Bava Kamma 32b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara resolves it:

as Rabbi Hanina, for Rabbi Hanina said: ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact folio location")

Come, let us go out

to greet the queen-bride.

Рабби Хананель объяснил, что рабби Ханина танцевал ради почёта Шабата, и отсюда следует, что ради почёта Шабата разрешено бежать. А «Нимукеи Йосеф» приводит слова рабби Яная так: «Рабби Янай танцевал, идя, танцевал, возвращаясь». Отсюда следует, что разрешено бежать ради почёта Шабата, и тем более — ради нужд Шабата. Возможно, Рамбам объяснит этот эпизод так же, как рабби Хананель или как «Нимукеи Йосеф». А «Эц Йосеф» к «Эйн Яаков» объяснил слова «Давайте выйдем»: выйдем из будней навстречу Шабату, чтобы заранее принять Шабат и добавить время к святости Шабата. См. там.

And some say,

there are those who say that this is what he would say: “Come, let us go out

to greet Shabbat, the queen-bride.”

Rabbi Yannai

was

wrapping himself

in fine garments

and standing,

and he said:

“Come, bride; come, bride.”

And from the practice of the amoraim of going out and receiving Shabbat, the Gemara proved that it is permitted to run on the eve of Shabbat because of the honor of Shabbat.

Mishna:

One who chops

wood

in the public domain

without permission

, and caused damage in the private domain,

through the iron having slipped from its handle.

And likewise one who chops with permission

in the private domain

of his own,

and caused damage in the public domain,

and likewise one who chops

in the private domain

of his own

and caused damage in the private domain

of

another,

In all these cases,

he is liable

the chopper for payments of damages, because although he did not intend to kill, he was negligent and caused damage through his force

.

Gemara:

And it is necessary,

it was necessary for the tannai to teach all these laws, and we could not have derived one law from the other.

Because

if the tannai had taught,

if the tannai had taught only

“one who chops in the private domain and caused damage in the public domain,”

that he is liable

,

there would have been room to say that specifically one who chops near the public domain is liable,

because

in the public domain

many people are commonly found,

and he should have been concerned lest people pass and he injure them.

But

one who chops

from the public domain

near

the private domain, where many people are not commonly found,

there

one might say no

he should be liable, since he is compelled; the tannai therefore teaches us that one who chops from the public domain toward the private domain is also liable.

And if he had taught, “from the public domain toward the private domain,”

there would have been room to say that his liability is

because initially,

when he chopped in the public domain,

he acted without permission; but from the private domain toward the public domain, where he acted with permission,

since it is permitted to chop in the private domain,

one might say no,

and he is exempt.

And if he had taught those two,

if the tannai had taught these two cases—he chopped in the public domain and caused damage in the public domain, and he chopped in the private domain and caused damage in the public domain—there would have been room to say that each has a particular reason to make him liable:

this one,

in the private domain and caused damage in the public domain, is liable

because many people are commonly found.

And this one,

in the public domain and caused damage in the public domain, is liable

because he acted without permission.

But

one who chops

from the private domain

of his own

to the private domain

of

another,

where the two above reasons do not apply—

for

this one,

many people are not commonly found, and

also

initially

the chopping was done

with permission—one might say that he should not be liable,

он не обязан,

And for this reason,

it is necessary,

the tannai needed to teach the three forms, since each contains a novelty that cannot be learned from the other

.

The Sages taught: One who entered a carpenter’s shop without permission, and a chip flew out and struck his face and he died,

the carpenter

is exempt.

And if he entered with permission,

and a chip flew out and struck his face

,

the carpenter

is liable.

And below it will be explained what the exemption and liability stated here mean.

And the Gemara asks:

What does “liable” mean?

Does the liability refer to a case in which the carpenter injured him and became liable for the four payments, or to a case in which he killed him and became liable to go into exile?

Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said:

The Mishna speaks of a case in which the one who entered was injured, in which case the carpenter

is liable for the four payments

because he was negligent,

but nevertheless he is exempt for humiliation, since he did not intend it

.

And exempt from exile,

if the carpenter killed the one who entered, he does not go into exile.

And the reason is

because it is not comparable

the case of one who entered a carpenter’s shop

to a forest,

to one who came into a forest to chop wood and accidentally killed his fellow there, for which the Torah made him liable to go into exile

.

For

a forest

is open for anyone to enter,

this one

the killer

entered with his permission, and this one

the victim

entered with his permission,

and in such a case the Torah made him liable to go into exile.

