Bava Kamma 43a — the Talmud in English

Or

that she was

a convert

who married a convert, conceived from him, and her children were born, and both of them died, and they are “like a newborn,” for they have no heirs—

the one who struck

acquired what was in his possession, and does not give at all the value of the offspring, nor compensation for damage and pain; because everything that a freed slave and a convert possess is ownerless, and he is the first to acquire them.

And the difficulty is: why do her heirs acquire the compensation for her damage and pain, while her husband does not acquire it?!

He said

he answered:

Rabba, and likewise Rav Naḥman, said:

This statement that we learned, “the woman does not give to her heirs,”

is dealing with a divorced woman

—and therefore her relatives acquire the compensation for damage and pain; but if she has a husband, he precedes her relatives in acquiring it.

The members of the academy said

to challenge this answer:

A divorced woman also should divide

the value of the offspring!

That is to say: if the beraita is dealing with a divorced woman, then why does her husband, who divorced her, acquire the value of the offspring? Does not the Torah say, “as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him,” and this man is not the husband of the woman, since he divorced her? And if he does not acquire it, she should acquire the value of the offspring?!

He said

he answered:

Rav Pappa said: The Torah granted the value of the offspring to the husband even when he had intercourse with her licentiously,

when he is not her husband. For the right to the value of the offspring does not depend on “the husband of the woman,” but on the one who has intercourse with the woman.

What is the reason?

Because

the verse says

“as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him.”

It follows that the Torah was particular about the one who had intercourse with her.

And we challenge Rabba and Rav Naḥman, who answered the earlier question by saying that the beraita is dealing with a divorced woman, thereby explaining why he does not give the compensation for damage and pain to her husband:

What difficulty did they have?! Although the obligation for damage and pain was created before the woman’s death, nevertheless the beraita is dealing with a case in which the compensation for damage and pain was paid after her death, and its law is like a debt that the woman had before she died and that was collected after her death, concerning which Rabba and Rav Naḥman disputed in what manner it is “expected” and in what manner it is “possessed”;

and

if so,

let us establish it,

let us explain the beraita as referring to what is “expected” and not “possessed.” How?

According to Rabba: for example, when they collected

the heirs, after the woman’s death,

money [

and not land] for the damage and pain; and in such a case, according to Rabba—as will be explained—this is “expected” and not “possessed.”

And according to Rav Naḥman: for example, when they collected

the heirs, after the woman’s death,

land

for the damage and pain, for according to his view—as will be explained—this is “expected.”

For Rabba said—

concerning a firstborn who takes a double portion in his father’s inheritance, but does not take a double portion in what is “expected” as in what is “possessed”—that if their father had a debt owed to him by another person, and he died:

If

they collected

the orphans

land

against their father’s debt,

he has

the firstborn a double portion in it, for it is considered “possessed,” since the land had already been encumbered during the father’s lifetime.

But if

they collected money, he does not have

a double portion, for this is “expected,” and a firstborn does not take a double portion in what is expected as in what is possessed; and according to his view we explain our case as referring to when they collected money.

And

if

Rav Naḥman said—

concerning the firstborn—in the reverse:

They collected

the orphans

money, he has

the firstborn a double portion, for this is not “expected,” since “their father lent money and they took money”; but if

they collected

the orphans

land, he does not have

a double portion, for this is “expected” and not “possessed,” even though the land had been encumbered during their father’s lifetime; and according to his view we explain our case as referring to when they collected land.

a. It was taught in a beraita brought in Bava Batra 124a: “A firstborn does not take a double portion in the increase by which the assets increased [which the father bequeathed; for example, he left them a date palm that had blossoms, and they became dates] after their father’s death [before they divided it; because it is ‘expected’]; Rabbi says: I say that a firstborn takes a double portion in the increase by which the assets increased [by themselves] after their father’s death,” for according to him an increase that occurs by itself is not considered “expected.”

b. We also read in Bava Batra 124b: “They sent from there [the people of the West sent from the Land of Israel, saying]: A firstborn takes a double portion in a loan [in repayment of a debt that their father had against others], but not in interest [for which the gentile borrower became liable after the father’s death].”

