Bava Kamma 22a — the Talmud in English

And it was taught in a beraita: The dog and the kid that jumped, whether from above downward or from below upward, are exempt.

Explain it

—

Rav Pappa

established it as referring to a case

where he completely reversed—

that they jumped in an unusual manner, the reverse of their normal manner of jumping,

the dog,

whose way is to drive its claws into the wall when it jumps, did so here

with driving in,

by jumping.

And the kid,

whose way is to jump by jumping, did so here

with clinging,

driving its claws into the wall.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

If so,

that you established that they were acting unusually and were not compelled,

why are they exempt

from paying half-damage, as is the law of keren?

And we answer: Indeed,

he is exempt from full-damage and liable for half-damage:

The discussion of “his fire is on account of his arrows”

Our discussion comes to explain the nature of the liability of one who causes damage through fire:

The amoraim disputed this. Rabbi Yohanan maintains: “His fire is on account of his arrows”—the meaning is that the fire is like an arrow, and the one who kindles it is like one who sends an arrow. And just as one who sends an arrow and it causes damage is liable to pay for the damage of the arrow as though he himself performed the damage with his hands, since the arrow goes by his force, so too with fire. Everything that the fire damages on its way is considered as though the one who kindled it damaged with his hands. For this reason, it is explained at the end of the discussion that if a person is injured by fire, the one who kindled it is liable for the payment of four types of compensation, as is the law regarding a person who causes damage with his hands, since the fire is like an arrow; and just as one who sends an arrow and injures a person is liable for four types of compensation, so too one who sends fire.

The reason of Rabbi Yohanan is explained below in the Gemara: he derives this from a verse.

The position of Reish Lakish is that “his fire is on account of his property”—the meaning is that the fire is like the property of the one who kindled it. For this reason, the one who kindled it is liable for the damage caused by the fire, since his property caused damage, and this is the law of all property that causes damage, for which one is liable.

Rashi and Tosafot disputed the words of Reish Lakish. Rashi’s position is that he is liable only if the ember was his, since his entire liability is on account of his property that caused damage. But Tosafot disagree and maintain that even if he kindled a fire belonging to another he is liable, because since he kindled it and caused the damage, it is considered his property and he is liable.

Regarding the very position of Rabbi Yohanan that “his fire is on account of his arrows,” Tosafot innovated that for the fire to be considered his arrows, it is not necessary that he kindle the fire with his hands. Rather, even if he was negligent and did not guard his ember, and the fire went on its own and caused damage, the fire is also considered his arrows, even though he did not send it with his hands. But the later authorities wrote that in a case where he did not create the fire with his hands, but the fire was created as a result of his negligence, Tosafot also agree that this is not considered his arrows. All the words of Tosafot apply only where he kindled the fire in a guarded place, but afterward was negligent in guarding it, and the fire went on and caused damage—in that case he is liable on account of his arrows. Tosafot also wrote that the fire is considered his arrows only if he kindled it in a place where it is nearly certain that damage will be created through his kindling. Therefore, it is specifically when he kindled it in a place where wind is ordinarily present that the fire is considered an arrow. But if he kindled it in a place where wind is not ordinarily present, and there is no certainty that damage will be created through his kindling, this is not similar to an arrow and he is exempt. Moreover, Tosafot wrote in Sanhedrin that he is liable only in a place where the fire can cause damage without any assistance from the wind at all. But the Chazon Ish explained the words of Tosafot as meaning that he is liable only if the fire caused damage through the same wind that existed at the time of the kindling; but if another wind arose after the kindling, he is no longer liable.

The definition of the Gr"ח “

8b” “

his fire is on account of his arrows”:

In the novellae of our master Chaim Halevi

he wrote two approaches to understanding the law of “his fire is on account of his arrows.” The first approach is that this law innovates that every damage which the fire causes is as though he himself performed the act. But this law does not state that the damage of the fire is considered damage performed through the force of the one who kindled it; on the contrary! Even though the damage was performed through the force of the fire and not through the force of the one who kindled it, he is nevertheless liable for it as though he had done it with his hands.

