Bava Kamma 33a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains: The reason the Gemara stated that this concerns his apprentice is that for

another

who entered with permission,

he does not have fear of his master,

and therefore, if the owner of the place asks him to leave, he will not hurry to obey him; and if he is killed, the smith is liable for exile, since he ought to have taken into consideration that he had still not left.

But

this one,

the smith’s apprentice,

does have fear of his master,

and if his master instructs him to leave, he immediately leaves. Therefore, if he is killed, it is explained in the beraita that he is exempt, since the smith thought that he had already left.

Now the Gemara brings another explanation of the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

Rav Zevid taught it in the name of Rava

in connection with the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina

with regard to this:

It is stated in the Torah: “And when a man goes with his fellow into the forest to hew wood, and his hand swings the ax to cut the tree, and the iron slips from the wood and finds his fellow, and he dies, he shall flee to one of these cities and live.”

The Sages expounded from what is stated

“and finds,”

that only if the iron found the victim and struck him is the killer liable for exile.

This excludes one who brought himself into its path:

if the murdered person brought himself to the place toward which the iron was thrown, the killer is exempt.

From here

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: If a stone left the hand of one who threw it

unintentionally,

and the other stuck out

his head

from the window

and received it

and died

, the thrower is exempt

from exile.

.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:

Even though from the verse it is expounded that he is

exempt from exile,

nevertheless, with regard to damages he is called negligent,

and

therefore, if he threw a stone and the other stuck out his head and was injured, the thrower

is liable for four matters.

And the Gemara explains:

The one who teaches it

the words of Rabbi Yosei

with regard to this,

concerning one who brings himself into its path, that he is liable for four matters,

all the more so

does he teach the words of Rabbi Yosei

with regard to the first case,

concerning one who entered a carpenter’s shop and the carpenter struck him, that he is liable for four matters.

And

if

the one who teaches it

the words of Rabbi Yosei

with regard to the first case,

concerning the beraita of one who entered a carpenter’s shop, holds that specifically in a case in which the carpenter ought to have been careful is he liable for the damages of the one who entered,

but with regard to this,

concerning one who brings himself into its path,

the thrower is exempt

from

entirely,

even from the four matters.

.

The Sages taught: Laborers who came to demand their wages from the householder, and the householder’s ox gored them or the householder’s dog bit them, and they died,

the householder

is exempt.

Others say: Laborers are permitted

to enter the courtyard in order

to demand their wages from the householder,

and the householder must guard his ox so that it will not injure them; and if it injures them, the householder is liable.

And the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances?

If

it concerns a householder

who is commonly found in the city,

who is present in the city and can be approached for payment even outside his home, then they do not have permission to enter his home, since they must wait for him outside until he leaves; and if so,

what is the reason of Others

who said that the laborers are permitted to enter to demand their wages?

And

if

it concerns a case in which

he is commonly found

the householder only

at home

and does not leave there, it follows that they have no possibility of receiving their wages unless they come to his home, and they enter with permission; and if so,

what is the reason of the first tanna

who said that if the householder’s ox injures them he is exempt, since they enter with permission?

And the Gemara explains:

It is necessary;

the Gemara is speaking

of a man who is sometimes found and sometimes not found,

who sometimes goes out of his home to the marketplace and sometimes is found inside his home.

And

the discussion concerns a case in which the laborers came to his home and

called at the door,

calling to him from the entrance of the courtyard,

and he said to them: Yes.

One Master holds:

Others explain that the householder’s intention in saying

“Yes” means, “Enter!”

come in

—that is what it means,

and it follows that the laborer entered with permission, and if the householder’s ox injured him, he is liable.

And one Master holds:

the Sages, that the householder’s intention was to say

“No; stand in your place,”

remain where you are and I will come to the entrance

—that is what it means.

Therefore, if the laborer entered the courtyard, he did so without permission, and if the householder’s ox gored him, the householder is exempt.

It was taught in accordance with the one who says: “No” means “Stand in your place,”

according to the Sages.

For it was taught: A laborer who entered to demand his wages from the householder, and the householder’s ox gored him or his dog bit him,

the householder

is exempt, even though he entered with permission.

And apparently one must examine:

Why

is the householder

exempt,

for he entered with permission?

Rather, is it not

necessary to explain that the case is one in which the laborer stood at the entrance of the courtyard,

for he called at the door,

and called to him from the entrance that he should come to him,

and he said to him

the householder

“No,” and

since it teaches that the householder is exempt,

infer from this

that his intention in saying

“No” means “Stand in your place,”

and therefore, if he was injured, the householder is exempt.

Mishna:

From the beginning of the chapter “The One Who Places” the Mishnayot and the Gemara dealt with a person who causes damage and with damages caused by a pit; from here onward the laws of an ox that causes damage will be explained.

A.

Two innocuous oxen [A0014]that had not been forewarned in court, belonging to two people,

[that had not been declared dangerous by a court], belonging to two different people,

that injured one another,

if the injury caused by one is greater than that caused by the other, the difference between the lesser damage and the greater damage is assessed, and

they pay from the surplus

out of the difference the amount of

half

the damage,

as is the law of an innocuous ox, which pays half the damage. For example: if one ox was injured by one hundred zuz [a maneh] and the other by two hundred, the ox injured by two hundred does not receive one hundred zuz as payment for half its damage, since it too caused damage of one hundred zuz; rather, the part by which it was harmed more than it caused is assessed, and it is found to be as though it was harmed by one hundred zuz, and it receives half of that, fifty. B. And if

both

were

forewarned,

and they damaged one another,

they pay from the surplus full damage,

the one whose damage was greater receives the entire difference, the amount by which it was harmed more than its fellow, as is the law of a forewarned ox that causes damage: it pays full damage.

For example, if one ox was injured by one hundred and the second ox by two hundred, the owner of the ox injured by two hundred should assess how much his ox damaged its fellow: one hundred; and the surplus, the amount by which it was harmed more than this—one hundred—he receives.

C. If

one

of the oxen

was innocuous and

the

one was forewarned

and they damaged one another.

If the injury caused by the

forewarned ox to the innocuous ox

is greater than the injury caused by the innocuous ox to the forewarned ox,

the owner of the forewarned ox pays

the owner of the innocuous ox

from the surplus full damage,

the entire difference, the amount by which his ox caused more damage than it suffered, as is the law of a forewarned ox that caused damage.

And if the injury caused by the

innocuous ox to the forewarned ox

is greater than the injury caused by the forewarned ox to the innocuous ox,

the owner of the innocuous ox pays

from the surplus

half-damage,

half the difference between what his ox caused and what it suffered, as is the law of an innocuous ox that caused damage.

D.

And likewise, two people who injured one another,

and the injury of one was greater than that of the other,

pay from the surplus full damage.

E.

A person

who injured

a

forewarned

ox, and likewise a

forewarned

ox

that injured

a person,

if one of them harmed the other more than it was harmed,

pays from the surplus full damage.

The Yam Shel Shlomo explained that there is a practical difference between saving one’s relative and saving another person. The case is one in which the victim was being struck lawfully. If the rescuer came to save his relative and struck the assailant, the rescuer is exempt even though the assailant was striking lawfully and there was no permission to stop him and strike him, because the rescuer is considered to have acted under duress: he could not bear seeing his relative being struck. But if he came to save another person, and the assailant was striking that person lawfully, the rescuer struck the assailant unlawfully and is liable to pay him for the blow. See there for the continuation of his words. And the Perisha [ section 421, subsection 20; this was quoted similarly by the Sma, subsection 28] explained that the distinction is as follows: when a person sees one person striking another, the observer is permitted to strike the assailant only in order to stop him from committing a transgression. Therefore, if it becomes known that the observer who came to stop the assailant was not striking him in order to stop the transgression but merely out of hatred—for example, this person had seen people striking each other several times but had never stopped them—he is forbidden to strike the assailant. This is not so when the victim is a member of his family: he may save the victim from the assailant even though he normally does not stop people who strike one another from committing the transgression. And the Taz questioned this explanation: does the law of stopping someone from committing a transgression depend on the rescuer’s intention? Since it is permitted to stop the assailant, it should make no difference what the observer’s intention was when stopping him—whether he acted for the sake of a mitzva or out of hatred. In either case, he is permitted to strike the assailant. Therefore, he explained that the distinction in the Rosh’s words between someone who wishes to stop an assailant from striking his relative and someone who wishes to stop an assailant from striking an ordinary person is that when saving another person, one may not strike until it is completely clear that the victim cannot be saved except by striking the assailant. But when saving a relative, one is not so exacting about whether the victim could have been saved in another way, because one’s relative is like oneself. See there, where he inferred this from the Rosh’s wording. Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky [ novellae on Bava Batra 10] questioned the words of the later authorities. Where do we find that a relative has the legal status of one’s own body, such that there should be a distinction in the law and one should be permitted to strike his assailant more readily than any other person? Therefore, Rabbi Shmuel explained the matter in the opposite way. There would actually have been reason to be more stringent and forbid striking the person who was striking one’s relative, because the fundamental permission to strike the assailant is in order to stop him from committing a transgression. If so, one might have said that a person saving his relative does not intend to stop the assailant from committing a transgression; his entire intention is merely to save his relative. The Rosh therefore teaches that even when one sees his relative being struck, he is permitted to save him and strike the assailant. [According to this, however, the Rosh should have mentioned first the law of stopping a transgression when one sees another person being struck, and afterward added that the same law applies when one sees his relative being struck. See there.] It has already been explained that the Taz’s words imply that, logically, one may stop the assailant even without an intention for the sake of a mitzva, unlike Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky. The Tur and the Shulchan Arukh [ section 421] cited this law: if the two people did not begin simultaneously, the person who was struck may strike the assailant in return. Their wording appears to imply that the second person is exempt only when the first continues striking him and he must strike the first in order to save himself. But if the first person has stopped striking, the second has no permission to retaliate. Apparently, this follows from the reasons given by the Rosh: that he may save himself and stop the assailant from committing a transgression. These reasons do not apply when the first person has stopped striking. According to this, there is a distinction between two oxen and two people. In the case of oxen, if the second ox returned and struck the first after the first had stopped striking, the second is exempt under the principle that “if one changed the animal’s behavior,” unless they separated and began a new quarrel, in which case the second is also liable. In the case of people, however, the second may strike only while the first is striking him. This is explained similarly by the Bach [ there, subsection 19] and by the Taz. But the Perisha [ there, subsection 18; this was quoted similarly by the Sma [24] and by the glosses of the Vilna Gaon [17]] maintained that there is a scribal error in the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh, and that in fact, if the person who was struck returned and struck the first person immediately after being struck, he is exempt, just as in the case of oxen, because he is acting in the heat of anger. See the Even HaEzel [ Monetary Damages 9:14], who questioned their view: what exemption can a person have for striking while in the heat of anger? Is striking permitted merely because he is angry? We do not find the principle that a person may enforce justice on his own behalf above, 28a, except when he is entitled to something according to the law, and not merely when he is in the heat of anger. See the Yam Shel Shlomo, who wrote that the second person is considered to be lacking judgment and has the exemption of “if one changed the animal’s behavior,” as in the case of an animal, even if the first person has stopped striking him. Now, the Shulchan Arukh [ section 421:13] cited the Rosh’s ruling concerning two people: both are liable only when they began simultaneously or when the second retaliated after some time. But [in section 402] it cited only the case of two oxen that injured each other, stating that they pay half the damage from the remainder, and did not mention the Rosh’s statement that there is a distinction between those who began simultaneously and those who began one after the other. And the Rema cited the Rosh’s view as one of the opinions, and concluded: “The author, who ruled here [concerning two oxen] like the one who disagrees [with the Rosh] and holds that no distinction should be made [between those who began simultaneously and those who began one after the other], while later [concerning two people] ruled as I have written [according to the Rosh], did not decide correctly.” The Sma [ section 402, subsection 11] and the Vilna Gaon [ subsection 4] wrote that the Rema’s words imply that there is a dispute between the Rosh and Rabbi Isaac, whom the Tur cited [as brought in the note]. But it is possible that Rabbi Isaac disagrees only with the Rosh’s method of calculation, not with this law. The Shulchan Arukh omitted this law in section 402 because it relied on its explanation of this law concerning oxen in section 421. See the Yam Shel Shlomo. And the Be’er HaGolah wrote that the author did not mention the Rosh’s words concerning two oxen because, in his view, there is a distinction between oxen that began simultaneously and those that began one after the other only in the case of people. In that case, the second person is exempt because he is permitted to save himself. But in the case of two oxen that began one after the other, the second ox has no permission to save itself; therefore, both owners are liable, just as when they began simultaneously. This requires explanation. It is understandable that the second ox is not exempt under the principle that “if one changed the animal’s behavior,” as explained by Maimonides—see the first note above—but why is an ox forbidden to save itself? And the Even HaEzel [ 9:14] wrote that the author understood the Rosh to permit the second ox to return and injure the first, and disagreed with him on this point. We do not find that one may strike under the principle that “if one changed the animal’s behavior” when the first ox is no longer striking. Therefore, the Shulchan Arukh omitted this law.

.

A person

who caused injury

a

to

a non-accustomed ox, and a

ox

that caused injury

that caused injury

to a person.

If the

person

caused damage

to the non-accustomed ox

greater than the damage he himself suffered,

he pays

the owner of the non-accustomed ox

the surplus,

the difference by which the non-accustomed ox was damaged more than the person himself was damaged,

full damage,

as is the law of a person who causes damage.

And if the

non-accustomed ox

caused injury

to a person

more than the person injured it, the owner of the non-accustomed ox

pays

the injured person,

the surplus,

the difference by which the person was damaged more than he caused damage,

half-damage,

as is the law of a non-accustomed ox.

Rabbi Akiva says: Even a non-accustomed ox that caused injury to a person pays full damage for the surplus.

Gemara:

The Gemara brings a beraita in which it is explained in what the Sages and Rabbi Akiva disagreed in the Mishna.

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 21:28–35]: “And when an ox gores a man or a woman and he dies, the ox shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten, and the owner of the ox shall be clear. But if the ox was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before, and its owner did not guard it, he shall surely pay an ox for the ox, and the dead one shall be his. Or if it gores a son or if it gores a daughter, according to this law shall it be done to him.” This is the passage concerning damage caused by an ox to a person.

“And when an ox strikes the ox of its fellow and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its money, and they shall also divide the dead one. Or it became known that it was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before, and its owner did not guard it; he shall surely pay an ox in place of the ox, and the dead one shall be his.” This is the passage concerning damage caused by an ox to an ox.

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagreed in explaining what is stated concerning an ox that gored a son or daughter,

“according to this law shall it be done to him,”

to which law the Torah referred.

The Sages explain that “this law” refers to the following passage, which deals with the law of an ox that gored an ox; the Torah intends to compare an ox that gored a person to an ox that gored an ox. And this is what it says:

“According to the law of an ox concerning an ox”

stated below,

so is the law of an ox concerning a person.

The Torat Chaim wrote that the derivation is from the wording “according to the law,” rather than “the law.” It appears from Tosafot that even without this verse, the law would be that an unblemished ox that injured a person pays half-damages. For what reason would one think that it pays more? We have not found an unblemished animal in the Torah that pays more than half-damages. The verse was needed to derive this limitation from “according to this law,” excluding Rabbi Akiva’s view.

And the meaning of the comparison is:

Just as concerning an ox and an ox

the law is that if the goring ox is

non-accustomed,

its owner

pays half-damage, and

if it is

accustomed,

its owner pays

full damage. So too, concerning an ox and a person: a non-accustomed ox pays half-damage, and an accustomed ox pays full damage.

And this is the source of the Sages’ ruling in the Mishna that a non-accustomed ox concerning a person pays half-damage.

Rabbi Akiva says:

From the fact that

“according to this law”

shall it be done to him

,

and it does not say, “according to the law shall it be done to him,” it follows from the superfluity of the word “this” that an ox that damages a person, whether it is non-accustomed or accustomed, its law is

like the lower one and not like the upper one,

like the lower case in the preceding verse, which deals with an accustomed ox that killed a person.

Therefore Rabbi Akiva held that concerning an ox that gores a person there is no distinction whether it is non-accustomed or accustomed; its law is that of an accustomed ox.

And this is the source of Rabbi Akiva, who said in the Mishna, “Even a non-accustomed ox that injured a person pays full damage,” because it is judged as an accustomed ox.

And Rabbi Akiva added: Since the law of a non-accustomed ox that gored a person is that of an accustomed ox,

it might

its law be entirely like that of an accustomed ox, whose owner

pays

the damage

from his superior assets [

and not from the body of the ox],

the Torah says

“according to this law,”

“shall it be done to him,”

we derive from the meaning of the word “to him” that

he pays from its body and does not pay from his superior assets.

And

the Gemara asks: According to

the Sages,

“according to the law of

this”—why do I need it?

It would have been sufficient to say, “according to the law shall it be done to him,” since they do not expound, like Rabbi Akiva, the superfluity of the word “this”? And the Gemara answers: The superfluity of the word “this” is stated in order

to exempt it from the four matters,

for this is the meaning of the verse: only this law applies to him, so that he pays according to the law of an ox that damages an ox, which is not liable for the four matters, and he does not pay according to the law of a person who injures his fellow, which includes five matters.

And the Gemara asks again:

From where does Rabbi Akiva derive that it is exempt from the four matters?

And it answers: He derives it from

what is stated [Leviticus 24:19]:

“When a man gives a blemish to his fellow”

“as he did, so shall it be done to him.” And we expound:

“a man concerning his fellow,” and not an ox concerning his fellow;

from here that an ox that gored a person is exempt from the four matters.

And the Sages

held that the source for exempting an ox that gored a person from the four matters is learned from the superfluity of “this,” for

if

we were to expound as Rabbi Akiva

from that

from the exposition, “a man concerning his fellow, and not an ox concerning his fellow,”

I would have said

that the ox’s exemption is only from

pain alone,

for payment for pain is not for the monetary loss of the injured party, and it is possible that the Torah came to say that a person is liable also for pain, whereas an ox is not liable for something that is not monetary loss.

But concerning medical treatment and loss of work, I would say

that concerning an ox that gores a person, its owner must

give it

to the injured party,

It teaches us

therefore the Sages expounded from the superfluity of “according to this law,” “this,” that an ox that gores a person is exempt from the four matters.

Mishna:

A non-accustomed ox that gored and caused damage pays half-damage from its body, as it is stated: [Exodus 21:35] “And they shall sell the live ox and divide its money, and they shall also divide the dead one.” Our Mishna comes to explain how the injured party collects his half-damage.

An ox

non-accustomed

worth one hundred zuz,

one hundred zuz

, that gored an ox worth two hundred

zuz, and it died,

and the carcass

of the injured ox

is worth nothing,

and it follows that half-damage is one hundred zuz, equal to the value of the damaging ox; therefore the injured party

takes the ox

that gored, as payment of his damages.

Gemara:

It is stated in the Mishna, “he takes the ox,” implying that the one who caused the damage has no right to pay money for the damage caused by his ox; rather, the ox itself is encumbered for payment of the damage, and therefore the injured party takes the ox.

And the Gemara discusses:

whose view is the Mishna,

according to whose view among the tannaim brought below does the Mishna hold?

Necessarily, it is according to

Rabbi Akiva!

For it was taught:

An ox worth one hundred zuz that gored an ox worth two hundred: how does the owner of the goring ox pay its half-damage?

The ox shall be assessed in court

The court assesses the value of the ox, and its owner pays its value to the owner of the damaged ox; but the injured party has no right to the body of the ox,

the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

If the one who caused the damage has no money, Rabbi Yishmael agrees that the injured party collects from the ox before collecting from the other assets, because the ox is expressly pledged for this debt. Below the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yishmael’s statement refers to the period before the court judgment, but after the judgment Rabbi Yishmael agrees with Rabbi Akiva in several matters. There are several approaches among the early authorities to defining the pledge of the damaging party according to Rabbi Yishmael after the judgment. According to Rashi and Tosafot, Rabbi Yitzchak, cited by Rabbeinu Peretz, maintains that immediately after the judgment the ox becomes assigned to the injured party according to Rabbi Yishmael as it does according to Rabbi Akiva. Thus, “the ox is appraised by the court” means that it is appraised so that the court can assign it to the injured party. Ketzot HaChoshen [407:1] wrote that this is the view of Tosafot. Tosafot in Gittin [40b] wrote: “He cannot remove him with money even according to Rabbi Yishmael.” The Maharsha, Kernei Re’em, and Penei Yehoshua there explained this in accordance with Rabbi Yitzchak: after the judgment, the injured party cannot be paid off with money. See the Maharsha there, who explained it differently. See also Ramban, Yevamot [46a]. The Chazon Ish maintains that the one who caused the damage may pay him off with money even after the judgment; however, if he does not pay immediately, the court assigns the ox to the injured party. This also appears from the words of the Raavad in the Shita. The Even HaAzel wrote [7:12] that after the judgment the ox is treated as pledged property whose time for collection has arrived, so that any increase in its value belongs to the injured party. If the owner wishes to pay him off with money, he must add the increase in the ox’s value between the judgment and payment. His words will be cited at length below. See the following note. There is another disagreement among the early authorities: Does the injured party collect from the other assets? The Ba’al HaMaor, at the beginning of chapter four, maintains that although the ox is pledged first for payment, if it is lost the injured party must accept money or other assets. Ramban, in his Milchamot there, extensively proves from our sugya that the ox is treated as expressly pledged property, and the pledge applies specifically to the ox or its value. If it is lost, the owner is exempt, and the injured party does not collect from other assets. In any event, the ox is not assigned outright to the injured party; it is merely expressly pledged, like property designated for collection. [The difference between outright assignment and an express pledge concerns the nature of ownership until the time of acquisition, with practical consequences such as who can consecrate the ox.] Below, with Heaven’s help, Ramban’s four proofs will be presented.

Rabbi Akiva says:

the owner of the damaging ox does not pay the value of his ox; rather,

the ox is designated

the injured party takes the damaging ox itself. It follows that what is stated in our Mishna, “the injured party takes the ox,” is according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that the ox is designated for the injured party and the one who caused the damage has no possibility of giving him money in place of the ox. And the Gemara explains:

In what do they disagree

in what did Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree?

Rabbi Yishmael holds: he is a creditor

the one who causes the damage is regarded as the creditor of the injured party, and he must pay for the damage caused by his ox, but the injured party has no right to the goring ox,

and

the entire claim of the injured party against the owner of the ox is

money that he owes him

that he should pay him the money that he became obligated to him.

And Rabbi Akiva holds,

the one who causes the damage and the injured party

are partners

in the damaging ox, and the claim of the injured party is upon the body of the ox itself; therefore, the one who causes the damage cannot pay him half the value of the ox with money, but gives him from the body of the ox. And likewise, if the ox is worth the entire half-damage, the injured party takes the entire ox.

And they disagree,

the foundation of the disagreement is

in the

meaning

of this verse: “And they shall sell the living ox and divide its money,”

and this verse speaks of an ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth two hundred, where the injured party cannot take the entire damaging ox as payment for his damage, because his legal claim is one hundred zuz, that is, half an ox; therefore the Torah said, “And they shall sell the ox”.

Rabbi Yishmael holds: the Merciful One warned the court,

the court was charged with appraising the damaging ox and dividing its money, and the injured party has no rights in the ox itself; rather, the one who causes the damage must pay its half-value to the injured party. Therefore, even when the entire ox is worth the half-damage, they do not collect from its body; rather, they appraise it, and the injured party gives its value.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: the Merciful One warned the injured party and the one who causes the damage

the obligation to divide its money was not stated to the court but to the one who causes the damage and the injured party; from this it follows that the injured party has a portion in the body of the damaging ox, and therefore they must sell it and divide its proceeds. Likewise, when the ox will be worth half the damage, the injured party will take it as payment for his damage.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the practical difference between them

what legal difference is there between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva: if

the injured party consecrated it

the injured party consecrated the goring ox belonging to the one who causes the damage,

there is a difference between them,

according to Rabbi Yishmael, the injured party has no right to the body of the ox and cannot consecrate it, but according to Rabbi Akiva, the consecration takes effect, because the ox was adjudicated for the injured party.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: if the one who causes the damage sold

his ox that gored,

according

to

Rabbi Yishmael, what is

whether his sale takes effect or not.

And the aspects of the doubt are:

Since Rabbi Yishmael said

that the one who causes the damage

is a creditor, and

the injured party has no right to claim the body of the ox, but

it is money that he is owed [

a creditor]

by him,

it follows that the ox does not belong to the injured party, and if the one who causes the damage sells it,

it is sold.