Bava Kamma 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

And one who became impure through contact with a corpse -

a person who became impure through contact with a corpse, by touching it, carrying it, or being with it under the same tent.

And just as there are primary sources of ritual impurity, so too there are secondary forms of impurity, which did not become impure from the corpse itself, but became impure through contact with a primary source of impurity."

However,

their secondary forms -

are not like them.

The laws governing secondary forms of impurity are not identical to those governing primary sources of impurity.

For whereas a primary source

of impurity

renders a person and vessels impure,

it has the power to render impure a person or a vessel that touches it [as explained in the Mishna there].

Whereas secondary forms

of impurity, which became impure through a primary source of impurity, render impure only

food and liquids,

but

do not render a person or vessels impure.

Secondary forms of impurity do not have the power to render a person or vessels impure, but only food and liquids.

If so, we find that there is a distinction between the various secondary forms: On the one hand, with regard to the forbidden labor of Shabbat, we find that the law of the secondary forms is like that of the primary sources; on the other hand, with regard to impurity, we find that the law of the secondary forms is not like that of the primary sources. Therefore, the question arises:

Here, what is the law?

Here, with regard to damages, what is the law of the secondary forms of damages? Is their law like that of the primary categories, or not?

The Gemara cites the statement of Rav Pappa, who resolves the question:

Rav Pappa said: Some of them are like them -

there are secondary forms of damages whose laws are like those of the primary categories,

and some of them are not like them,

whose laws differ from those of the primary categories.

But now a new question arises before the Gemara: Which secondary forms have the law of a primary category, and which do not, since it has not been explained what they are? The Gemara attempts to resolve this question. In the course of the discussion, it explains which are the secondary forms of the primary categories, as well as from where the primary categories are derived and what characteristics define each primary category individually.

The Gemara begins with the primary categories of the ox that cause damage, and cites a baraita:

The Sages taught: Three primary categories are stated with regard to an ox -

three types of damage are stated in the Torah that are caused by an ox:

The horn -

to gore with its horn.

And the tooth -

to eat with its tooth [to cause damage by eating in the fields of others].

And the foot -

to walk and trample vessels with its feet, and the like.

The Gemara initially discusses the law of the horn, to determine whether its secondary forms are like it or not, and begins by asking about the source of the horn in the Torah:

Horn,

which is considered a primary category -

from where do we know it?

From where is the law of the horn derived in the Torah? -

As the Sages taught -

the Torah states: “And

when it gores

an ox a man,” [ Exodus 21:28], and the Torah does not explain what this goring is. However, from other passages we learn that

goring is only with the horn,

that the ox gores forcefully and causes damage with its horn,

as it is stated [

I Kings 22:11]:

“And Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made iron horns for himself, and he said: So said the Lord: With these you shall gore Aram,” and so on.

Thus, the act of goring is performed with the horn.

And it says -

another proof of this from the verse [

Deuteronomy 33:17]:

“The firstborn of his ox, majesty is his, and his horns are the horns of a wild ox; with them he shall gore nations.” Thus we learn that goring is with the horn.

The Gemara discusses the statement of the baraita:

What is the meaning of “and it says”? -

Why did the tanna need to bring an additional proof from Scripture, rather than suffice with the first proof?

And if you would say

that perhaps one might reject the first proof on the grounds that

a matter of Torah cannot be derived from a matter of tradition,

that is, one may not derive matters stated in the Torah from matters of tradition [Prophets and Writings], therefore the tanna added and said:

Come and hear: “The firstborn of his ox, majesty is his,”

bringing an additional proof from a verse stated in the Torah itself.

But the Gemara rejects this explanation:

Is this really a derivation!?

Is there a legal derivation here concerning liability or exemption, such that you would say that a matter of tradition cannot be derived for a matter of Torah? After all, everything we learned from the matter of tradition is only

a mere clarification of the matter [

a clarification of the matter in general]:

that goring is with the horn,

that wherever Scripture says “goring,” its intention is an act performed with the horn; and this can certainly be learned from a matter of tradition. If so, the question returns: Why did the tanna bring an additional verse?

Therefore, the Gemara gives another reason:

Rather,

there is another reason why the tanna added the second verse:

What might you have said?

Perhaps one might say:

When the Merciful One distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox,

the distinction that the Torah made between an innocuous ox, which pays only half the damage [“and they shall divide its money equally”], and a forewarned ox, which pays the full damage [“he shall pay in full an ox in place of the ox”],

this applies

only to

a

horn

that was detached,

where the ox held the horn between its teeth and gored in that manner [as in the example of the iron horns made by Zedekiah, which were detached horns]. Only with regard to this type of goring did the Torah distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, saying that since it is not the ox’s manner to gore with a detached horn that it holds in its teeth, the owners were not required to guard it against this, and therefore the Torah did not obligate them to pay full damages.