The second approach is that, in truth, the force by which the fire travels is the force of the one who kindled it. Everything that the fire damages on its way is considered damage through the direct force of the one who kindled it. And the Gr"ח added that for this innovation no verse is needed; rather, it is logical that the force by which the fire travels is the force of the one who kindled it. But it could still be exempted because, in the end, another force is involved in the movement of the fire, since it proceeded not only through his force but also through the force of the wind. Regarding this, the verse innovates that even when another force is involved in it, it is still considered that the fire proceeds through his force, and he is liable because the damage was performed through his force.

Regarding capital matters:

The position of Tosafot and the Rosh is that according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that the one who kindled the fire is liable for it as though he caused damage with his hands, if so, even if a person was killed by the fire, the one who kindled it is liable to death as though he killed him with his hands. But the Ran disagrees and maintains that even according to the position of Rabbi Yohanan, he is not liable to death if a person dies because of the fire. And although his fire is on account of his arrows, this is similar to grami, for which one is not liable to death.

And regarding the position of Tosafot and the Rosh, the Gr"ח raised an objection: It is explained in the Gemara that this law of “his fire is on account of his arrows” is derived from a verse, and this verse was stated concerning monetary law and not concerning capital law. If so, from where did Tosafot derive that this law was also innovated concerning capital law?

And the Gr"ח answered this according to his second approach, which we cited above: The foundation of the matter of “his fire is on account of his arrows” was not learned at all from the verse. Rather, it is logical that the fire is literally like an arrow, because it travels through his force; and this reasoning applies both in monetary law and in capital law. And although we still require a verse in order to make him liable even where the fire traveled with the assistance of the wind—and this verse was stated only concerning monetary law—regarding this the Gr"ח innovated that this is not an innovation specific to monetary law, but rather a general revelation for all the laws of the Torah: even where another force is involved in it, this does not diminish his force, and it is still considered to proceed through his force. Therefore, the one who kindled the fire is liable to death, since the person was killed through his force, and this is like killing with one’s hands.

Regarding Shabbat:

The Nimukei Yosef raised an objection: According to Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that everything the fire burns on its way is as though he himself kindled it with his hands, how is it permitted to light a lamp on the eve of Shabbat? For when the lamp is burning on Shabbat, this is as though he is kindling a fire with his hands on Shabbat. And he answered that the meaning of the law that “his fire is on account of his arrows” is not that each and every moment that the fire exists, it is as though he is kindling it with his hands. Rather, the definition of the law is that at the time of the kindling he becomes liable for everything that the fire will damage afterward through his kindling. Since this is so, there is no difficulty from a lamp on Shabbat, since his entire liability is completed at the time of the kindling, and at the time of the kindling it is a period when kindling a fire is permitted.

And the Nimukei Yosef proved his words: For the Gemara compares fire to an arrow, and with an arrow it is certain that his liability is completed at the time of throwing the arrow and not at the time when the damage is actually done. For if we say that the liability of one who throws the arrow is only at the time when the damage is done, at that time he is compelled, since even if he desires it, he cannot retrieve the arrow so that it will not cause damage. It necessarily follows that his liability is at the time of throwing the arrow, and then he becomes liable for everything that the arrow will do afterward; and the same is true of fire: his liability is completed at the time of the kindling.

Regarding slaughter:

In the Gemara in Chullin 31a it is explained that if a knife fell from his hand and slaughtered [the animal] at the time of its fall, the slaughter is invalid. And Tosafot raised an objection in Sanhedrin according to Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that “his fire is on account of his arrows”: Just as with a burning fire, although it left the hand of the one who kindled it, it is nevertheless considered that he burned with his hands, so too the knife should be considered to travel through the force of the one who dropped it, as though he himself slaughtered with his hands. Why, then, is his slaughter invalid? Tosafot wrote

that in truth this law applies only according to the one who says that his fire is on account of his property.

But the Gr"ח wrote an answer to this law even according to Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that his fire is on account of his arrows, according to the two approaches that we cited above:

According to the first approach, that even according to the one who says that his fire is on account of his arrows, this is not considered that the damage was performed through his direct force, but rather we consider it as though he performed the damage with his hands—if so, this is effective only regarding monetary law and the like. But regarding slaughter, there is a law that the slaughter must be performed through “the force of a person.” If so, what we consider as though he performed the act with his hands will not help, since in the end there is no force of a person here, for the act was not performed through his force. Therefore, regarding slaughter, the law of “his fire is on account of his arrows” does not exist.

And according to the second approach written by the Gr"ח, that we know logically that the fire travels through the force of the one who kindled it—and regarding this the Torah innovated that even though another force is involved in it, it is still considered to be through the force of the one who kindled it—if so, this applies specifically to fire, which we know travels through his force. But if a knife fell from his hand, his force ceased immediately at the time of the fall, and afterward the slaughter was not performed through his force. Since this is so, this has no connection to the law of “his fire is on account of his arrows,” whose foundation is that the fire travels through the force of the one who kindled it.

Conclusion of the discussion—

and the law of concealed property:

In the continuation of the discussion, the Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yohanan: How will he explain the law of exemption for concealed property in a fire? According to his position, every one who causes damage through fire is like one who causes damage with his hands, and with a person who causes damage there is no exemption for concealed property. And the Gemara answers, according to the conclusion, that Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that his fire is on account of his arrows, also maintains that his fire is on account of his property. Therefore, in a place where he cannot be made liable on account of his arrows, he is still liable on account of his property. And it is explained in the Gemara that if there was a fence preventing the fire from spreading, and the fence fell not because of the fire, and the fire spread, in this case the fire is not considered his arrows. For at the time when he kindled the fire, the fire had no ability to continue. In this case Rabbi Yohanan makes him liable only on account of his property. According to this, the Gemara’s difficulty from concealed property is resolved, since in this case, where he is liable only on account of his property, the Torah stated the exemption of “concealed property.” And the Gemara raises an objection: If Rabbi Yohanan also maintains that he should be made liable on account of his property, then what practical difference is there between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish? And the Gemara answers that according to Rabbi Yohanan, if the fire damaged a person, he is liable for four types of compensation, as is the law of a person who causes damage, whereas according to Reish Lakish he is liable only for damage, as is the law of property that causes damage.

We find two approaches among the early authorities in understanding the conclusion of the Gemara. The first approach is what Rashi brought here: In truth, even according to the conclusion, according to Rabbi Yohanan the damage of the fire is considered literally like damage with one’s hands; only in a place where he cannot be made liable on account of his arrows is he liable on account of his property. According to this, there are indeed further practical differences between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish besides the one brought by the Gemara—for example, whether there is an exemption for concealed property in a case where his arrows have not been exhausted, and likewise whether he is liable to death if a person is killed by his fire, and other practical differences, as explained by Rashi and Tosafot, s.v. “What.”

