Bava Kamma 22b — the Talmud in English

Therefore, in the

first clause of the Mishna, where the lamp was inside the shop,

Мишны, где светильник находился внутри лавки,

the owner of the camel is liable,

because of

he should not have increased the load [he should not have needed to load so much flax onto the camel that it would enter the shop; and since he was negligent in this, he is liable for the camel’s act even though he was compelled at the time the damage was done, since he should have prevented the camel from causing damage in advance by loading it with less flax]. And whereas in the

emu ne sledovalo nagruzhat na verblyuda stolko lna, chtoby tot voshel v lavku. I poskolku on proyavil nebrezhnost v etom, on obyazan za deystvie verblyuda, dazhe hotya v moment prichineniya vreda on byl vynuzhden: ved emu sledovalo zaranee ne dopustit, chtoby verblyud prichinil vred, nagruziv ego menshim kolichestvom lna].

A v

final clause, where the shopkeeper placed the lamp outside,

Мишны, где лавочник поставил светильник снаружи,

the shopkeeper is liable,

because of

he should not have placed his lamp outside [he should not have placed the lamp outside]; and since he was negligent in this, the shopkeeper is liable for what the fire damaged through the camel that passed there with permission and according to law.

emu ne sledovalo stavit svechu snaruzhi]. I poskolku on proyavil nebrezhnost v etom, lavchnik obyazan za vred, kotoryy ogon prichinil cherez verblyuda, kotoryy prohodil tam na zakonnyh osnovaniyah.

Come and hear: We learned in a Mishna below [61b]:

V Mishna nizhe [61b] skazano:

“One who ignites a stack of grain

etc.’

and a kid was tied to it—to the stack—

k stogu

and a slave was near it—near the stack—

s stogom

and was burned with it—

he is liable for the kid and the stack, since he does not have the law of death on account of the slave, for the slave should have fled. And he does not have the law of kam lei bid’rabba minei to exempt him from monetary liability. But if there was

za kozlenka i stog, potomu chto emu ne polagaetsya nakazanie smertyu iz-za raza, ved rab mog ubezhat. I k nemu ne primenyaetsya printsip “vozlozhennoe na nego bolee tyazheloe obyazatelstvo osvobozhdaet ego ot denezhnogo obyazatelstva”, chtoby osvobodit ego ot denezhnogo platezha».

No esli

a slave tied to it—to the stack—

k stogu

and a kid near it—and the kid was near the stack—

i kozlenok byl ryadom so stogom

and was burned with it—with the stack—

so stogom,

“he is exempt,” because since he is liable for death on account of the slave, as it is stated, “He shall surely be avenged” [Exodus 21:20], he is therefore exempt from payments for the kid and the stack. For there is the law of kam lei bid’rabba minei [meaning: the monetary liability is considered subsumed in the greater liability that took effect upon him, namely, liability for death]. [What we learned in the first clause, “there was a kid tied,” is not specifically so; rather, even if it was not tied but merely near, nevertheless he is liable for it, since it does not have the understanding to flee. And what the final clause stated, “and a kid was near it,” it stated incidentally to the first clause: since in the first clause it stated “a kid tied and a slave near,” it therefore stated here “a slave tied and a kid near”; but in the case of the kid there is never a difference between one tied and one that is not tied].

ot platezha, potomu chto, poskolku za raza on podlezhal smertnoy kazni, kak skazano: «mestyu budet otomsheno» [Shemot 21:20], on osvobozhdaetsya ot platezha za kozlenka i stog. Ved zdes primenyaetsya printsip «vozlozhennoe na nego bolee tyazheloe obyazatelstvo osvobozhdaet ego ot denezhnogo obyazatelstva» [to est denezhnoe obyazatelstvo schitaetsya pogashennym bolee tyazhelym obyazatelstvom, kotoroe na nego vozlozheno, a imenno obyazatelstvom smertnoy kazni].

To, chto skazano v nachale: «kozlenok byl privyazan», ne obyazatelno oznachaet imenno eto: dazhe esli on ne byl privyazan, a byl prosto ryadom, vse ravno za nego obyazan, potomu chto u nego net sposobnosti ubezhat. A to, chto skazano v konce: «a kozlenok byl ryadom s nim», upomyanuto v sootvetstvii s nachalom: poskolku v nachale skazano «kozlenok byl privyazan, a rab byl ryadom», v konce skazano «rab byl privyazan, a kozlenok byl ryadom». No v otnoshenii kozlenka raznitsy net, byl li on privyazan ili ne byl privyazan .

And we object:

Granted, according to the one who says [Rabbi Yoḥanan], who holds that for

[Rabban Yohanan], chto za

his fire that caused damage, he is liable

kotoryy prichinil vred, on obyazan

because it is considered

chto on schitaetsya

his arrow, and when he kindled a fire and the slave was burned, it is considered as though he himself burned him and he is liable for death on his account, it is understandable that

и когда он зажег огонь и раб сгорел, это считается, будто он сам его сжег, и он подлежит за это смертной казни; понятно,

for this reason he is exempt from monetary payment.

ot denezhnogo platezha.

But according to the one who says [Resh Lakish], who holds that for

[Resh Lakish], chto za

his fire that caused damage, he is liable

kotoryy prichinil vred, on obyazan

because it is considered

chto on schitaetsya

his property, and when he kindled a fire and the slave was burned, it is considered as though his property burned him,

а когда он зажег огонь и раб сгорел, это считается, будто его имущество сожгло раба,

why is he exempt from monetary payment? And is it so that

ot denezhnogo platezha? Razve

if his ox killed a slave

[ubiya ego byk raza],

he would likewise not be liable [would he be exempt from monetary payment] on account of this? But it is explicitly stated in the Torah that he is liable monetarily, as it is stated: “He shall give his master thirty shekels of silver” [Exodus 21:32].

[razve on osvobozhdalsya by ot denezhnogo platezha] iz-za etogo? Ved v Tora pryam skazano, chto on obyazan zaplatit denezhnuyu summu: «tridtsat shekeley serebra pust on vydast ego gospodinu» [Shemot 21:32].

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could say to you: With what are we dealing here [the Mishna is speaking]?—

[v Mishna govoritsya]?

when he ignited [the fire] on the body of the slave, and in this manner he actually killed him with his hands and is liable for death; therefore he is exempt from monetary payment,

a takim obrazom deystvitelno ubil ego sobstvennymi rukami i podlezhal smertnoy kazni, poetomu osvobozhdaetsya ot denezhnogo platezha,

for kam lei bid’rabba minei.

And we object:

if so, if the Mishna is speaking of a case in which he ignited the slave with his hands,

esli Mishna govorit o sluchae, kogda on podzhog raza sobstvennymi rukami,

what is it coming to say [what does the Mishna come to teach]? For it is an obvious law that he is exempt from monetary payment in a case in which he became liable for death.

[chto ona dolzhna skazat]? Ved ponyatno, chto v sluchae, kogda chelovek podlegayet smertnoy kazni, on osvobozhden ot denezhnogo platezha.

And we answer:

it was not necessary [the Mishna did not need to innovate this law, that he is exempt for the kid], but

[Mishna ne dolzhna byla] ustanavlivat eto pravilo, chto on osvobozhden ot platezha za kozlenka, no

[it is speaking] of a kid belonging to one person and a slave belonging to another, in which case there is an innovation: he is exempt for the kid even though he is not liable for death on account of the kid, but on account of the other person’s slave.

[kozlenok prinadlezhit odnomu cheloveku, a rab — drugomu]. Novizna zaklyuchaetsya v tom, chto v takom sluchae on osvobozhden ot platezha za kozlenka, hotya smertnoy kazni podlegaet ne za kozlenka, a za raza, prinadlezhashchego drugomu cheloveku.

Come and hear: We learned in a Mishna below [59b]:

V Mishna nizhe [59b] skazano:

“One who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor and it burned another’s property—

i ogon sozhg imushchestvo drugogo,

“he is exempt under human law but liable under heavenly law.”

And we object:

granted, according to the one who says [Rabbi Yoḥanan], who holds that for

[Rabban Yohanan], chto za

his fire that caused damage, he is liable

kotoryy prichinil vred, on obyazan

because it is considered

chto on schitaetsya

his arrow, it is understandable that he is exempt under human law when he handed the fire to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, for

понятно, что он освобожден по законам человека, когда передал огонь глухонемому, умственно неполноценному или малолетнему, поскольку

it is the deaf-mute’s arrow: this is not considered the act of the one who sent it, but the act of the deaf-mute, and the deaf-mute is exempt for his acts.

— ne deystvie peredayushchego, a deystvie gluhogo, kotoryy osvobozhden ot otvetstvennosti za svoi deystviya.

But according to the one who says [Resh Lakish], who holds that for

[Resh Lakish], chto za

his fire that caused damage, he is liable

kotoryy prichinil vred, on obyazan

because it is considered

chto on schitaetsya

his property, why is he exempt when he handed his fire to the deaf-mute? For

pochemu on osvobozhden, kogda peredal svoy ogon gluhomu, bezumnomu ili nesovershennoletnemu? Ved

if he handed

his

ox to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor and the ox caused damage while it was in their possession,

i byk prichinil vred, nahodyas v ih vlasti,

would he likewise not be liable? He is surely liable for failing to guard his property properly, as explained above [10a], that if he handed it to a deaf-mute he is liable; so too, with his fire he should be liable for failing to guard his fire so that it would not cause damage.

Ved on obyazan za to, chto ne nadlezhashchim obrazom ohranyal svoe imushchestvo, kak obyasneno vyshe [10a]: esli on peredal ego gluhomu, on obyazan; tak i v sluchae s ego ognem on dolzhen byt obyazan za to, chto ne ohranyal svoy ogon, chtoby on ne prichinil vreda.

And we answer:

this was stated concerning it [the Gemara concerning the Mishna [there] said]:

[Gemara skazala o etoy Mishna [tam]]:

Resh Lakish said in the name of Hezekiah: They taught that he is exempt for his fire that he handed to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor

ot otvetstvennosti za ogon, kotoryy on peredal gluhomu, bezumnomu ili nesovershennoletnemu,

only when he handed him a coal and the deaf-mute fanned it, since the coal cannot cause damage so long as it is not fanned. And this is not considered handing a damaging object into the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor.

— etot gluhoy, bezumnyy ili nesovershennoletniy, ved ugol ne mozhet prichinit vred, poka ego ne razduyut. I eto ne schitaetsya peredachey vredonosnogo predmeta gluhomu, bezumnomu ili nesovershennoletnemu.

But if

esli

he handed him a flame—

he is liable. What is the reason? The damage is certain, and he is liable to guard the flame so that it will not cause damage; and when he hands it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, he is negligent in guarding the object and is liable for this.

[on navernyaka prichinit vred], i peredayushchiy dolzhen ohranyat plamya, chtoby ono ne prichinilo vreda. A kogda on peredayot ego gluhomu, bezumnomu ili nesovershennoletnemu, on proyavlyaet nebrezhnost v ohrane predmeta i obyazan za eto.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that he is liable for his fire because it is considered his arrow,

kotoryy schitaet, chto za ego ogon on obyazan, potomu chto ogon schitaetsya ego strelami,

said that

even when handing a

даже

pri peredache

flame to the deaf-mute, he is

gluhomu

exempt, for

potomu chto

he holds: it is the grasp

of the deaf-mute that causes the ignition, since he took it and carried it to the stack. And it is not considered the act of the one who sent it, but the act of the deaf-mute, and the deaf-mute is exempt for his acts; and the one who sent it

[его хватка привела к возгоранию], поскольку он взял пламя и отнес его к стогу. И это считается не действием передавшего, а действием глухонемого, который освобожден за свои действия. А передавший

is not liable until he hands the deaf-mute

[a]

a piece of wood, kindling, and a lamp, in which case the act of damage is attributed to the one who sent it.

[kusty, pruty i svechu], tak kak v takom sluchae deystvie, prichinivshee vred, otnositsya k peredayushchemu.

Rava said: A verse and a Mishna [a verse and a beraita]

[stikh i barayta]

support Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that he is liable for his fire because it is considered his arrow.

kotoryy schitaet, chto za ego ogon on obyazan, potomu chto ogon schitaetsya ego strelami.

The verse [the verse] supports this:

[stikh Pisanija] pomogaet:

as it is written: [Exodus 22]

[Shemot 22]

“When a fire goes forth,” “goes forth”

implies

by itself, that he did not himself ignite his fellow’s stack, but ignited [the fire] within his own [property], and the fire went forth by itself; and nevertheless it is written

то есть он не зажигал собственноручно стог своего товарища, а зажег огонь на своей территории, и огонь сам пошел; несмотря на это, написано:

“the one who kindles the fire shall surely pay,” for the Torah calls him “the one who kindles the fire,” as though he had ignited it himself.

potomu chto Tora nazyvaet ego «podzhigatelem», kak budto on sam podzheg ego.

Infer from this [it is proven from this] that

[iz etogo dokazyvaetsya], chto

his fire, which goes forth by itself, he is liable for

kotoryy rasprostranyaetsya sam, on obyazan vozmestit

because it is considered

chto ogon schitaetsya

his arrow.