But

when the ox gores

with a

horn

attached

to it, which is its usual manner,

say that it is entirely forewarned,

I would say that it has the status of a forewarned ox from the outset and pays full damages already for the first goring. Therefore, to reject this possibility, the tanna added the second verse and said:

Come

and hear: “The firstborn of his ox, majesty is his,” and so on,

from which we learn that the goring of the horns of the wild ox, which are attached to its head, is also called goring. Since, when the Torah distinguished between an innocuous ox that pays half the damage and a forewarned ox that pays full damages, it spoke of goring without qualification, this also includes goring with an attached horn; and the Torah stated that an innocuous ox pays half the damage in such a case. The Gemara now clarifies what the secondary forms of the horn are:

What is the secondary form of the horn? -

Pushing -

the animal caused damage intentionally by pushing with its body.

Biting -

it bit with its teeth in order to cause damage.

Lying down -

an animal saw vessels in its path, proceeded, and lay down on them intending to break them.

And kicking –

kicking utensils with its legs in order to break them.

And later the Gemara will ask, regarding each of these modes of damage, why it is considered a derivative of keren.

The Gemara first raises an objection concerning negifa: Why is it not considered a primary category?

What is different about goring, that it is called a primary category,

how is the goring of keren different, such that it is called the primary category? It is certainly because

it is written

explicitly in the Torah

“When it gores”,

and if so, this is difficult:

goring with the body also

is written in the Torah, as

it is written

“When it pushes”,

so why is negifa not considered a primary category? The Gemara answers: The verse [Exodus 21:28] that discusses an ox that killed or injured a person begins, “And when an ox gores a man,” whereas the verse that discusses an ox that injured another ox [and there, verse 35] begins, “And when an ox pushes its fellow’s ox.”

This pushing,

“when it pushes,” which the verse says concerning an ox that pushes its fellow’s ox, does not refer to pushing with the ox’s body; rather,

it is goring

with its horn.

It

is therefore only goring with the horn that constitutes the primary category of keren, whereas pushing with its body is merely a derivative of keren.

The Gemara supports this from the words of a beraita:

As it was taught: The verse begins

the verse

with pushing,

the verse [verse 35] concerning an ox that injured another ox begins, “And when an ox pushes,”

and concludes with goring,

“or it became known that it is a goring ox.” Why did the verse not conclude with the same term with which it began, and say, “that it is a pushing ox,” as it said initially? Rather, the verse

comes to tell you: This is pushing; this is goring.

The pushing mentioned here refers to goring with the horn, not to pushing with the body.

But the Gemara asks: Since it has been explained that, in the language of the verse, goring and pushing have the same meaning—goring with the horn—then

what is different with regard to a person,

how is an ox that gored a person different,

that it is written, “When it gores,”

so that the language of goring is used with regard to it,

and what is different with regard to an animal,

how is an ox that gored another ox different,

that it is written, “When it pushes,”

so that the language of pushing is used with regard to it?

The Gemara answers:

A person, who has protection,

a person who has the awareness to protect his body,

“When it gores” is written with regard to him, the language of goring, whose meaning is that the ox came against the person with great force, since the ox certainly intended to harm him.

But but

an animal, which has no protection,

which lacks the human capacity to protect itself and is easily injured,

“When it pushes” is written with regard to it,

meaning that the damaging ox found the ox being damaged standing and lightly pushed it with its horns [a goring of lesser force], since, in order to injure another animal, the damaging ox need not prepare itself and approach it with great force.

And it teaches us something incidentally,

the Torah teaches us, by the way, something additional through having used different language with regard to a person and an animal:

If an ox killed a person, and the ox was innocuous, the ox is stoned and its owner is exempt. But if the ox was established as dangerous [having already killed three people before standing trial], the ox is stoned, and the owner of the ox pays kofer, “ransom,” to the heirs of the deceased.

If an ox killed another ox, and the damaging ox was innocuous, its owner pays half-damage; but if it was established as dangerous, he pays full damages.

Therefore, the Torah used the language of goring with regard to a person and the language of pushing with regard to damage caused to an ox, in order to say that it is easier to injure an ox than a person. And it teaches us

that an ox established as dangerous with regard to a person is established as dangerous with regard to an animal,

that is, an ox that killed three people and thereby became established as dangerous with regard to people is considered established as dangerous with regard to animals as well. From then on, it pays full damages for goring an animal, as required for an ox established as dangerous, because if it was established as dangerous for killing a person, all the more so is it established as dangerous for killing an animal, which is easier to kill.

