Bava Kamma 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

3.

And if

N

the owner of the beam stopped

and as a result the barrel struck the beam, the owner of the beam

is liable.

4.

And if

the owner of the beam

said to the owner of the barrel, “Stop,”

because I wish to stop, but the owner of the barrel continued walking and his barrel struck the beam, the owner of the beam

is exempt,

since he warned the owner of the barrel before stopping, and the latter caused his own injury. 5.

If the owner of the

barrel

was

walking

first, and the owner of the beam was last,

and the owner of the beam increased his pace until he collided with the barrel, and

the barrel was broken by the beam, he is liable.

6.

And if the owner of the barrel stopped

and as a result the owner of the beam collided with the barrel and broke it, the owner of the beam

is exempt.

7.

And if

the owner of the barrel

said to the

the

owner of the beam

behind him:

“Stop,”

because I wish to stop to rest, but the owner of the beam continued walking and collided with the barrel, the owner of the beam

is liable.

And similarly

the law applies to two people who were walking in the public domain,

one carrying his lamp and the other carrying his flax.

Gemara:

Rabba bar Natan asked Rav Huna: One who injures his wife during intercourse—what is the law?

The sides of the uncertainty are as follows: Is it that

since he acts with permission,

he is like two people who were walking with permission in the public domain and injured one another, who are exempt, and here too the one who caused the injury

is exempt?

Or perhaps

those walking in the public domain and injuring one another are exempt because we hold [27b] that people do not ordinarily look carefully at the roads; but here

he should have examined carefully

so as not to cause injury.

Rav Huna said

to Rav Natan:

You have learned it in a Mishna,

for we learned in the Mishna that when

“this one has permission to walk and that one has permission to walk,”

both are exempt; here too, the husband is exempt because he is considered to be acting with permission.

Rava said:

Although he is treated as one walking with permission, he is nevertheless liable by

a kal va-chomer.

We find that the Torah imposes exile upon one who unintentionally kills a person, for example, when he enters a forest to chop wood, the blade slips from the ax, and unintentionally kills a person.

And

one who unintentionally kills another person in a

forest, where this one entered with permission and that one entered with permission, is treated as one who entered another’s domain, and is liable.

This one,

one who injures his wife during intercourse,

who entered another’s domain, all the more so

is he liable.

Rather,

Rava said:

that which

is taught

in the Mishna, that when

“this one has permission to walk and that one has permission to walk,”

the one who causes damage is exempt, applies specifically

there,

since

both are equal,

both caused the damage equally: the owner of the beam by colliding with the barrel, and the owner of the barrel by colliding with the beam. And when the injured party assists the one who causes the damage, the one who causes the damage is exempt.

But

here,

one who causes injury during intercourse

he alone performs

the

act

of causing the injury, and is liable.

The Gemara asks:

But

since

she did not

perform an act,

and it is writtenregarding an adulterer and an adulteress [Leviticus 18:29]:

“the souls that perform it shall be cut off from among their people,”

and it is evident that the woman too is treated as one who performs an act, just as the man is.

The Gemara answers: The Torah considered the woman as one who performs an act because

both of them derive equal pleasure

and therefore both are fit to be punished equally. But in truth,

he is the one who performs the act,

and the woman does not; therefore, when he causes injury, the husband is treated as the sole one who causes the injury and is liable.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If the owner of the beam was first,” etc.:

Reish Lakish said: There are two cows

that are

in the public domain, one lying down and one walking.

The walking cow is acting with permission, since it is customary for animals to walk in the public domain, whereas the lying cow is acting without permission, since it is not customary for animals to lie in the public domain.

1.

If the

cow

walking cow kicked the lying cow, it is exempt,

because animals, when they see unusual conduct, are also apt to act unusually. Therefore, the kick of the walking cow is considered a result of seeing the lying cow, and the one that kicked is exempt.

In the language of the Gemara above [24b]: Whoever acts unusually, and another comes and acts unusually toward him, is exempt. B. If the

lying cow kicked the walking cow, it is liable

for half the damage, as the law of a derivative of keren above [2b].

