Bava Kamma 43b — the Talmud in English

Who is it?

, in any event, there is a distinction between the money of a freeman, which he pays on his own admission, as explained in the first clause, and the money of a slave, which he does not pay on his own admission, as explained in the final clause. And the reason for the distinction is:

A freeman, who pays

even

ransom on his own admission—and what are the circumstances

in which he pays ransom on his own admission, even though the ox is not put to death by stoning on his own admission, and the owners do not pay ransom:

If witnesses came and testified concerning it that it killed [if witnesses came and said that this ox killed a person] and he became liable to be put to death by stoning,

and it became liable to stoning,

and

however

they did not know

the witnesses

whether it was innocuous

and exempt from ransom,

or whether it was forewarned

and liable even for ransom,

and its owner said that it was forewarned [and its owner admitted that it was forewarned]—

And in this manner he pays ransom on his own admission, because the ox is to be put to death by stoning on the testimony of the witnesses; for whether it is innocuous or forewarned, it is put to death by stoning, and we need his admission only with regard to ransom, and ransom is not a fine, so that he should not pay it on the basis of his admission—

And therefore

where there are no witnesses

to make him liable to be put to death by stoning, and it is impossible to make him liable for ransom, he

pays money

on his own admission.

But with regard to a

slave, who does not pay a fine on his own admission—and what are the circumstances,

that is, in what manner can it be found that he does not pay a fine on his own admission, without there being the deficiency that “if the ox is not put to death by stoning, the owners do not pay the value of the slave,”

if witnesses came and testified concerning it that it killed

and it became liable to be put to death by stoning,

and

however

they did not know whether it was innocuous

and exempt from the value of the slave,

or whether it was forewarned

and liable even for the value of the slave,

and its owner said, “It is forewarned”,

for

he does not receive a fine on his own admission,

since the thirty [shekels] of a slave are a fine, which he does not receive on his own admission—therefore,

where there are no witnesses

to make him liable to stoning and a fine, he

does not pay

even

money.

Rab Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak raises an objection

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak raised an objection

to Rabbah, who distinguished between ransom and the value of a slave, from that which was taught in a beraita:

Anyone who is liable for

the killing of an ox of

a freeman is liable for

the killing of an ox of

a slave, both for ransom [he proceeds to explain it]

or for the death penalty

and for death

of the ox. That is to say: just as in the case of a freeman, whether it is innocuous or forewarned, and whether it killed adults or whether it killed minors, it is liable to death, so too when it killed a slave.

But surely the following difficulty arises: how did they say that a slave is equal to a freeman with regard to ransom?

Is there ransom for a slave

—is there ransom for a slave? For he pays the fine of thirty shekels, and not ransom!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the beraita’s intention is not to ransom itself, but to

money

of the injured party; and this is the meaning of the beraita:

Anyone for whom the owner of the ox becomes liable for money when it kills a freeman—for example, when he admitted on his own behalf, so that he does not become liable for ransom because the ox is not put to death by stoning—

so too with regard to the value of a slave: if he admitted on his own behalf, although he is not liable for a fine [since the ox is not put to death by stoning, and one who admits to a fine is exempt], he pays money.

And if so, this is a difficulty against Rabbah, who distinguished between a freeman, whose value is paid through the owner’s admission, and a slave, whose value is not paid through the owner’s admission!?

Some say:

Rab Shmuel bar Yitzḥak

He

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak

raised the objection [he challenged Rabbah],

himself

and he

himself

resolved it [he establishes the following resolution], and

Rab Shmuel bar Yitzḥak himself did not give the resolution; rather,

some say: it was not Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak himself who resolved it, but

Not as you interpreted it—that the source means that when he admits based on his own statement that he is liable for monetary value for killing a free person, he is liable for monetary value for killing a slave. Rather,

Rabbah said to him:

It is not as you explained, that the beraita comes to say that when he admits on his own behalf that he is liable for money in the case of a freeman, he is liable for money in the case of a slave; rather,

this is what it teaches

in the beraita:

Anyone who is liable in the case of a freeman, intentionally, on the testimony of witnesses, for ransom,

that is to say: anyone who is liable for ransom in the case of a freeman—and what are the circumstances? For example, it was intentional and on the testimony of witnesses, as the ordinary liability is on the testimony of witnesses—

in this manner he is

liable in the case of a slave for a fine.