But Rashi brought another interpretation in understanding the conclusion of the Gemara, and this is the primary one, although Rashi did not explain what the interpretation is. This interpretation is explained in the Shita Mekubetzet ( and likewise in the Maharshal here, according to Rashi’s view ) that according to the conclusion of the Gemara, the meaning of “his fire is on account of his arrows” is not that he is considered as though he caused damage literally with his hands, like one who throws an arrow. Rather, even according to Rabbi Yohanan, the main basis of his liability for the damage of the fire is that the fire is his property; but the Torah said that within this liability there are also laws of arrows [and for this reason he is liable for four types of compensation as though he caused damage with an arrow]. But the main basis of his liability is on account of his property. According to this interpretation, even according to Rabbi Yohanan there is an exemption for concealed property in all circumstances, including where his arrows have not been exhausted. According to this, certainly if a person dies through his fire, the one who kindled it is certainly not liable to death, since the foundation of the liability for fire is on account of his property; it merely contains laws as though he caused damage through his arrow, but it is not considered that he actually caused damage through his arrow. Now, the Rambam ruled according to Rabbi Yohanan, that his fire is on account of his arrows, and the Maggid Mishneh raised an objection: According to this, the exemption for concealed property should apply only where “his arrows have been exhausted,” as is explained in the Gemara, for where his arrows have not been exhausted he should be liable even for concealed property, as is the law of a person who causes damage. But the Rambam wrote without qualification that there is an exemption for concealed property, and did not mention at all that his exemption applies only where his arrows have been exhausted. This is astonishing, since the Rambam ruled according to Rabbi Yohanan. However, according to the second interpretation that we brought in the discussion—that according to the conclusion, even according to Rabbi Yohanan the main basis of his liability is on account of his property—he is always exempt for concealed property, even where his arrows have not been exhausted, and the words of the Rambam are settled.

We learned in the Mishna:

The dog that took a cake of charcoal and went to a stack, ate the cake of charcoal and set the stack on fire—

for the cake of charcoal he pays full-damage, and for the stack he pays half-damage.

It was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: His fire,

the one who sends the conflagration and it causes damage, the Torah made him liable

on account of

its being considered

his arrows,

and as though he throws an arrow.

And Reish Lakish said:

For

his fire,

the Torah made him liable

on account of his property,

that causes damage, for the fire is considered like his ox and his pit that caused damage.

And now the Gemara understands that according to Rabbi Yohanan he is liable only on account of his arrows and not on account of his property, while according to Reish Lakish he is liable only on account of his property and not on account of his arrows. The practical difference between them is in the case of one who sends a conflagration through an ember that is not his: according to Rabbi Yohanan he is liable because it is considered his arrows, while according to Reish Lakish he is exempt because the ember is not his property.

And we inquire about it:

And what is the reason that Reish Lakish did not say as Rabbi Yohanan?

He can say to you

Reish Lakish:

His arrows proceed through his force,

[they] go and cause damage, but this

this

fire

does not proceed through his force,

[it goes], for the fire goes and burns far away by itself, without any addition whatsoever on the part of the person who kindled it. Therefore Reish Lakish maintains that the fire is not considered the person’s arrows, and his entire liability is because it is considered his property that caused damage, and he is liable because he was negligent in guarding it.

And what is the reason that Rabbi Yohanan did not say as Reish Lakish?

He can say to you

Rabbi Yohanan: Every

property

for whose guarding one is liable

has substance,

[there is substance in it], but this

this

fire

has no substance,

[there is no substance in it]. If so, it is not considered his property, and his entire liability is only because it is considered his arrows, which caused damage through him.

We learned

[in the Mishna]:

The dog that took a cake of charcoal

and went to a stack, ate the cake of charcoal and set the stack on fire—for the cake of charcoal he pays full-damage, and for the stack he pays half-damage.

And we raise an objection:

Granted, according to the one who says

that for

his fire

he is liable

on account of

its being considered

his arrows,

it is understandable why a person who kindled a fire and caused damage is liable to pay full-damage, whereas a dog that set a stack on fire is liable only for half-damage, because

it is the dog’s arrows,

and it is considered that the dog caused damage through pebbles, whose law is half-damage. But a person who kindles a fire is liable for full-damage, because there is no law of pebbles with regard to a person.

But according to the one who says

that for

his fire

he is liable

on account of

its being considered

his property,

that causes damage,

this fire is not the property of the owner of the dog

but rather of the owner of the cake of charcoal. If so, why is the owner of the dog liable to pay for the stack half-damage? And if the intention of the Mishna is that he is liable for the place where he placed the ember, where the dog caused damage with its body, then he should pay full-damage, since it is the way of a dog to take a cake of charcoal and place it.