But

this one,

the one who entered the carpenter’s shop with permission,

entered into his fellow’s domain,

and we do not find liability for exile in the domain of the one causing the damage.

Rabba said:

On the contrary, is it not more severe than a forest? He should indeed be liable to go into exile by

a kal va-chomer: Just as in a forest, this one enters with his permission and that one enters with his permission,

and neither one needs to request permission from the other, nevertheless

the

victim

becomes like one who entered with his fellow’s permission,

as though he requested permission from the killer to enter,

and goes into exile

through him.

This one, who entered with his fellow’s permission—how much more so

should the carpenter go into exile because of him.

Rather, Rava said: What does “exempt from exile” mean

as Rabbi Yosei stated?

Exile is not sufficient for him,

he is not fit to attain atonement through exile

.

And this is the reason of Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina, because

he is an inadvertent offender close to deliberate,

for he should have examined and taken care not to strike the one who entered with permission

.

But in the first clause of the beraita, “one entered a carpenter’s shop without permission,” the carpenter is exempt from exile and from the four payments, since he is compelled.

Nevertheless, he is liable for damages, as we hold that a person is always forewarned.

Rava challenged

Rabba, who said that an inadvertent offender close to deliberate does not go into exile

,

from what we learned: A court agent who flogged a person who had become liable for lashes, and

added one strap

beyond the number that they had assessed he could receive,

and he died,

the one who was flogged,

behold this one,

the court agent,

goes into exile through him.

But here, where

the court agent

is an inadvertent offender close to deliberate,

since

he should have considered that people die through

the addition of

one strap, and

nevertheless

it teaches: “Behold, he goes into exile.”

Rav Shimi of Nehardea said:

Indeed, if the agent of the court intentionally added one strap and [the flogging] killed him, he is liable, and the Mishna exempted him when

he erred in the counting,

for he is inadvertent in this matter.

He tapped him,

he kicked

him, Rava, with his sandal

of Rav Shimi,

and

said to him: Is it so

that you think that

he

the agent of the court counts the number of lashes, and if he erred in the counting and killed him, he is liable to exile?

But it was taught in a beraita: The greatest of the judges reads: “If you will not observe to do. And the Lord will single out your blows.”

“If you will not observe to do. And the Lord will single out your blows.”

And the second counts

the number of lashes appropriate for him,

and the third says: Strike him!

It is thus clear that the agent of the court who strikes cannot err in the counting of the lashes, since the judge tells him when to strike and when to stop. It follows, then, that what was said in the Mishna, “he added one strap for him,” refers to his having added it on his own. And why was he made liable to exile? He is an inadvertent offender close to being intentional.

Rather, Rav Shimi of Nehardea said:

Actually, if he added one strap on his own and [the flogging] killed him, he does not go into exile, because he is an inadvertent offender close to being intentional. And the Mishna is speaking when

the judge himself erred

the judge who told him, “Strike,” added one strap more than what they had assessed the flogged man to receive, and in such a case the agent of the court goes into exile. And the Gemara raises another objection against Rabba, who exempts an inadvertent offender close to being intentional from exile.

He raised an objection: One who throws a stone

from his domain

into the public domain, and it killed

a person who was walking in the public domain,

behold, this one goes into exile.

But here,

throwing the stone into the public domain

is an inadvertent act close to being intentional,

since

he should have brought it to mind

,

for he should have considered

that people are commonly found in the public domain,

people are present there and liable to be harmed because of him,

and

even so

it teaches: This one goes into exile,

This proves that even an inadvertent act close to being intentional is atoned for through exile, and it is not in accordance with Rabba.

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said:

Actually, one who unintentionally kills a person in a manner close to being intentional does not go into exile, in accordance with Rabba. And what was stated in the Mishna, that the one who throws a stone goes into exile, does not refer to one who literally throws a stone into the public domain; rather, it refers to

one who demolishes his wall,

and while he was occupied with demolishing the wall, a stone was thrown into the public domain without his intention, struck a person, and killed him,

for he is inadvertent with regard to his killing.

And the Gemara objects: Even one who demolishes his wall adjacent to the public domain is close to being intentional, since

he should have examined,

he should have taken care

that a stone not be thrown from the wall into the public domain!?.

And the Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking of

one who demolishes

his wall

at night,

at a time when many people are not present, and he is not required to take so much care. Therefore, if he killed, he is inadvertent and goes into exile.

And the Gemara again objects:

At night too, he should have examined,

perhaps there are people in the street; and since he did not take proper care, he is an inadvertent offender close to being intentional.

