Bava Kamma 31b — the Talmud in English

The Gemara answers: Rava held that according to everyone, one who stumbled is negligent, but nevertheless there is a distinction between the obstacle created by the first and the obstacle created by the second.

The

first

who stumbled by himself on the ground

is certainly negligent,

because he should have been careful.

But the second, who stumbled on the body of the first, is an unavoidable victim, because it is not the way of people to look attentively at the roads.

Nevertheless, if after the

second

fell, a period of time passed during which he could have stood,

with regard to his body he is liable

if the third stumbled on the body of the second; the second is liable,

for he should have stood but did not stand,

and he is judged as a person who causes damage.

And

with regard to his property,

if the third was damaged by the property of the second, the second is

exempt,

even though he could have stood but did not stand, because

he can say

the second to the third:

“This pit”

this pit

“I did not dig,”

I did not dig it; rather, the pit was dug on account of the negligence of the first, and the second has no obligation to remove a pit that he did not dig.

It was objected:

from the continuation of the beraita, against Rava’s interpretation of the first clause.

All

all those who fell and caused others to stumble

are liable for the damage

caused on account of

their bodies, and exempt for

the damage

caused on account of

their property.

What, is it not

possible to learn from this that the beraita did not distinguish between the first, who fell and caused the obstacle, and the second and third, who fell and caused obstacles, that

even

the

first

is exempt for damage caused by his property, and this is unlike Rava, who made him liable by the law that one who stumbles is negligent?

The Gemara rejects:

No,

the beraita spoke of those who stumbled involuntarily

except for the first,

but the first, who stumbled, is liable both for damage caused by his body and for damage caused by his property, in accordance with Rava.

The Gemara is astonished:

But

the wording of the beraita is:

“All”

are exempt for damage caused by their property;

it teaches,

and it implies that the first is included as well.

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said:

It must be reconciled that when the beraita said

“all,”

it meant all

those who were damaged,

all those who were damaged by the first, if afterward they damaged others, are liable whether they damaged through their bodies or whether they damaged through their property.

The Gemara is astonished:

What is this?

How can the beraita be reconciled in this way!?

Granted, if you say

that the intent of the beraita is

“even the first”—this is why it teaches “all,”

and the first too is included.

But if you say

like Rabbi Adda bar Ahava, that the intent of the tan­####nay is

“except for the first,” what

reason did the tan­####nay state

“all,”

which allows one to err and explain that the first is included?

It should have

taught

and said as follows:

“Those who were damaged

are liable for damage caused by their property and exempt for damage caused by their bodies”—that is, according to Rabbi Adda bar Ahava, the tan­####nay spoke only about those who were damaged. If so, why did he not say this explicitly, but rather used the indefinite wording “all,” which implies that the first too is included?

Rather,

this is what

Rava said:

In truth, the beraita holds according to the one who says that one who stumbles is not negligent,

and both the first and the second who stumbled are unavoidable victims, and because of the obstacle they are exempt whether they caused damage with their bodies or whether they caused damage with their property.

Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the first and the second: the

first

who stumbled on the ground and caused the second to stumble with his body

is liable both for damage to the body of the second and for damage to the property of the second,

according to the law of a person who causes damage, because he should have stood but did not stand.

And

if the

second,

who should have stood but did not stand,

is liable for the damage of the third

only

for damage to the body

of the third,

but not for damage to his property.

What is the reason,

why did the law of the second differ from that of the first?

Because

it is the case that

the second causes damage by the law of a

“pit,” and we do not find a pit that is liable for vessels.

It follows according to this that the distinction between the first and the second concerns one who damages the property of the one who comes after him with his body: the first is liable [by the law of a person who causes damage, since he did not stand], and the second is exempt [since a pit is exempt for vessels]. But if the property of the first caused damage, he is exempt, because he stumbled involuntarily, and one who renounces ownership of his hazards after an involuntary fall is exempt.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rava’s principal statement, that the second is judged as a damaging pit and is exempt for the vessels of the third:

This works out well according to Shmuel, who said

above that

every obstacle,

including one for which he did not renounce ownership, has liability on account of

a pit;

it is possible to say that the second is judged as a pit.

But according to Rav, who said

that every obstacle

“if he renounced ownership of it,”

if he renounced ownership of it,

yes,

indeed he is liable for it on account of a pit,

but if not

he renounced ownership of it,

no,

his liability is not on account of a pit but on account of an ox,

what is there to say?

The second does not renounce ownership of his body, and if so he cannot be considered a damaging pit, and he should therefore be liable for damage to the vessels of the third.

The Gemara answers Rava’s statement even according to Rav:

In truth,

the meaning of the beraita is

as it was said at first,

at the beginning of the sugya,

that the distinction between the first and the second is that the first is liable for damage caused by his body and his property by the law that one who stumbles is negligent, whereas the second is not negligent [because he is not obligated to look attentively at the roads]. Nevertheless, he should have stood but did not stand; therefore, for damage caused by his body, such as when the third stumbled on the body of the second, he is liable. But for damage caused by his property, he is exempt, because the second can say to the third: “This pit—I did not dig it,” and I am not obligated to remove it.

And

as for

what is difficult for you

from the wording of the beraita,

“All are liable

for damage caused by their bodies and exempt for damage caused by their property,” which implies that the first too is exempt for his property that caused damage—

Rav Adda bar Manyumi expounded [

established and explained ]

before Ravina

that the intent of the beraita when it says “exempt for damage caused by their property” is in a case

where vessels were damaged by vessels,

such as when one person stumbled on his fellow’s vessels and his vessels broke.

And in this there is no distinction between the first and the second, because the first too is liable for damage caused by his vessels [when he renounced ownership of them, according to Rav] by the law of a pit, and a pit is exempt for vessels.

It follows from the conclusion of the Gemara:

One who stumbled on the ground and fell, and caused another person to stumble with his body, is a person who causes damage, and is liable both for bodily damage and for damage to the property of the second.

If the vessels of the first fell together with him, and another person came and stumbled on them, according to Shmuel the first is liable by the law of a pit. And its law is as follows: for bodily damage to the second he is liable, and for damage to his property he is exempt. According to Rav, if the first renounced ownership of his vessels, he is liable for them by the law of a pit: he is liable for the body and exempt for the vessels. But if he did not renounce ownership of them, he is liable by the law of an ox, both for the body of the second and for his property.

The second, who stumbled on the body of the first and also fell, is not negligent in his fall, for it is not the way of people to look attentively at the roads. And as long as he could not stand or warn, he is entirely exempt.

If the second could have stood or warned, but did not stand or warn, and he damaged the third with his body, he is liable by the law of a person who causes damage, both for bodily damage to the third and for damage to his vessels.

But if the property of the second damaged the third, he is exempt, because the first says to the second: “This pit—I did not dig it.”

The Master said: If

all

fell because of the first, the first is liable for the damage of all.

And the Gemara discusses:

“Because of the first”—how did they fall?

How did it happen that they all fell because of him?

Rav Pappa said:

It is speaking

where he cut off the path,

that the first blocked the entire width of the road, like a carcass laid across the width of the road.

Rav Zevid said:

For example, the first lay diagonally

like a blind man’s staff,

like the staff of a blind man with which he feels his way.

Mishna:

1. Two who were walking in the public domain, one opposite the other,

this one coming with his barrel and that one coming with his beam,

and they encountered one another, and

this one's barrel was broken by that one's beam,

the owner of the barrel

is exempt, for this one had permission to walk and that one had permission to walk.

2. If they were walking one after the other, and

the owner of the beam was

walking

first, and the owner of

the

barrel last,

and the owner of the barrel hastened his walking, and

the

barrel

was broken

as a result of its striking

the beam

before it,

the owner of the beam is exempt.