And

by contrast,

an ox established as dangerous with regard to an animal is not established as dangerous with regard to a person,

for if an ox became established as dangerous for killing three animals, it is still not considered established as dangerous with regard to a person. If it then gores a person and kills him, its status is that of an innocuous ox that killed a person, and its owner does not pay kofer. For although it was established as dangerous for killing an animal, it is still not considered established as dangerous for killing a person, since a person is more difficult to kill.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the other derivatives of keren mentioned in the beraita: Why are they not considered derivatives of other primary categories?

Biting –

when the animal bites with its teeth,

is a derivative of shen!

Since the biting is done with the teeth, it resembles shen and should be considered a derivative of shen, not a derivative of keren.

The Gemara explains:

No.

Biting does not resemble shen, because the primary category of damage of

shen

is defined by the fact that

there is pleasure in causing its damage,

as the animal eats and derives pleasure from eating, thereby causing the damage. But

this [

this biting],

does not involve pleasure in causing its damage,

as it does not do so for its own pleasure, but only in order to cause damage. Therefore, it is not a derivative of shen.

The Gemara continues its discussion:

Lying down and kicking,

why are they considered derivatives of keren? Lying down is performed by bending the legs, as is kicking; if so,

they are derivatives of regel.

They more closely resemble derivatives of regel!?

The Gemara explains:

No.

They do not resemble regel, because

the damage caused by regel is common,

as the animal is constantly walking and trampling everything beneath its feet; this is what characterizes it as a primary category of damage. But

these,

whereas lying down and kicking are not performed in the course of walking,

their damage is not common

at all times. Therefore, they are not considered derivatives of regel.

Now that the derivatives of keren have been clarified, the Gemara returns to discuss which derivatives are not like their primary categories:

Rather,

“Their derivatives are not like them,” as Rav Pappa said

what Rav Pappa said, that there are derivatives whose law is not like that of the primary category,

with regard to which

derivatives did he say this?

If you say it refers to these,

if we say that he means these derivatives of keren, this is not reasonable, because

what is different about keren, that its intention is to cause damage

how is the primary category of keren different, in that its distinctive severity is that the goring ox intends to cause damage,

and

since it is

your property, and

the obligation of

guarding it

so that it not cause damage is

upon you,

you are therefore liable for damage caused by keren.

If so,

these too,

these derivatives of keren likewise have the same reasons, since their damage is caused with

the intention to cause damage, and

they too are

your property, and

therefore the obligation of

guarding them

so that they not cause damage is

upon you. Since they are entirely similar to the primary category, there is no reason to say that their law should differ from that of the primary category. Rather, certainly their law is like that of the primary category.

The Gemara concludes:

The Gemara concludes:

Rather,

indeed,

a derivative of keren

is like its primary category,

like keren.

And since Rav Pappa’s statement was not said with regard to derivatives of keren, the Gemara establishes the following as its premise:

And when Rav Pappa said,

that which Rav Pappa said, “Their derivatives are not like them,”

he said it with regard to shen and regel

[with regard to shen and regel], that the law of the derivatives is not like that of the primary category. [

The Gemara states this as a premise, but later it will become clear whether this is indeed the case.]

The Gemara first clarifies the source from which shen and regel are derived:

“Shen”,

when the ox causes damage through eating,

and “regel”,

when the ox causes damage by trampling in the course of walking, which are considered primary categories,

how are they written –

where are they written in the Torah?

The Gemara cites a beraita that explains this:

It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 22:4]: “When a man lets his animal loose into a field or vineyard, and he sends forth his animal, and it consumes the field of another, he shall pay from the best of his field and the best of his vineyard.” This verse discusses a person who leads his animals into another person’s field or vineyard and causes damage in one of two ways: either by sending forth his animal, or by consuming.

The Torah does not explain the nature of the damage meant by “sending forth the animal,” or the nature of the damage meant by “consuming in another’s field,” and the beraita explains this: “

And he shall send forth

his animal”

this is regel,

damage caused by the sole of the foot. And support for this is the verse:

And so it says [

Isaiah 32:20] “

Those who send forth the foot of the ox and the donkey.”

Thus, the term “sending forth” is used with regard to the foot.

And concerning what is stated, “

and it shall consume

in another’s field,”

this is shen,

which eats and consumes. And support for this is the verse:

And so it says [

I Kings 14:10] “

as a thing consumes entirely,”

as the teeth consume the food entirely [“galal” refers to the tooth, from an expression of exposure, since the tooth is sometimes exposed and sometimes covered]. Thus, the term “consuming” is used with regard to eating with the teeth.

And concerning what is stated, “

and it shall consume

in another’s field,”

this is shen.

That is, the damage caused by the teeth, which eat and consume.