And there we explain that the people of the West distinguished between a loan and interest only according to the opinion of the Sages, who do not grant a firstborn a double portion in the increase by which assets increased by themselves; therefore, with interest—which is the increase that comes automatically from the debt—he does not take, but in the loan itself he does take, since repayment is not like an increase of the debt that increased after death. But according to Rabbi, who holds that an increase that occurs by itself is not considered “expected,” he takes a double portion even in interest, for interest is no inferior to an increase that occurs by itself, in which the firstborn takes a double portion.

The members of the academy said

to resolve this:

These words—

that a loan is not considered “possessed” in every circumstance—

according

to the view of

the people of the West according to the Sages,

who say according to their opinion that although a firstborn does not take a double portion in an increase, nevertheless he does take a double portion in a loan; and in this Rabba and Rav Naḥman disputed when a loan is superior to an increase—whether when land was collected or when money was collected—

When they said—Rabba and Rav Naḥman—

Rabba and Rav Naḥman

here,

where a loan is considered possessed in every circumstance,

according to Rabbi,

who, according to his view, grants a firstborn a double portion even in an increase by which assets increased by themselves; if so, any repayment of a loan is no inferior to an increase that occurs by itself, and it is not considered “expected.”

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: An ox that killed a slave unintentionally,

for which it is not liable to stoning, is

exempt

even

from thirty shekels,

because

it is stated:

“The silver of thirty shekels he shall give to his master, and the ox shall be stoned.”

And we learn:

Whenever the ox is subject to stoning, the owners pay thirty shekels,

but if

the ox is not subject to stoning, the owners do not pay thirty shekels.

Rabba said: An ox that killed a free person unintentionally,

for which it is not liable to stoning, is

exempt from ransom,

because

it is stated:

“The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death.

If a ransom is imposed upon him,”

and we learn:

Whenever the ox is subject to stoning, the owners pay ransom; if the ox is not subject to stoning, the owners do not pay ransom.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba

—who holds that if the ox is not subject to stoning, the owners do not pay ransom—from a Mishna in tractate Ketubot 41a:

For we learned there: If a person confessed and said,

“My ox killed so-and-so,”

or

he confessed and said, “My ox killed

so-and-so’s ox,”

he pays on his own admission,

for the admission of a litigant is considered like one hundred witnesses.

And

is it not so

that the meaning of the Mishna is that if he confessed and said, “My ox killed so-and-so,” he pays

ransom;

it is therefore proven that although the ox is not subject to stoning, since it is not killed on the basis of his admission, nevertheless the owners pay ransom—and this is a difficulty against Rabba?!

Rabba said to Abaye:

No,

not as you explained it, that he pays ransom, which is atonement, on the basis of his own admission; rather,

money

for the one killed is what he pays, and not by virtue of “ransom,” but like other damages.

Abaye said to him:

If

as you say, that where there is no ransom there is an obligation of

money

for the death of a person like other damages, then the same law applies concerning a slave: where there is no fine, there is an obligation of money to his master for his death like other damages. If so,

say the latter clause:

If he confessed and said,

“My ox killed so-and-so’s slave,”

he does not pay on the basis of his own admission,

because the thirty [shekels] of a slave are a fine, and a person does not pay a fine on the basis of his own admission.

And if

as you say, that there is an obligation of

money

for the death of a person like other damages, then even concerning a slave,

why does he not

pay money to the master on the basis of his own admission? For he should be obligated to pay money like other damages with which he damaged the master’s property. Rather, certainly, when there is no fine, he also does not pay money, for there is no payment of money for killing a person. If so, even concerning ransom, if he would not pay ransom because the ox is not subject to stoning, he would not pay money either; necessarily, therefore, he is paying ransom, even though the ox is not subject to stoning.

Rabba said to him

Rabba said to Abaye:

I can answer you

that the

first clause

is dealing with

money,

and

whereas

the

latter clause

is dealing with a

fine; but in truth, he is liable for money.

fine—but in truth he is liable for monetary compensation.

And

however, a strained resolution, I will not give you

[I do not wish to give you strained answers], and therefore I will say to you:

Both this and that

[both the first clause and the final clause] deal with liability for

monetary damages

as with other damages; and as for what is difficult for you: why is it different that, in the killing of a free person on his own admission, he is not liable for kofer, because the ox is not subject to stoning, nevertheless he pays monetary damages; whereas in the killing of a slave on his own admission, he does not pay a fine, because the ox is not subject to stoning [and because he admitted to a fine], he is not liable for monetary damages; your answer is: