Bava Kamma 21b — the Talmud in English

Rather,

in general, a pit in his domain is exempt

in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael, and the produce does not have the status of a damaging agent,

but here is different,

for if it ate from them, it is not liable, because

the owner of the animal said to the owner of the produce:

to the owner of the produce:

You have no authority to bring your produce close to the public domain and thereby make my ox liable.

For although the place is your domain, you have no right to place your produce near the public domain,

and you make my ox liable,

for thereby I am caused liability for damages.

And

Shmuel said: In general, a pit in his domain is liable

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, and nevertheless the produce does not have the status of a pit. The reason for this is:

Granted, concerning a pit

in his domain,

it can be said

that it is liable, because an ox walking in the public domain

has no awareness;

it has no awareness with which to take care, and the Torah made the owner of the pit responsible for the damage caused by the ox, which has no awareness with which to take care.

But produce

by which the ox was harmed—

is it possible to say, “It has no awareness”!?

Can it be said that it did not notice in order to take care?

It sees it!

It is visible to the eye. And since he placed the produce in his domain, he is not liable for such an obstacle. The Gemara discusses:

Let us say: the one that turns its head is subject to a dispute between tannaim.

For from the beraita before us it appears that the law of an animal that turns its head depends on a dispute between tannaim:

As it was taught in a beraita: If it ate from the expanse, it pays what it benefited,

but if it ate

from the sides of the expanse, it pays what it damaged—these are the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Eliezer say: It is not the manner

of an animal that is walking

to eat, but to walk,

and therefore, if it ate from the sides of the expanse, it is liable.

And we raise a difficulty: If so,

Rabbi Yosei is identical with the first tanna,

as both of them make it liable in the case of the sides of the expanse.

Rather,

necessarily,

the one that turns its head is what separates them.

They disagree when it ate the produce while it was in the expanse, and it turned its head and ate from the sides of the expanse.

The first tanna holds: Even when it turns its head, it pays

only

what it benefited.

And that which the first tanna said—that if it ate from the sides of the expanse it pays what it damaged—refers to a case in which the animal itself is standing at the sides of the expanse.

And Rabbi Yosei holds

that even when it turns its head it

pays what it damaged,

since this is not its manner.

And we reject this:

No.

It is possible to say that they do not disagree about this; rather,

everyone

holds that an animal that

turns its head and eats has the status

of

either according to Rav,

who says it is liable,

or according to Shmuel,

who says it is exempt,

and here,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei,

“and it consumed in another’s field”

is where they disagree,

concerning the exclusion required from the verse “and it consumed in another’s field”: whether it comes to exclude the category of tooth in the public domain.

One Master holds:

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei hold that

“and it consumed in another’s field”

excludes:

but not in the public domain!

And therefore, if it ate from the expanse, it pays only what it benefited.

And one Master holds:

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Eliezer hold that

“and it consumed in another’s field”

excludes:

but not in the domain of the one who was damaged!

For if he brought his produce into a courtyard without its owner’s permission, and it was damaged by his animal, he is exempt.

And we challenge:

In the domain of the one who was damaged,

what need is there for an exclusion?

Let the one who caused the damage say:

the damager,

“What is your produce doing in my domain?!”

Since you have no permission to bring your produce into my domain, responsibility for its damage is upon you.

And we conclude:

Rather,

their dispute is only concerning this,

that of Ilfa,

who said above [20a]: An animal that stretched out its neck and ate from atop another animal is liable.

And

likewise

in

the matter

of Rabbi Oshaya,

who said: An animal that jumps and eats from inside a basket is liable,

is what separates them.

And they disagreed about this: Rabbi Meir holds that when it ate from the expanse it is always exempt, even when it ate from atop another animal or by jumping; and Rabbi Yosei holds that it is not the manner of an animal to eat from atop another animal or by jumping, and it is liable.

Mishna:

In the Mishna below, the laws of tooth and foot are explained in several ways, as well as the laws of fragments produced by fire.

1.

The dog and the kid that jumped from the roof

into the courtyard of the one who was damaged

and broke

there

the vessels pay full damage,

by the law of “foot,”

because they are forewarned

to jump in this manner, and this is not a deviation; and since it is their manner to do so, they are liable for their damage by the law of foot, which likewise has this as its manner: to walk and break vessels while walking.

2.

The dog that took a cake,

a cake placed upon coals and stuck to them,

and walked

the dog with the coal stuck to the cake

to the stack.

The dog ate

the

cake, and ignited

the

stack [

and in the Gemara they disagreed about how it ignited the stack].

For the cake it pays full damage,

by the law of tooth.

And for the stack it pays

only

half-damage.

They disagreed in the Gemara about the explanation of the reason.

Gemara:

The Gemara infers:

The reason

that the dog and the kid are liable for breaking the vessels is

because they jumped,

since it is their manner to jump.

But

if they

fell

from the roof,

they are exempt.

Apparently, he holds

the tanna of our Mishna that damage whose

beginning was through negligence,

as he allowed them to move about on the roof and did not guard them so that they would not jump into his fellow’s courtyard, even though he knew that it was their manner to jump [and then they also would not have fallen],

and whose end was through accident,

for he is compelled concerning their falling, since it is not their manner to fall,

he is exempt.

It was also taught so in a beraita: The dog and the kid that jumped from the roof and broke the vessels pay full damage.

If they fell, they are exempt.

And since the amoraim disagreed concerning this question, the Gemara discusses:

This works well according to the one who says: “Its beginning was through negligence and its end through accident—he is exempt.”

But according to the one who says he is liable, what is there to say?

How will he establish the Mishna, for he does not dispute an anonymous Mishna, in which there is no opposing tanna? The Gemara establishes our Mishna according to this one who says that he is liable:

For example, the vessels were close to the wall.

The vessels were very close to the wall, and they could not be damaged by the jump, which was outward, and it turns out that he was not negligent at all in guarding them; therefore, when they fell and caused damage, he is exempt.

For when they jumped with their jump, they would not fall upon them, and there is not even “its beginning was through negligence.”

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: Sometimes, even if they fell, he is also liable.

You find it

that this liability is possible,

with

the wall of the roof’s fence, which was

dilapidated,

and the dilapidated fence could not prevent the fall. It follows that he was negligent in guarding them against falling, and therefore he is liable even according to the one who says that when its beginning was through negligence and its end through accident he is exempt—even if they fell on their own, without the fence falling.

And we inquire about this:

What is it,

what is the reason for his liability? It is apparently because

he should have brought to mind

that he should have considered the possibility

that the roof tiles might fall,

that the tiles of the dilapidated wall might fall.

But if so, since

ultimately the tiles did not fall, but they fell

on their own, and there is no negligence here concerning such a fall, and even in this manner

its beginning was through negligence and its end through accident!

And one who exempts should exempt him here as well!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state that this refers

to a narrow wall.

The roof parapet was narrow, in a manner that caused them to jump or slip from it, and placing them on the roof was negligence with regard to their falling.

The Sages taught: The dog and the kid that leaped from below upward,

and broke vessels above, this is a deviation, and

they are exempt

from full damage, but liable for half-damage by the law of keren..

And only if they jumped

from above downward are they liable,

since this is their manner.

A person and a chicken that leaped, whether from above downward or from below upward, are liable.

The chicken is liable since this is its manner, and it is forewarned with regard to jumping and is not an innocuous animal; whereas a person is liable even if this is not his manner, because a person who causes damage is always liable for damage as one who is forewarned, and there is no aspect of being innocuous in the case of a person. And the Gemara raises a difficulty from a beraita, in which the case of the kid and the dog is stated differently: