Bava Kamma 3a — the Talmud in English

And a proof for this is

and so it is

written

says

I Kings 14:10: "

as it consumes ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column location")

the refuse completely."

Just as the tooth, called “refuse,” consumes the food completely. [The tooth is called galal, from the language of revelation, for sometimes the tooth is revealed and sometimes it is covered

. The Gemara now discusses why the tannaitic source needed to bring proof both for the interpretation of “tooth” and for the interpretation of “foot”:

The Master said

in the beraita:

“And he sent forth”—this is the foot,

and the tanna brought proof for this:

And so it says: “Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey.”

The Gemara analyzes the words of the tanna:

The reason,

the reason for interpreting and saying that “and he sent forth” refers to the foot, is only because

the Merciful One wrote,

that the Torah wrote another verse,

“Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey.”

And the Gemara raises an objection:

If not so, with what would you establish it!?

For even without the proof from the verse “Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey,” we would also interpret that “and he sent forth” refers to the foot, because with what would you establish it if not with the foot? For

if

you wish to establish it with

horn,

but

it is written,

the liability for horn has already been stated in the Torah. And

if

you wish to establish it with

tooth,

but

it is written,

that liability for it is already stated in the verse “and it consumes in another’s field.” If so, why did the tanna need to bring proof from elsewhere that the Torah’s intention in “and he sends forth” is the foot!?

And the Gemara answers:

It was necessary;

The tanna needed to bring proof for this, because without the proof

it might enter your mind to say

we would think to say that

both this and that

—both “and he sent forth his animal” and “and he consumed in another’s field”—were stated

with regard to tooth

[to impose liability for damage caused by the tooth].

And this,

what the verse says, “and he consumed in another’s field,” whose meaning is that it consumes completely, comes to impose liability in a case

where it consumes the principal

[where the tooth consumed all the produce of the field, that is, the entire “principal” of the field, through its eating], for example, where it consumed a garden bed in such a manner that it will not ultimately grow again. And

this,

what is said, “and he sent forth his animal,” the verse comes to impose liability also in a case

where it does not consume the principal

[where it did not consume the “principal” through its eating], for example, where it ate young grain [grain at the beginning of its growth] that will ultimately grow again, although not as it was at first. And we would say that the verse comes to include that one is also liable in such a case, therefore

it teaches us

that the tanna in the beraita teaches that the verse “those who send forth the foot” indicates that “and he sends forth his animal” imposes liability for damage caused by the foot, not for damage caused by the tooth.

But the Gemara asks:

And now, once we have established it as referring to the foot,

now, according to the conclusion, that the verse “and he sent forth” comes to impose liability for damage caused by the foot, and the tooth is learned only from the verse “and he consumed,” if so, damage caused by the

tooth

in a case

where it does not consume the principal—from where do we derive it,

from where did we learn to impose liability for a tooth that does not consume the principal?

The Gemara answers:

By comparison with the foot

[similarly to the foot], meaning, the law of the tooth is learned by juxtaposition from the law of the foot which is written together with it:

Just as

just as

the foot, it makes no difference

[the law does not differ] whether it

consumes the principal, and it makes no difference

[and the law does not differ] whether it

does not consume the principal,

in both cases there is liability,

so too

the

tooth,

do not distinguish in its case, and

it makes no difference whether it consumes the principal or whether it does not consume the principal,

there is liability.

And now the Gemara raises a similar question concerning the second part of the beraita:

The Master said

in the beraita: “

And he consumed”—this is the tooth.”

And the tanna brings proof for this:

And so it says: “As one consumes the refuse completely.”

The Gemara analyzes the words of the beraita: It is implied by the tanna’s words

that the reason

the reason that we know that “and he consumed” refers to the tooth is because we find

that the Merciful One wrote, “As one consumes the refuse completely.”

And this is difficult:

But

if

not so, with what would we establish it!?

For even without proof, we should establish “and he consumed” as imposing liability for damage caused by the tooth, because with which damager would we establish it?

If

you wish to establish it with

horn,

but

it is written,

its liability has already been stated in the verse.

And if

you wish to establish it with

foot,

but

it is written,

that it is already learned from “and he sends forth his animal.” Why, then, did the tanna need to bring proof from elsewhere regarding the Torah’s intention in “and it consumes”? The Gemara answers:

It was necessary;

The tanna needed to bring proof from elsewhere because without the proof

it might enter your mind to say

we would think to say that

both this and that

—both “and he sent forth his animal” and “he consumed in another’s field”—were stated

with regard to the foot

[to impose liability for damage caused by the foot].

This,

what is said, “and he consumed in another’s field,” comes to impose liability also where

it goes on its own,

that it went by itself to another field and caused damage.

This,

what is said, “and he sent forth his animal” [from the language of sending], comes to impose liability where

he sent it through an agent,

where its owner sent it with the intention that it graze in his fellow’s field.

It teaches us

that the tanna in the beraita teaches that from the verse “as one removes the refuse completely” we learn that “and it consumes in another’s field” imposes liability for damage caused by the tooth, not for damage caused by the foot.

The Gemara asks:

And now, once we have established it as referring to the tooth,

now, according to the conclusion, that the verse “and he consumed in another’s field” comes to impose liability for damage caused by the tooth, and the foot is learned only from the verse “and he sent forth,” if so,

the foot that goes on its own—from where do we derive it,

from where did we learn to impose liability for damage caused by the foot that goes on its own?

The Gemara answers:

By comparison with the tooth,

the law of the foot is learned by juxtaposition from the law of the tooth, which is written together with it:

Just as the tooth, it makes no difference

[the law does not differ] whether it

sent it

through an agent

to graze in another field and it ate there,

it makes no difference

[and the law does not differ] in a case where

it goes on its own,

where the animal went by itself to graze in another field and ate, in both cases there is liability.

So too

the

foot,

do not distinguish in its case:

it makes no difference whether he sent it through an agent,

and

it makes no difference whether it went on its own,

there is liability.

And the Gemara objects that from “and he sent forth” we could have learned both primary categories:

And let the Merciful One write “and he sent forth,”

let the verse say only “and he sent forth his animal,”

and it would not need

and it would not need to say

“and he consumed

in another’s field,” since

it is implied

by “and he sent forth”

the foot, and the tooth is implied,

for it is interpreted as referring both to damage caused by the foot and to damage caused by the tooth.

And the Gemara brings the proofs for this:

The foot is implied,

as was explained in the beraita,

for it is written, “Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey,” and it implies

also

the tooth, for it is written

in the portion of Haazinu, Deuteronomy 32:24:

“And the teeth of beasts I will send against them” ,

so the expression “and he sent forth” implies damage caused by the tooth as well. If so, from “and he sent forth” alone we already know to impose liability both for damage caused by the foot and for damage caused by the tooth. This is difficult: For what purpose was “and he consumed in another’s field” said?

And see what we wrote in the explanation of Tosafot. The Gemara answers:

If not for an additional verse,

if the Torah had not added and said also “and he consumed,”

I would have said

I would say that the Torah’s intention in “and he sent forth” is not to impose liability for both the foot and the tooth, but rather

either this or that,

only one of them, either this or that:

Either

the Torah’s intention in “and he sent forth” is to impose liability only for damage caused by the

foot,

and not for damage caused by the tooth, and I would say this because the foot has a stringency,

for its damage is common,

since the animal is accustomed to walk and cause damage through its walking; therefore the Torah was more stringent, that its owners must guard it, but for damage caused by the tooth, which does not have this stringency, it did not impose liability.

Or

I would interpret that the Torah’s intention is to impose liability for damage caused by the

tooth,

and I would say this because the tooth has a stringency,

for there is benefit in its causing damage,

since the animal causes this damage for its benefit; therefore the Torah was more stringent, that its owners must guard it. But for damage caused by the foot it did not impose liability. Therefore the Torah added “and he consumed” to teach us about the tooth, and consequently, from “and he sent forth” we learn the foot.

But the Gemara rejects the answer:

Since,

the tooth and the foot

are equal,

they are equal, for neither is considered more stringent than the other, since each has its own stringency,

and

if so

let both of them come,

let us learn both of them, both the tooth and the foot, from “and he sent forth”;

which of them could you exclude,

for which one could you exclude from the inference and not learn it? That is, since they are equal, it is impossible for us to learn only one primary category, for whichever one you exclude from learning, they are equal.

The Gemara answers:

It was necessary,

although we could have learned both of them from “and he sent forth,” nevertheless the Torah needed to write also “and he consumed.”

