Bava Kamma 33b — the Talmud in English

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since

the ox

is liened to him for the injured party,

and if so, even according to the words of Rabbi Yishmael

he does not have the power:

the damaging party has no possibility of selling his ox, since by doing so he removes from the injured party the possibility of collecting from the ox.

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Indeed, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, if he sold it,

it is not sold,

because the ox is liened to the injured party.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But it was taught:

we learned in a beraita that according to Rabbi Yishmael, if

he sold it,

the damaging party

it is sold,

which is not in accordance with Rav Naḥman.

The Gemara answers: Indeed, the ox is sold, and nevertheless afterward

the injured party returns

and

collects it

from the purchaser. The Gemara wonders:

But since the injured party returns

and

collects it

from the purchaser,

for

what

what

is it said that it is

sold,

what significance does this sale have?

And the Gemara answers: Although the purchaser is liable to return the ox into the possession of the injured party, nevertheless the sale takes effect

for plowing,

so that if the purchaser plowed with the goring ox, when the injured party comes to collect the ox, the purchaser is not liable to give him the value of the use of the ox, because the sale takes effect until the time when the injured party returns to collect the ox.

And the Gemara wonders about Rav Naḥman's answer to Rava: that the damaging party cannot sell his ox, and if he sold it, it is sold only for plowing, and when the injured party wishes, he can remove his ox from the purchaser's possession.

Infer from this that if

a person

borrowed

money,

and

afterward

sold

the borrower's

movable property

in his possession to others,

if the lender wishes to collect his debt,

the court collects for him from them

from those who purchased the movable property from him [if the borrower has no money with which to repay his debt].

For just as the owner of the goring ox, although he is only a debtor, has his ox become liened for payment of the damage and cannot sell it, so too, with every borrower, his movable property becomes liened for repayment of the loan, and he is forbidden to sell it; and if he sold it, the court will collect from the purchasers.

But we have established that movable property does not become liened to a creditor, because the lender does not rely on collecting from movable property. And how, then, did Rav Naḥman state that movable property [the damaging ox] becomes liened for a loan [the debt of payment for the damage]?

The Gemara rejects this: Rav Naḥman too concedes that movable property does not become liened to a creditor. But with regard to what Rav Naḥman prohibited the damaging party from selling his ox,

it is different there,

with regard to the damaging ox,

for it is considered as though he made it an apotiki,

as though the damaging party explicitly stipulated: If I do not have money to pay, collect your debt from the goring ox.

Accordingly, the ox is liened to the injured party, and the damaging party cannot sell it.

And

the Gemara raises an objection:

But Rava said: If he made

the borrower

his slave an apotiki

for the lender,

and

afterward

sold him

the borrower to another,

if the borrower has no money with which to pay the lender,

the creditor

returns and

collects from him,

collecting the slave from the purchaser against his debt.

But if the borrower made

his ox an apotiki

for the lender

, and

afterward

sold it

the borrower to another,

the creditor does not collect from him,

the creditor has no right to collect the ox from the purchasers.

And it is explained that when an ox made an apotiki is sold to another, the lender can no longer collect from it. If so, why did Rav Naḥman prohibit the damaging party from selling his ox because of its lien to the injured party? His words imply that the injured party can collect it if it is sold, yet we find that an ox is not collected from purchasers even if it is an apotiki?

And the Gemara answers: There is no comparison between an ox that became liened to a lender against a debt and an ox liened to the injured party against its damage.

For from Rava's own words it is explained that there is a distinction between an ox made an apotiki and a slave. And apparently,

a slave—for what reason

does a lender who made a slave an apotiki collect him when the borrower sold him?

It must be

because it has public notice,

when a borrower liens his slave and makes him an apotiki against his debt, public notice goes out concerning the slave that he is liened to a certain person. Therefore, whoever nevertheless purchases him has brought the loss upon himself, and the lender can collect from him.

In contrast, movable property made an apotiki does not acquire public notice, and a purchaser of movable property cannot know whether it is liened for some loan of the seller. Therefore the lender has no right to collect from the purchasers.

And since this is so,

this one too,

the ox liened to the injured party,

since it gored, it has public notice

that it is liened,

for they call it a goring ox,

the public call it a goring ox, and consequently everyone knows that those who were damaged by it may come and collect their debt from it. Anyone who purchases it purchases it with this understanding: that the injured party can come and collect from it.

Accordingly, Rav Naḥman said that the lender has no permission to sell the ox, since it has already become liened as an apotiki to the injured party, and public notice has gone out that it is liened; and if he sells it, the injured party can collect the ox from the purchaser.

Rav Taḥlifa bar Ma'arava taught before Rabbi Abbahu:

An innocuous ox that gored:

if he sold it, it is not sold; if he consecrated it, it is consecrated.

The Gemara raised the question: What is the distinction between consecration and sale? For if it is possible to consecrate the ox, apparently it is also possible to sell it; and likewise, if it is impossible to sell it, why is it possible to consecrate it?

And in order to explain the distinction between sale and consecration, the Gemara first raised two doubts:

a.

“He sold it”—who?

Concerning whom did the beraita say “he sold it” and “he consecrated it”: the damaging party or the injured party?

b. According to whose view did it say “it is not sold” and “it is consecrated”: according to Rabbi Yishmael or according to Rabbi Akiva?

And the Gemara explains that Rav Taḥlifa's words have implications both according to Rabbi Akiva and according to Rabbi Yishmael:

For

if you say,

if we interpret the beraita as dealing with the sale by the

damaging party,

then what is the meaning of what was said,

“‘He sold it, it is not sold’—whose view is it,”

apparently it is the statement of

Rabbi Akiva, who says: the ox has been designated,

and therefore the damaging party cannot sell it, since the ox belongs to the injured party. But according to Rabbi Yishmael, the ox is sold for plowing.

And

from what was said,

“he consecrated it, it is consecrated,” this brings us

[that is, brings us]

to Rabbi Yishmael, who says: the ox is assessed in court,

and therefore the damaging party can consecrate his ox. But according to Rabbi Akiva, the damaging party cannot consecrate the ox, because it has been designated for the injured party.

And it is explained that if we establish the beraita as referring to the damaging party's selling and consecrating, we cannot interpret it according to either one of them, since according to this the first clause is according to Rabbi Akiva and the latter clause according to Rabbi Yishmael.

Rather,

it must necessarily be explained that the one who sold and consecrated was the

injured party.

And the Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation as well: It cannot be established either according to Rabbi Yishmael or according to Rabbi Akiva:

For from what was said,

“he sold it, it is not sold,”

it is implied:

whose view is it? Rabbi Yishmael's

since according to him the injured party has no rights whatsoever in the ox, and consequently he has no possibility of selling it. But according to Rabbi Akiva, the injured party can sell his ox because it has been designated for him. If so, this section is according to Rabbi Yishmael and not according to Rabbi Akiva.

Whereas from what was said,

“he consecrated it, it is consecrated”—this brings us

[this goes]

to

the words of

Rabbi Akiva,

who says that the ox has been designated, and therefore the injured party can consecrate the goring ox. But according to Rabbi Yishmael, he has no right to consecrate the ox. If so, this section of the beraita is according to the words of Rabbi Akiva.

It follows that whichever way we interpret the beraita, whether as referring to the damaging party's sale or to the injured party's sale, one section emerges as according to Rabbi Yishmael and one section as according to Rabbi Akiva.

And the Gemara explains what was stated in the beraita: “He sold it, it is not sold; he consecrated it, it is consecrated”:

In every event,

it speaks of the damaging party's sale and consecration,

and

the beraita is interpreted according to

everyone,

both according to Rabbi Yishmael and according to Rabbi Akiva.

“He sold it, it is not sold”:

it is not necessary to say that according to Rabbi Akiva the damaging party cannot sell his ox, which has already been designated for the injured party; rather,

even according to Rabbi Yishmael

the damaging party cannot sell it, and if he sold it, it is not sold,

for it is liened to the injured party.

And, according to everyone, if

the one who caused the damage consecrated

the damaging

ox,

it is consecrated

with regard to this matter: that one must give something small for its redemption,

and

even according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Akiva,

the one who caused the damage can consecrate it, despite the fact that the ox has already been decided to belong to the injured party.