meaning: Just as when the ox killed unintentionally, but the matter was established by witnesses rather than by the owner’s admission, he is liable for monetary value, since when the ox kills unintentionally it is not sentenced to stoning and is therefore liable for monetary value—

And anyone who is liable in the case of a freeman, unintentionally, on the testimony of

witnesses, for money,

that is to say: just as when the ox killed unintentionally, but nevertheless on the testimony of witnesses and not on the basis of his admission, he is liable for money—for since the ox is not put to death by stoning when it killed unintentionally, he is liable for money—

he is liable

also

in the case of a slave, unintentionally, on the testimony of witnesses—

Rava said

money,

that is to say: this is also the law in the case of a slave, that if he acted unintentionally, but nevertheless on the testimony of witnesses [so that he is not included in “one who admits to a fine”], he is liable for money. This is because Rabbah only said that there is a distinction between a freeman and a slave with regard to money where he admitted, for the reason explained in the Gemara above [since we find a distinction between them with regard to admission concerning the very body of the ransom and the very body of the fine]. But where this occurred unintentionally, there is no distinction between ransom and a fine. Just as with ransom, since he does not pay ransom—for the ox is not put to death by stoning—nevertheless he pays money, so too with a slave he pays money, since he does not pay a fine.

He said

he challenged

Rava

to Rabbah:

If so,

according to your words, that his ox, unintentionally, which is not subject to ransom, pays money, since there is money for the death of a person where there is no ransom and no fine, then even

his fire

which went out and killed

unintentionally

and

on the testimony of witnesses,

money is paid

for it, since it is subject to the law of damages.

And we explain:

And from where does Rava know that he does not pay

—from where does Rava know that he does not pay money for fire?

If you say, from that which we learned

below, 61b: One who ignites a stack of grain, and

a tied kid was

to the stack,

and a slave was near it

and was not tied, for he should have fled,

and he was burned with it,

he is

liable

for the kid and exempt for the slave, for the kid could not flee, whereas the slave should have fled.

But

if there was

a slave tied to it, and

there was

a kid near

it

for it should have fled,

and it was burned with it,

he is

exempt

from payments for the slave and for the kid.

And it entered our minds that this is why he is exempt both for the slave and for the kid: for the slave he is exempt [even though it was tied to him and could not flee], because there is no money for the death of a person; and for the kid he is exempt because it should have fled. It is thus proven that with fire there is no liability for money for the death of a person!

It is impossible to say this, for the reason for the exemption in the final clause is not as you explained, for

Reish Lakish said [above, 22b]

to explain the Mishna:

For example, he ignited the body of a slave

and became liable to death for him when he was tied, and he is exempt for all of them, even for the stack, because of

he is subject to the greater penalty,

for he is liable to death for the slave.

Rather

interpret Rava’s source regarding his fire that acted unintentionally as saying that he is exempt from monetary compensation, namely that it is

from that which was taught:

There is a stringency with fire over a pit, for fire is forewarned to consume both something fit for it

and

something unfit for it,

that is to say: he is liable for the fire whether it burned something that is fit for it, namely wood and the like, or whether it burned something that is unfit for it, such as when it singed the plowed field in the field or burned stones.

Which is not so with a pit,

for he is not liable for something that is unfit for it.

But

there is an additional stringency with fire over a pit:

that fire pays monetary compensation unintentionally

if a person was burned,

which is not so with a pit,

for it does not pay for a person—for it is stated concerning it: “And an ox or a donkey fell there,” and we expound: “an ox but not a person”—

it does not teach

in the beraita! It is thus proven that even fire that acted unintentionally does not pay monetary compensation!

This too cannot be said, because:

perhaps the tanna

taught one stringency

and omitted

another stringency.

Rather,

on the force of this objection the Gemara says that it was not simple to Rava that fire that acted unintentionally does not pay monetary compensation, so that he raised an objection on this basis against Rabba.

Rather,

Rava himself, the matter was in doubt to him.

It was a doubt that he had, after he heard from Rabba that an ox that acted unintentionally pays monetary compensation:

With regard to his fire that acted unintentionally, does it pay

also

monetary compensation

like an ox that acted unintentionally,

or not

pay monetary compensation?