Rather, the Gemara answers: It does not refer to one who demolishes his wall adjacent to the public domain; rather, it refers to

one who demolishes

his wall during the day, into a refuse heap

a place where people relieve themselves.

And the Gemara clarifies:

This refuse heap

that you mentioned,

what are its circumstances,

where was the refuse heap located?

If

it refers to a refuse heap

where

there are

many

people to relieve themselves there, then the one who demolished his wall for that purpose is

intentional,

like one who throws a stone into the public domain, and it is impossible to make him liable to exile.

And if many people are not commonly found there,

and even individuals are not present there, then he should not become liable to exile for another reason, for

he is coerced,

and one who kills a person under coercion is exempt from exile.

Rather,

Rav Pappa said, [

it is necessary only ]

in order to establish the beraita in a case of coercion that is neither close to coercion nor close to intentionality, one must establish it as involving

a refuse heap

of such a kind

as is made for relieving oneself

people relieve themselves there

at night, and is not made

it is not the practice of people

to relieve themselves during the day

because of modesty

, and

sometimes

someone happens to come and sit there

to relieve himself there during the day, and it happened that he demolished his wall during the day, at the time when a person was staying there.

And in this case

he is not intentional, for it is not made for relieving oneself during the day,

and it is not common for a person to pass there at the time of demolishing the wall.

He is not coerced either, for someone happens to come and sit there,

and it is impossible to call one who demolished his wall toward a place where people are sometimes found coerced.

And one who kills in a manner that is neither coerced nor intentional is called inadvertent.

Rav Pappa, in the name of Rava, taught it

the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Chanina

on the first clause

of the beraita.

And this is what he is saying:

One who enters a carpenter’s shop without permission, and a piece of wood flew out and struck him in the face, and he died, is exempt.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yosei bar Chanina said:

Even though he entered without permission, if he was struck by the piece of wood, the carpenter

is liable for the four matters, and

what the tanna said, “is exempt,” means that he is

exempt from exile.

The Gemara explains:

And the Gemara explains:

The one who teaches it

who teaches the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Chanina

on the latter clause

in which it is stated, “entered with permission is liable,” and concerning this Rabbi Yosei said that he is exempt from exile. [And what is stated there, “liable,” means liable for the four matters].

All the more so

that in his view Rabbi Yosei will say this also

with regard to the first clause,

in which it is stated that if he entered without permission, he is exempt—that he is exempt from exile.

And

if

the one who teaches it

is Rav Pappa, who taught the statement of Rabbi Yosei

about the first clause,

in which it is stated that one who entered without permission is exempt, and Rabbi Yosei said that he is exempt from exile: specifically in this case the carpenter is exempt from exile,

but about the final clause,

in which it is stated that one who entered with permission is liable,

since he entered with permission,

the carpenter

is liable for exile.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And is he liable for exile?

Is it possible to say that the carpenter is liable for exile for having unintentionally killed one who entered with permission?

But it was taught in a beraita:

a person

who entered the shop of a blacksmith, and sparks flew

through the agency of the blacksmith

and struck him in the face

of the one who entered the shop

, and he died,

the blacksmith

is exempt

from exile

. And even

if

he entered with permission,

he is exempt.

It is thus proved that one who kills unintentionally is exempt from exile even in a case where the one who entered asked permission to enter, and this is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei according to Rav Pappa.

The Gemara rejects this: In truth, if he killed one who entered with permission, he is liable for exile; and as for what was stated concerning the blacksmith, that he is exempt,

with what are we dealing here? With the apprentice of a blacksmith,

the student of that blacksmith.

And the Gemara wonders: And is

an apprentice of a blacksmith destined to be killed,

so that his blood is permitted, such that the blacksmith is exempt for killing him?

And the Gemara explains: In the case of his apprentice, it is possible that he would come to be killed

when his master repeatedly urges

him, imploring him

to leave

his shop,

and he does not leave,

and his master kills him.

And

the Gemara again wonders: And

because his master repeatedly urges him to leave,

and he does not heed his words,

is he destined to be killed?

And the Gemara answers: Since the blacksmith repeatedly urged his apprentice to leave,

he thought

that he had already

left,

and therefore he was under duress and exempt from exile.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

If so,

if indeed the reasoning that one who repeatedly urges his apprentice to leave is considered under duress is correct, why did the Gemara state that the beraita is speaking of an apprentice of a blacksmith? The same law applies to any

other

person who asked permission and entered, and then the homeowner asked him to leave, but he did not leave, and a piece of wood or sparks struck him;

also

the owner should be exempt because he thought that he had already left.