Bava Kamma 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

And it was taught in a beraita: The dog and the kid that leaped, whether from above downward or from below upward, are exempt.

Explain it

as referring to a case where

Rav Pappa

established it as one

in which they acted in an inverted manner,

leaping in an unusual way, contrary to their normal manner of leaping,

the dog,

whose manner is to drive its claws into the wall when it leaps, did so here

by leaping,

rather than by driving in its claws.

And the kid,

whose manner is to leap, did so here

by clinging,

driving its claws into the wall.

And the Gemara challenges this:

If so,

if you established that they acted unusually and were not compelled,

why are they exempt

from paying half the damage, as is the law in the case of keren?

And we answer: Indeed, they are

exempt from full damages, but liable for half-damages:

The Sugya of “Its Fire Is Due to Its Arrows”

Our sugya comes to clarify the nature of liability for one who causes damage through fire:

The amoraim disagreed concerning this matter. Rabbi Yohanan maintains: “Its fire is due to its arrows”—meaning that fire is like an arrow, and the one who kindles it is like one who shoots an arrow. Just as one who shoots an arrow and causes damage is liable for the damage caused by the arrow as though he himself caused the damage directly, since the arrow moves by his force, so too with fire. Everything that the fire damages along its path is considered as though the one who kindled it caused the damage directly. Therefore, as is explained at the end of the sugya, if a person is injured by fire, the one who kindled it is liable to pay the four types of indemnity, as in the case of a person who causes damage directly. For fire is like an arrow, and just as one who shoots an arrow and injures a person is liable for the four types of indemnity, so too one who sends fire.

Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is explained later in the Gemara, where it is derived from a verse.

The view of Reish Lakish is that “its fire is due to his property”—meaning that fire is like property belonging to the one who kindled it. Therefore, the one who kindled it is liable for damage caused by the fire, since his property caused damage, as is the law with regard to all property that causes damage.

Rashi and Tosafot disagreed concerning Reish Lakish’s statement. Rashi’s view is that he is liable only if the coal belonged to him, since all his liability is on account of his property that caused damage. Tosafot, however, disagree and maintain that even if he kindled a fire belonging to someone else, he is liable: since he kindled it and caused the damage, it is considered his property, and he is liable.

Regarding the fundamental view of Rabbi Yohanan that “its fire is due to its arrows,” Tosafot innovated that for the fire to be considered his arrows, it is not necessary for him to kindle the fire directly. Rather, even if he was negligent and failed to guard his coal, and the fire proceeded on its own and caused damage, the fire is still considered his arrows, even though he did not send it directly. But the later authorities wrote that when he did not create the fire directly, but the fire was created as a result of his negligence, Tosafot also agree that this is not considered his arrows. Tosafot’s entire statement applies only where he kindled the fire in a guarded place, but subsequently was negligent in guarding it, and the fire proceeded and caused damage—in which case he is liable on account of his arrows. Tosafot also wrote that the fire is considered his arrows only if he kindled it in a place where it was nearly certain that damage would be caused through his kindling it. Therefore, specifically when he kindled it in a place exposed to the ordinary wind is the fire considered an arrow. But if he kindled it in a place not exposed to the ordinary wind, where it is not certain that damage will be caused through his kindling it, this is not comparable to an arrow, and he is exempt. Tosafot wrote even further in Sanhedrin that he is liable only where the fire could cause damage without any assistance from the wind at all. But the Hazon Ish explained Tosafot’s words to mean that he is liable only if the fire caused damage through the same wind that existed at the time of the kindling; but if another wind arose after the kindling, he is no longer liable.

Definition of the Geraḥ

[section] 8b

“Its Fire Is Due to Its Arrows”:

In the novellae of Rabbeinu Hayyim Halevi,

he presented two approaches to understanding the halakha of “its fire is due to its arrows.” The first approach is that this law innovates that every damage caused by the fire is considered as though he himself performed the act. But this halakha does not state that damage caused by the fire is considered damage performed through the force of the one who kindled it. On the contrary: even though the damage was caused by the force of the fire and not by the force of the one who kindled it, he is nevertheless liable for it as though he had caused it directly.