For if only “and he sent forth” had been written,

it might enter your mind to say

we would think to say

this matter

[this matter] that the Torah imposed liability for damage caused by the tooth and the foot applies only

where he sent it through an agent,

where its owner sent it to graze in another’s field and it caused damage, as is implied by the Torah’s expression, “and he sent forth his animal,”

but where it goes on its own, no.

If the animal went by itself to graze in another’s field, the Torah did not impose liability on its owner. Therefore

it teaches us,

the Torah stated the verse “and he consumed in another’s field,” so that from it we learn to impose liability for a tooth that goes on its own. And once we know that there is liability for the tooth, we learn from the tooth also with regard to the foot, that there is liability for it as well even when it goes on its own.

And now the Gemara returns to the words of Rav Pappa, that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the principal category. Above, we assumed that he meant the derivatives of the tooth and the foot. The Gemara comes to examine this and asks: What is a derivative of the tooth? The Gemara answers: an animal

that rubbed itself against a wall for its enjoyment,

and knocked it down.

And likewise an animal

that soiled produce for its enjoyment, that rolled on the produce for its enjoyment, as horses and donkeys do, and the produce was damaged.

And since it caused these damages for its enjoyment, they are derivatives of the tooth, whose defining feature is “there is enjoyment in its damaging”; the damage caused by eating the produce is done for its enjoyment.

And after the Gemara explained what the derivatives of the tooth are, the Gemara rejects the assumption that Rav Pappa’s words referred to them, for this is not reasonable, since: What difference is there,

what is different about the

tooth,

whose special stringency is

that there is enjoyment in its damaging, and

the damager is

your property, and

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it should not cause damage rests

upon you?

After all,

these too,

the derivatives of the tooth, are likewise:

there is enjoyment in their damaging, and

they are

your property, and

the obligation of

guarding them

so that they should not cause damage rests

upon you.

And since the derivatives are entirely similar to the principal category, there is no reason that their law should differ from the law of the principal category.

And the Gemara concludes:

Rather,

indeed

the derivatives of the tooth

their law is

like the

tooth!

And when Rav Pappa said

that there are derivatives whose law is not like the law of the principal category, he said this only

with regard to a derivative [concerning a derivative]

of the foot

.

But the Gemara examines whether this assumption is correct and asks:

What is a derivative of the foot —

what is it?

An animal that

caused damage with its body in the course of its walking,

for example, while walking it pushed vessels with its body and broke them. And likewise an animal to which vessels became attached

to its hair,

and it dragged them

in the course of its walking

until it broke them. And likewise if it did not cause damage with its body or with something attached to it, but caused damage in the course of its walking

with a load carried upon it ,

together with the burden that was in its sack.

And likewise if it caused damage

with a bit [a bridle] that was

in its mouth,

or with a bell [a bell]

that was

hanging

upon its neck.

And all these are derivatives of the foot. For the defining stringency of the foot is that “its damage is common,” since it is done in the course of its walking. And these derivatives too, since they are done in the course of walking, have damage that is common.

And after the Gemara explained what the derivatives are, the Gemara rejects the assumption that it was said concerning the derivatives of the foot that their law is not like that of the principal category, for this is not reasonable, since: What difference is there, what is different about the foot, whose special stringency is that its damage is common, and the damager is

a clapper]

that was

hanging

from its neck.

All these are derivative categories of foot. The characteristic that defines foot is that “its damage is common,” since it occurs through the animal’s walking. These derivative categories likewise cause common damage, since they occur through walking.

your property, and

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it should not cause damage rests

upon you?

After all,

these too,

the derivatives of the foot, likewise have

damage that is common,

since they are done in the course of its walking,

and

they are

your property, and

the obligation of

guarding them

so that they should not cause damage rests

upon you.

And since the derivatives of the foot are entirely similar to the principal category, there is no reason that their law should differ from the law of the principal category.

Rather,

indeed

a derivative of the foot

its law is

like the foot!

And when Rav Pappa said

that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the principal category,

with regard to a derivative [concerning a derivative]

of the pit

he said this.

But the Gemara rejects this assumption and asks:

A derivative of the pit,

which you wished to say that Rav Pappa’s words referred to,

what is it [what is it]?

