Bava Kamma 42b — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection: But in the beraita above, on page 42a, it is explained that Rabbi Akiva challenged Rabbi Eliezer, who interpreted this verse as excluding an innocuous ox from payment of ransom: “But the ox itself is paid for only from its body; bring it to court and it will pay you.” If so, this should be difficult:

And let Rabbi Akiva apply this argument to himself

that is, let him raise against himself the same objection that he raised against Rabbi Eliezer:

But

it

itself is paid for only from its body,

for if an innocuous ox were liable to pay compensation for the killing of a slave, it would pay from its body, just as it pays from its body for half the damage. If so:

“Bring it to court and it will pay you!”

He said

Rab Shmuel bar Yitzchak answered:

the verse had to exclude it from payment of ransom

when its owner acted first

and slaughtered it

before its judgment had been completed, before it became forbidden to derive benefit from it.

What might one have said: “He should collect from it”

that is, he should collect the thirty sela from the ox?

Therefore,

the verse teaches us

that

since it is liable to be put to death

that is, the ox is subject to the death penalty,

even though

its owner acted first and

slaughtered it,

nevertheless

he may not collect from it.

And we wonder about this answer:

If so

if you have explained the matter in this way according to Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation,

the same should apply to Rabbi Eliezer as well.

Let us say that the verse had to exclude half-ransom

when the owner acted first and slaughtered the ox.

Then what difficulty did Rabbi Akiva raise against Rabbi Eliezer? We answer:

That is indeed so.

Rabbi Akiva did know that the verse could be interpreted as referring to a case where the owner acted first and slaughtered the ox,

and

he challenged Rabbi Eliezer only because he

thought

that Rabbi Eliezer

might have

another reason,

a stronger one than this, and that he should state it to him.

[perhaps he had a better answer and would give it to him].

And

But we still ask:

Why did Rabbi Eliezer not answer him:

The verse was needed for a case

where the owner acted first and slaughtered the ox!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Eliezer could say to you:

There

in the case under discussion,

the person intended to kill an animal but killed a human being, so the ox is not liable to be put to death at all.

In other words, the ox is not subject to any death penalty.

One might have thought that it should nevertheless be liable,

in that circumstance;

therefore the verse was needed to exclude it.

That is, only in the case I mentioned—where the ox was intended to kill an animal but killed a human being, and therefore is not subject to any death penalty—could one have said that since it was not originally subject to death, a liability payable from its body should take effect. The Torah therefore had to exclude it from ransom.

But here

where it was intended to kill—

from the outset,

before it was slaughtered,

it was liable to be put to death

that is, it was actually subject to the death penalty. From the outset, then, no liability payable from its body could take effect. In this case,

no verse was needed

to exclude it from ransom,

even though

in the end

the owner slaughtered it,

and a circumstance arose that could otherwise have made it liable to payment from its body.

And we ask:

But according to Rabbi Akiva too, this reasoning certainly applies

that is, surely this reasoning is valid. If so, it cannot be said that, according to Rabbi Akiva, the verse was needed to exclude payment for a slave when the owner acted first and slaughtered the ox. Since the ox was liable to be put to death, it is obvious that it does not pay for the value of a slave.

Because of this difficulty, the Gemara gives another reason why, according to Rabbi Akiva, the verse had to exclude an innocuous ox from payment for a slave, so that the owner could not say, “Bring it to court and it will pay you”:

Rather, Rabbi Asi said: I heard this matter from a great man

that is, I heard this answer from a distinguished person,

and who was he? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Hanina!

The verse therefore had to exclude an innocuous ox from payment for a slave, even though payment can be collected only from its body. For

one might have thought, since Rabbi Akiva said

in the Mishna above, on page 33a:

“Even an innocuous ox that injured a person pays full damages for the difference,”

and its law is not like that of an innocuous ox that damaged property, which is liable only for half the damage,

it might likewise be possible to collect the value of a slave from the owner’s general assets.

Therefore

the Torah stated

“The owner of the ox is clear,”

to teach that an innocuous ox is exempt from payment for the value of a slave.

to teach that a tam is exempt from payment for a slave.

He said

Rabbi Zeira challenged

Rabbi Asi: “But Rabbi Akiva had already withdrawn his own argument!”

That is, Rabbi Akiva had already refuted the force of his own argument.

For

it is

taught

above, on page 33a:

“Rabbi Akiva says: Could it be that

an innocuous ox that injured a person would pay

from the owner’s general assets?

The verse states:

‘As this law shall be done to him.’

He pays from his body, and he does not pay from the owner’s general assets.”

If so, the difficulty returns: The owners could say to him, “Bring it to court and it will pay you.”

Rather, Rava said:

Here is another answer why, concerning payment for a slave, the argument “Bring it to court and it will pay you” does not apply:

The verse was needed

to exclude an innocuous ox from payment for a slave, because

one might have thought: Since I treat

the killing of

a slave more stringently than

the ransom paid for killing

a free person:

When a free person is worth

one

sela

and is killed by the ox,

the owner of the ox pays ransom of

one

sela only; but if the victim is worth

thirty

sela, he

pays ransom of

thirty

sela.