And we answer:

Reish Lakish can say to you: What are we dealing with here?

The Mishna is speaking in a case

where it threw it,

where the dog threw the cake of charcoal together with the ember onto the stack,

for the cake of charcoal he pays full-damage,

since it caused damage to it with its body,

and for the place of the ember he pays half-damage,

since it caused damage to it through its force by means of pebbles,

and for the entire stack he is exempt,

since the ember is not the property of the owner of the dog but rather of the owner of the cake of charcoal. And he is not liable on account of pebbles, since from the place of the ember onward, the fire burned by itself.

And Rabbi Yohanan

who holds that he is liable for his fire because it is considered his arrows, how will he explain the Mishna?

He will explain that it is speaking of a case

where it was placed by the placer,

where the dog placed the coal on the stack.

Therefore

for the cake

he pays full damages, as in the case of a tooth.

And for the place of the coal he pays full damages,

because it is the way of a dog to place the cake, and it placed it there directly and not through pebbles.

And for the stack he pays half-damages,

because every place to which the fire went and caused damage is considered the dog’s arrows, and he is liable for it as pebbles, half-damages.

The Gemara attempts to resolve the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish from a Mishna below.

Come and hear:

We learned in a Mishna below [62b]:

“A camel

that was

laden with flax and passed through the public domain,

the camel passed beside a shop, and

its flax entered the shop and caught fire from the shopkeeper’s lamp

that was inside the shop

and set the entire building ablaze

[the entire building]—

the owner of the camel is liable

because he should not have made its bundle so large that it would enter the shop.

And if

a shopkeeper placed his lamp outside,

and the flax caught fire from the lamp that stood outside and burned the entire building—

the shopkeeper is liable

because he was negligent בכך that he placed the lamp outside.

Rabbi Judah says: With a Hanukkah lamp—

he is exempt,

for it is a mitzva to place it in the public domain in order to publicize the miracle, and he was not negligent by placing it there, for he did so with permission. Thus far are the words of the Mishna.

And we raise an objection to Reish Lakish:

Granted, according to the one who says

[Rabbi Yohanan], who holds that he is liable for

his fire because

it is considered

his arrows,

it is understandable why, when the owner of the camel was negligent, he is liable for the entire building, because the fire that burned the building

is the arrows of the camel, but according to the one who says

[Reish Lakish], who holds that he is liable for his fire

because

it is considered

his property,

behold,

this fire is not the property of the owner of the camel

but of the owner of the shop, so why is the owner of the camel liable for what the fire went on its own and burned?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish could say to you: Here, with what are we dealing

[the Mishna is speaking]—

with scorching

[setting fire] with its body to

the entire building,

for the fire reached the entire building through the camel and not on its own, and therefore he is liable for the burning of the entire building.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if it is speaking of a case in which the camel, with its body, set the entire building ablaze, the words of the Mishna in the latter clause are difficult.

Come and say the latter clause: “If a shopkeeper placed his lamp outside

the shopkeeper is liable,” and if

it is speaking

of scorching

[setting fire] to the entire building with its body,

why

[why]

is he liable

the shopkeeper for this? Behold, this is the act of the camel.

And we answer: It is speaking

of where it stood,

where the camel stood in its place and set the entire building ablaze from the place where it stood, for it had a bundle as large as the entire building.

And we raise an objection: If it is speaking of

where it stood and scorched, all the more so is the shopkeeper exempt and the owner of the camel liable!

For the owner of the camel should have hurried to lead it away from there so that it would not set the building ablaze.

And he answers:

Rav Huna bar Manoah said in the name of Rav Ika: Here, with what are we dealing

[it is speaking]—

with a case in which it stood in order to urinate,

and he cannot lead it away from there as long as it has not finished; and if so, the owner of the camel is compelled regarding the fact that it stood and set the entire building ablaze.