The second approach is that, in truth, the force that causes the fire to proceed is the force of the one who kindled it. Everything that the fire damages along its path is considered damage caused by the direct force of the one who kindled it. Rav Hayyim added that for this innovation no verse is necessary; rather, it is a logical inference that the force by which the fire proceeds is the force of the one who kindled it. Yet he could still be exempt on the grounds that, ultimately, another force is involved in causing the fire to proceed, since it proceeds not only through his force but also through the force of the wind. Concerning this, the verse innovates that even when another force is involved, the fire is still considered to proceed through his force, and he is liable because the damage was caused through his force.

With Regard to Capital Matters:

The view of Tosafot and the Rosh is that according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that the one who kindles fire is liable as though he caused damage directly, if a person is killed by the fire, the one who kindled it is likewise liable to execution as though he had killed him directly. But the Ran disagrees and maintains that even according to Rabbi Yohanan, he is not liable to execution if a person dies as a result of the fire. Although its fire is due to its arrows, this is comparable to garmi, for which one is not liable to execution.

Rav Hayyim raised a difficulty against the view of Tosafot and the Rosh: It is evident from the Gemara that this law of “its fire is due to its arrows” is derived from a verse, and that verse was stated with regard to monetary law and not capital law. If so, from where did Tosafot derive that this law was also innovated with regard to capital law?

Rav Hayyim answered this according to his second approach cited above: The foundation of the concept of “its fire is due to its arrows” is not derived from the verse at all. Rather, it is a logical inference that fire is ממש like an arrow because it proceeds through his force, and this inference applies both in monetary law and in capital law. Although a verse is still needed to make him liable even where the fire proceeded with the assistance of the wind—and this verse was stated only with regard to monetary law—Rav Hayyim innovated that this is not an innovation specific to monetary law. Rather, it is a general revelation applying to all areas of Torah law: even where another force is involved, this does not diminish his force, and it is still considered to proceed through his force. Therefore, the one who kindled the fire is liable to execution, since the person was killed through his force, and this is like killing directly.

With Regard to Shabbat:

The Nimukei Yosef raised a difficulty: According to Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that everything the fire burns along its path is considered as though he himself kindled it directly, how is it permissible to kindle a lamp on the eve of Shabbat? When the lamp is burning on Shabbat, is that not considered as though he is kindling fire directly on Shabbat? He answered that the meaning of the halakha “its fire is due to its arrows” is not that at every moment the fire exists, it is as though he is kindling it directly. Rather, the definition of the halakha is that at the time of kindling, he becomes liable for everything the fire will subsequently damage by virtue of his kindling it. Since this is so, the case of a lamp on Shabbat presents no difficulty, because his entire liability is completed at the time of kindling, and at that time kindling fire is permissible.

The Nimukei Yosef proved his words from the fact that the Gemara compares fire to an arrow. With regard to an arrow, it is certainly the case that one’s liability is completed at the time he shoots the arrow, and not at the time the damage actually occurs. For if we were to say that the one who shoots the arrow becomes liable only when the damage occurs, then at that time he is compelled, since even if he wishes to do so, he cannot retrieve the arrow and prevent it from causing damage. Necessarily, his liability takes effect at the time he shoots the arrow, and he then becomes liable for everything the arrow will do thereafter; the same applies to fire, whose liability is completed at the time of kindling.

With Regard to Slaughter:

The Gemara in Ḥullin 31a explains that if a knife fell from his hand and slaughtered an animal while falling, the slaughter is invalid. Tosafot in Sanhedrin raised a difficulty: According to Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that “its fire is due to its arrows,” just as in the case of burning fire, although it has left the hand of the one who kindled it, he is nevertheless considered to have burned directly, so too the knife should be considered to proceed through the force of the one who dropped it, as though he himself slaughtered the animal directly. Why, then, is his slaughter invalid? Tosafot wrote

that in truth, this law applies only according to the one who says that its fire is due to its property.