Let us say that this supports him

according to the statement of Reish Lakish, “If a stationary animal kicked a walking one, it is liable,” from our Mishna:

The owner of a beam was

walking

first, and the owner of a barrel was last,

and the owner of the barrel hastened his pace, stumbled over the beam before him, and

the barrel was broken by the beam;

the owner of the beam is

exempt, but if the owner of the beam stopped

without warning the owner of the barrel, and as a result the barrel struck the beam and broke, the owner of the beam is

liable.

But here,

the stopping of the owner of the beam in the public domain is considered an unusual act, since it is not the way of people to stop in order to rest. It follows

that

the damage caused by the owner of the beam is

like

a stationary animal

kicking a walking one, and it teaches that he is liable.

Thus it is explained that one who caused damage is liable and may not say to the owner of the barrel: You should have walked at the side and not behind me.

The Gemara rejects this:

And can you understand it so? Is support even necessary here?

Does this law require support? It is obvious that the one who caused the damage is liable.

Furthermore,

it is not merely that it does not provide support;

it is not enough that the beraita does not support Reish Lakish;

it also raises a difficulty against him.

For from the precise wording of Reish Lakish, “A stationary animal kicked a walking one,” it follows that

the reason is that it kicked,

the stationary animal is liable;

but

if it did nothing, and rather the walking animal stumbled over the stationary animal and

was thereby injured,

the owner of the stationary animal is

exempt.

But

in the

Mishna

it is explained that if the owner of the beam stopped,

and thereby

the owner of the barrel was injured by it—for the owner of the beam did not exert force in order to damage the barrel—

and it teaches that he is liable,

which is contrary to Reish Lakish.

To reconcile the words of Reish Lakish with our Mishna, it is necessary to distinguish between the cases:

The Mishna,

our Mishna made the owner of the beam liable even when he did not cause the damage through his force, but through damage that occurred incidentally, because the case is one in which the beam

blocked

[barred]

the road

[the entire width of the road]

like a carcass

[like a discarded carcass],

so that the owner of the barrel had no way to avoid colliding with the beam. Therefore, the owner of the beam is liable.

But if the owner of the beam stopped without blocking the road, and the owner of the barrel collided with him, the owner of the beam may say to him: You should have walked at the side and not behind me; and he is exempt.

The reason for Reish Lakish’s statement that

here

a stationary animal that kicked a walking one is liable, but if the walking animal was injured by the stationary one it is exempt, is that the case is

for example, it reclined

[lay]

on one side

[on one side of the road], and the reclining animal can say to the walking one:

You should have gone by the other side;

you should have walked on the other side so that you would not collide with me.

Rather, the latter clause of the Mishna supports Reish Lakish

with regard to his first law, “If a walking animal kicked a stationary one, it is exempt,” for if one deviates and another comes and deviates against him, the latter is exempt.

For it teaches

in the latter clause:

The owner

of the

barrel

was walking

first, and the owner of the beam was last,

and the owner of the beam hastened his pace until he collided with the barrel, and

the

barrel was

broken by the beam;

the owner of the beam is

liable. But if the owner of the barrel stopped,

the owner of the beam is

exempt.

But here,

when the owner of the barrel stopped and the owner of the beam collided with him,

the

owner of the beam is considered

like

a

walking

cow that

kicked a stationary one,

since the owner of the barrel deviated by stopping; therefore, the owner of the beam struck him and injured him,

and it teaches

that the owner of the beam is

exempt,

which demonstrates that if one deviates and another comes and deviates against him, the latter is exempt.

The Gemara rejects this: The Mishna provides no proof for the words of Reish Lakish. It is always possible that if one deviates and another comes and deviates against him, the second one is liable.

And as for what is written in the

Mishna

—that the owner of the beam is exempt when the owner of the barrel stopped—it is because

the

owner of the beam

was proceeding in his usual manner;

he was walking as usual and deviated in no way. Thus, the damage to the owner of the barrel was not caused by an action of the owner of the beam, but by his stopping; therefore, the owner of the beam is exempt. But

here,

with two cows, one reclining and one walking, if the walking one kicks the reclining one, it becomes liable for the kick, since it has no permission to deviate. As though

the reclining one said to it,

the walking one:

Granted that you have permission to walk over me

when I am blocking the road, but

you do not have permission to kick me.