тридцать

села.

But

if his ox killed

a slave,

even when he is worth only

one sela,

he

pays thirty sela to his owner.

sela to his owner.

Therefore, one might have thought that the slave should be treated more stringently also in that

the value of the slave should likewise be collected from the owner’s general assets,

rather than from the ox’s body.

Therefore,

the Torah stated

“The owner of the ox is clear,”

to exempt him.

A beraita supports Rava’s view:

As it is taught: “

The owner of the ox is clear.”

Rabbi Akiva says: “Clear of payment for a slave.”

Lest you say: Why did the Torah need to exclude it?

It follows by logical inference

that it should not pay:

Since it is liable

for payment

for a slave, and liable

for ransom

for a free person,

if so,

just as

when it is liable

for ransom

for a free person,

you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a liable ox,

so that an innocuous ox does not pay ransom,

so too, when it is liable

for payment

for

killing a

slave, you should distinguish between an innocuous ox and a liable ox, so that the innocuous ox is exempt from payment for a slave. Why, then, is a verse needed?

There is also an a-fortiori inference

that an innocuous ox is exempt from payment for a slave. Why, then, is a verse needed?

If a free person, for whom the owner pays

in ransom

his entire value, you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a liable ox; then in the case of a slave, for whom the owner pays

only thirty

sela,

is it not all the more so that you should distinguish between an innocuous ox and a liable ox,

so that the innocuous ox is exempt?

The tan nai, the sage of the Mishnaic era who authored the beraita, rejects this:

No.

This is not so, and the matter cannot be derived from ransom, because I might have thought that

I treat a slave more stringently than a free person.

For

a

free person,

when he is

worth one sela, the one who caused the damage pays

only

one sela

as ransom, and when he is worth

thirty, he pays thirty.

But

if it is a

slave,

even when he is

worth one sela, the owner pays thirty.

If so,

could an innocuous ox be liable

for payment for a slave? Therefore,

the verse states

“The owner of the ox is clear,”

to teach that he is

clear of payment for a slave.

The Sages taught:

It is written in the passage concerning kofer: “And if it is an ox accustomed to gore from yesterday and the day before, and its owner was warned but he did not guard it,”

“and it killed a man or a woman.

If kofer shall be imposed upon him”—

Rabbi Akiva said: And what does this

“or a woman”

come to teach us!?

If it is to obligate

kofer

for the woman

whom it killed

as

the

man, it was already stated

in the preceding verse concerning a harmless ox:

“When an ox shall gore a man or a woman,”

and we thereby learn that when the Torah obligated kofer for an ox accustomed to gore, the Torah also obligated it for the goring of a woman.

Rather,

the verse returned and said “or a woman” in order

to equate a woman with a man: Just as a man’s damages

namely, the kofer

go to his heirs

his relatives who inherit him,

so too, a woman’s damages

the kofer paid on her account

go to her heirs,

that is, to her relatives and not to her husband.

And we challenge this:

A

fter all,

did Rabbi Akiva hold

that

a husband does not inherit her!?

That is, that a husband has no inheritance at all in the property of his wife!?

And it was taught:

It is written [Numbers 27:11]: “And you shall give his inheritance to his relative who is closest to him from his family,

and he shall inherit it”;

from here that a husband inherits his wife,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

It is thus that a husband inherits his wife everywhere; and why is the kofer not given to the husband!?

He said

he answered:

Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Akiva said

only

with regard to kofer

that a husband does not inherit his wife,

since

the kofer

is paid only after death, and it is

a

prospective asset

to come to the wife after her death,

and a husband does not inherit a

prospective asset

to come to his wife after death,

as

an established asset

that belonged to his wife during her lifetime.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that the kofer is paid only after death, even though during the person’s lifetime the court assessed that he would die?

Because

the verse says

concerning kofer:

“And the ox killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned and its owner shall also be put to death.

If

a kofer shall be imposed upon him,”

for the Torah obligated it only when it killed him, and an assessment that he would die is not sufficient.

And we challenge this: Did Rabbi Akiva say only with regard to kofer that the husband does not inherit it,

a

nd if it were

with regard to damages

for which the offender became liable to the woman and she died,

Rabbi Akiva did not say

that the husband does not inherit them!?

And it was taught:

One who

struck a woman, and her children emerged,

he

gives damages and pain

of the woman’s injury

to the woman—

A

nd if it were

the payments for the offspring

that he gives

to the husband.

And if

the husband is not

alive,

he gives

the payments for the offspring

to his heirs.

And if

the woman is not

alive,

he gives

the damages and the pain

to her heirs.

And if

the

woman

was a maidservant, and she was emancipated,

and she married an emancipated slave and conceived from him, her children emerged, and both of them died, and they have no heirs, since an emancipated slave is like “a newborn” without a family—