But Rav Hayyim wrote that this law can also be reconciled with the view of Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that its fire is due to its arrows, in accordance with the two approaches cited above:

According to the first approach—that even according to the one who says that its fire is due to its arrows, it is not considered that the damage was caused by his direct force, but rather we regard it as though he caused the damage directly—this is effective only with regard to monetary law and similar matters. But with regard to slaughter, there is a halakha that slaughter must be performed through the “force of a person.” Therefore, it does not help that we regard him as though he performed the act directly with his hands, since ultimately there is no force of a person here, as the act was not performed through his force. Consequently, the halakha of “its fire is due to its arrows” does not apply to slaughter.

According to the second approach presented by Rav Hayyim—that we know through logic that the fire proceeds through the force of the one who kindled it, and that the Torah innovated concerning this that even though another force is involved, it is still considered to be through the force of the one who kindled it—the matter applies specifically to fire, which we know proceeds through his force. But if a knife fell from his hand, his force ceased immediately at the time it fell, and the slaughter was no longer performed through his force. Since this is so, it has no connection to the halakha that “its fire is due to its arrows,” whose basis is that the fire proceeds through the force of the one who kindled it.

Conclusion of the Sugya —

and the Law of Concealed Property:

Later in the sugya, the Gemara challenges Rabbi Yohanan: How will he explain the law exempting one from liability for concealed property damaged by fire? According to his view, anyone who causes damage through fire is like one who causes damage directly, and there is no exemption for concealed property in the case of a person who causes damage. The Gemara answers, in its conclusion, that Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that its fire is due to its arrows, also maintains that its fire is due to its property. Therefore, where he cannot be made liable on account of his arrows, he is still liable on account of his property. The Gemara explains that if there was a fence preventing the fire from spreading, and the fence fell for a reason unrelated to the fire and the fire spread, in this case the fire is not considered his arrows. For at the time he kindled the fire, it had no ability to continue onward, and in this case Rabbi Yohanan holds him liable only on account of his property. Accordingly, the Gemara’s difficulty concerning concealed property is resolved, since in this case, where he is liable only on account of his property, the Torah’s exemption for “concealed property” applies. The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Yohanan also maintains that he must be held liable on account of his property, what practical difference is there between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish? The Gemara answers that according to Rabbi Yohanan, if the fire damages a person, he is liable for the four types of indemnity, as in the case of a person who causes damage; whereas according to Reish Lakish, he is liable only for the damage itself, as in the case of property that causes damage.

We find two approaches among the Rishonim to understanding the Gemara’s conclusion. The first is the explanation cited by Rashi here: In truth, even according to the conclusion, according to Rabbi Yohanan damage caused by fire is ממש considered damage caused directly. It is only where he cannot be held liable on account of his arrows that he is liable on account of his property. Accordingly, there are indeed further practical differences between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish beyond the difference cited by the Gemara—for example, whether there is an exemption for concealed property in a case where his arrows have not been exhausted, and whether he is liable to execution if a person is killed by his fire, as well as further practical differences, as explained by Rashi and Tosafot, s.v. Mai.