Mishna:

Two people who were walking in the public domain

and injured one another. Likewise, if

one was running

in the public domain

and one was walking,

and the runner injured the one who was walking,

or both were running, and injured one another,

both are exempt.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses: Seemingly,

our Mishna,

our Mishna, which exempts one who is running from liability for damage caused to one who is walking, is

not in accordance with Isi ben Yehuda.

As it was taught [in the

Tosefta]:

Isi ben Yehuda says:

If two people were walking in the public domain, one running and one walking, and the one who was walking was injured by the runner, the

runner is liable, because his conduct is unusual;

running in the public domain is unusual, since people do not generally run there, and therefore he is considered the one who caused the damage.

And Isi

ben Yehuda concedes to the first tanna, who disagrees with him, that if one runs

on the eve of Shabbat during twilight, he is exempt, because he is running with permission;

the Gemara goes on to explain why it is permitted to run on the eve of Shabbat.

Yet the Mishna does not mention a distinction between Shabbat and the weekdays, which indicates that people ordinarily run in the public domain even on weekdays.

Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Isi ben Yehuda,

that one who runs on weekdays and causes damage is liable, while on the eve of Shabbat he is exempt.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Did Rabbi Yohanan actually say this,

that the halakha follows Isi?

But

did he

not state the general principle: Rabbi Yohanan said, the halakha follows an unattributed Mishna?

And we learned

in our Mishna, which is an unattributed Mishna:

Whether one was running and the other walking, or both were running, they are exempt.

Evidently, it is permitted to run even on weekdays, and if one causes damage, he is exempt. The Gemara has already demonstrated that our Mishna is not in accordance with Isi ben Yehuda. If so, how could Rabbi Yohanan rule in accordance with Isi ben Yehuda when there is an unattributed Mishna that disagrees with him?

The Gemara answers: Our Mishna does not necessarily contradict the words of Isi ben Yehuda, since it can be explained by saying that

the Mishna

is speaking of one who runs

on the eve of Shabbat during twilight,

in which case he is exempt even according to Isi. But if one runs on weekdays, the tanna of our Mishna concedes that he is liable, in accordance with Isi.

The Gemara explains:

From where

is it evident from the Mishna that it is speaking of one who runs on the eve of Shabbat?

As it teaches: “

one was running and the other walking,

or both were running, they are exempt,”

and seemingly,

why do I need

this additional clause?

Why did the tanna add the case of a runner who caused damage? After all,

now, if one was running and the other walking,

the walker did not deviate from the norm at all, whereas the runner did deviate, and nevertheless, if the runner injured the walker, the runner is

exempt;

if so, when both deviated from the norm, such as when

both were running

and one injured the other,

is it necessary

for the tanna to teach us that he is exempt?

?

Rather,

necessarily, the tanna of our Mishna

is saying as follows:

this is how the tanna’s statement in the Mishna is to be divided:

If one was running and the other walking, he is exempt,

and it is as though the tanna added and said:

When are these words applicable? On the eve of Shabbat during twilight,

when he is running with permission.

But on a weekday,

since there is no permission to run in the public domain, if

one was running and the other walking,

and the runner injured the walker, he is

liable.

And if

both were running, even on

week

days [when

running is prohibited], they are

exempt,

as we will learn below [48b]: if both had permission, or both lacked permission, and they injured one another, they are exempt.

It follows that the Mishna itself mentions the distinction between one who runs on the eve of Shabbat and one who runs on weekdays, in accordance with the words of Isi ben Yehuda; therefore, Rabbi Yohanan ruled in accordance with his words.

The Master said: And Isi concedes that on the eve of Shabbat during twilight he is exempt, because he is running with permission.

The Gemara discusses:

On the eve of Shabbat, what running with permission

is there?

What type of running is considered running for the sake of a mitzva, such that we exempt the runner from liability for damage caused to a walker?!