Bava Kamma 43b (מג:) — the Talmud in English

Who is it?,

in any event, there is a distinction between the value of a free man, which he pays on his own admission, as explained in the first clause, and the value of a slave, which he does not pay on his own admission, as explained in the latter clause. And the reason for the distinction is:

In the case of a free man, who pays

even

ransom on his own admission—and what are the circumstances

in which he pays ransom on his own admission, even though the ox is not sentenced to stoning on his own admission, and the owners do not pay ransom:

If witnesses came and testified against it that it killed [if witnesses came and said that this ox killed a person] and it is therefore liable to stoning,

and it became liable to stoning,

but

nevertheless

they did not know

the witnesses

whether it was innocuous

and exempt from ransom,

or whether it was forewarned

and liable even for ransom,

and its owner said that it was forewarned [and its owner admitted that it was forewarned]—

In this manner he pays ransom on his own admission, because the ox is sentenced to stoning on the testimony of the witnesses: Whether it was innocuous or forewarned, it is stoned. We need his admission only with regard to the ransom, and ransom is not a fine, so that he does not pay it on the basis of his admission—

And therefore,

where there are no witnesses

to make it liable to stoning, and it is impossible to make him liable for ransom, he

pays the value

on his own admission.

But with regard to

a slave, for whose value he does not pay a fine on his own admission—and what are the circumstances,

that is, in what manner can we find a case in which he does not pay a fine on his own admission, without there being the deficiency that “if the ox is not sentenced to stoning, the owners do not pay the value of the slave,”

if witnesses came and testified against it that it killed

and it became liable to stoning,

but

nevertheless

they did not know whether it was innocuous

and exempt from payment for the slave,

or whether it was forewarned

and liable even for payment for the slave,

and its owner said: “It is forewarned,”

so that he

does not receive payment of a fine on his own admission,

since the thirty [shekels] for a slave are a fine, which is not paid on his own admission—therefore,

where there are no witnesses

to make it liable to stoning and to a fine, he

does not pay

even

the value.

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak raised an objection

to Rabba, who distinguished between ransom and payment for a slave, from that which was taught in a beraita:

“Anyone who is liable for the killing of an ox of

Anyone for whom there is liability in the case of

the killing by an ox of a

free man, there is liability in the case of

the killing by an ox of a

slave, both with regard to ransom [he proceeds to explain it],

and with regard to

the death

of the ox. That is to say: Just as in the case of a free man, whether the ox was innocuous or forewarned, and whether it killed adults or minors, it is liable to death, so too when it killed a slave.

But surely it is difficult: How could they say that a slave is equal to a free man with regard to ransom?

Is there ransom for a slave?

Is there ransom for a slave? After all, he pays the fine of thirty shekels, not ransom?!

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the beraita does not refer to ransom itself, but rather to the

payment of the value

of the injured party; and this is the explanation of the beraita:

Anyone for whom the owner of the ox becomes liable to pay the value when it kills a free man—for example, when he admits on his own that he is not liable for ransom because the ox is not sentenced to stoning—

so too with regard to the value of a slave: If he admits on his own, although he is not liable for the fine [since the ox is not sentenced to stoning, and one who admits to a fine is exempt], he pays the value.

If so, this is difficult for Rabba, who distinguished between a free man, whose value is paid on the owner’s admission, and a slave, whose value is not paid on the owner’s admission!?

There are those who say:

Rab Shmuel bar Yitzḥak

He,

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak,

raised the objection [he challenged Rabba],

and he

himself

resolved it [he supplied the following resolution].

And

there are those who say: It was not Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak himself who resolved it, but

Rabba said to him:

It is not as you explained, that the beraita comes to say that when he admits on his own that he owes payment of the value for a free man, he owes payment of the value for a slave. Rather,

this is what it teaches

in the beraita:

Anyone for whom there is liability in the case of a free man, intentionally, on the basis of witnesses, for ransom,

that is: Anyone for whom there is liability for ransom in the case of a free man—and what are the circumstances? For example, the act was intentional and established by witnesses, as is the standard liability, which is based on witnesses—

in such a case he is

liable for the fine in the case of a slave—

And anyone who is liable, with regard to a free person, when the killing was unintentional and established by

And anyone for whom there is liability in the case of a free man, unintentionally, on the basis of

witnesses, for payment of the value,

that is: Just as when the ox killed unintentionally, but nevertheless on the basis of witnesses and not on the basis of the owner’s admission, he is liable to pay the value—for since the ox is not sentenced to stoning when it kills unintentionally, he is liable to pay the value—

he is liable

also

in the case of a slave, unintentionally, on the basis of witnesses—

for payment of the value,

that is: The same law applies to a slave: If it acted unintentionally, but nevertheless the matter was established by witnesses [so that he is not included in the rule “one who admits to a fine”], he is liable to pay the value. This is because Rabba distinguished between a free man and a slave with regard to payment of the value only where the owner admitted, for the reason explained above in the Gemara [since we find a distinction between them with regard to admission concerning the ransom itself and the fine itself]. But where the act was unintentional, there is no distinction between ransom and the fine. Just as with regard to ransom, since he does not pay ransom—for the ox is not sentenced to stoning—he nevertheless pays the value, so too with regard to a slave he pays the value, since he does not pay the fine.

Rava said

he challenged

Rabba:

If so,

according to your words, that when his ox acts unintentionally

and is not subject to ransom, it pays the value, since there is payment of the value for the death of a person where there is no ransom or fine, then even

his fire,

which spread and killed unintentionally

and

on the basis of witnesses,

pays the value,

since it is subject to the laws of damages.

And we explain: And from where does Rava derive that he does not pay payment of the value? If you say, from that which we learned below, on folio 61b: One who ignites a stack of grain, and

money is paid

And we explain:

there was a kid bound to it,

bound to the stack,

and a slave adjacent to it,

not bound, so that he could have fled,

and he was burned with it, he

is liable

for the kid

and exempt with regard to the slave, because the kid could not flee, whereas the slave could have fled.

This proves that in the case of fire there is no monetary-value liability for the death of a person!

But

if there was

a slave bound to it, and

there was a kid adjacent to it,

which could have fled,

and it was burned with it,

he

is exempt

from payment for both the slave and the kid.

it

And we initially assumed that this was the reason he is exempt both with regard to the slave and with regard to the kid: He is exempt with regard to the slave [even though the slave was bound to it and could not flee], because there is no payment of the value for the death of a person; and he is exempt with regard to the kid because it could have fled.

This proves that in the case of fire there is no liability for payment of the value for the death of a person!

he is

exempt

It is impossible to say this, because the reason for the exemption in the latter clause is not as you explained, for

Reish Lakish said [above, on folio 22b] in explaining the Mishna: For example, he ignited the body of the slave and he was liable to death for him when he was bound, and he is exempt with regard to all of them, even with regard to the stack, because of the principle “he is faced with a more severe liability,”

since he is liable to death for the slave.

since he is liable to death for the slave.

to explain the Mishna:

For example, he ignited the body of a slave

and became liable to death for him when he was tied, and he is exempt for all of them, even for the stack, because of

he is subject to the greater penalty,

for he is liable to death for the slave.

[that the following applies]:

to include a slave killed unintentionally; similarly, “

to include the killing of a free person unintentionally as requiring an atonement payment?

to include a slave killed unintentionally, nevertheless “

to include liability for an atonement payment when a free person is killed unintentionally.

as it is stated: “If an atonement payment is imposed upon him,” and it is therefore properly possible to include payment even when the killing was unintentional.

[that this can be learned by a general principle]:

[a person who killed another person], and