But Rashi cited another interpretation of the Gemara’s conclusion, and this is the primary one, although Rashi did not explain what the interpretation is. This interpretation is explained in the Shita Mekubbetzet ( and likewise in the Maharshal here, in Rashi’s view) as follows: According to the conclusion of the Gemara, “its fire is due to its arrows” does not mean that it is considered as though he caused damage directly, ממש like one who throws an arrow. Rather, even according to Rabbi Yohanan, the fundamental basis of his liability for damage caused by the fire is that the fire is his property. The Torah merely stated that this liability also includes the laws of arrows [and therefore he is liable for the four types of indemnity as though he caused damage with an arrow], but the fundamental basis of his liability is his property. According to this interpretation, even according to Rabbi Yohanan there is an exemption for concealed property in every circumstance, including where his arrows have not been exhausted. Accordingly, it is certainly the case that if a person dies through his fire, the one who kindled it is not liable to execution, since the foundation of liability for fire is that it is his property; it merely has laws as though he caused damage with his arrows, but it is not considered that he actually caused the damage with his arrows. Maimonides ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, that its fire is due to its arrows. The Maggid Mishne raised a difficulty: According to this, the exemption for concealed property should apply only where “his arrows have been exhausted,” as explained in the Gemara, since where his arrows have not been exhausted he should be liable even for concealed property, like a person who causes damage. Yet Maimonides wrote without qualification that there is an exemption for concealed property, and did not mention at all that the exemption applies only where his arrows have been exhausted. This is surprising, since Maimonides ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan. However, according to the second interpretation cited in the sugya—that according to the conclusion, even according to Rabbi Yohanan the fundamental basis of his liability is his property—he is always exempt for concealed property, even where his arrows have not been exhausted, and Maimonides’ words are thus resolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

The dog that took a cake and went to a haystack, ate the cake and ignited the haystack—

for the cake, it pays full damages, and for the haystack, it pays half-damages.

It was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: Its fire,

the one who sends forth the fire and it causes damage, the Torah made him liable

because it is considered

as

his arrows,

and it is as though he shot an arrow.

And Reish Lakish said:

For

his fire,

the Torah made him liable

because it is his property

that caused damage, since the fire is considered like his ox or his pit that caused damage.

The Gemara now understands that according to Rabbi Yohanan, one is liable only because of his arrows and not because of his property, while according to Reish Lakish, one is liable only because of his property and not because of his arrows. The practical difference between them is in the case of one who sends forth a fire using a coal that does not belong to him: according to Rabbi Yohanan, he is liable because it is considered his arrows, whereas according to Reish Lakish, he is exempt because the coal is not his property.

We inquire concerning this:

And according to Reish Lakish, what is the reason that he did not state his view in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan?

He could have said to you,

Reish Lakish:

His arrows proceed through his force

[they proceed] and cause damage, whereas

this

fire

does not proceed through his force

[it proceeds], since the fire continues and burns into the distance on its own, without any further contribution from the person who kindled it. Therefore, Reish Lakish maintains that the fire is not considered the person’s arrows; rather, all his liability is because it is considered his property that caused damage, and he is liable because he was negligent in guarding it.

And according to Rabbi Yohanan, what is the reason that he did not state his view in accordance with Reish Lakish?

He could have said to you,

Rabbi Yohanan: Every

item of property

for which one is liable to provide safeguarding

has substance

[it has substance], whereas

this

[this] fire

has no substance

[it has no substance]. Therefore, it is not considered his property, and all his liability is because it is considered his arrows, which caused damage through him.

We learned

[we learned in the Mishna]:

The dog that took a cake,

and went to a haystack, ate the cake and ignited the haystack—for the cake, it pays full damages, and for the haystack, it pays half-damages.

And we challenge this:

Granted, according to the one who says

that for

his fire

one is liable

because it is considered

as

his arrows,

it is understandable why a person who kindled a fire and caused damage must pay full damages, whereas a dog that ignited a haystack is liable only for half-damages, because

they are the dog’s arrows,

and it is considered that the dog caused damage through pebbles, for which the law is half-damages. A person who kindles a fire, by contrast, is liable for full damages, since the law of pebbles does not apply to a person.

But according to the one who says

that for

his fire

one is liable

because it is considered

as

his property

that causes damage,

this fire is not the property of the dog’s owner

but rather belongs to the owner of the cake. If so, why is the dog’s owner liable to pay half-damages for the haystack? And if the intention of the Mishna is that he is liable for the place where he deposited the coal, where the dog caused damage with its body, then he should have to pay full damages, since it is the dog’s manner to take a cake and deposit it.