And the reason for this is

because of Rabbi Abahu.

For Rabbi Abahu said:

one who consecrates something that was pledged to others, even though the consecration does not take effect, nevertheless must give the consecrated property something small as the redemption of the consecration,

as a decree, lest they say: Consecrated property goes out without redemption.

And therefore it was stated in the beraita, “If he consecrated it, it is consecrated,” to say that the injured party must give the consecrated property something for the redemption of the ox.

The Gemara cites a beraita in which the details of the laws of a non-habitual ox that causes damage are explained, according to Rabbi Ishmael:

The Sages taught: A non-habitual ox that caused damage

and became liable for half-damage: its law is divided between before standing in judgment and after standing in judgment:

Before it stood in judgment,

as long as the court had not determined that the one who caused the damage must pay half the damage,

the ox still belongs to the one who caused the damage.

And therefore, if

he sold

the one who caused the damage,

it is sold;

and likewise, if

he consecrated it,

it is consecrated;

and likewise, if

he slaughtered it or gave it as a gift

afterward,

what he did is done,

and the injured party has no possibility of collecting the body of the ox.

But

once

the ox

stood in judgment,

it is pledged to the injured party. Therefore, if

he sold

the one who caused the damage,

it is not sold;

and if

he consecrated it, it is not consecrated.

And if

he slaughtered it or gave it as a gift

afterward,

he accomplished nothing whatsoever.

Because the ox had already become pledged to the injured party.

If other creditors came first

others,

who were creditors of the one who caused the damage,

and collected

the damaging ox as payment of the debt of the one who caused the damage, they did not acquire the ox, since the ox is pledged to the injured party and they must return it to him.

And there is no distinction

between when he became indebted

he became liable to those creditors

before he caused damage,

before he caused damage and became pledged before the creditors, and

between when he caused damage before he became indebted,

when it had already become pledged to the injured party before the creditors,

in every case the creditors who seized the ox for their debt

accomplished nothing whatsoever, because

after standing in judgment

one can collect only from its body.

And all this applies to a non-habitual ox. But

a habitual ox that caused damage—whether it stood in judgment or whether it did not stand in judgment—if he sold it, it is sold; if he consecrated it, it is consecrated; if he slaughtered it or gave it as a gift, what he did is done,

because the ox is not pledged to the injured party, since in the case of a habitual ox one collects from the other property.

And for this reason, if

creditors came first and collected it,

whether he became indebted before he caused damage or caused damage before he became indebted, what he did is done, because

a habitual

ox can be collected from only the other property,

and the injured party has no pledge whatsoever upon the damaging ox.

From this point onward, the Gemara explains the beraita, passage by passage:

The Master said:

Before it stood in judgment,

“If he sold it, it is sold.”

And the Gemara explains: The meaning of “if he sold it, it is sold” is: it is sold

for plowing,

for plowing,

but the sale does not take effect completely, since the ox became pledged to the injured party.

“If he consecrated it, it is consecrated”:

Since the ox is pledged to the injured party, the consecration takes effect only with regard to this: that the one who redeems the ox must give a pruta to the consecrated property,

because of

Rabbi Abahu,

a decree lest they say that consecrated property goes out without redemption.

It is stated in the beraita:

“If he slaughtered it or gave it as a gift, what he did is done”:

And the Gemara discusses:

Granted,

what is stated,

“If he gave it as a gift, what

he did is done,

can be explained to mean that although the ox is pledged to the injured party, nevertheless what he did is done

, for plowing,

that is, the gift takes effect with regard to this: if the recipient of the gift plows with the ox, the injured party cannot demand from him the benefit of using it.

But

what is stated, that if he

“slaughtered it,”

what he did is done,

is difficult:

why is what he did done? After all, the flesh of the ox still exists, and

let

the injured party

come and collect

from its flesh.

And the Gemara brings proof that the flesh of the ox remains pledged even after its slaughter, from a beraita:

For it was taught:

“And they shall sell the

‘live’ ox; I have only

that the one who caused the damage and the injured party divide the damaging ox when it is

alive.”

But if

he slaughtered it,

the one who caused the damage,

from where

do we know that the injured party has a share in it?

The verse states: “And they shall sell the ox”—in any event.

It follows that the injured party has a right to the ox even after its death. Why, then, was it stated in the beraita, “If he slaughtered it, what he did is done”? After all, the injured party can still collect it against his damage?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Shizbei said:

What is stated, “If he slaughtered it, what he did is done,”

was necessary

was stated

only for

the law of

the reduction caused by slaughter.

For if the value of the ox was reduced at the time of slaughter, and not even the value of half the damage remained in it, the one who caused the damage is not liable to make up what he became obligated to pay.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: That is to say,

it follows from Rav Shizbei’s words that

one who damages his fellow’s pledge is exempt.

Since, by damaging the ox liened to the injured party, he thereby caused the injured party to have nothing from which to collect his half-damage, and regarding this it was said: what he did is done, and he is not liable to pay the difference up to half the damage.

And the Gemara is astonished: But

is it not obvious

—for what purpose did Rav Huna need to say, “This indicates”? Is it not clear that this is the reason for the exemption of one who damages by slaughtering an ox liened to the injured party?

And the Gemara answers: Had Rav Huna said that this is the reason for the exemption of one who slaughters an ox liened to the injured party, there would have been room to say,

what might you have said,

specifically

there

in the case in which the ox was slaughtered, what he did is done and the damaging party is exempt, because

he

is not actually causing damage,

as he can say to him

to the injured party:

“I have deprived you of nothing whatsoever,”

because the carcass still exists,

for

he can

say to him: “It is merely air that I took from you,”

for I only removed the animal’s breath, and there is no actual damage here.

But ordinarily,

if a person damages his fellow’s lien in a manner in which the lien no longer exists,

let him be liable.

Rav Huna teaches us

that the reason of the tanna of the beraita is that one who damages his fellow’s lien is exempt, even if the lien no longer exists.

And the Gemara objects:

Rabba also said this,

that one who damages his fellow’s lien is exempt even in a case in which, because of his damage, the lien is completely nullified?

For Rabba said: One who burns his fellow’s documents

[debt documents]

is exempt,

because the documents are not actual property; rather, they are evidence that the borrower is liened to pay his debt.

It follows that Rabba’s words already explained that one who damages his fellow’s lien is exempt even in a case in which he will no longer be able to collect his debt

because of the damage,

so why did Rav Huna need to learn this from the beraita?

And the Gemara answers: It is not possible to prove from Rabba’s words the law that one who damages his fellow’s lien is exempt.

What might you have said? There it is

that Rabba exempted him because

he can say to him

the one who burns the documents to the owner of the documents:

“I have burned mere paper for you,”

I did not damage property itself, but merely paper.

But

one who actually damages his fellow’s lien, such as

where

a field was liened to a creditor and

he dug in it

the borrower

pits, ditches, and caves, let him be liable,

for he actually damaged it.

Rav Huna teaches us

therefore Rav Huna needed to explain that the exemption in the beraita is on account of the principle that one who damages his fellow’s lien is exempt, implying that even one who damages the lien itself is exempt.

For here,

when the damaging party slaughtered the ox liened to the injured party, he is

like one who dug in it

the borrower, in a field liened to the damaging party,

pits, ditches, and caves.

And

regarding this

he says, “What he did is done,”

and the damaging party is exempt. Therefore Rav Huna stated, “This indicates that one who damages his fellow’s lien is exempt,” in order to teach that even if he damaged the lien itself and through this his fellow’s lien was nullified, he is exempt.

The Gemara returns and explains what was stated in the beraita: “

When he had stood in court, if

the creditors preceded and collected [the ox], whether he became indebted before he caused the damage, or he caused the damage before he became indebted, they have done nothing. For he pays only from its body.”

And the Gemara discusses:

Granted

if

he caused the damage before he became indebted,

the creditors cannot collect the ox, since

the injured parties preceded,

and the ox became liened to the injured party before it became liened for their debt.

But

if

he became indebted before he caused the damage,

why can they not collect the ox? After all,

the creditor’s

debt

preceded,

and the injured party became liened to the creditor first, and only afterward to the injured parties?