Bava Kamma 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

The first Mishna opens with an enumeration of the primary categories of damage mentioned in the Torah, and explains why it was necessary to specify all of them in the Torah:

Four primary categories of damage —

There are four principal types of damaging agents explicitly stated in the Torah, and they are:

a.

The ox

that causes damage.

In the introduction to this chapter it is explained that three types of damage are included in “an ox that causes damage”:

Foot: an animal that tramples with its feet and damages an object in the course of its walking.

Tooth: an animal that eats produce in another person’s field for its own benefit.

And horn: an ox that gores with its horns with the intention of causing damage, without deriving benefit from its damage, and does so in an unusual manner, as this is not its normal behavior.

The amoraim dispute in the Gemara whether “the ox” mentioned by the Mishna refers only to damage caused by “foot,” or also to damage caused by “tooth” and “horn.”

b.

And the pit —

if a person dug a pit, or opened a pit that had been covered, and an ox or donkey fell into it.

c.

And the maveh —

the amoraim dispute in the Gemara the interpretation of “the maveh”: whether it is an ox that damages another person’s property by eating, and is the primary category of damage called “tooth,” or whether it is “a person who causes damage,” who damages another person’s property with his body.

d.

And fire —

if a person kindled a fire in his domain, and the fire spread, went out, and damaged another person’s property.

The Mishna now explains why all four primary categories of damage had to be written in the Torah: since they differ in their essence and characteristics, it would not have been possible to derive one from another.

For if the Torah had written only the primary category of damage of “ox,” we would not have derived “maveh” from it, since:

The ox is not like the maveh,

the degree of leniency of the ox is not like that of the maveh, because the maveh is more lenient. That is, the damaging ox has a severe characteristic particular to it that the maveh does not have, and this characteristic is sufficient to establish liability. Therefore, had the Torah written only “ox,” the maveh, which is more lenient than it, could not have been derived from it.

Conversely, had the Torah written only “maveh,” the “ox” could not have been derived from it, because:

The maveh is not like the ox.

The degree of leniency of the maveh is not like that of the ox, because the ox is more lenient. That is, the maveh possesses a severe characteristic particular to it that the ox does not have, and this characteristic is sufficient to establish liability. Therefore, had the Torah written only “maveh,” the ox, which is more lenient, could not have been derived from it.

Now that the necessity of writing “ox” and “maveh” has been explained, the Mishna explains that it was also necessary to write the primary category of fire in the Torah, because its law cannot be derived from ox and maveh. One might say that ox and maveh possess a shared characteristic that is the cause of their liability for damages, whereas this characteristic does not exist in fire; therefore, their liability cannot be derived for fire. That is:

Nor can these two

the “ox” and the “maveh,” whose particular characteristic is the reason for their liability, because

they possess the breath of life,

and can go and cause damage by their own choice,

be like the “fire,” which does not possess the breath of life,

and cannot go and cause damage on its own, but only if the wind carries it. Therefore, had the Torah written only “ox” and “maveh,” fire, which is more lenient than they, could not have been derived from them.

The Mishna continues to explain why the Torah wrote “pit,” rather than relying on its being derived from the other damaging agents:

Nor can these two,

the “ox,” the “maveh,” and the “fire,” whose special shared characteristic is the reason for their liability,

be like those whose manner is to go and cause damage,

meaning that these damaging agents go toward the damaged party,

be like the “pit,” whose manner is not to go and cause damage,

for the pit remains fixed in its place, and it is the damaged party that comes to it. Therefore, had the Torah written only the other damaging agents, we would not have derived from them that the owner of a pit must pay for damage caused by falling into the pit, since the pit is more lenient than they. The Mishna concludes by saying: Although each damaging agent has a different characteristic, they all share one factor that renders all of them liable to pay for damages:

The common factor among them

is that, with regard to all the damaging agents,

they have this in common:

their manner is to cause damage,

and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you,

because they are your property, you became obligated to safeguard them so that they would not cause damage.

And when it caused damage

each of them,

is liable [

is obligated]

the one who caused the damage [

the owner of the damaging entity]

to pay compensation for the damage,

and the payment is

from the best land.

When the one who caused the damage does not pay with money but with land, he must pay from the finest [choicest] land among his properties. However, if he pays with movable property, he may pay with whatever he wishes, because with regard to movable property everything is included within “the best.”

From this general rule one can learn the law of every other type of damaging entity whose way is to cause damage and whose safeguarding is incumbent upon you: if it caused damage, its owner becomes obligated to pay compensation for the damage from the best land. In the Mishna below [15a], and in the Gemara [below 6a], it will be explained which damaging entities the Mishna intends to include by this statement.

Gemara:

The Gemara infers from the wording of the Mishna:

Since it teaches,

from the fact that the tanna taught in our Mishna, “four

primary categories

of damage,”

by inference

you learn

that there are

also “

derivatives

of damage” [types of damaging entities resembling the primary categories, and therefore regarded as their derivatives]. For if the “primary categories” have no “derivatives,” why are they called “primary categories of damage”?

