Bava Kamma 44a — the Talmud in English

An ox that gored a person, concerning whom it is written

oxen

small

that killed,

as

oxen

large

that killed, and they too are liable to stoning,

is it not logical that it is liable

them

for the small ones

that were killed

as the large ones

that were killed?

It is not difficult; for it cannot be learned either through a binyan av or through a kal va-chomer, because:

If you say

that it is liable for the small ones as for the large ones, that is only

a person concerning a person, since he is liable

for injury

for four matters

in addition to damage, [namely: pain, medical treatment, loss of income, and humiliation];

can you say

that it should be liable for the small ones as for the large ones even

with an ox

concerning a person,

which

he

is not liable

for injury

for four matters

but only for damage?

And therefore

the verse states: “

Whether it gores a son or it gores a daughter,”

to make

even the ox concerning a person

liable for the small ones as for the large ones.

And I have only—

that they are liable to stoning for killing the small ones—

in the case of forewarned oxen; from where

do we know that it is liable to stoning even for killing the small ones? And if you say: It is obvious, for

is this not logical

that we learn it through a binyan av:

Since it made

the ox liable to stoning

for

killing

a man and a woman, and it made

it liable to stoning even

for

killing

a son and a daughter, just as when it made

it

liable for a man and a woman, you did not distinguish in its case between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, so too, when it made it liable for a son and a daughter, you should not distinguish in its case between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox.

And furthermore:

this is

a kal va-chomer

that the innocuous ox is liable for killing the small ones!?

For a man and a woman, whose status is weakened with regard to damages,

for if they cause damage, they are liable to make payment,

you did not distinguish in its case

when they killed them

between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox—

a son and a daughter

the small ones,

whose status is strengthened with regard to damages,

for if they cause damage, they are not liable to pay,

is it not logical that you should not distinguish concerning them

when they killed them

between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox?

You say:

The matter is not so, for it is impossible to learn from a man and a woman that the law of an innocuous ox is like that of a forewarned ox, neither through a binyan av nor through a kal va-chomer!

You cannot learn it through a binyan av, because

do they really derive

through a binyan av

from a lenient case to a stringent one,

so that you learn that an innocuous ox should be made liable for the small ones from a forewarned ox, which is liable for the small ones!?

And

if the verse made stringent

the written text

with the stringent forewarned ox [

which is liable for ransom] to make it liable to stoning for the small ones,

should you make stringent with the lenient innocuous ox [

which is not liable for ransom] to make it also liable to stoning for the small ones!?

And furthermore,

meaning: Also through a kal va-chomer you cannot learn it, because:

If you say with regard to a man and a woman

that an innocuous ox is liable to stoning for killing them, because

they are liable for mitzvot, can you say

also

with regard to a son and a daughter, who are exempt from mitzvot,

that an innocuous ox is liable for killing them!?

And since without a verse we do not know that an innocuous ox is liable for killing the son and the daughter, therefore

the verse states: “

Whether it gores a son or it gores a daughter,”

the verse repeated the expression “it gores” in order to teach us:

Goring

of a son and a daughter

by an innocuous ox, goring

of a son and a daughter

by a forewarned ox—

Goring

of a son and a daughter

for their death

of them,

goring

of a son and a daughter

for their damages

of them, to say that it is liable to pay for the damages of the minor boy and the minor girl.

Mishna:

An ox that was rubbing against a wall, and it fell

the wall

upon a person

without the ox’s intention—or an ox that

intended to kill an animal

for which the ox is not liable to stoning,

and

eventually

killed a person—

Or the ox intended

to

kill the

non-Jew

for whom it is exempt,

and it killed an Israelite—

Or the ox intended

to

kill the

miscarried fetus

for whom it is exempt,

and it killed a viable person—

In all these cases

the ox is exempt

from stoning, since it did not intend [to kill] one for whom there is liability.

Gemara:

Samuel said:

This that we learned, “exempt,” means

exempt from death, but liable for ransom.

And although the ox is not subject to stoning, the owners are liable for ransom, because Samuel expounds from “if ransom,” to include unintentional ransom like intentional ransom.

And Rav said: Exempt from both this and that.

For if the ox is not subject to stoning, the owners do not pay ransom, and he does not expound “if ransom” to include it.

And we object to Samuel:

But why

is it liable for ransom when it was rubbing against a wall and it fell upon a person?

For it is an innocuous ox,

and an innocuous ox is not liable for ransom!?

And we answer: And we explain:

As Rav said [

below, 48b] concerning what we learned in the Mishna below, 47b: “One who brought his ox into another’s courtyard without permission ... it fell [the ox] into the pit of the courtyard’s owner and fouled its water, he is liable; if his father or his son [of the courtyard’s owner] was in it [and the ox killed him by its fall], [the ox’s owner] pays ransom”; and we objected to it: But it is an innocuous ox! And Rav answered

in the case of an ox forewarned to fall upon people in pits—

Here too,

this case is speaking

of one forewarned to rub

intentionally

upon people in walls.

And we wonder:

If so,

that the case is speaking of its doing so intentionally,

it is liable to be put to death [

it is liable to death] through this goring; so how did we learn in the Mishna that it is exempt from death!?

Granted, there,

in Rav’s statement, it is not difficult that it is liable to death, for it was liable to stoning from the earlier falls, and how could it become forewarned? For it can be explained as Rav Yosef will resolve below, 48b, in a case where

it saw

the ox

grass [

on the edge of the pit] and it came to eat it,

and it fell

the ox into the pit unintentionally, and it follows that the ox did not intend to kill him; therefore it did not become liable to stoning.

But here,

with regard to the wall,

what is there to say!?

For since it intended, it is liable to stoning; why, then, did we learn that it is exempt from death for this goring!?

And we answer:

Here too, it is a case of rubbing

in the fourth goring

against the wall for its pleasure,

and it did not intend to kill with it; rather, it intended to kill in the earlier gorings.

And from where do we know,

how will we know that it is rubbing against the wall for its pleasure, so as to exempt it from death, and perhaps it is rubbing against the wall in order to make it fall upon people, and it is liable to death? And we answer: In a case where

after it fell, it rubs against it [

it rubs against the wall even after it fell], and certainly its intention is only for the rubbing itself.