Bava Kamma 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

? Ведь только если он должен был встать, но не встал, он несёт ответственность. Однако и в этом случае нет различия между первым, который не встал, и вторым, который не встал. The Gemara answers: Rava holds that everyone agrees that one who trips is negligent, but nevertheless there is a distinction between the obstacle created by the first and the obstacle created by the second.

The

first,

who tripped over the ground by his own action,

is certainly negligent,

because he should have been careful.

But the second, who tripped over the body of the first, is an ones, beyond his control, since people do not ordinarily look carefully at the roads.

Nevertheless, if after the

second

fell, a period of time passed during which he could have stood up,

with regard to his body he is liable

if the third tripped over the body of the second; the second is liable,

because he should have stood up but did not,

and he is judged as a person who causes damage..

And

with regard to his property,

if the third was injured by the property of the second, the second is

exempt,

even though he could have stood up but did not, because

he can say

to the third:

“This pit

—this pit—

I did not dig it;

I did not dig it; rather, the pit was created because of the negligence of the first, and the second is not obligated to remove a pit that he did not dig.”

They raise an objection from a source,

The Gemara raises an objection,

from the continuation of the beraita to Rava’s interpretation of the first clause.

All of them,

all those who fell and caused others to stumble,

are liable for their damage

caused by

their bodies,

and are exempt for their damage

caused by their property.

Is it not the case

that one can learn from the fact that the beraita did not distinguish between the first, who fell and caused the obstacle, and the second and third, who fell because they tripped over those before them, that

even

the

first

is exempt for damage caused by his property, contrary to Rava, who held him liable under the principle that one who trips is negligent?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the beraita was speaking about those who tripped involuntarily,

apart from the first,

but the first, who tripped, is liable both for damage caused by his body and for damage caused by his property, in accordance with Rava.

The Gemara asks:

But

the wording of the beraita is:

“All of them”

are exempt for damage caused by their property;

it teaches,

which indicates that the first is included as well.

The Gemara answers:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

It can be reconciled by saying that when the beraita said

“all of them,”

it meant all of

those who were injured

—all those who were injured by the first and subsequently injured others. They are liable whether they caused the damage through their bodies or through their property.

The Gemara asks,

“What is this?”

How can the beraita be reconciled in this manner?

Granted, if you say

that the intent of the beraita is

“even the first”—this is why it teaches “all of them,”

including the first as well.

But if you say

in accordance with Rav Adda bar Ahava, that the tanna’s intent is

“apart from the first,” what

is the reason that the tanna used the expression

“all of them,”

which leaves room for the error of interpreting it as including the first?

It should have

taught

and stated as follows:

“Those who were injured

are liable for damage caused by their property and exempt for damage caused by their bodies.” That is, according to Rav Adda bar Ahava, the tanna was speaking only about those who were injured. If so, why did he not say this explicitly? Rather, he used the nonspecific expression “all of them,” which implies that the first is included as well.

Rather,

this is what

Rava

said:

The beraita actually holds according to the one who says that one who trips is not negligent,

and both the first and the second who tripped are onesim, beyond their control. Because of the tripping itself, they are exempt whether they caused damage with their bodies or with their property.

Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the first and the second. The

first,

who tripped over the ground and caused the second to fall with his body,

is liable both for damage to the body of the second and for damage to the property of the second,

under the law of a person who causes damage, because he should have stood up but did not.

And if the

second,

who should have stood up but did not,

is liable for the damage suffered by the third

only

for damage to the body

of the third,

but not for damage to his property.

What is the reason

that the law of the second differs from that of the first?

Because

he is

the second, who causes damage under the law of a

“pit, and we have not found a pit for which there is liability for vessels.”

It follows that the distinction between the first and the second concerns one who injures the property of the person who comes after him with his body: The first is liable [under the law of a person who causes damage, since he did not stand up], while the second is exempt [since a pit is exempt for vessels]. But if the property of the first caused the damage, he is exempt, because he tripped involuntarily, and one who abandons his hazards after an involuntary fall is exempt.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rava’s principal statement that the second is judged as a damaging pit and is exempt for the vessels of the third:

This works out well according to Shmuel, who said

above that

every obstacle,

including one that was not abandoned, is liable under the law of a

pit;

it is possible to say that the second is judged as a pit.

But according to Rav, who said

that every obstacle,

if he abandoned it,

if he abandoned it,

yes,

he is indeed liable for it under the law of a pit,

but if he did not

abandon it,

no,

his liability is not under the law of a pit but under the law of an ox,

what can be said?

The second does not abandon his body, and therefore cannot be considered a damaging pit; if so, he should be liable for damage to the vessels of the third.

The Gemara answers Rava’s statement even according to Rav:

Actually,

the interpretation of the beraita is

as was said initially,

at the beginning of the discussion,

namely, that the distinction between the first and the second is that the first is liable for damage caused by his body and by his property under the principle that one who trips is negligent. The second is not negligent [because he is not obligated to look carefully at the roads], but nevertheless he should have stood up and did not. Therefore, for damage caused by his body—for example, if the third tripped over the body of the second—he is liable. But for damage caused by his property, he is exempt, because the second can say to the third: “This pit—I did not dig it, and I am not obligated to remove it.”

And

as for

what is difficult for you

from the wording of the beraita,

“All of them are liable

for damage caused by their bodies and exempt for damage caused by their property,” which implies that even the first is exempt for damage caused by his property:

Rav Adda bar Minyomi interpreted [

he established and explained ]

before Ravina

that when the beraita says “exempt for damage caused by their property,” it is referring to a case

in which vessels were damaged by vessels,

for example, one person tripped over another’s vessels and his own vessels broke.

In this there is no distinction between the first and the second, because the first too is liable for damage caused by his vessels [when he abandoned them, according to Rav] under the law of a pit, and a pit is exempt for damage to vessels.

The conclusion of the Gemara is therefore:

One who trips over the ground and falls, thereby causing another person to fall with his body, is a person who causes damage, and is liable both for bodily damage and for damage to the property of the second.

If the first fell together with his vessels and another person subsequently tripped over them, according to Shmuel the first is liable under the law of a pit. His law is as follows: He is liable for bodily damage suffered by the second, but exempt for damage to the second’s property. According to Rav, if the first abandoned his vessels, he is liable for them under the law of a pit: he is liable for bodily damage and exempt for damage to vessels. If he did not abandon them, he is liable under the law of an ox, both for damage to the body of the second and for damage to his property.

The second, who tripped over the body of the first and also fell, is not negligent in his fall, since people do not ordinarily look carefully at the roads. As long as he was unable to stand up or issue a warning, he is entirely exempt.

If the second could have stood up or issued a warning but neither stood up nor issued a warning, and he injured the third with his body, he is liable under the law of a person who causes damage, both for bodily damage suffered by the third and for damage to his vessels.

But if the property of the second injured the third, he is exempt, because the first can say to the second: “This pit—I did not dig it.”

The master said: If

all of them

fell because of the first, the first is liable for the damage suffered by all of them.

The Gemara discusses this:

“Because of the first”—how could they all fall

because of him? How did it happen that they all fell because of him?

Rav Pappa said:

It is referring to a case

in which he blocked the path,

where the first blocked the entire width of the road, like a carcass lying across the road.

Rav Zevid said:

Rav Zevid said:

It is a case in which the first lay diagonally,

like a blind man’s staff,

like a stick with which a blind man feels his way. Mishna:

A. Two people were walking in the public domain toward one another,

one carrying his barrel and the other carrying his beam,

and they collided with one another, and

the barrel of one was broken by the beam of the other,

the owner of the barrel

is exempt, since the one had permission to walk and the other had permission to walk.

B. If they were walking one behind the other, and

the owner of the beam was

walking

first, and the owner of the

barrel

last,

and the owner of the barrel hastened his pace and

the

barrel

was broken

as a result of striking

the beam

in front of it,

the owner of the beam is exempt.