And we answer:

Reish Lakish could have said to you: What are we dealing with here?

The Mishna is speaking of a case

where it threw it,

where the dog threw the cake together with the coal onto the haystack.

For the cake, it pays full damages,

since the dog damaged it with its body;

and for the place of the coal, it pays half-damages,

since it caused damage through its force, by means of pebbles;

but for the entire haystack, it is exempt,

since the coal does not belong to the dog’s owner but to the owner of the cake. Nor is he liable on account of pebbles, since from the place of the coal onward, the fire burned on its own.

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that one is liable for his fire because it is considered his arrows—how will he explain the Mishna?

He will explain that it is referring to a case

where it placed it,

in which the dog placed the burning coal on the sheaf.

Therefore,

for the cake

he pays full damages, as in the case of Shen.

And for the place of the burning coal he pays full damages,

because it is the manner of a dog to place the cake, and it placed it there directly, not through pebbles.

And for the sheaf he pays half-damages,

because every place to which the fire traveled and caused damage is considered the dog’s arrows, and he is liable for it as Tzerorot, for half-damages.

The Gemara attempts to resolve the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish from a Mishna below.

Ta shma:

We learned in a Mishna below [62b]:

“A camel

that was

laden with flax and was passing through the public domain,

the camel passed alongside a shop, and its flax

entered the shop and caught fire from the shopkeeper’s lamp

that was inside the shop,

and set the entire building ablaze

[the entire building]—

the owner of the camel is liable

because he should not have made its bundle so large that it would enter the shop.

And if

a shopkeeper placed his lamp outside,

and the flax caught fire from the lamp that stood outside and burned the entire building—

the shopkeeper is liable

because he was negligent in placing the lamp outside.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of a Hanukkah lamp—

he is exempt,

because it is a mitzva to place it in the public domain to publicize the miracle, and he was not negligent in placing it there, as he did so with permission. This concludes the words of the Mishna.

And we raise an objection to Reish Lakish:

Granted, according to the one who says

[Rabbi Yohanan], who holds that one is liable for

his fire because

it is considered

his arrows,

it is understandable why, when the camel’s owner was negligent, he is liable for the entire building, because the fire that burned the building

is the camel’s arrows. But according to the one who says

[Reish Lakish], who holds that one is liable for his fire

because

it is considered

his property,

then

this fire is not the property of the camel’s owner

but rather that of the shopkeeper; so why is the camel’s owner liable for what the fire spread to on its own and burned?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish could say to you: Here, with what are we dealing

[in the Mishna]?—

with a fire scorching

[setting fire by contact with]

the entire building with its body,

as the fire reached the entire building through the camel and not on its own. Therefore, he is liable for the burning of the entire building.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the case is one in which the camel itself set the entire building ablaze, the latter clause of the Mishna is difficult.

Come and hear the latter clause: “If a shopkeeper placed his lamp outside

the shopkeeper is liable.” And if

the case is one

of scorching

[setting fire to] the entire building with its body,

why

[why]

is the shopkeeper liable

for this? It is, after all, the act of the camel.

And we answer: The case is

when it stood,

as the camel stood in its place and set the entire building ablaze from the place where it stood, because it had a bundle as large as the entire building.

And we raise an objection: If the case is one of

standing and scorching, all the more so the shopkeeper should be exempt and the camel’s owner liable!

For the camel’s owner should have hastened to lead it away from there so that it would not set the building ablaze.

And he answers:

Rav Huna bar Menahum said in the name of Rav Ika: Here, with what are we dealing

[are we dealing]?—

With a case in which it stopped to urinate,

and he cannot lead it away until it has finished. If so, the camel’s owner is exonerated by circumstances beyond his control for the fact that it stood and set the entire building ablaze.