The Gemara now discusses the law of the derivatives: whether

their derivatives

of the primary categories of damage are

like them,

that is, whether the law of the derivatives is the same as the law of the primary category,

or

perhaps their derivatives are

not like them,

so that their laws are not the same as the laws of the primary category?

The Gemara explains the reason for the uncertainty: We find the concept of “primary categories and derivatives” in other areas as well. In some of them the Mishna makes clear that the law of the derivatives is the same as that of the primary category, while in others the law of the derivatives differs from that of the primary category, as the Gemara will bring below. Therefore, one must investigate what the law of derivatives is in the laws of damages.

The Gemara first cites the law of derivatives with regard to the labors of Shabbat:

Regarding Shabbat, we learned [

Shabbat 73a]:

The primary categories of labor —

forty minus one.

There are thirty-nine types of primary labor, for which those who perform them on Shabbat incur liability: if they perform them unwittingly, they are liable to bring a sin-offering, and if they perform them intentionally, they are liable to stoning.

There too the Mishna used the term

“primary categories,”

which implies

by inference

this

that there are “derivatives.”

With regard to the labors of Shabbat,

their derivatives are like them,

for one who performs them on Shabbat, whether unwittingly or intentionally,

there is no difference [

the law does not differ]

between a primary category

of labor, for if he performed the labor unwittingly, he must bring a

sin-offering, and there is no difference [

the law does not differ] between a

derivative,

for if he performed it unwittingly, he must bring a

sin-offering.

That is, the primary category and the derivative have the same law in that one must bring a sin-offering for performing either of them unwittingly.

Their law is likewise the same with regard to liability for intentional performance: if he performed the labor intentionally and after having been warned, then

there is no difference [

the law does not differ] between performing a

primary category

of labor, for the one who performs it is liable to

stoning, and there is no difference [

the law does not differ] with regard to the

derivative,

whose penalty is

stoning.

That is, whether for the primary category or for the derivative, one is liable to stoning for performing it intentionally.

It follows that the derivatives of the primary categories of labor on Shabbat are like them.

The Gemara continues and explains: Since the derivatives of the labors of Shabbat are like them, then

what difference is there between a primary category and a derivative?

What difference does it make whether the labor is called a “primary category of labor” or is called a “derivative”?

A practical difference:

there is a difference between them in this regard:

if one performed two primary categories together,

if a person unwittingly performed two labors, each of which is considered a primary category of labor, even if he performed them during one period of unawareness [without realizing between the performance of the two labors that performing these labors on Shabbat is prohibited],

or, alternatively, two derivatives together,

and likewise if he unwittingly performed two labors, each of which is considered a derivative of a different primary category, and he performed them during one period of unawareness,

he is liable

for a sin-offering

for each one,

he must bring a sin-offering for each labor separately.

But

however,

if he performed a primary category and its derivative,

if he unwittingly performed during one period of unawareness two labors, one of which is considered a primary category of labor and the other a derivative of that same primary category of labor,

he is liable only for one.

He is liable to bring only one sin-offering for both.

This is the difference between a case in which the labor is considered a primary category in its own right, in which case he would be liable for two sin-offerings, and a case in which it is a derivative of the primary category of labor, in which case he is not liable for the derivative independently when it is performed together with its primary category; rather, he brings one sin-offering to atone for the primary category and its derivative.

But the Gemara objects that this answer applies only according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain this view [Shabbat 75b]. Yet it remains difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who disagrees with them:

And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds one liable for a derivative [

for a derivative] independently, even

in the presence of its primary category [

Keritot 16a], even when the derivative was performed during the same period of unawareness as its primary category of labor, so that he incurs liability for two sin-offerings, both for the derivative and for the primary category, then the question still stands:

Why is this called a “primary category,” and why is that called a “derivative”?

Why is this labor called a “primary category” and that labor called a “derivative”? That is, what difference is there whether the labor is called a “primary category” or a “derivative,” when in either case he is liable to bring two sin-offerings for performing them?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no difference in law between whether the labor is called a primary category or a derivative. The reason that one labor is called a primary category and the other a derivative is only that

the one that was

significant in the Tabernacle,

the labor that was performed in the Tabernacle and was significant,

is called a primary category,

it is the one called a primary category, whereas

the one that was not significant in the Tabernacle,

the labor that was not performed in the Tabernacle and is not significant,

is called a derivative,

it is the one called a derivative.

The Gemara now continues and brings another matter in which there are primary categories and derivatives, and there we find that their derivatives are not like them: Regarding

ritual impurities,

with regard to levels of impurity,

we learned

in a Mishna [at the beginning of tractate Kelim]: “

Primary categories of impurity”: the level of impurity capable of rendering a person and vessels impure is called “a primary source of impurity.” These are the entities regarded as “primary sources of impurity”:

A creeping creature

—each of the eight creeping creatures specified in the Torah [Leviticus 11:29–30], which render a person and vessels impure upon their death.

And seminal emission [

including one who touches it, as explained in the Gemara in tractate Niddah 43b].