Bava Kamma 42b (מב:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise a difficulty: In the beraita above, on 41b–42a, it is explained that Rabbi Akiva challenged Rabbi Eliezer, who interpreted this verse as excluding a tam from payment of kofer: “But he himself is compensated only from his body; bring him to court, and he will pay you.” If so, the following difficulty arises:

And let Rabbi Akiva say to himself

[that is, Rabbi Akiva should raise against himself the same difficulty that he raised against Rabbi Eliezer]:

But

he

himself is compensated only from his body,

for if the tam were required to pay the value of the offspring, he would pay from his body, just as he pays half the damage from his body. If so:

“Bring him to court, and he will pay you!”

.[unclear: text references and abbreviations in original footnote]

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak

explained:

He said:

The verse had to exclude it from payment of kofer

when its owner acted first

before its verdict had been completed, before it became prohibited for benefit,

and slaughtered it.

Lest you say: Let him be compensated from it

[that he should collect the thirty shekels from the ox], therefore

the verse teaches us

that

since it is fit for execution

[the ox is liable to be put to death], therefore

even though

its owner acted first and

slaughtered it,

nevertheless

he is not compensated from it.

; [unclear: doctrinal elaboration in original footnote] ;

And we raise an objection to this:

If so,

if you have explained the matter in this way according to Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation,

the same should apply to Rabbi Eliezer:

Let us say that the verse had to exclude it from half-kofer

when its owner acted first and slaughtered it.

Then what was Rabbi Akiva’s difficulty with Rabbi Eliezer!? We answer:

Yes, indeed.

Rabbi Akiva did know that the verse could be interpreted as referring to a case in which the owner acted first and slaughtered it,

and

he challenged Rabbi Eliezer only because

Rabbi Akiva thought that

Rabbi Eliezer

might have

Rabbi Eliezer

another reason, superior to this one, and might have told him

[perhaps he had a better answer and would give it to him].

And

we nevertheless raise another difficulty:

Rabbi Eliezer too—why did he not answer him

[why did Rabbi Eliezer not answer Rabbi Akiva]: The verse was necessary

when its owner acted first and slaughtered it!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Eliezer could have said to you:

Rabbi Eliezer:

There,

in that case,

it was a case in which he intended to kill an animal but killed a person, for the ox is not at all fit for execution

[the ox is not subject to any liability to be put to death],

you might have thought that we should impose liability

in such a case.

The verse was therefore necessary to exclude it.

That is, only in the case I mentioned—when he intended to kill an animal but killed a person, where the ox is not at all subject to liability for execution—could one have reasoned that since initially it was not fit for execution, an obligation to pay from its body would take effect, and the Torah therefore had to exclude it from kofer.

But here—

when he intended to kill—

from the outset

before it was slaughtered,

it was fit for execution

[it was actually liable to be put to death], and initially there was no possibility for an obligation to pay from its body to take effect. In this case

no verse is necessary

to exclude it from kofer,

even though

ultimately

he slaughtered it

and a circumstance arose that could cause an obligation to pay from its body to take effect.

And we raise a difficulty:

According to Rabbi Akiva too, surely this must be so

[surely this reasoning is correct]!? If so, it is impossible to say that according to Rabbi Akiva the verse was needed to exclude payment for a slave when the owner acted first and slaughtered it, for since the ox was liable to be put to death, it need not be stated that it does not pay the value of a slave.

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara gives another reason why, according to Rabbi Akiva, the verse was needed to exclude a tam from payment for a slave, and why one cannot say to the owner, “Bring him to court, and he will pay you”:

Rather, Rabbi Asi said: I heard this matter from a great man

[I heard this explanation from a distinguished person],

and who is he? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina!

The verse was therefore needed to exclude a tam from payment for a slave, even though he is compensated only from his body, because

you might have thought: Since Rabbi Akiva said

[in the Mishna above, 33a]:

“Even a tam that injured a person pays full damages for the surplus of the damage”,

and its law is not like that of a tam that damaged property, which is liable only for half the damage, if so,

he too is compensated for the value of a slave from the superior-quality property—

therefore

the Merciful One wrote

[the Torah had to state]:

“The owner of the ox is clear”,

to teach that a tam is exempt from payment for a slave.

Rabbi Zeira

challenged

Rabbi Asi: But Rabbi Akiva already demolished his own argument!

[surely Rabbi Akiva had already broken the force of his own fist—that is, refuted this argument himself].

For

it is

taught

[above, 33a]:

Rabbi Akiva says: Could it be that he pays

when a tam injures a person

from the superior-quality property?

The verse states:

“According to this judgment shall be done to him.”

He pays from his body, and he does not pay from the superior-quality property.

If so, the difficulty returns to its place: The owners could say to him, “Bring him to court, and he will pay you.”

Rather, Rava said

another answer as to why, concerning payment for a slave, one cannot say, “Bring him to court, and he will pay you”:

It was necessary

for the verse to exclude a tam from payment for a slave, because

you might have thought: Since I am more stringent

with regard to killing a

slave than

with regard to kofer paid for killing a

free person:

If a free person is worth

the equivalent of

one sela,

when he is killed by the ox,

the owner of the ox

pays kofer of

one sela בלבד, and if the person killed is worth

thirty

sela, he

pays kofer of

thirty

sela;

sela, he

a sela

but

if his ox killed a

slave,

even when he is worth

one sela

pays thirty

sela to his owner.