And these are the sides of his doubt:

Do we say: It is with regard to an ox that, when acting intentionally, it pays a ransom, and when acting unintentionally, it pays monetary compensation,

that is to say: specifically with regard to an ox, since when acting intentionally it pays a ransom, therefore it pays monetary compensation when acting unintentionally—

but with regard to his fire, which when acting intentionally does not pay a ransom,

if so,

when acting unintentionally as well, it does not pay monetary compensation.

Or perhaps, since with regard to an ox that acted unintentionally, even

though there is no ransom

in this very circumstance, nevertheless it

pays monetary compensation, with regard to his fire as well, even though

even

when acting intentionally it does not pay a ransom,

nevertheless

at least when acting unintentionally, it pays monetary compensation.

And we do not know; teyku!

When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan:

It should have been written to say: “

a ransom

shall be imposed upon him,” but

what is the meaning of its saying: “

If a ransom

shall be imposed upon him”?

To include

the verse’s coming to impose

a ransom

when the ox killed

unintentionally, like a ransom when acting intentionally, and in this Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Rabba, who exempts.

Rabbi Yohanan thus disagrees with Rabba, who exempts him.

Abaye said

to Rav Dimi:

But if that is so,

according to your exposition, “

a slave”—

the verse written concerning payment for a slave, as it is stated: “If a slave the ox gores, or a maidservant”—

also

let it be said that it would have sufficed for Scripture to write it, but

what is the meaning of its saying: “

If a slave,”

to include a slave killed unintentionally like a slave killed intentionally!?

And if you would say, so too—

But Resh Lakish said: An ox that killed a slave unintentionally is exempt from thirty shekels;

for it follows that we do not expound “if a slave” to include him.

He said to him

Rav Dimi to Abaye: Is it that

you are casting one man against another [you are objecting from one amora against another amora]!? For although Resh Lakish does not expound “if a slave,” it can properly be said that Rabbi Yohanan does expound it.

When Ravin came

from the Land of Israel,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan:

It should have been written to say, “

A slave

the ox shall gore.” But

what is the meaning of its saying “

If a slave

the ox shall gore”?

To include

the verse’s coming to impose a fine when it killed the

slave unintentionally, like a slave intentionally.

And as for Resh Lakish—

who exempts one for killing a slave unintentionally from payment for the slave—

let us also say [shall we say also]:

[that the following applies]:

from “

a slave, if a slave”

he does not expound

to include him when acting unintentionally, “

a ransom, if a ransom”

he also does not expound

to include the killing of a free person unintentionally as liable for a ransom?

They said

the members of the academy:

No,

it is not necessary to say so, and it can be said that although

“a slave, if a slave”

he does not expound

to include his killing unintentionally, nevertheless

“a ransom, if a ransom”—

he does expound

to include liability for a ransom for killing a free person unintentionally!

And what is different?

For

“a slave, if a slave”

is not written in the place of payment,

but was stated concerning the act of goring itself, and it was necessary to write it in order to distinguish between the law of a free person stated above, for whom he pays a ransom, and a slave, for whom he pays a fixed fine of thirty shekels; therefore we do not include from it an unintentional goring.

But

“a ransom, if a ransom”

is written in the place of payment,

for it is stated: “If a ransom shall be imposed upon him,” and it is proper to include payment even when acting unintentionally.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise with regard to a son or a daughter:

The Sages taught:

It is written: “The ox shall be stoned:

or if it gores a son or if it gores a daughter

according to this judgment shall be done to it,”

to obligate

the verse the ox in stoning

for

goring

the minors as

for goring the

adults.

And if you would say: Why do I need a verse?

Is it not an inference [it can be learned through an av binyan]:

[that this can be learned by a general principle]:

Since he is liable

for death for

a person killing a person [a person who killed a person],

[a person who killed another person], and

and is liable

for stoning for

an ox killing a person, just as when a person kills a person, there is no distinction between

killing the

minors and

killing the

adults,

so too, when an ox kills a person, you shall not distinguish between

minors and adults!?

Furthermore:

it is

a kal va-chomer

that he is liable for the ox with regard to minors as with regard to adults, because:

And just as with a person killing a person, where he did not make

the

the

minors

like the adults

who kill, for minors are not liable to death if they killed a person, nevertheless

he is liable for it

for death

with regard to the minors

who are killed

as with regard to the adults

who are killed—