If you say,

if it is said that the

principal category

is a damaging pit ten

handbreadths

deep,

and the

derivative

is a pit nine

handbreadths

deep. The distinction between them is that a pit ten handbreadths deep is capable of killing, whereas a pit nine deep is capable only of causing damage.

the primary category

is a pit that is

ten

handbreadths deep,

and the derivative category

is a pit

This distinction is impossible, for these two types of pits are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah. For

neither a pit

nine deep is written, nor a pit ten deep is written, as written, and why should we distinguish and say that this is considered a principal category and that is considered a derivative? But the Gemara answers the rejection: This —

is not difficult!

What we rejected, that the two measures are not mentioned and that there is no reason to distinguish between them, is not difficult. For a pit whose depth is ten handbreadths is indeed mentioned in the Torah. For

“and the dead one shall be his” the Merciful One said

in the section of the pit [Exodus 21:34], as it says, “the owner of the pit shall pay ... and the dead one shall be his”; thus the Torah spoke of a pit that kills.

And it is established [known]

to the Sages

that only

ten

handbreadths

cause death,

for only such a depth is capable of killing the one who falls into the pit, whereas a pit

nine

handbreadths deep

only

causes damage,

but

does not cause death.

There is enough depth in a pit of nine handbreadths to cause damage, but not to cause death. Accordingly, the Torah, which spoke of a pit that kills, spoke of a pit ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is possible to say that this pit is the one considered the principal category.

But the Gemara rejects this again: ultimately, even if the verse said “and the dead one shall be his,” there is no basis for distinguishing between them, since both are still learned from the verse. For this [the pit ten deep] is considered a principal category with regard to death, for if an ox fell into the pit and died, the owner of the pit is liable. And this [the pit nine deep] is considered a principal category with regard to damages.

because only this depth is sufficient to kill one who falls into the pit. But a pit

nine

handbreadths deep

causes only injury,

but

does not cause death

It does not cause death.

A depth of nine handbreadths is sufficient to cause injury but not to cause death. Accordingly, since the Torah speaks of a pit that causes death, it is speaking of a pit ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is possible to say that this pit is considered the primary category.

For if an ox fell into a pit nine deep and died, the owner of the pit is exempt, but if it was injured, he is liable. And this too is learned from the precision of the verse “and the dead one shall be his”: we learn from it that if it is capable of killing, he is liable for death; and it implies that if it is not capable of killing, he is not liable for death, but only for damages. And since a pit nine deep is learned from the Torah, it too should be considered a principal category.

Ultimately,

even if the verse says “and the dead animal shall be his,” one cannot distinguish between them, since both are still derived from the verse. For

this one [a pit ten handbreadths deep]

is considered

a primary category with regard to

the matter of

death,

since if an ox fell into the pit and died, the owner of the pit is liable.

And this one [a pit nine handbreadths deep]

is considered

a primary category with regard to

the matter of

injury.

If an ox fell into a pit nine handbreadths deep and died, the owner of the pit is exempt; but if it was injured, he is liable. This too is learned from the precise wording of the verse “and the dead animal shall be his”: We learn that if the pit is capable of causing death, the owner is liable for death, and it follows that if it is not capable of causing death, he is not liable for death but only for injury. Since a pit nine handbreadths deep is also learned from the Torah, it too is considered a primary category.

Rather,

necessarily, Rav Pappa’s words were stated

with regard to his stone

[with regard to his stone]

his knife and his burden

of a person

who left them in the public domain, and they caused damage

to those who stumbled over them. And since they are an obstacle like a pit, they are considered a derivative of a pit, and concerning them Rav Pappa said that their law is not like that of a pit.

And the Gemara rejects:

How is it

that these stone, knife, and burden are being discussed?

If he abandoned them,

if it is speaking of a case in which he abandoned them and left them in the public domain , then

both according to

the view of

Rav and both according to

the view of

Shmuel, this is

[it is a derivative of]

a pit.

Rav and Shmuel dispute below [28b] whether the pit stated in the Torah applies only when he abandoned it, or whether it also concerns a pit belonging to him [who did not abandon his pit]. But both agree regarding an obstacle [such as his stone, knife, and burden] that he abandoned, that their law is like that of a pit. And since the causes of liability in their case resemble those of a pit, there is no reason to say that Rav Pappa’s words concerned them [as the Gemara will say further on ].