Therefore, one might say that the slave is also treated more stringently with regard to the fact that

the value of a slave is likewise paid from the superior-quality property,

and not from the ox’s body.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote

“The owner of the ox is clear,”

to exempt him.

A beraita supports Rava’s view:

;

For it is taught: “

The owner of the ox is clear.”

Rabbi Akiva says: Clear of payment for a slave.

Lest you say: Why was it necessary for the Torah to exclude it?

Is it not a logical inference

that it should not pay:

Since it is liable

for payment

for a slave, and it is liable

for

a free person

to pay kofer, if so,

just as

when

it is liable

for kofer

for a free person, you distinguished between a tam and a muad,

as a tam does not pay kofer,

so too, when it is liable

for payment

for

killing a

slave, distinguish between a tam and a muad, and say that the tam is exempt from payment for a slave. Why, then, do I need a verse!?

and one might say that in the case of a harmless ox he is exempt from the payment for a slave; why, then, is a verse needed?

And there is also a kal va-chomer

that a tam should be exempt from payment for a slave; why, then, do I need a verse!?

If, in the case of a free person, he pays

as kofer

his entire value, and you distinguished between a tam and a muad; in the case of a slave, for whom he pays

only thirty

sela,

is it not logical that you should distinguish between a tam and a muad,

so that the tam is exempt!?

The tanna of the beraita rejects this:

No.

That is not so, and it cannot be derived from kofer, for I might have thought that

I am more stringent with regard to a slave than with regard to a free person.

For

indeed, a

free person,

when he is

worth one sela, pays—the one who caused the damage pays only

one

sela as kofer; and when he is worth

thirty, he pays thirty.

thirty, he pays thirty.

But

if it is a

slave,

even when he is

worth one sela, he pays thirty.

If so,

it could be that a tam is liable

for payment for a slave. Therefore

the verse states

“The owner of the ox is clear,”

to teach that he is

clear of payment for a slave.

This is apparently difficult: The Tosafot asked above that this is not a stringency with regard to a slave, since, on the other hand, when the slave is worth one hundred maneh, the owner pays only thirty sela. They explained that, nevertheless, with regard to collection from the ox’s body, it is logical that he should not pay specifically from the body, since the payment is fixed. ;

The Sages taught:

It is written in the passage concerning the ransom: “And if it was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before, and its owner had been warned but did not guard it,

and it killed a man or a woman.

If a ransom shall be imposed upon him”—

Rabbi Akiva said: What does this [“

or a woman”]

come to teach us!?

If it is

a ransom

for the woman

whom it killed

as

that for the

man, it has already been stated

in the preceding verse, concerning a harmless ox: “

When an ox gores a man or a woman”;

and it follows that when the Torah obligates a ransom for a forewarned ox, the Torah also obligates it for goring a woman.

Rather,

the verse repeats and says “or a woman” in order

to equate a woman with a man: Just as the damages of a man

meaning, the ransom]

go to his heirs

his relatives who inherit from him],

so too, the damages of a woman

the ransom paid on her account]

go to her heirs,

meaning her relatives, and not to her husband.

And we raise an objection:

D

o

Rabbi Akiva really hold

that

a husband does not inherit from his wife!?

That is, that a husband does not inherit any of his wife's property at all!?

And it was taught in a beraita:

It is written [Numbers 27:11]: “And you shall give his inheritance to his relative who is closest to him from his family,

and he shall inherit it.”

From here it follows that a husband inherits from his wife,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

It follows that a husband inherits from his wife in every case. Why, then, is the ransom not given to the husband!?

Said

—he explained—

Reish Lakish: Rabbi Akiva said

Rabbi Akiva

only concerning a ransom,

where a husband does not inherit from his wife,

since

the ransom

is paid only after death, and it is

something

prospective

to come to his wife after her death,

and a husband does not inherit in

prospective property

that comes to his wife after death,

as he does in

property already in her possession

during her lifetime.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that the ransom is paid only after death, even though during the victim's lifetime the court assessed that he would die?

Because

the verse says

with regard to a ransom: “

And it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death.

If

a ransom shall be imposed upon him.”

Thus, the Torah obligated payment only when the ox killed him; an assessment that he would die is not sufficient.

And we raise an objection: Did Rabbi Akiva say that a husband does not inherit from her only with regard to a ransom,

a

if

with regard to damages

that were owed to a woman and she died,

did Rabbi Akiva not say

that her husband does not inherit from her!?

And it was taught in a beraita:

One who

struck a woman, and her children emerged,

he

gives the damages and pain

for the woman's injury

to the woman—

A

if

the payments for the fetuses

he gives

to the husband.

And if

the husband is not alive,

having died,

he gives

the payments for the fetuses

to his heirs.

And if

the woman is not alive,

having died,

he gives

the damages and pain

to her heirs.

And if

she was

the woman

a maidservant, and she was emancipated,

and she married an emancipated slave and became pregnant by him, and her children emerged, and both of them died, and they have no heirs, since an emancipated slave is like “a newborn,” without a family—