

so that they will not cause damage rests

upon you.

Since the derivatives of foot are entirely similar to the primary category, there is no reason for their law to differ from the law of the primary category.

Rather,

indeed,

a derivative of foot

has a law

like foot!

And when Rav Pappa said

that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the primary category, he was referring

to a derivative [

concerning a derivative]

of pit;

he said this regarding it.

But the Gemara rejects this assumption and asks:

A derivative of pit,

which you wished to say was what Rav Pappa’s statement referred to,

what is it [

what is it]?

If you say,

if we say that the

primary category

is a pit that is ten

handbreadths

deep,

and the derivative

is a pit that is

nine

handbreadths deep. The distinction between them is that a pit ten handbreadths deep is capable of causing death, whereas a pit nine handbreadths deep is capable only of causing injury.

This distinction is impossible, for these two types of pit are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah.

Neither

a pit nine handbreadths deep

is written, nor

a pit

ten handbreadths deep is written,

so why should we distinguish between them and say that one is considered a primary category and the other a derivative?

But the Gemara answers the objection:

That—

this is not difficult!

What we rejected—that the two measures are not mentioned and that there is therefore no reason to distinguish between them—is not difficult. A pit ten handbreadths deep is indeed mentioned in the Torah. For

the Merciful One stated, “and the dead animal shall be his”

in the passage concerning a pit [Exodus 21:34], as it says: “The owner of the pit shall pay ... and the dead animal shall be his.” Thus, the Torah spoke of a pit that causes death.

And it is established [

known]

to the Sages

that only

ten

handbreadths

cause death,

since only such a depth is sufficient to kill an animal that falls into the pit, whereas a pit

nine

handbreadths deep causes only

injury,

but

does not cause death;

it does not. A depth of nine handbreadths in a pit is sufficient to cause injury, but not to cause death. Accordingly, the Torah, which spoke of a pit that causes death, spoke of a pit ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is possible to say that this pit is the one considered the primary category.

A depth of nine handbreadths is sufficient to cause injury but not to cause death. Accordingly, since the Torah speaks of a pit that causes death, it is speaking of a pit ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is possible to say that this pit is considered the primary category.

But the Gemara again rejects this:

Ultimately,

even if the verse says “and the dead animal shall be his,” there is still no basis for distinguishing between them, since both are derived from the verse. For

this [

a pit ten handbreadths deep] will be considered

a primary category with regard to

the matter of

death,

for if an ox fell into the pit and died, the owner of the pit is liable.

And this [

a pit nine handbreadths deep] will be considered

a primary category with regard to

the matter of

injury.

If an ox fell into a pit nine handbreadths deep and died, the owner of the pit is exempt; but if it was injured, he is liable. This too is derived from the precise implication of the verse “and the dead animal shall be his”: We learn from it that if the pit is capable of causing death, one is liable for death, implying that if it is not capable of causing death, one is liable not for death but only for injury. Since a pit nine handbreadths deep is derived from the Torah as well, it too should be considered a primary category.

Rather

necessarily, Rav Pappa's words were stated

with regard to his stone [

concerning his stone]

his knife and his burden

of a person

who placed them in the public domain, and they caused damage

to those who encountered them. Since they constitute an obstacle, like a pit, they are considered a derivative of a pit; and it was with regard to them that Rav Pappa said that their legal status is not that of a pit.

The Gemara rejects this:

What are the circumstances

, i.e., how are these stone, knife, and burden under discussion to be understood?

If he rendered them ownerless

, if it is referring to a case in which he rendered them ownerless and placed them in the public domain , then

according to

the opinion of Rav, and

according to

the opinion of

Shmuel, this is

a derivative of

a pit.

Rav and Shmuel disagree below [28b] as to whether the pit mentioned in the Torah is only one that he rendered ownerless, or whether it also includes a pit belonging to him [that he did not render his pit ownerless]. But both agree that an obstacle [such as his stone, knife, and burden] that he rendered ownerless has the legal status of a pit. And since the grounds for liability in these cases are similar to those of a pit, there is no reason to say that Rav Pappa's words referred to them [as the Gemara will state below ].